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ABSTRACT
By 1973, the period of uncertainty that followed
independence in the Maghreb was over, and the regimes in place -
whether civilian or military were there to remain. Legitimising
formulas were no longer rested on the ideological rhetoric that had
been derived from the euphoria of independence, and by now the
Maghrebi elites had to seek other legitimising sources. Thus they
embarked on consolidating the state through institutionalisation and
through new policies that sought to associate key constituencies with
the conduct of the government. The intense social transformation
over the last two decades, with greater access to education, has been
coupled with the new emphasis on the state. Ideology has retreated
before the advance of pragmatism and a greater awareness of the
developments both at home and abroad. Accordingly, our work suggests
that foreign policies of the Maghreb States, in the period under study
have been executed in accordance with, and in response to, the
exigencies of 'national interest'.
The thesis is divided into five parts:
The First Part, discusses different theories of foreign policy-making
and sets out our suggested framework for analysis;
The Second Part, deals with the conflicting and competitive nature
that commands Inter -Maghrebin relations. The strife and rivalry for
leadership and supremacy in North Africa has been a crucial factor
dictating Maghrebi policies in Africa, the Middle East, Europe and
beyond;
The Third Part, treats Maghrebi relations with the Arab World and
their attitudes with regard to issues ranging from the Arab Israeli
conflict to the Iran-Iraq War, while competing for support and allies
in their inter -Maghrebin altercations;
Part Four, is concerned with the Maghrebi African policies. While the
continent became a battle ground for the struggle against Isreal, it
has also become a forum that for long has been dominated by
inter -Maghrebin rivalries;
Finally, the Fifth Part, deals with the Maghrebi foreign policies with
regard to Europe and the super powers. As in the case of their
relations with the Middle East and Africa, relations with Europe and
the super powers have also been conflicting and competitive as far as
the Maghreb states are concerned. Here, however, Maghrebi pragmatic
approach has prevailed through the divorce of the foreign policy
utterances from economic practices.
PART ONE
INTRODUCTION
- I -
CHAPTER ONE : INTRODUCTION 
Theories of foreign policy are usually oriented towards the
study of well established, highly structured political entities
and are concerned mainly with the industrialised and developed
world. The foreign policies of the "developing" states, which are
assumed to reflect rather different problems and aspirations,
have not yet received the same degree of attention from
specialists in international politics. Because the developing
states are mostly "new" it is more difficult to identify any
tradition or well established patterns in their foreign policies.
Their lack of "power" and inability to influence major events
outside their frontiers, together with the difficulty in
acquiring credible information and reliable data about these
states, has also served to discourage more detailed examination
of their policies. Some scholars have gone so far as to question
the utility of studying their foreign policy at all - suggesting
that attention might be more profitably focussed on their
domestic problems or on the "linkage" between the domestic
situation and the international arenas. Presumably to attempt a
comparative study of foreign policy-making in a number of such
states is only to compound the error.
Foreign Policy in the Developed States 
Approaches to foreign policy-making in the more developed
states include the theories of "power" politics associated with
the "realist" school and with Hans Morgenthau in particular. 	 He
identified "power" as the distinguishing element in international
politics, whether that "power" was intended to serve aggressive
or defensive ends.	 Whether or not such a view is still
appropriate and relevant in this nuclear age is a matter for
debate.	 What is obvious, however, is that most states of the
Third World lack not only the elements of national power but also
the capacity to create those elements, at least in the short run.
They are characterised more by dependence, or at best
interdependence. The decision-making approach associated with
Richard Snyder, H.W. Bruck and Burton Sapin, directs attention
more to the motivations of the decision-makers, themselves, the
flow of information among them and the way they interpret and
respond to the many signals that they receive. 2 Here the "human"
dimension is of particular interest : i.e., the perceptions and
subsequent behaviour of those directly responsible for making and
implementing government policy.
The "bureaucratic" mode1, 3 on the other hand, emphasisesthe
role played in the foreign policy process by administrators and
officials of all grades and at all levels, instead of focussing
solely on the top decision-makers. Because of the considerable
- 3 -
turnover in government and among party leaders, in many states,
and because politicians often lack expertise in foreign policy,
they must of necessity rely on career public servants for
information and advice. Hence the importance of bureaucrats in
the shaping of foreign policy. 4	Both the decision-making
approach and the bureaucratic model suggest an open system with a
well structured and well organised decisional unit, possessing a
high level of political institutionalisation, ready access to
information, together with a sophisticated and highly routinised
bureaucracy. This last then plays a significant role in shaping
foreign policy decisions in a manner that is both rational and
cautious.
This scenario seems far removed from that to be encountered
in most developing countries where the level of institutional-
isation is low, and the indices of instability and insecurity
remain high.	 Such states are seldom characterised by
bureaucratic rationality. The dominant influence is usually the
personality and character of a political leader unconstrained by
an opposition or by a free press. Public opinion and pressure
groups count for little while the role and influence of the
bureaucracy - such as it is - depends for its effectiveness on
the support and confidence of the political leadership.
The communication or "steering" model, presented by John
Burton, seems even less relevant to the analysis of policy making
in developing states. s It assumes that the state has ready access
- 4 -
to large quantities of information and the capacity to collect,
classify, store, retrieve and process such information. It is
claimed that modern states, thanks to the efficiency of their
communication systems, now have the ability to adjust and adapt
to new external pressures without provoking a crisis. They are
well placed to take whatever action may be necessary to meet and
contain all threats, real or potential, to themselves and their
immediate environment. But the new states, already lacking the
power to impose themselves on their environment, are even more
deficient in the sophisticated techniques of data collection and
processing that are central to the notion of "steering".
Information is scarce, genuine choices are few, and the capacity
to adjust to new circumstances is necessarily limited.
Similar problems also arise in the case of the "adaptive"
model of foreign policy, which focusses on the way states respond
to the constraints and the opportunities presented by their
different external environments. 6
 The fact remains that most new
states lack the resources and the institutional means to adapt to
an environment where the constraints are many and the
opportunities are few and infrequent.
Foreign Policy in a Third World Context 
In the literature on Third World states and their foreign
policies the main emphasis has been on the character and quality
of the leadership.
	 It is assumed that, where structures are
5weak, leadership and personality will be a significant, if often
unpredictable variable in the decision-making process. While the
observation has considerable merit, and one cannot rule out the
idiosyncratic nature of much decision-making in many Third World
states, the invocation of leadership (and sometimes charisma)
does entail a risk of "reductionism" and over-simplification.
Foreign policy-making can easily be made to appear an irrational
activity that does not warrant systematic, detailed analysis but
dependent rather on the psychology and even the whims of an
individual. However prominent the individual he is more or less
constrained by the context in which he has to operate, whether
domestic, regional or global.	 The approach also tends to
underestimate the role that personalities can and do play in
policy-making in the most developed states.
Theories of global or structural dependence often go to the
other extreme, seeking to explain the weakness and vulnerability
of Third World states by reference to their peripheral role
within the capitalist system. 	 While emphasising external rather
than domestic factors, and seeking to de-personalise policy-
making, the approach usually involves an element of determinism,
emphasising economic factors while appearing to exclude any
prospect of "independent" foreign policy initiatives on the part
of individual Third World governments.
Others again have pointed to the role of foreign policy in
seeking to reduce dependence.
	 Thus Franklin Weinstein insists
that the role of foreign policy making in the new states is
closely bound up with the pursuit of domestic goals. 7 In support
of that view he identifies three main foreign policy objectives
: (1) defence of the nation's independence against perceived
external threats; (2) the mobilisation of external resources for
the country's development; and (3) the achievement of objectives
related to domestic politics, including "nation" or "state"
building.	 In hostile, competitive situations, independence is
likely to be the main priority;
	 in a more relaxed environment
the emphasis may be on the search for aid and the consolidation
of domestic support. 	 One problem with this approach is that
foreign policy everywhere has always served a variety of
purposes. The manipulation of foreign policy to build a domestic
constituency is hardly confined to Third World states.
In his introduction to Foreign Policy Making in Developing
States,' Christopher Hill argues, as we have done, that much of
the theory derived from studies of foreign policy- making in more
developed states is likely to be unhelpful if and when it is
applied to less developed states. 9	 At the same time he is
critical of those who seek to draw a "sharp contrast between
decision- making in complex industrial societies, and in elitist
developing countries". In discussing the latter he concedes that
"no doubt foreign policy in these states is a different matter
altogether" : there is the "lack of power experienced by many
developing countries" and "decisions will always be subject to
the ambitions of individual leaders to make their mark in world
- 7 -
politics". 10 Moreover, it requires little sophistication to be
able to see that bureaucracy, and related factors, will be less
in evidence in the new states than in countries like Britain, the
United States, and the Soviet Union.
But there are interesting exceptions. There are new states
where the administration has been especially influential in
policy-making, whether negatively by reason of their shortcomings
and failures, or more positively, reflecting their (relatively)
greater professionalism, experience and intellectual formation."
Hill turns, however, to other arguments, "structural" this time,
to justify the separate treatment that developing states receive
in the book, at the same time rejecting any deterministic bias
implicit in the notion that "the foreign policies of the
developing countries are ultimately shaped by the external
environment".
Where the introduction is content to outline the problems
posed by any comparative study of foreign policy making within
the Third World, the conclusion, by Christopher Clapham, points
to regional studies, not unlike our own, as the most promomising
area for comparative treatment. 12 	 The existence of a shared
culture and history limits significantly the number of variables
that have to be considered. It is in the regional context, too,
that the definition of goals or the articulation of a "national
interest" assumes some importance. 	 While there are obvious
problems with the use of the term national interest - this "hoary
- 8 -
phrase" - Clapham does maintain - quite reasonably in our view -
that "eventually, some elements of national - or at any rate of
state - interest do generally emerge" in the case of the new
states, at least in the sense of acquiring a certain perspective
and arranging or re-ordering priorities and goals accordingly.1 3
Foreign Policy-Making in the African Context 
In an article in the early 1970s, Dennis Austin has provided
us with a succinct account of the (then) relatively small but
growing corpus of African political studies in the 1960s. 14 Of
particular interest to us is his survey of relations between and
among the new African states. Being on the periphery such states
have had to meet and overcome considerable problems first in
formulating and then in implementing their foreign policies.
Where the more developed states have been assisted in that area
by a long history and a sense of continuity, the recent
experience of most African states has been one of colonialism and
dependency, accompanied by rapid social and political change,
superimposed on traditions and values of a very different kind.
The effect has been to delay the emergence of a consensus about
national interest and therefore to postpone the adoption of
credible foreign policies.'6
Because of their colonial history, African states had to give
first priority at independence to domestic problems, which were
largely inherited, over inter-state relations. Moreover, in the
- 9 -
absence of any "large body of shared opinion" policy has, by
default, been left to individual leaders who have often projected
a very singular and strongly personal view of the national
interest. Austin does not suggest, however, that this state of
affairs need continue indefinitely. There is the possibility in
future of a more structured network of relations, thanks to the
emergence of regional powers with a larger population base and
greater resource potential. 	 For the present, however, and
notwithstanding the fact of independence, it is best to approach
African governments and the study of their policies in terms of
their colonial past and their ties with the former metropole.'s
Here Austin appears to attach more significance to colonial
influence in Africa and its persistence long after independence
than does I.W. Zartman, in a contemporaneous article." Zartman
suggests that dependency is clearly being overcome after only a
decade of independence, deriving that conclusion from a rather
summary account of Euro-African relations within the evolving
context of the Yaounde and Lome Agreements. le	Despite his
emphasis on the colonial relationship and its "interest to the
African governments concerned", Austin does not, however, see
this "as crippling their freedom of action in other directions" -
if only because economic and political relationships are
constantly evolving along with the patterns of trade and
investment. The principal concern in African capitals in the
- 10 -
1970s was not "dependency" but the "indifference" of the European
states to the plight of their former territories.
In a discussion of "the determinants" of foreign policy in
the African states Olajide Aluko identifies a number of key
problem areas. 19 There is the "newness" of the states and the
absence as yet of any "tradition" or "firmly established pattern
of interests" behind their foreign policies. 	 He nevertheless
regards as possibly "an extreme view" Austin's contention that
the study of African foreign policies was "a doubtful
exercise". 2°	 Like Austin, however, he recognises the
inconsistency of much that passes for foreign policy in Africa,
as well as the prominence and unpredictability of those engaged
in policy-making.	 Finally,	 there is "the problem of
generalisation" : a problem of comparison, i.e., trying to cone
to terns with so many sovereign and independent states.
Aluko nevertheless attempts to isolate and identify those
situations and concerns that appear to be of particular relevance
to a majority of African states, In the domestic sphere there is
concern "with unity, stability, independence and economic
development";
	 while abroad there is the pursuit of liberation
particularly in Southern Africa; and beyond that there is the
search for international peace and security - which can best be
achieved through non-alignment. 2 ' In Aluko's view the principal
variables influencing African foreign policies are the weakness
of the domestic economies on the one hand, and the efforts to
raise living standards and reduce external dependence on the
other.	 He seems, on the whole, to agree with Austin that the
colonial heritage has been the main influences in African states
south of the Sahara. And even if that "is certainly not true in
all cases", Aluko nevertheless cites Vernon Mckay to the effect
that "anti-colonialism is the most obvious and consistent, and
all embracing common denominator of African foreign policies".22
Like Austin, Aluko stresses the importance of leadership in
the formulation of foreign policies and "the enormous influence
of the African heads of state". Unlike Austin, however, he does
recognise the existence of domestic opinion in Africa, in the
shape of interest and pressure groups, which "are a continuing
factor" in foreign-policy making. Such opinion has in "several
instances" prompted changes in foreign policy on the part of
African governments, although its importance should not be
exaggerated. 2.
	 Again Aluko follows Austin in recognising the
weakness of African states and their reluctance to employ force
to resolve their disputes.	 This, in turn, is a consequence of
the extent to which power is widely diffused in Africa, only a
handful of states - Egypt, Algeria, Zaire, Nigeria - having any
clearly discernible advantage over the rest.
In the end Aluko returns to the concerns that are distinctive
and, in his view, central to the foreign policies of the African
states : on the one hand de-colonisation and liberation, and on
the other rejection of the cold war in favour of non-alignment.
- 12 -
It is true that on both issues their achievements have been
limited, a reflection of their undoubted weakness together with
their continuing differences of viewpoint and interpretation.
For some states the French connection retains a certain
attraction while for the countries of North Africa it is the
Middle East rather than Africa that is the principal focus of
attention. In other words, the history that has helped shape the
objectives of the new African states has also set the conditions
of (and the limits to) their external involvement.
It is interesting to compare two accounts of Africa's
external relations which appeared in the same year, 1977. 24 Both
writers, Olajide Aluko and All Mazrui, are African and their
interests were then focussed on two contemporary issues : the
prospects for liberation in Southern Africa and the idea of a new
international economic order. Again each emphasises the salient
role of leaders. According to Mazrui, H one important dimension
in politics is the interaction between politically significant
persons". They are agreed, too, that the history that has shaped
both the past and the present will continue to shape the future
of the African states. Mazrui goes further than Aluko, however,
in stressing that economic dependence is but one aspect of the
much wider question of cultural dependency. In the last resort
it is the penetration of Africa by Arab/Moslem and
European/Christian influences, and their interaction with more
"traditional" African ideas and cultures, that has given the
- 13 -
African state its present character and African politics their
sense of movement and direction.
For Mazrui, therefore, the search for independence is not
just political or economic but is, above all, the quest for
cultural identity and racial dignity. This indeed suggests a
limited resemblance to the earlier doctrine of negritude : but
negritude was primarily concerned with the upwards mobility of
black African and Caribbean elites, and the obstacles they had
first to overcome. Mazrui, on the other hand, seeks to overturn
what he regards as the "caste" system entrenched in the
international division of labour. For him it is race not class
that is at the heart of the international system and it is race
that is reflected in the global hierarchy of states.2s
Aluko sees the main contest, globally, as one between rich
and poor with its familiar class overtones. 	 The principal
objectives of the new African states are political independence
and a fairer economic order. 	 With Mazrui, however, it is race
that is the decisive factor at the international level while
class, so important in European society, has to compete in Africa
with ethnic and other more "traditional" identities. 	 Liberation
is a re-assertion of African culture and African values in the
face of the challenge from other cultures. 26 Aluko and Mazrui
are both convinced that, for the African states, the liberation
of Southern Africa is (or should be) the main focus of their
foreign policies. For Mazrui at least revolution in South Africa
- 14 -
in the 1980s would be an important contribution to the racial and
cultural emancipation of black peoples worldwide, 27
That emancipation will, however, entail a measure of racial
collaboration.	 For Mazrui the oil crisis of 1973 marked the
first successful challenge by Third World states to the
international economic (and political) order. A future alliance
of Arab oil and Black gold, following the overthrow of white rule
in Southern Africa, would mark a critical success for the
strategy of "counter-penetration" - i.e., "establishing a Third
World presence in the developed world" - which would help to
balance the Western cultural and economic presence in Africa,
Asia and Latin America. Mazrui concludes that the best and "only
hope lies in the capacity of the Third World to use their natural
resources more effectively as leverage for reform".29
Austin's broadly historical approach, which emphasises the
significance of Euro-African ties can be distinguished both from
the "developmental" focus of many writers of the 1960s, and from
the "dependency" viewpoint that was more salient a decade later.
Writing in the early 1970s Austin shares some of the
preoccupations of both intellectual schools.	 There is his
recognition of the continuing and close ties between Europe and
Africa and their relevance to "national life" in the African
states. There is the realisation, too, that the under-developed
African states lacked the power to influence and coerce others
and had not yet had the opportunity to develop a clear and
- 15 -
consistent view of their national interest. Indeed, the African
states were (and still are) forced to devote much attention to
their domestic problems - usually subsumed under the heading of
"development".
There is no doubt that, today, domestic issues remain the
first priority for most African governments, while inter-African
relations are relegated to third place - after relations with the
developed world. However, the scope for foreign policy has been
greatly enlarged as African states have come to perceive the
relevance of wider, often global issues involving debt and
economic re-structuring. In any case, the interests of the major
African states - as defined by domestic circumstances as well as
by the external situation - are by no means as volatile as some
have suggested.	 And with the rupture of the Libyan/Moroccan
accord, in 1986, even the Libyan government would appear, at
last, to be following a more predictable if not more stable
course of action. Even the pronounced changes of generation and
leadership, that have been a feature of Africa in the past ten
years, have brought only shifts of emphasis in foreign policy -
and not the dramatic upheavals that had earlier been feared.
If one no longer has to explain and Justify the study of
African foreign policy there still remains the problem of
interpretation - and perspective. 	 The emphasis by Aluko and
Mazrui on "structural" factors, which help to shape economic and
cultural "dependency", suggests that African foreign policies
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either share (or should share) a range of common concerns which
themselves reflect certain common values or orientations; i.e.,
they are not so much national as African concerns.	 But on
apparently crucial issues such as "dialogue" with South Africa in
the 1960s and 1970s, or trade with Israel in the 1970s and 1980s,
the African states were far from united.
There were many and varied interpretations of non-alignment
while questions of liberation and self-determination, as in the
Western Sahara, served to divide rather than unite the
Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The movements in the 1970s
towards regional cooperation, cited by Aluko, proved short-lived
or unprofitable, while Mazrui's notion of an Afro-Arab alliance
was already being contested in Africa at the very time his book
was being published. That idea now looks increasingly fanciful
whatever the outcome of the present struggle in South Africa and
the longer-term prospects for an alliance of Arab oil and Black
gold.
Foreign Policy in a Middle Eastern Context 
Similar criticisms can be advanced in the case of another
fairly recent and influential study that focusses on the foreign
policies of the Arab states. 29	Bahgat Korany and All Hillal
Dessouki begin their study by expressing dismay at the dearth of
literature on Arab foreign policies-30 and rejecting what they
describe as the "contemporary political history approach", with
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its inadequate conceptualisation, over-emphasis on historicism,
and its neglect of a truly comparative outlook.'' 	 In trying to
isolate elements they believe are unique to the foreign policies
of the Arab states they advance four general propositions.
These are that the Arab states share a number of norms and
concerns; that their foreign policies are primarily regional in
orientation; that domestic and foreign policy are closely inter-
related; and that there exists a latent tension in Arab foreign
policies between the regional or Arab commitment and the narrow,
secular interests of each state. 32
In their search for specifically Arab characteristics Korany
and Dessouki lay particular emphasis on cultural homogeneity as a
factor shaping policy, and on the centrality of the Arab-Israeli
conflict.	 Thus, the pan-Arab movement of the 1950s and 1960s,
culminating in the creation of the United Arab Republic (UAR),
features prominently in their account of Arab foreign policies.
What is less clear, however, is its relevance to present day
policy-making. The authors seem to be indulging in the kind of
historicism they were at such pains to reject. 	 Moreover, the
establishment of the UAR is seen as confirmation of their view
that Arab foreign policies are subject to "intense involvement by
the masses". 33 But they fail to draw the distinction between
involvement on the one hand and influence on the other. It is
questionable whether Arab elites are particularly responsive to
pressures from below.
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In any long term view of the evolution of Arab foreign
policies, the disintegration of the UAR and the factors
contributing thereto were probably more significant than its
formation.	 Fouad Ajami, for example, sees it as marking the
beginning of the end of pan-Arabism. 34 When Korany and Dessouki
describe Arab opposition to the Camp David Agreements they choose
to ignore the support for Sadat's initiative, not only in Egypt
itself but also from the Arab governments of Morocco, Sudan and
Oman.	 The gradual reintegration of Egypt into the Arab fold,
which was already well advanced in 1984 when the book in question
was published, is likewise overlooked. It does not bear out
their claim that the Israeli presence in the region has
contributed to the sentiment of Arab unity.
The other writers in the book for the most part subscribe to
the conclusion already reached by Ajami : namely, the primacy
since 1967 of state interests and state loyalties over earlier
pan-Arab sentiment. Paul Noble, for example, in his chapter on
"The Arab System : Opportunities, Constraints and Pressures",
records the decline in the significance of ideology and of pan-
Arabism for Arab political elites during the 1970s. 35 He finds
confirmation of this thesis in the recent trend within the region
away from outright mergers and towards functional bilateral
agreements between states. At the sane time he insists that, as
the Arab world becomes less revolutionary, it also becomes more
fragmented while a more prominent role is assigned to raison
d'êtat in the formulation of foreign policy. 36
	That was
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certainly the case with Sadat's Egypt and it is also a prominent
feature of Syrian foreign policy in its continuing conflict with
Israel.
In the Maghreb, too, with which we are primarily concerned,
raison d'êtat has long been an essential element in foreign
policy-making.	 In this regard it is interesting that in his
contribution on Algeria	 "Third Vorldism and Pragmatic
Radicalism : The Foreign Policy of Algeria" - Bahgat Korany
identifies broad Third World concerns rather than pan-Arabism as
the dominant ideological strand in the country's foreign
policy. 37 This is certainly true in the sense that Algeria's
anti-colonial strategy and progressive political views have
pushed it towards assuming a leadership role in Africa and the
Third World, rather than in the more divided and more generally
conservative Arab world.	 Algeria, for its part, tends to look
somewhat askance at the other Arab states which it sees as being
jealous of its achievements and resentful of its legitimate
ambitions.
The other case studies bring further modifications of the
editors' thesis about the distinctive character of Arab foreign
policies. Thus I.W. Zartman and A.G. Kluge, in their examination
of Libyan foreign policy - "Heroic Politics : The Foreign Policy
of Libya" - present Muammar Kadhafi as a maverick leader, seeking
unity in the Arab world through disunity. 3° In his determined
bid for Arab leadership he has spared no one, least of all the
- 20 -
Arab Heads of State. His support, until recently, for Iran in
its confrontation with Arab-led Iraq, is but one, albeit extreme
example of his rather singular approach to the question of Arab
unity.
His critics and opponents, not excluding Yasser Arafat, the
popular leader of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO)
have often been the target of campaigns to remove them. In fact
the notion that conflict with Israel promotes Arab unity - as
advanced by the editors of the book - is difficult to reconcile
with the statement attributed to an Israeli general who
maintained that "for Israel, Kadhafi can be a kind of an asset.
Who else, in all his frantic attempts to unify the Arabs, is
keeping them divided to the extent Kadhafi is?" 39
Many of the case studies seem to suggest that there is little
that is particularly Arab about the foreign policies of most Arab
states.	 Which may be why the editors are prepared to concede at
the end that the propositions advanced at the outset are only
partly confirmed by the studies themselves. This attempt to find
a unifying framework for the analysis of Arab foreign policies
has, therefore, fallen short of its objective. It was a bold and
courageous first step towards a more systematic and comparative
analysis of policies that were both complex and difficult. But
in the end it has to be admitted that the one feature that today
is common to the foreign policies of the Arab states is the
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saliency of state loyalties and state interests, contributing to
the general picture of disunity.
Foreign Policy in -_North African Context 
I.W. Zartman is an outstanding scholar whose work has
focussed on the study of politics in West and North Africa, more
particularly in Algeria.
	 In his earliest writings, dating from
the 1960s, Zartman identified the features characteristic of the
new African states whose polities were as underdeveloped as their
economies. They suffered from low levels of institutionalisation,
weak and unstable political structures, chronic insecurity and a
general lack of power and effectiveness.
	 Decision-making was
highly personalised and, at the sane tine, largely reactive in
nature. 4° Under-development was also a characteristic of their
foreign policies which, for the most part, failed to come to
terms with - let alone secure - their immediate environment.
Lacking power themselves and finding it difficult, therefore, to
relate to the international system, the new states took refuge in
ideology - if only to mask their incomplete sense of national
interest.
In a further contribution, entitled "National Interest and
Ideology", Zartman argues that the preoccupation with ideology
shown by many .
 African policy-makers is not so much incompatible
with national interest but rather that ideology and national
interest constitute "two extremes of a range of foreign policy
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criteria". 4
	In the end, however, ideology bows before reality;
the state acts in its own and/or the national interest or it runs
the risk of being overwhelmed and disappearing altogether, or of
being captured by a rival technocratic elite "that places
problem-solving before ideology". 42
 In terms of foreign policy-
making, therefore, development to Zartman means a situation where
"aspiration and reality at least cone in sight of each other",
and when "means become commensurate with state ends". It is when
African decision-makers can think more in terms of their
interests and less in terms of idealist, revisionist ideologies"
- but "obviously, Africa is not yet at this point".
Zartman's early writings on African states and their foreign
policies all betray the strong influence of the "developmental"
school.	 This is clear from the (mainly negative) criteria he
uses to characterise policy-making in West and North Africa.
There he maintains that the state is only partially a "sovereign
territorial group";	 the nation is not yet "an organised
aggregate"; the transition "from party to state to nation is not
complete"; the elements of state power on which capability is
based "are underdeveloped"; the instruments of national policy,
with which this capability is exercised are limited; "sanctions
and force are either disallowed or impractical"; domestic public
opinion and pressure groups "have little weight in decision-
making process"; informational output is "small" and "there are
few clear goals, flexible policies, and nation-interest criteria"
to support a rational, negotiating process.
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As a result foreign policy-making in Africa, and possibly
elsewhere in the Third World, was ad hoc and improvised. "Too
often it is made on the basis of incomplete evidence, chance
meetings, and accidental stimuli, and without much awareness of
state interests."	 In such circumstances and in the absence of
stable commitments and firm alliances the prospects for on-going
cooperation were poor. There was an absence of "clear interests
involved to hold them together", leaving their relations "at the
mercy of changing situations and events". To summarise : "the
final characteristic of Western Africa's developing international
relations is their instability", i.e., "the lack of permanence in
affinities and commitments, and the lack of control over events".
But it is not only in their approach to policy-making that
African states are said to differ from their more developed
counterparts. Africa also boasts a "system of limited, mobile
relations". The alliances that were created in the early 1960s,
in response to the pressures of rapid de-colonisation, were
dissolved either before or shortly after the creation of the OAU
in 1963.	 According to Zartman, the continent subsequently
reverted to "the more basic characteristics of international
relations", namely, "temporary coincidence of policy on the issue
of the moment".	 Elsewhere Zartman again singles out "the
kaleidoscopic nature of African relations where a slight turn of
events brings .
 dramatic new patterns ; until firmer patterns of
friendship and rivalry are established, yesterday's friends can
become today's enenies".43
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Moreover, "few friendships and enmities are of such serious
nature that they involve the entire continent".	 Despite the
continental perspective, the orientation of individual states is
essentially local or, at best, regional. 	 The priorities of the
new states are directed toward nation-building and to securing
their immediate environment 	 (i.e.,	 boundaries),	 carefully
avoiding wider involvement and open-ended commitments that might
have a de-stabilising effect.
North Africa and the "Checkerboard" Model 
On these grounds Zartman has described the dominant pattern
of relations in Western Africa - West and North Africa - as that
of the "checkerboard", which is a multilateral extension of "bad
neighbour" relations, predicated on the view that "my enemies'
enemies are my friends". 44
 Zartman would appear to have adapted
this checkerboard model from the European experience of inter-
state relations in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when
nation-state formation was already well under way.
	 If the
pattern seems to have been most visible in West Africa during the
early 1960s it is also said to have been "characteristic of North
Africa" where "the states of the region have continually acted as
if my neighbour is my enemy and my neighbour's neighbour is my
friend".	 In both cases the explanation given is the same
having so much in common culturally, such states are compelled to
exaggerate their few differences and to accord these a high
priority in foreign policy-making.
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They feel the need for self-identification, to help
distinguish one state from the next; and the need for re-
assurance or secure frontiers against predatory neighbours.
Zartnan sees these preoccupations as the main obstacles to any
permanent move away from the "primitive checkerboard of West
Africa" and towards "a more sophisticated pattern of relations",
e.g., the balance of power model, or a genuine concert of states
"as practised in other parts of the world". 	 Meanwhile
circumstances - since 1975 the dispute over Western Sahara - have
been more conducive to conflict and competition within the
region rather than to cooperation and the pursuit of trade and
mutual advantage.
In his more recent writings Zartman has returned to the
question of inter-Maghrebin relations and the theme of conflict
versus cooperation.	 Once more he reviews the sources of the
continuing tension and conflict within the region. 46 While there
has been substantial growth in the economic and military
capabilities of the individual states he considers that power
here, as elsewhere in Africa, remains diffused. There is no
question of one state imposing union on another. Any cooperation
within the Maghreb would therefore have to be voluntary. But the
will to cooperate has been absent since the Moroccan decision to
occupy and partition the Spanish Sahara in 1975.
The late 1970s saw the escalation of the Western Sahara
conflict with growing African and external intervention in the
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dispute in the early 1980s. Moroccan claims to the former Spanish
Sahara had their counterpart in Algerian support for the
nationalist movement, Polisario, and for an independent Saharawi
Democratic Republic.	 Libyan involvement was a complicating
factor both here, where it backed Polisario, and in the long-
standing civil war in Chad where Libyan forces intervened
directly.	 The two overlapping conflicts in the Sahel region of
West Africa threatened for a time to overwhelm existing political
mechanisms for dealing with such disputes.
There was a revival of ideological groupings in Africa with
the emergence of a radical/conservative cleavage - linking these
and other issues. A large and impressive, but heterogeneous
coalition of "radical" states emerged in the early 1980s, which
brought together Algeria and Libya and various "Front-Line"
states, who were looking for allies in their confrontation with
South Africa. The accommodation of interests was only temporary,
however, and the grouping soon dissolved without effecting any
real transformation of existing African political structures in
Africa. The re-alignments of the 1980s, like those of the 1960s,
proved to be temporary, essentially parochial, and for the most
part opportunistic.
Nor did mounting external involvement in the Maghreb bring
any dramatic . change in existing patterns of inter-state
relations. American and Soviet involvement has been low key as
the Soviet Union does not appear eager to confront the United
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States and its European allies	 in North Africa and	 the
Mediterranean. Moreover, each of the super-powers has important
interests, political and economic, on both sides of the Algerian-
Moroccan frontier.	 They are likely, therefore, to favour the
present military "stalemate" which avoids any direct challenge to
those interests, while reducing the risks of armed confrontation.
But if the balance in the Maghreb is unlikely to be
transformed by external political or military intervention that,
in Zartman's view, leaves the Maghreb states with a choice
between regional cooperation, or, failing that "a conflictual
future" and "an overriding checkerboard pattern". 46	The first
option would be more compelling were the Maghrebin economies
truly complementary, which they are not. Moreover, cooperation
can only succeed with	 Algerian support whereas, at present,
Algeria is no more disposed to join with Morocco than Morocco is
to unite with Algeria. Much would depend on a settlement of the
dispute in Western Sahara. 	 Meanwhile, "the tendency to return
to a checkerboard pattern of relations has proved irresistible".
Within the Maghreb the	 advent of new issues and the
appearance of new actors have served only to entrench an already
established pattern of inter-state relations. 	 Whether as
enemies, rivals or allies, the Maghrebin states have behaved "as
a checkerboard set of neighbours/non-neighbours should". 47 In a
revealing comment Zartman admits that the pattern, itself, may be
"more a reflection of relations than their cause, but (it is]
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nonetheless a pattern that seems to reassert itself despite some
efforts to the contrary". We must therefore be prepared for "a
continuation of the past pattern of relations", for "a future of
attentuated conflict and interrupted cooperation", punctuated by
unstable alliances and occasional experiments in "balance of
power" or "concert" politics.
"Checkerboard" Model Reviewed 
Most striking in Zartman's writings over a period of two
decades are the continuities of theme and emphasis. The role of
foreign policy is to help define and protect the new community as
well as mobilising domestic support for the new state. Foreign
policy-making in Africa was "underdeveloped" because of the
weakness of the state and its organisational deficiencies. As a
result the leadership became personally involved in policy-making
without the constraint of . an informed and relatively stable
public opinion.	 There was thus a certain ambivalence about
national interests and a preference for confrontation and
ideological posturing at the expense of a more "mature",
pragmatic bargaining style.
	
But at the heart of the problem
there lies the post-colonial "checkerboard" and the resulting
pressures for identity and differentiation at the expense of
cooperation and accommodation.
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It is to the theme of the checkerboard that Zartman
continually returns. What began as an evolutionary model,
focussing on change and the "development" of foreign policy in
the new states, has since become a largely static model. Its
theme is the	 persistence of a single pattern of inter-state
relations : the checkerboard. 49
 The model borrows from European
experience and the implication is that, across the Mediterranean
at least, the checkerboard has been largely superseded - replaced
by more stable forms of alliance based on inter-dependence and
cooperation.
Alternatively, one could argue that inter-state relations in
Europe were "static" for a good part of the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries while, even today, "bad neighbour" relations
are by no means exceptional among the more developed states. All
policy-making is subject to constraints, environmental and
otherwise.	 The basic ingredients of foreign policy-making -
population, resource base, and geographical situation - are all
fairly fixed and immutable. Which may explain why foreign policy
tends to be more flexible and imaginative when it is concerned
with issues far removed from its domestic base. Washington can
show greater flexibility in dealing with Western Europe or even
the Soviet Union than in its relations with Central America, the
Caribbean and Mexico.
Whatever its derivation, Zartman's model does serve to
direct our attention to what he sees as the most salient and
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enduring aspects of inter-state relations in Africa in general
and North Africa in particular. 	 He does, however, acknowledge
limitations in the model.	 It does not purport to explain
everything about inter-state relations.	 Even in the 1960s when
the checkerboard pattern was becoming established in Africa it
was more useful in explaining inter-state relations in West and
North Africa than in other regions.	 And in West Africa the
model was much less relevant after 1963 and the creation of the
OAU.	 There it could even be said to have lost most of its
point following the disappearance of the Ghanaian leader, Kwame
Nkrumah, overthrown by a military coup in 1966.
In North Africa, on the other hand, Zartman originally had
reservations about the model and its relevance although he tells
us that it was the French who helped establish the pattern inside
the region by according independence to Tunisia and Morocco in
1956, in an attempt to forestall (and pre-empt) independence for
Algeria. By the 1970s, however, the model has become central to
Zartman's interpretation of inter-state relations in the Maghreb
and is even described as being "characteristic of North
Africa". 49 In fact the checkerboard model does help us to "make
sense" of relations both within the Maghreb and between Maghrebin
states and the outside world. 	 It does not, however, provide a
comprehensive picture of those relations and their evolution over
time; nor does it do Justice to their variety and complexity;
and, like all models, it necessarily leaves a good many questions
unanswered.
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The key to North African politics and the foreign policies of
its states is the persistent hostility and suspicion between
rulers and administrations in Algiers and Rabat. 	 Algeria, by
reason of its geographical situation, its population and resource
base, and its revolutionary origins, alone has the potential to
play a dominant role within the region. Morocco, on the other
hand, claiming a long and continuous history, and with a largely
agrarian base and an independent military capability has been
mainly concerned to resist Algeria's pretensions. Concerned for
its own industrial development, Algeria has in political terms
favoured the status quo within the Maghreb - while pursuing the
theme of de-colonisation elsewhere in Africa during the 1960s and
1970s, hoping eventually to replace the French in the markets of
Black Africa.	 By way of contrast Morocco has over three
decades pursued a policy of territorial expansion, favouring the
incorporation first of Mauritania, and more recently of the
Spanish Sahara, and persisting in a long-standing border quarrel
with Algeria - hoping, it would appear, to correct what it
rightly perceives as an unfavourable balance of power within the
Maghreb.
The situation in the Maghreb is in fact both more complex and
also more straightforward than Zartman's model suggests.
	 No
state has managed to maintain cordial relations with all its
neighbours over any period of time. 	 Conversely, no state can
afford to antagonise all its neighbours at one and the same time.
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Bad relations with one neighbour are likely to dictate a policy
of friendship towards the others. Having failed in its campaign
to annex Mauritania in the 1960s, Morocco tried in the 1970s to
persuade that now independent state 	 to join her in the
subsequent partition of the Spanish Sahara, thereby pre-empting
the Polisario's claim to independence - which was supported by
Algeria and Libya.
Tunisia, being territorially the smallest state in the
region, has directed its efforts to surviving as an independent
political and economic unit. Tunisian policy is essentially
reactive, based more on prudence than on calculation, and
Involves remaining on reasonably friendly terns with at least one
of her two more powerful neighbours. As Tunisia poses no direct
threat and certainly no challenge to Algeria, their relationship
has been more relaxed than that between Algeria and Morocco. And,
notwithstanding the checkerboard, Tunisia and Morocco have only
very occasionally made common cause against Algeria. At present
Algeria, Tunisia and Mauritania are members of a Maghrebin
alliance that does not include Morocco or, as yet, Libya.
Libya has pursued a "policy" of union with all her neighbours
and with states that were not even contiguous. Kadhafi's growing
involvement with the states of sub-Saharan Africa as well as with
those of the Maghreb was the result of frustrated ambitions
elsewhere in the Arab East.
	 The accession of Anwar Sadat in
Egypt in 1970, following the death of Gamal Nasser, effectively
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blocked his designs for Arab unity under his own charismatic
leadership.
	
The growing influence of Saudi Arabia inside both
the Arab League and the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting
States (OPEC)	 also contributed to the Libyan failure.	 Which
left Kadhafi little choice but to turn his attention - southwards
and westwards - to the Maghreb and the neighbouring states of the
Sahel.
The result was a series of abortive proposals for union with
Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, Chad, Morocco, and most recently, Algeria
- a policy of "voluntary" union with neighbours and near
neighbours which then contributed to Libya's subsequent
isolation.	 If a kind of checkerboard pattern did subsequently
emerge it was certainly not in any sense inherent in the
situation of the states themselves, but was rather the product of
Kadhafi's style and policies.
Apart from these matters of detail there are problems, too,
with the actual status of the checkerboard model. Originally it
seemed to offer a plausible, even convincing explanation for
the otherwise rather chaotic pattern of 	 alliances and counter-
alliances that linked the new African states in the 1960s. By
focussing on the twin concerns of identity and security it also
provided a credible motive for actions that otherwise might have
seemed to defy logic.	 The persistence of the checkerboard
through the 1960s and into the next decade could be seen as a
consequence of, - if it did not serve as an explanation for - the
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failure of African states to support an effective balance of
power system or even to sustain a loose concert pattern.
There was the impression of a structural "grid" or, to change
metaphors, of a kind of strait-jacket that would allow no escape
and permit no deviation.
However, Zartman has since insisted that the checkerboard
pattern is more a reflection of existing relations rather than
their cause.	 Which suggests he	 does not view it as an
independent causal factor, still less as a strait-jacket or
structural grid. It could be meant simply	 as a point of
reference, suggesting and even anticipating certain kinds of
partnership/alliance and so directing our attention to exceptions
and apparent anomalies.	 But Zartman's preoccupation with the
model over three decades does suggest something more is involved.
Zartman's argument may require further clarification, but
this should not be allowed to detract from the strength of his
thesis which is that the foreign policies of the North African
states are primarily a response to the situation within the
Maghreb.	 It is circumstances in the Maghreb that have usually
dictated forays abroad into the Middle East, Black Africa and
Western Europe;
	
events close to home are also largely
responsible for the assumption by the North African states of
global as well as continental and regional responsibilities.
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The real problem with Zartman, and with other writers who
seek to look at the African states and their political behaviour
in "structural" terms, is the essentially static picture they
manage to convey even when incorporating a "developmental"
perspective. Change comes to depend largely on external events
or pressures.
	 Interestingly, Aluko, Mazrui and, more recently,
Zartman, s° have been looking to the troubled situation in South
Africa to provide possible scenarios for more "radical" changes
elsewhere in the continent. The danger is that in their efforts
to isolate and describe the more enduring (and perhaps less
endearing) features of the African landscape, they may have
neglected or dismissed other important developments in African
inter-state relations, particularly since 1973.
It is our contention that after 1973 there did emerge in the
Maghrebin states, beginning with Algeria, a sense of national
interest which was	 reflected in the foreign policies of those
states and which has since provided a measure of continuity and
predictability in their policy. In the Maghreb this change seemed
to coincide with the emergence, in the late 1960s,of a new, more
technocratic generation of leaders, sometimes of military
background, and favouring pragmatic rather than ideological
solutions. The switch was most marked in Algeria following the
removal of Ben Bella in 1965 and the arrival in power of Colonel
Houari Boumedienne.
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With the new leader and his "team" there eventually came a
change of emphasis from "nation" to "state" building, or what
Zartman has described as "national consolidation processes".
This coincided with the attempt to create a centralised
governmental structure. There was "the need to build a centre",
and "to define, attract, and hold its periphery" often in
competition with neighbours : the state and its concerns were
increasingly central to foreign policy and a source of potential
conflict with other states. Ideology remained important but was
now harnessed to the state, serving its need for 	 "self-
perception and identification".
This new, more pragmatic emphasis on the state and its
interests was reinforced by events elsewhere. 	 In the Middle
East, there was the 1967 Arab defeat followed by the defeat and
eviction of the PLO from Jordan in 1970, and later that year the
death of Nasser and his replacement by Sadat. All heralded the
decline of pan-Arabism as a factor in Arab foreign policies and
its substitution by narrower, state-based interests.
The partial military success by the Arab forces, in 1973, not
only strengthened Sadat's position in the Arab world, but also
gave a much-needed boost to the "peace process" in the Middle
East as dialogue and bargaining came to succeed the politics of
confrontation.	 As Ajami has argued the power of revolution
(thawra) was replaced by that of wealth (tharwa). 51 The striking
success of OPEC in boosting oil prices in 1973 reinforced the
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state in the Middle East, as well as helping to promote more
technocratic elements within the administration.
The revival of cold war tensions after 1978 and the
continuing economic crisis of the 1980s all served to underline
the essential inter-dependence of political and economic
structures on both the global and the regional/local levels. In
North Africa there emerged new and, hopefully, more discerning
patterns of alliance as Algeria, linked militarily with the
Soviet Union, sought closer economic ties with the United States,
while Morocco, allied with the United States and the West,
expanded its own trade with the Soviet Union.
Even Libyan policy had at last to come to terms with falling
oil prices and the almost complete isolation of the regime
following the American attack on Tripoli and Benghazi,in April
1986, and the humiliating defeat in Chad at the end of 1987.
The treaty with Morocco (1984-86) - a union of incompatibles -
was an indication both of the extent of Kadhafi's isolation and
of the contradictions in his foreign policy. It is true that in
some quarters the treaty was seen as further evidence of African
unpredictability and the intrusion of personalities into the
domain of foreign policy-making. But there was never much chance
of the union surviving - or being consummated. Ideology played
no role whatever in the 'union' which was, on the contrary, an
extreme example of the principle of raison d'etat.
The Thesis
Our thesis is concerned with the evolution of Maghrebin foreign
policy during the years 1973-1987.	 Despite the fact that
dependence and instability have imposed serious constraints on
the political leadership, these have not prevented the North
African states pursuing quite original and often imaginative and
forward-looking policies in the Middle East, in Africa and the
Third World - even if there has been little change in the pattern
of inter-state relations in the Maghreb itself.
	 Although the
balance of power in North Africa is central to the preoccupations
and therefore the policies of all four states, that is no reason
for neglecting their contribution in other regions and other
spheres.	 Nor can we "explain" each and every foreign policy
initiative- by reference to local, Maghrebin factors, without
laying ourselves open to charges of "reductionism".
Foreign policy usually begins (but seldom ends) with the
immediate environment. As a process, however, it has a life and
style	 of its own, generating a complex set of responses to
apparently discreet problems. Certain preoccupations recur over
time while responses become more structured and priorities are
established.
	 There is a growing sense of continuity and
consistency as the interests of the state come to be defined by
the elites - political, economic and military - and by the
rapidly proliferating administrative agencies.
	 These interests
then provide a	 sense of direction for foreign policy and
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criteria with which to judge its success or failure. They will
also suggest a preference for certain approved options in each
area of foreign policy.
The prominence of leaders in African policy-making is perhaps
exceptional, as are the political and other constraints under
which the bureaucratic agencies must function - but in no sense
is this unique to Africa or the Middle East. Public interest in
foreign policy fluctuates, even within developed Western states,
while its presence or absence can hardly be said to characterise
foreign policy-making in Africa or in the Third World. Likewise
a supposed preference for ideological rather than pragmatic
solutions hardly matches the recent and widespread rejection of
socialism by African leaders in favour of "free enterprise"
solutions and programmes of "structural adjustment". And while
the notion of "national interest" may have been poorly defined
before 1973 that is no longer the case today. 	 Indeed, it is
doubtful whether the changes of leadership that have so far taken
place in North Africa - and those yet to cone - will greatly
alter the parameters of foreign policy in the individual
Maghrebin states.
Economic constraints will probably continue and even grow,
along with urban unrest, ethnic and religious tensions, and
military frustration	 - and they may, of course precipitate
sudden changes of leadership. However, the persistence of North
African regimes to date does argue for a certain identification
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between the leadership on the one hand and strategically placed
elites on the other.	 In any case it is the role of foreign
policy to help define and elaborate the national interest in such
a way as to enlist popular support for the regime and for its
objectives. King Hassan II was highly successful in associating
a large part of the opposition and the country as a whole with
the Green March of 1975 and the "peaceful" occupation of the
Spanish Sahara. The result was a policy and a situation that
future leaders will find it difficult to reverse.
The parameters of Algerian policy were set by a number of
confrontations : with France in the war of independence, 1954-62,
and again in 1971 over nationalisation of the Algerian oil
industry; and with Morocco in 1963, over boundary demarcation,
and again in 1975 over the Western Sahara, In Tunisia the
identification between the regime and the strategic elites was
forged at a much earlier stage, with the consolidation of the
Yeo-Destour Party and the triumph of Bourguiba's militant and
secular nationalism against the opposition of the French and the
resistance of the Bey.
The options of the North African leaders have been under
challenge in the 1980s, particularly their failure to alleviate
economic hardship and distress. 	 In every case, however,	 the
opposition has focussed on economic discontent and the criticisms
have been directed more at domestic rather than foreign policies.
It would be difficult, therefore, to envisage an abrupt change in
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any key area of foreign policy simply as the result of a change
of leadership. In Libya, however, where it is still difficult to
identify any clear sense of national interest, it is conceivable
that realpolltik or a change of leadership could dictate sharp
changes in international as well as Middle Eastern and Maghrebin
policies.	 Kadhafi has certainly moved a little closer to
"moderate" Arab opinion, on oil pricing as on the Iran-Iraq war.
Relations with the Soviet Union have been strained since the
American raid in April 1986.
Even there, however, it seems unlikely that a new Libyan
regime would depart so far from existing foreign policy options
as to approach, say, the Tunisian position. 	 Nor would
Bourguiba's successor find much support in Tunis and other
African and European capitals were he to revise his country's
foreign policy in conformity with
	 the prescriptions set out in
Kadhafi's Green Book.	 And one can no longer argue, as Zartnan
did in the 1960s, that the rationale for such policies in North
Africa was simply the concern with identity and the pressure for
differentiation.	 While national interest and identity are
clearly related the second now seems firmly established - in the
Maghreb if not in the adjoining Sahel. 	 The role of foreign
policy therefore is to perpetuate the state and the national
interest as it is perceiveded by the state.
It is our thesis that the evolution of the North African
states since independence, and more particularly since 1973, has
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been accompanied by substantial bureaucratic growth and an
intensification of economic activity, to say nothing of much
higher levels of education and social formation and greatly
increased expectations throughout the society. Such changes have
for the most part been more pronounced in the Maghreb than in
other African states.	 Where the leaders of the 1960s had
subscribed to the idea of nation-building, with its emphasis on
identity and differentiation, their successors in the seventies
were more likely to emphasise state-building with a new emphasis
on economic priorities and encouragement for limited inter-state
cooperation at regional and other levels.	 Indeed, there was a
relaxation of tension within the Maghreb in the early seventies,
with confirmation of existing frontiers and a discussion of
economic integration - until the revival of Moroccan territorial
claims in the Sahara, in 1975, ended any realistic prospect of a
Maghrebin Union.
With the 1980s the emphasis switched again as state-building
became associated with the poor performance of the public sector
in previous decades. The goals of "liberalisation" and the "free
market" economy did not sit easily with the historical, dynastic
and cultural traditions of the Maghreb. They did, however, shift
the responsibility for relieving the acute economic situation,
particularly in the large connurbations, onto other shoulders,
namely the so'-called "middle sectors". 	 At the sane time they
sought to re-direct state activity to the "approved" tasks of
structural adjustment - with new opportunities for patronage, for
- 43 -
a much-needed shake-up of the bureaucracy, and with a renewed
search for popular support in the countryside.
Socialism was finally dropped from the agenda in the 1980s -
Libya being the exception - while new priorities also emerged in
foreign policy.	 Mazrui's proposed coalition of Arab oil and
Black gold appeared even more fanciful as North African states
counted the costs of their African involvement at a time of
sharply falling oil prices. 	 Their initial successes had to be
set against more recent failures, notably those African states
which had severed ties with Israel in 1973 only to resume their
former relations after 1979.	 Meanwhile hard-pressed African
governments were again looking to the West and to France for
economic relief while criticising the Arab states for their want
of solidarity. The Middle East, too, receded in importance for
the Maghrebin states, Libya included, following the Israeli
invasion of Lebanon in 1982, and the subsequent failures of Arab
diplomacy leading to the near collapse of the Arab League.
By contrast the connection between domestic unrest and the
global economic crisis has served to push the Maghreb states,
again with the exception of Libya, closer to the western powers
and America. Where regional competition had previously dictated
contrasting foreign policies and rival alignments, there has been
considerable convergence in the 1980s in the policies of Algeria,
Morocco and Tunisia.	 The emphasis is no longer on Afro-Arab
Dialogue, or Euro-African Dialogue, or the North-South Debate.
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The rivalry now centres on efforts to secure trade and credits,
preferential access to markets and the transfer of advanced
technology, interest relief and multi-year repayments. And the
West, America in particular, is the most obvious source of all
such goods and "concessions" - to say nothing of sophisticated
military hardware.
To that extent it might appear that in North Africa foreign
policies are being traded in the market-place. But the functions
and uses of foreign policy have always been many and complex.
From Zartnan's point of view relations within the Maghreb seem to
have changed but little since independence and these, in turn,
have largely determined the pattern of North Africa's external
relations. By comparison with the West and other more advanced
states	 their	 foreign	 policies	 presumably	 remain
"underdeveloped".	 Others again maintain that the present
predicament of the Maghrebin states is the direct and necessary
consequence of	 "dependency" on the West : a dependency that
foreign policy, even in Algeria, has done little to relieve.
Neither interpretation seems to us to provide a sufficiently
fair or full account of the evolution of foreign policy in the
Maghrebin states over the last fifteen years. 	 While colonial
influence remains, is likely to persist for some time to come
and is more pronounced in same states than in others, there is
now a greater appreciation elsewhere of the determination of the
North African states to maintain their independence, and to
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continue to formulate their own policies and press for more
investment and better terns of trade.	 Nor can we accept the
view that a continuation of Algerian-Moroccan rivalry inside the
Maghreb means that little has changed in terms of foreign policy-
making.
In our view the last two decades have seen considerable
change and ferment, both in North Africa and in the international
sphere. Policy-makers in the Maghreb have had to respond to new
problems and pressures, and from many and varied quarters. The
administration of the state has grown in complexity and also in
its capacity to define and defend national interests. Military
capabilities have likewise increased considerably - although
admittedly an increase in the "power" of one state tends to be
balanced by corresponding increments on the part of its
neighbours. If the checkerboard is still with us it is not for
want of change in other areas of North African society.
Structure of the Thesis 
In our dissertation we wish to examine the impact since 1973
of some of these changes, not on the states themselves or on
North African society as such, but with reference to foreign
policy and inter-state relations. 	 It is not our intention to
discuss the way foreign policy is made in North Africa or
elsewhere. Nor	 will we be looking, in any detail, at the
interaction between domestic and external policies except where
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this relates directly to our subject. Instead we propose to
analyse North African foreign policies in so far as they affect
the Maghrebin states (1) in their relations with one another and
(2) in their relations with states in other, adjacent regional
sub-systems, namely the Middle East, Africa and Europe.
	 This
then provides the subject matter of our dissertation, while
suggesting its main themes and the comparative framework within
which we have tried to work.
PART TNAO
INTER-MAGHREBIN RELATIONS 
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CHAPTER TWO : THE MAGHREB. AN OVERVIEW 
Four Regimes Under Pressure 
The prospects for continued stability and renewed growth in
the Maghreb states appear rather bleak. The 'feudal' character
of the Moroccan regime and the strong social tensions that
underpin it could one day lead to a violent explosion - although
not of the Iranian type as the King, who is Commander of the
Faithful, serves as a deterrent against religious fanaticism. He
also functions as an effective obstacle to military intervention.
For the	 present the large and well equipped army is fully
occupied defending Moroccan positions in the Western Sahara, but
it has threatened the regime before, in the early 1970s, and
could well do so again. An interventionist military would be a
de-stabilising factor elsewhere in the region as it would be
under strong domestic pressure to adopt a foreign policy even
more expansionist than the present one. To that extent the
monarchy is a force for stability in the region as a whole.
In Tunisia the most immediate and persistent threat comes
from its neighbour, Libya. But other factors also threaten
the country's enviable reputation for stability. There was the
chronic succession crisis after 1973;
	 aggravated by earlier
failures to broaden the base of the regime by co-opting the
secular opposition.
	 Here as in Morocco, stagnation 	 of the
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economy in the 1980s and a mounting debt problem, has occasioned
considerable economic hardship. There has been widespread unrest
and violence, particularly in the towns and cities, following
cuts in government subsidies that were dictated by pressure
mainly from the International Monetary Fund and from the major
Western creditor-nations. One consequence has been the recent
challenge from extreme Islamic elements which had not previously
attracted much support inside Tunisia. The growing uncertainty
about the choice of a constitutional successor to Bourguiba has
also contributed to the recent turbulence. A quick succession
of prime ministers and the inability of President Bourguiba, in
power since 1956, to organise a voluntary retirement finally led
to his enforced removal in November 1987.
	 He was finally
displaced by the last of his prime ministers, not a civilian
this time but the former director of military security, General
Ben Ali.
Unlike its two North African neighbours, Algeria has the
advantage of a legitimising formula - the revolutionary struggle
against French rule - that does not depend to any extent either
on personalities or on the survival of a dynasty. The succession
'crisis' in 1979 was resolved peacefully, albeit by the elites
themselves and without popular involvement. 	 Dissidence has so
far been contained by a mixture of exhortation, concessions and
coercion	 while the military has little reason to overturn
existing structures in which it occupies a privileged place. The
deteriorating economic situation of 1980s seemed to call for new
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policies and a new style of government. Where Tunisia vacillated
between liberalisation and repression, and the Moroccan regime
drew still further on its reserves of patriotism and popular
enthusiasm, there was a natural change of leadership in Algeria
following the death in 1978 of President Houari Boumedienne and
the accession, in 1979, of Chadli BenJedid. There was scope
therefore for new initiatives and policies and an enforced
turnover among the ruling elites. One should not, however,
underestimate the extent and importance of the social pressures
that have long been building up inside Algeria. They are likely
to be exacerbated as population continues to grow rapidly,
accompanied by large-scale migration to the towns, while the
economic base of the country contracts, if only temporarily, with
the global recession of the 1980s and the sudden fall in oil and
gas revenues.
Aware of the problems confronting its neighbours, the new
Algerian leadership is concerned about stability both at home and
within the region. At the regional level Algeria has
traditionally favoured closer political and economic cooperation,
particularly the latter, stopping well short of "integration".
That was certainly the view of President Houari Bounedienne until
the emergence of the conflict in Western Sahara in 1975. As
relations between Algeria and Morocco deteriorated, however, in
the late 1970s, Boumedienne adopted a more strident, populist
note, threatening the Moroccan regime with a "Maghreb of the
Peoples". Under Chadli, however, the emphasis was once again on
reconciliation with his neighbours, while
	
his approach to
regional cooperation has been functional and technocratic rather
than political and ideological.
	 Nevertheless, the	 new
government continues, 	 like its predecessor, to emphasise
Algeria's strategic position at the centre of the region and her
privileged role within the Maghreb. But it also acknowledges
that little can be achieved by way of economic cooperation
without political good-will on all sides.
Although the general framework of Algeria's foreign policy
remains basically the same, each president appears to stamp the
country's diplomacy with his own personality and preoccupations.
The emergence of the Western Sahara issue prompted Boumedienne's
speech on June 19, 1975, the tenth anniversary of his accession,
marking a shift in his position. Instead of cooperating with its
neighbours in the construction of a "Maghreb of States" Algeria
would lead the struggle for a "Maghreb of the Peoples".'
Chadli's more conciliatory approach was set out in a speech
of December 20, 1981, that turned away from Boumedienne's earlier
diplomatic offensive and looked forward instead to a resumption
of dialogue and cooperation with the rest of the Maghreb. The
aim was to enter on a period of "positive good neighbourlinesV
within the region as a whole - < le bon volsinage positif). 2 As
the conflict in the Sahara continued, however, despite Chadli's
efforts, the prospects for economic cooperation and a new
political relationship between Morocco and Algeria remained, at
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best, uncertain. Hopes for détente within the Maghreb improved,
however, following Chadli's meeting with King Hassan in 1987,
which took place on the border of the two states, after the
intervention of King Fand of Saudi Arabia. It was seen by most
observers as a conciliatory gesture on the part of the Algerians.
Subsequently the Moroccans reciprocated by releasing a number of
Algerian soldiers who had been captured at the height of the
confrontation between the two states.
The conflict in the Western Sahara has yet to be resolved,
however.	 Meanwhile Algeria has continued its earlier and quite
successful diplomatic efforts to isolate the Moroccan regime,
both in North Africa itself and in the wider international
community.	 Less successful have been the Algerian government's
efforts to persuade King Hassan's Western allies to desist from
providing economic and mint ;ary support for Rabat. The key to
the new diplomatic offensive was the Algerian-Tunisian Friendship
Treaty concluded in March 1983, to which Mauritania later
acceded.
	 This provided Bourguiba with guarantees against
possible Libyan aggression following his earlier rejection of the
proposed Libyan-Tunisian merger. Meanwhile Morocco found itself
excluded from an alliance that threatened it on both flanks,
southern and eastern, and served to distance it even further
from its former partner, Tunisia.
Morocco reacted by signing the 1984 agreement on 'union'
with Libya - provoked by the growing diplomatic isolation of both
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regimes that was itself the result of their expansionist policies
in the south, aimed respectively at the Western Sahara and Chad.
The sudden rapprochement between the two former antagonists was
the more unexpected as their ideologies had seemed incompatible.
There was, however, a temporary convergence of interests as each
sought to 'squeeze' Algeria so as to effect a quick and mutually
advantageous change in the regional balance.	 By 1986, however,
the union apeared to have outlived its usefulness - certainly
from the Moroccan
	 point of view.	 There was a marked
deterioration in the Libyan position,
	 in Chad and elsewhere,
following the armed intervention against Tripoli by the
Americans. Which coincided with the strengthening of Morocco's
defensive frontier around much of Western Sahara, where American
support seems again to have played a major role.
As the disadvantages of the agreement with Libya came
increasingly to outweigh any possible advantages, King Hassan
broke with Libya, returning to more orthodox policies and the
quest for more conventional and less controversial allies.
	 It
was left to Chadli to try to accommodate a shaken but apparently
unrepentant Colonel Muammar Khadafi who at the end of 1987 sued
to join the tri-partite alliance between Algeria, Tunisia and
Mauritania. As the alliance was directed as much against Libya
as against Morocco Chadli has to balance Tunisian fears of Libya
off against the obvious advantage of maintaining
	 diplomatic
pressure on Morocco to reach an accommodation with the Polisario
guerrillas, who are receiving Algerian as well as Libyan support.
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It seems clear that where Boumedienne and Chadli both
started out with the aim of securing a political settlement in
the Western Sahara and improving relations within the Maghreb,
neither was able or willing to accept major territorial changes
that would threaten 	 the existing power balance which is
favourable to Algeria.
	 Meanwhile Algerian support for the
Polisario guerrillas and the widespread -recognition accorded to
the Democratic Arab Republic of the Sahara (SADR) are additional
complicating factors.
	 Given the Algerian commitment to self-
determination, with its roots in the long war against the French,
and the problems in the way of an agreement between Polisario and
Morocco, both Boumedienne and Chadli came reluctantly to accept
the need for diplomatic sanctions against Morocco in place of
their earlier goal of closer economic cooperation. In North
Africa as elsewhere Algeria remains committed to self-
determination but	 within established colonial	 frontiers.
Acceptance of the territorial status quo and non-intervention in
the affairs of neighbouring states, is perceived as the minimum
condition for future economic cooperation within the Maghreb.
Meanwhile national economic development remains the first
priority of all Algerian governments and leaders : here, after
all, they do still have a clear advantage over Morocco.
Obstacles to Maghrebin cooperation 
Chadli outlined his policy of "good neighbourliness" to the
Algerian National Assembly, in the traditional "state of the
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nation" message, in 1981. 	 It was based on adherence to the
principles of non-aggression and non-interference in the internal
affairs of other states - already embodied in the charter of the
Organisation of African Unity. Chadli also proposed to develop
cooperation at the regional level with a view to coordinating
policies where it was a question of "common problems" and
"complementary interests".	 To achieve this objective it was
first necessary to liquidate "all causes of tension" and for the
governments concerned to uphold the decision of the OAU in favour
of retaining the borders inherited at independence - any change
requiring the voluntary agreement of the states affected.
The border issue has rightly been seen by successive Algerian
governments - and by outside observers - as a fundamental, even
primordial source of tension. Its solution, therefore, is a pre-
requisite for genuine rapprochement and cooperation within the
region.	 Shortly before Tunisia and Morocco acquired first self-
government then, in 1956, independence, the French finally agreed
to define the border separating French Algeria from the former
protectorates. Tunisia and Morocco have always claimed that the
result favoured Algeria at their expense. 	 As a gesture of
Maghrebin solidarity - and because they were unlikely to secure
better terms from the French - they did, however, agree to
postpone further discussion of the issue until Algeria became
independent. It was the refusal of the new Algerian leadership
to consider territorial revision that helped prompt the short
border war with Morocco in October 1963, which focussed on
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ownership of mineral deposits in the frontier zone between the
two states, near the town of Tindouf, in South-Western Algeria.
The contentious border question betwen Algeria and Morocco is
the most serious of all because of the size and military
resources of the two states involved and because of the sheer
extent of Moroccan 'historic' claims, not only on a part of the
Algerian desert, but also over the whole of Mauritania, Western
(former Spanish) Sahara, as well as parts of Mali and Senegal.
Such claims were based on the 'Greater Morocco' thesis, initiated
in the mid 1950s by the then leader of the Istiqlal Party, Allal
Al Fassi and his brother Abdelkbir Al Fassi. The independence of
Mauritania in the 1960s and the rejection of Moroccan claims not
only by the colonial power but also by the OAU led to more
conciliatory policies by the Moroccan regime in the early 1970s.
At the OAU summit in Rabat - the "summit of reconciliation" - in
June 1972, agreement was reached between Algeria and Morocco
concerning their own disputed frontier, with provision for
Algerian sovereignty and joint exploitation by the two states of
the mineral wealth. However, the Moroccan parliament failed to
ratify the agreement.
	 This enabled	 Morocco to revive her
territorial claims on Algeria in the mid 1970s in an attempt to
persuade
	 Algeria to concede Morocco's right to the former
Spanish Sahara, the phosphate-rich territory adjacent to
Morocco's southern frontier.
Algeria's border dispute with Tunisia arose largely from
Tunisia's decision, during the Algerian war, to allow the French
to run an oil pipeline from Ejele, in Algeria. to the Tunisian
city of Skirra - before the question of sovereignty over the
Sahara had been finally resolved.
	 Here, however, there was no
deep-seated rivalry or clash of national interests or territorial
ambitions.	 Economic cooperation along the Algerian-Tunisian
frontier had long been a reality. The dispute was satisfactorily
resolved as early as 1970, and the agreement confirmed much later
by the Algerian-Tunisian Friendship Treaty of March 1983.
Algeria was also able by 1983 to settle outstanding border
problems with all her southern neighbours,
	 Mali, Niger, and
Mauritania.	 Besides the continuing dispute with Morocco only
the frontier with Libya remains unsettled.
	 The government in
Tripoli has claims on Algerian territory but has chosen not to
press them - partly because of Libya's extensive commitments
elsewhere in Africa, and partly on account of Algeria's military
strength and the extent of her diplomatic support. 	 Libyan
acceptance of existing boundaries in North Africa is, however, a
condition for joining Algeria, Tunisia and Mauritania as co-
signatories of the Friendship Treaty.
Algeria has been understandably sensitive about border
Issues, in North Africa as elsewhere, because of her central
location within ' the Maghreb, her extended frontiers, the
proximity of expansionist states like Morocco and Libya, and the
nomadic character of much of the population in the Sahara region.
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Whereas we can speak of the Maghreb as a cultural and historical
unit,	 political union, while perhaps "inevitable" necessarily
involves cooperation among existing states which can only be
achieved on the basis of sovereignty and mutual respect for
existing boundaries.
	 After the long and bitter war of
independence against the French the Algerian leadership will not
accept subordinate status inside a Maghrebin super-state. Nor is
there any question of union being imposed on the North African
states, whether from outside or from within.
Contrasting perspectives on Maghrebin unity 
While the commitment to unity may be deep-felt, Algeria is
not alone in viewing Maghrebin unity largely from the vantage
point of 'national interest'. Thus President Bourguiba of Tunisia
continued, to the end of his rule, to work for the realisation of
the Maghrebin ideal, despite his reservations about the prospects
for and the wisdom of pan-Arab political union. Circumstances
seem to have conspired to push Tunisia in that direction
including the country's small size, limited resources and
military weakness compared with its larger neighbours. There is
also the relatively developed economic base and the surplus of
educated and skilled personnel forced to seek employment abroad.
Trade, commerce and movement across the Tunisian-Algerian
frontier is far from negligeable while a pipeline carries
Algerian gas across the border to an outlet on the Tunisian
coast. It is not surprising then that the Tunisian constitution
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of 1959 underlined the will of the people to obey the teachings
of Islam, to respect the unity of the 'Greater Maghreb' and to
remain loyal to the wider Arab community.
In Morocco, too, the constitution of December 1962 emphasised
not	 only the sovereignty and the Islamic character of the
kingdom, but also its membership of the 'Greater Maghreb'. The
same formula was repeated in the July 1970 constitution.4
However, King Hassan II prefers, like his father before him, to
base his legitimacy on the Sharifian dynasty which claims descent
from the Prophet himself. As Commander of the Faithful, the king
continues to rely on historical continuity and religious sanction
in his attempts to re-constitute a national territorial state out
of the remnants of a colonial empire. Maghrebin and Arab unity
are, in any case, not without problems for a ruler whose
territorial ambitions are blocked by Algeria in the east, and
whose legitimacy has been contested by 'progressive' Arab states,
including Algeria and Libya, as well as by 'progressive'
political forces at hone.
The constitution of the United Kingdom of Libya of October
1951 made no reference to Arab unity. On the other hand, the
first article of the constitutional proclamations of December
1969, affirmed that "Libya is a free Arab Democratic Republic
and sovereignty therein is vested in the people who are part of
the Arab nation and whose aim is full Arab unity." 5 In those
terms, the young Libyan revolution proclaims its firm commitment
- 59 -
to the cause of Arab unity.
	
In contrast to the Algerian,
Moroccan and Tunisian constitutions, there is no reference here
to an intermediate stage of regional or Maghrebin unity, no
mention of the creation of a Greater Maghreb.	 The object of
Kadhafi's Libya was Arab unity and the importance of that unity
was such that the first foreign minister after the revolution was
designated the Minister of Unity.
The Algerian elite approaches Maghrebin unity from a
viewpoint that reflects both ideology and pragmatism. Before his
removal by the military in 1965 President Ben Bella showed
considerable interest in and enthusiasm for an Arab unity
inspired by revolutionary ideals. 	 Hence his close and
conspicuous friendship with President Nasser of Egypt and his
attacks on conservative Arab regimes in general and the
monarchies in particular.	 Boumedienne, on the other hand,
appealed after 1965 for a united Maghreb that would constitute
a 'first step' towards a wider and more comprehensive Arab and
African unity. Later this would receive a more ideological and
even subversive emphasis, in his demand for the creation of a
"Maghreb of the Peoples". 	 As the National Charter of 1976
emphasised
Because there can be no objective for Maghrebin unity
other that the well-being of its peoples, it must aim
first and foremost for the liberation of the exploited
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and	 deprived	 masses...the	 result	 would	 be	 a
strong, united, prosperous and progressive Arab Maghreb.6
It is unlikely that Morocco or Tunisia would accept unity on
that basis, seeing it as a threat to the privileged classes of
both countries.	 It might even	 appear as a not too subtle
attempt to export the Algerian revolution to its more
conservative neighbours, an appeal to the masses over the heads
of their leaders.	 Equally, the statement could signify that
social emancipation must begin at home and that domestic
preoccupations would receive priority over less pressing regional
concerns. But the language of tile Charter abounds in ambiguities
of that kind as the ruling elites have tried to match
revolutionary rhetoric and populist themes to an administrative
style that is essentially paternalistic and conservative.
Whatever the "Maghreb of the Peoples" was meant to convey, the
kind of regional unity envisaged by Algeria corresponds more
closely to the "Maghreb of the States". Since 1965 the pragmatic
element has taken precedence over the doctrinal. Bounedienne and
now Chadli have favoured an incremental, functional approach to
unity, based on existing states and their economic interests.
They have shown no enthusiasm about creating a new supra-national
entity.
According to the National Charter (1976) the Greater Maghreb
would be built in stages with the first stage involving the
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"strengthening of	 economic,	 trade and cultural
	 links".
Cooperation among member states would develop on the basis of
their "common interests", "respecting at the same time the
specific circumstances of each and every country." Algeria views
the Greater Maghreb first and foremost in terms of her
preoccupation with ending foreign domination or exploitation.
It would strengthen the region both economically and politically,
helping to guarantee both its independence and its autonomous
development.
	 In his report to the Fifth Congress of the
National Liberation Front (19-22 Dec.1983) Chadli reminded
delegates that
The building of the 'Greater Maghreb' requires respect
for the underlying principles that relate to the right of
peoples to equality,	 and their right to self-
determination;	 also respect for their sovereignty and
territorial integrity, as well as support for the
principle of non-interference in domestic affairs.7
The object of the Greater Maghreb is to reinforce the
independence of existing states rather than reduce or undermine
it. In so far as it leads to greater interdependence this would
be to the advantage of Algeria both by reason of its central
location within North Africa and because it would help confirm
the status quo in a region where Algeria, unlike Morocco or
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Libya, has no expansionist ambitions.	 For Algerian leaders,
then, the Western Sahara conflict remains an insurmountable
obstacle to Maghrebin union. 	 There is much, however, to
recommend the idea of a loose Maghrebin arrangement between the
various North African states. 	 By its geographical location
Algeria would occupy a privileged position.
	 An economic union
with benefits widely shared would reduce pressures for a possible
alliance between Algeria's 'moderate' neighbours, Morocco and
Tunisia, perhaps even in conjunction with France, in a move to
contain Algerian influence.	 Maghrebin cooperation was also
preferable to more comprehensive schemes for Arab unity that
would focus on the Middle East and the 'core' Arab states, with
Algeria relegated to the periphery.
That was, indeed,
	 one of the principal concerns of the
Tangiers meeting, in April 1958, between representatives of the
three main political parties of the Maghreb : the Neo-Destour of
Tunisia, IstiVal of Morocco, and the FLN, representing the
struggling Algeria. 	 Bourguiba's aim in summoning the meeting
was to try to put an end to Nasser's revolutionary influence
over the FLN, and to bring the Maghreb states to the position
where they could assert their identity and withstand Nasser's
drive for domination. Twenty-five years later, in April 1983,
the three Maghrebin parties met again at the same venue, this
time to revive the spirit of unity and bring together the
leadership of the region.	 But by then the parties were so
clearly subordinate to their respective states, and their powers
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so limited,
	
that no genuine rapprochement was possible. 	 A
regional summit meeting, scheduled for the following month,
failed to convene at the agreed rendez-vous, Algiers.	 King
Hassan II and President Kadhafi both declined to join Presidents
Chadli, Bourguiba and Mohammed Ould Haidallah of Mauritania, in
this mini-summit, emphasising once again the marginality of the
Maghrebin parties - even as an arena for diplomacy - at a time
when inter-state rivalry was pronounced within the region.
Centrifugal pressures and decline of the Maghrebin idea 
It is an undisputable fact that the Maghrebin states share a
common history, geography and culture. 	 But the " Maghreb of the
States", with its fusion of inherited colonial frontiers and
narrow, state-based nationalism, is an effective barrier to the
rival notion of a "Maghreb of the Peoples".	 The most striking
and recent example of Maghrebin unity was probably the generous
support that Tunisia and Morocco both provided to the FLN during
the war of Algerian independence. This included the use of much
of their territory for military bases when the Army of Liberation
(ALN) could no longer operate from Algerian soil. Since Algerian
Independence in 1962, however, strong centrifugal pressures have
overcame what little remained of Maghrebin sentiment. There was
Morocco's coolness towards Tunisia, after Tunisia recognised the
independence of Mauritania, thereby rejecting Moroccan claims to
that territory. There were the frontier disputes between Tunisia
and Algeria, on the one hand, and between Algeria and Morocco on
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the other. The Algerian-Moroccan dispute escalated into a short
armed confrontation in 1963. And more recently there has been
the continuing dispute over the Western Sahara.
A Permanent Consultative Committee of the Maghreb (CPCM) was
set up in 1964, in an effort to carry on the earlier work of the
secretariat created at the Tangiers conference of 1958. The four
member states included Libya. There was a first conference of
Maghrebin economic ministers in Tunis in October 1964 and the
CPCM was scheduled to meet every two years. Its aims included
the encouragement of preferential trade within the Maghreb, as
well as the harmonisation of customs tariffs and procedures, the
coordination of industrial policies and joint action to expand
infrastructure and improve communications. The coordination of
policy towards the EEC was also among the objectives. At this
and later meetings various Maghrebin agencies were created to
plan, coordinate and supervise the above activities. There was
provision for a Council of Ministers for Economic Affairs; a
Permanent Consultative Committee 	 (CPCM)	 assisted by a
Secretariat; a Centre for Industrial Studies (CEIM) as well as a
number of special commissions and sub-commissions covering trade,
industry, transportation, postal and telegraph services,and
tourism!
From October 1964 until 1970 Libya was an active member of
the Maghreb organisation, but the coup of September 1969 brought
to power a new leadership group whose values and objectives
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differed markedly from those of the other Maghreb states. The
immediate result was that Libya under Kadhafi drifted eastwards,
away from the Maghreb and in the direction of the Machrek.
Because of political conflicts and repeated disagreements the
movement towards Maghrebin economic cooperation yielded little if
anything in the way of tangible results. With the emergence of
the Western Saharan issue in the mid 1970s its institutions ceasd
to function while meetings and consultation lapsed. 	 The
prospects for Maghrebin cooperation were never strong in any case
despite the common history and culture and some experience of
collaboration during the Algerian war. The Maghrebin economies
have never achieved any great degree of complementarity and the
undoubted development that took place in the 1960s and 1970s was
coordinated on a state rather than a regional basis. At the end
of the 1970s inter-Maghrebin trade still comprised only three per
cent. of their total external trade and does not begin to compare
with the figures for trade between the Maghrebin states and
France.
	 Within the Maghreb the pattern is one of intensified
competition for external markets like the European Community
where the North African states, being "associate" members, are
increasingly at a disadvantage compared with full member states.
Conclusion 
These then are the Maghrebin states whose interactions are
the subject of our dissertation.
	 In the remaining chapters of
Part II we will be examining the relations between individual
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pairs of Maghrebin states in an attempt to trace the evolution of
their foreign	 policies from 1973 to the present. 	 We are
particularly interested in Zartman's preoccupation with Algerian-
Moroccan rivalry and its persistence over time. 	 Here the
conflict that has emerged since 1975 in the Western Sahara is
clearly the most important development of our period. We propose
to analyse first the response of the two leading protagonists in
the dispute and then to consider the role and relevance of the
other states and their relationship with Algeria and/or Morocco.
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CHAPTER THREE . ALGERIA VERSUS MOROCCO 
Western Sahara : a race for leadership 
Algeria and Morocco are the main antagonists in the Maghreb,
and the principal contenders for dominance and supremacy within
the region.	 Morocco's claim is based on historical continuity
and traditional legitimacy and its long-standing role as
intermediary between Western and Arab cultures. Algeria, on the
other hand, claims to derive its legitimacy from its recent
revolutionary experience, which it offers as a model not only for
the peoples of the region but also for the entire Third World.
Algeria's wider perspectives, far-ranging pretensions and more
ambitious economic policy would seem to have given it a clear
advantage in any contest for leadership, whether at the regional
or continental levels, or in the Third World as a whole.
Such competitive perceptions have given rise to the
conflicting attitudes and policies of the two states, both within
the region and also outside it. Morocco's pursuit of irredentist
claims on the territory of its southern and eastern neighbours
had economic as well as political objectives : the significant
iron ore deposits at Tindouf, just inside the Algerian border,
were the focus of the brief war between the two states in 1963.
Mauritania's reserves of iron ore and the rich phosphate deposits
of the Spanish Sahara also influenced Moroccan policy in an
expansionist direction.
	 Algeria, on the other hand, possessed
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extensive deposits of iron ore, as well as large reserves of oil
and natural gas. Her policy was directed more towards securing
her long pipelines and, where necessary, negotiating storage
terminals, port facilities and access to the european natural gas
network.	 Hence the concern to maintain close political and
economic ties with Tunisia and to reach an early settlement of
outstanding border issues. 	 Algeria's ambitions south of the
Sahara stopped far short of territorial aggrandisement.
	 Black
Africa presented itself as an obvious future market for Algeria's
industrial production.
	 Hence the idea of building the Trans-
Saharan Highway to link the proposed industrial centres with the
countries of the Sahel. There is also the idea of Algeria as a
kind of 'bridge' across the Mediterranean, linking the two
continents : although Morocco is perhaps rather better situated
for that purpose.
Algerian-Moroccan relations appeared to have reached a
critical stage by 1973.	 The meeting of Heads of State and
Government of the Organisation of African Unity, held in Rabat,
Morocco,
	 in 1972 had been hailed as the "summit of
reconciliation", not least between the former Maghrebin rivals.
Where Morocco had earlier dropped her claims on Mauritania and
now seemed ready to ratify her disputed border with Algeria,
Algeria was ready to support the candidacy of Hassan II for the
chairmanship of the OAU in 1972-3.
	 Hassan's domestic
difficulties prevented him, however, from playing a more active
role in the African context, while the sane internal problems may
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once again have suggested a more aggressive external policy - if
only to outflank the opposition parties and deflect mounting
criticism within the military. The illness of General Franco and
uncertainty about the future of the Spanish Sahara must have
prompted a review of Moroccan foreign policy. A continuation of
the recent policy of cooperation with Algeria could only mean
self-determination for the small Saharawi population, whose
leaders were already close to Algeria.
	
This would eventually
strengthen Algeria's position to the south of Morocco, thereby
tilting the balance of power within the region further in
Algeria's favour.
Such an outcome had few if any attractions for the Moroccan
state and had little appeal either for Tunisia or Libya. However,
the incorporation of the Spanish Sahara into Morocco was likely
to provoke intense Algerian opposition as it, too, threatened the
existing balance of power.
	 Libya, although not so directly
Involved at this tine, had no interest in a diplomatic or
military success for either of its principal rivals in the
region.	 A continuing state of tension or stalemate offered
greater scope for Libya's own wider ambitions both in the Maghreb
and the neighbouring Sahel zone. Tunisia, for its part, was
intent on placating its powerful neighbours. While recalling its
former support for Mauritanian independence, when it had aligned
with France and the black francophone states, Tunisia may this
time have hoped to benefit from a territorial arrangement that
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would secure an even closer balance between the rival regional
powers.
Thus, at the end of 1974, President Bourguiba moved
sufficiently in the direction of Morocco to envisage and even
recommend to his Maghrebin neighbours a division of the former
Spanish territory between Morocco and Mauritania.	 At the time
this appeared to be a judgement of Solomon - which nevertheless
won French and (later) Spanish support, and for which President
Bourguiba even claimed some measure of Algerian approval.
President Boumedienne's reaction was, however, predictably
hostile. Algerian-Moroccan tension mounted during 1975 as King
Hassan prepared for the 'Green March' southwards into the
territory that the Spanish would relinquish without firing a shot
- despite earlier warnings to the contrary. The success of the
Moroccan move, at least in the short term, provoked the Algerian
authorities into a hostile reaction as they reaffirmed their
support for self-determination. At the same time they channelled
additional assistance to the Saharawis in the form of re-
settlement camps, for those who did not wish to remain under
Moroccan or Mauritanian rule, and training and armaments for the
military arm of Polisario.
At the end of February 1976 Algeria went further and
recognised the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) as an
independent state whereupon Rabat severed diplomatic relations
with Algiers threatening an open confrontation. 	 Relations
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between Algiers and Tunis likewise deteriorated for a time
because of the role played by President Bourguiba in engineering
the rapprochement between Mauritania and Morocco - at the expense
of Algeria who had long cultivated a very close and cordial
relationship with Mauritania.	 Before long, however, Bourguiba
had distanced himself from the Moroccan position, offering
instead to mediate between the parties to the conflict. He was
doubtless influenced by the hostile position adopted by President
Boumedienne, the military su pport accorded Polisario by both
Algeria and Libya, and Tunisia's rather exposed position between
the two. The decision by a new regime in Mauritania to quit the
Western Sahara and withdraw to its own frontiers, in 1979, was
confirmation of the extent of Algerian pressure on Nouakchott.
At issue in the dispute over the Spanish Sahara was not so
much the assertion of national identity and its preoccupation
with frontiers and differentiation of policy. That had dominated
the earlier confrontations between Algeria and Morocco in the
1960s, notably the 1963 war and the conflicting positions over
Mauretania.
	 The refusal of the Moroccan regime to ratify the
border agreement with Algeria, after 1973, signified not a return
to the politics of identity and differentiation, but rather a new
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concern with the state, its domestic consolidation, its resource
base, and the balance of forces within the region. 	 From
Zartman's perspective, it signified a return to the checkerboard
pattern. We would maintain, instead, that it marked a new phase
in the evolution of Maghrebin foreign policies,
	 Not only were
the relevant national interests more clearly defined than a
decade before but, with the possible exception of Mauritania,
they corresponded more closely to perceptions of economic as well
as political advantage and reflected assessments of the relevant
costs and benefits rather than an unreflecting response to ill-
defined 'ideological' positions.
The stakes were much higher than in the 1960s, the African
alliances and international linkages were likewise based less on
ideology than on more immediate and pragmatic considerations.
Opportunism was certainly a factor but a sense of raison d'etat
was even more pronounced. Thus the 'radical' bloc that emerged
within the OAU in the early 1980s, with the Western Sahara as one
of the main issues, included very 'moderate' southern African
states.	 Libya, which had the highest profile among the
'radical' states - although it was far from being their leader -
was prepared to distance itself from the Polisario movement if
that was the price for African consensus about the selection of
Tripoli, its capital, as the venue for the nineteenth OAU summit
and the selection of Kadhafi, its leader, as the next OAU
chairman.	 By the 1980s questions of cost and benefit, real or
potential, had moved close to the top of the Maghrebin agenda.
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The economic crisis, too,	 imposed new constraints on foreign
policy while falling commodity and energy prices threatened the
economic strategy as well as the political ambitions of the two
contending Maghrebin states.
Algeria's hopes to become a newly industrialising country
(NIC) with access to black African and Maghrebin markets were
shelved as the new administration of Beniedid Chadli sought
instead, after 1979, to revive agricultural production with the
emphasis on incentives for the individual producers, and worked
to break up the large, costly and inefficient state industrial
corporations. In Morocco, the collapse of the phosphates market,
the cost of erecting and securing the defensive perimeter that
was constructed around the Spanish Sahara, and a mounting debt
burden that cane to exceed the Gross Domestic Product, all
suggested a too familiar pattern. 	 France, after all, had
effectively occupied Algerian territory and secured the eastern
and western perimeters in the course of the war of independence.
But the cost in terms of money and morale soon proved excessive.
It remains to be seen whether Morocco will prove as vulnerable to
domestic and international pressures.	 Western Sahara is far
smaller and more easily defended than Algeria; the population in
question is small and probably little more than 100-150,000; it
Is close to Morocco in terms of culture; and Moroccan opinion,
as expressed through the parties, still seems to be supportive of
the military campaign.
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In any case new socio-economic pressures, arising from the
economic downturn of the 1980s, would seem to act as a constraint
on the leading parties to the dispute. Morocco and Algeria
cannot afford a re-run of the Iran-Iraq war in the context of
North Africa.	 Only Libya and its leader, Kadhafi, could
conceivably benefit from a damaging war of attrition fought from
behind prepared defences.
	
It is doubtful, moreover, whether
either regime would survive prolonged exposure to military
confrontation. In the present economic climate it is therefore
likely that the contest for regional leadership will remain
relatively subdued. There are, of course, similarities with the
earlier contest of 1963. There is still the element of
confrontation between neighbouring states, and the territorial
dimension which focusses on the inherited frontiers and which is
now being challenged by Morocco in the context of Western Sahara.
But to interpret the conflict largely as a return to the
checkerboard pattern of the 1960s is, in our view, unduly to
neglect the many and important developments that have taken
place in North African society and politics and in policy-making
since that time.
Morocco is, like Tunisia, a 'conservative' focCein the
Maghreb, but one whose major foreign policy objective is to
secure the stability of the monarchy. The Alawite dynasty in
Rabat rejects the Algerian version of Maghrebin unity together
with the revolutionary rhetoric emanating from Tripoli. From the
viewpoint of Algeria and Libya a monarchical regime appears as an
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anomaly and as an obstacle to Maghrebin unity. 	 Hence the
Moroccan perception that any increase in the strength of its
larger, 'revolutionary' neighbour, would represent a conspicuous
threat to the security of its regime. 	 Meanwhile, aware of the
danger of intervention by disgruntled elements of the military,
the Moroccan leadership has consistently sought to distract the
attention of the army away from internal and towards external
issues, One result has been to keep the area in a state of
permanent tension.
For its part the Algerian leadership, aware of Morocco's
expansionist designs, has repeatedly signalled its determination
to retain intact the territory that was finally liberated in 1962
at the cost of so many lives. In a variety of contexts Algeria
has affirmed its support for the frontiers inherited from
colonialism and the principle, recognised by the OAU in 1963 and
confirmed again in 1964, that the frontiers of African states can
only be modified by mutual agreement. 	 Algeria is, therefore,
committed to the territorial status quo : its pretensions to
leadership of the Maghreb (and of the Third World) are largely
ideological and economic.	 Its large army has, since 1965, been
closely associated with the administration of the country : with
the removal of President Ben Bella the military has provided the
top political leadership while participating actively in the
economic development of the country and in the socialisation of
its youth. The last attempted coup was in 1967 and the regime is
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under no great pressure to re-direct the energies of the military
outside the country.
These then are the factors that have inspired the contest
between the two countries for leadership of the region : a
contest that has helped promote the growth of nationalistic
fervour, underlined by latent hostility and military tensions,
beginning with the 'war of the sands', in October 1963, and
culminating, after 1975, in the threatened (and sometimes actual)
confrontation between the two states over the Western Sahara.
Failure of détente 
Before 1973 there were, however, clear signs of detente and
rapprochement, beginning with the removal of Ben Bella by the
military in 1965. Following the settlement of Algeria's border
problem with Tunisia, in 1970, there was a move by President
Houari Boumedienne and King Hassan to resolve their own disputed
frontier. To that end Algeria refused to be associated with the
efforts of Colonel Muamnar Khadafi, after 1969, to de-stabilise
the Moroccan monarchy by offering support to the domestic
opponents of the regime. Instead Algeria sought an accomnadation
with King Hassan, even at the expense of his left-wing critics.
The main priority of Algiers was to resolve, once and for all,
the contentious border issue. To that end President Boumedienne
gave assurances that his government would not intervene in
Morocco's domestic affairs while at the same time emphasising the
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benefits to be derived from economic cooperation with Algeria -
notably through joint exploitation of the iron ore deposits at
Gara Jebilet, in Tindouf, south-western Algeria.
There followed a meeting between the King and Boumedienne at
Ifran, Morocco, early in 1969, and much later there came the
signature, at the Rabat summit of the OAU in June 1972, of an
agreement establishing Algeria's control and sovereignty over the
Gara Jebilet, but conceding joint exploitation of the mineral
reserves. Boumedienne then gave his support to the campaign by
Hassan to hasten the Spanish departure from the Western Sahara
and complete the de-colonisation of North Africa.
	
Boumedienne,
indeed, confirmed his good intentions when, after the abortive
military coup against Hassan, in August 1972, he was among the
first to greet the King after he had escaped the assassination
plot. Boumedienne presumably realised that a change of regime in
Morocco was likely to bring to power a nationalistic regime that
would be more intransigent over the border issue.
In fact Boumedienne's optimism was short-lived. Perhaps as a
result of mounting pressure from the military establishment in
Morocco, as well as from opposition parties that were generally
hostile to Algeria, the Moroccan parliament delayed ratification
of the border agreement sine die. There was no doubt, however,
that despite their mounting suspicions, the Algerian and Moroccan
leaders wished to see an end to the Spanish presence in Western
Sahara.	 Thus, on 23 July 1973, Hassan II of Morocco met in
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Agadir with Presidents Boumedienne of Algeria and Mokhtar Quid
Daddah of Mauritania to consider Western Sahara and re-affirmed
their attachment to the principle of self-determination and their
desire to ensure the implementation of this principle in a
framework that would guarantee the inhabitants a genuine
opportunity freely to express their will in conformity with the
decisions of the United Nations.'
It was at that meeting that Ould Daddah asked that his
country should be integrated with the 'Arab' Maghreb. 	 Four
months later, at the Arab Summit in Algiers in November,
Mauritania was, with Algerian help, admitted to membership of the
Arab League.	 Other factors were, however, working against
détente within the Maghreb. 	 The prospects for an orderly,
negotiated de-colonisation in the Spanish Sahara had begun to
recede as early as 1963 with the discovery by the Spanish of rich
phosphate deposits. 	 Already in 1966	 the Algerian foreign
minister, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, had declared Algeria to be a
"concerned and interested" party. 	 A little earlier the
Mauritanian representative at the United Nations, Ahmed Baba
Niske, had publicised his country's claims to the territory,
based on tribal affinities.2
In 1974, as Spanish rule in the Sahara moved to an end, the
Moroccan leadership sought to link the question of detente and a
final resolution of the Algerian-Moroccan border dispute with the
wider issue of sovereignty over the Western Sahara. In a speech
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on 20 August 1974 Hassan II warned the Algerians that the
continued improvement in relations between their two states was
dependent on Algerian support for Moroccan claims over the
territory.	 Two months later, at the Arab Summit in Rabat, in
October, Boumedienne was reported to have expressed his readiness
to "give his political, military and diplomatic support to a
division of the Spanish Sahara between Morocco and Mauritania",4
presumably in the context of multi-lateral negotiations that
would involve the Polisario movement and would entail certain
concessions tor Algeria, possibly in the transit of Algerian iron
ore to the Atlantic coast.	 Equally, it is possible that
Boumedienne was convinced that Mauritania was firmly on Algeria's
side and would never conclude an agreement with Morocco. If that
was the case it soon proved to be an illusion.
As the Spanish role in the territory came to a close Spain,
Morocco and Mauritania started negotiations. Suspecting a sell-
out shortly before the vital Madrid Tripartite Agreement of
November 1975, Boumedienne met President Ould Daddah at Colomb
Bechar, in South-West Algeria.	 There he seems to have urged him
to part company with Morocco warning of grave consequences should
he proceed with partition.	 Ould Daddah stood his ground,
incorporated the southern portion of the Spanish territory into
Mauritania in 1975,	 and, under pressure from Polisario
guerrillas, hastened in 1977 to sign a defence pact with Morocco.
Meanwhile France and Tunisia were recommending the division of
the Sahara between Morocco and Mauritania. 	 In the end the
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occupation of Western Sahara was accomplished by Morocco in
November 1975, as masses of 'volunteers' crossed the southern
border into the Sahara in what was described as the 'Green
March'.
There followed the Tripartite Agreement between Spain,
Morocco and Mauritania, which transferred responsibility for the
administration of the territory from Spain to the other two
states.	 While the phosphate deposits in the north were secured
by Morocco, the southernmost part of the territory was awarded to
Mauritania.	 Excluded from the final settlement the Algerian
government complained that the pledge of self-determination for
the Saharawi peoples had not been honoured. 	 Algeria was not
prepared to abandon its life-long commitment to the principle
long since accepted by member-states of the OAU including
Morocco.	 Since 1975 the renewed conflict between Algeria and
Morocco has been a focal point of the diplomatic efforts of the
two countries.
Towards a military solution? 
Political leaders generally manipulate national symbols for
their own purposes and the Maghrebin states are no exception.
Thus Hassan was able to use the Green March once again to link
his dynasty with a popular nationalist cause.	 Popular support
for Moroccan claims on the Western Sahara was clearly expressed
in the enthusiasm generated by the Green March, with its
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traditional and religious character. 	 Hassan had taken the
opportunity of the march to affirm an oath to abandon no part of
the newly acquired territory.
	 It was a massive demonstration of
popular fervour that could not be ignored either by the Moroccan
military, whose loyalty to the dynasty had so recently been
questioned, or by the opposition parties whether of the
nationalist right or the socialist left. 	 Indeed the parties
adopted a line even more strident than that of the King himself.
There were accusations of "collusion" directed at Algiers and
Madrid from lstiqlal on the right as well as from the USFP on the
left.	 Thg! Algerian foreign minister, Bouteflika, was nicknamed
Boutefrica, or divider of Africa, and portrayed by the Istiqlal
press with a colonial helmet accompanied by a dog labelled
Polisario. s
 But perhaps the most fervent defenders of Moroccan
claims to the Sahara have been the Moroccan Communists (Paz-ti de
Progres et de Soclalisme), whose general secretary had published
a book as early as 1972 entitled <Le Sahara Occidental Barocain>
1976 saw the beginning of extensive military operations by
Polisario guerrillas, in particular the Amgala I and II
offensives, in January and early February, which witnessed direct
military confrontation between Algerian and Moroccan troops.
That, and the creation of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic
(SADR) on February 28, and its recognition by Algeria a week
later, led Hassan to announce that the confrontation was not
between Moroccans and Saharawis, but rather between Morocco and
Algeria, with Algeria fully engaged behind Polisario.
	 After
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Amgala II Hassan offered the Algerians a choice between all-out
war or a negotiated peace.	 In November 1977 Morocco accused
Algeria of supplying troops as well as arms and vehicles to the
Polisario forces, and warned of 'hot pursuit' and retaliation by
Moroccan troops against bases in Algeria should the attacks
continue against "Moroccan borders", 6	 The Algerian media
responded in much the same tone.
Moroccan foreign policy has criticised the 'intransigence' of
the Algerian leadership that has so far prevented a negotiated
settlement.	 The Polisario guerrillas are presented as
'mercenaries', camped in Algeria and dependent on the Algerian
authorities for their very existence. Behind the threats of 'hot
pursuit' is a clear preference for a political solution rather
than a military confrontation which would be disastrous for both
sides.	 The desire to renew negotiations with Algeria over the
Issue is reflected in the willingness of Morocco to play down, if
not renounce any further claims over Algerian territory in return
for Algerian recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the Western
Sahara. In this context the Moroccan foreign minister, Mohammed
Boucetta, who is also the leader of the Istiqlal nationalist
party, declared in October 1977 that
for me there is only one problem in the Maghreb, that of
the Sahara...I do not make a point of the border
controversy with Algeria; the only problem is Algeria's
attitude towards Moroccan and Mauritanian Sahara. 	 For
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us, as for our Mauritanian brothers, the recovery of
these territories is definitive and irreversible.7
Algeria, on the other hand, does not admit to being directly
concerned in the conflict and rejects the view that it is one
between the two leading Maghrebin powers. 	 Given her own long
struggle for independence and self-determination Algeria cannot
deny material and diplomatic support for Polisario in its present
campaign on behalf of the Saharawi people.	 But Algeria insists
her government cannot speak for Polisario or represent it in
negotiations.	 It maintains it has no independent territorial
claims over the Western Sahara but that its case is based on UN
Resolution 1514 (xv) concerning the "offering of independence to
colonised peoples".
	 And in various international and African
forums the Algerian government has argued further that the
problem in the Western Sahara is one of de-colonisation,
involving both Morocco and Mauritania as the new occupying
powers.
This view has won increasing support, particularly within the
OAU whose members are particularly sensitive to questions of de-
colonisation and receptive to the principle of self-
determination. On the other hand it has made little headway with
the conservative majority of the Arab League who reject the
parallel with the Palestine Liberation Organisation. They have to
confront demands for autonomy on the part of ethnic minorities
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and continue therefore to affirm the essential unity of the Arab
nation.	 Where Algeria has preferred to take the issue to the
OAU, with its more sympathetic audience of African Heads of
State, Morocco has been able to count on the support of the other
Arab monarchies as well as the more conservative Arab regimes.
The period of most acute tension between Algeria and Morocco
coincided with a marked deterioration in Franco-Algerian
relations following the racist and anti-Algerian campaign which
developed in France in the mid 1970s, The new French President,
Valery Giscard d'Estaing, elected in 1974, had initially hoped
for better relations with Algeria, with its large surplus of
cheap energy. Relations quickly deteriorated, however, after the
French intervened militarily in North West Africa, ostensibly to
protect their expatriates working in Mauritania and exposed to
Polisario raids.	 In reality the French seem to have been
supporting Morocco as part of a concerted effort to isolate and
de-stabilise 'revolutionary' Algeria.	 This became more obvious
in 1977 when the French deployed Jaguar aircraft, stationed in
Senegal, to attack Polisario bases close to if not inside
Algerian territory.	 The French raid coincided with joint
military efforts by France and Morocco to suppress rebellion in
Shaba province of Zaire in 1977 and again in 1978, and to
safeguard the conservative regime of Mobutu Sese Seko against
forces attacking from across the Angolan frontier.
	
For three
years (1975-78) Algeria was indeed isolated and threatened by a
Paris-Rabat-Dakar-Nouakchott axis.
	 The isolation was only
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relieved in July 197S when a coup in Mauritania removed the pro-
French government of Mokhtar Quid Daddah and substituted a regime
that was anxious to end the conflict with Polisario, restore
security within the troubled Mauritanian state, and arrest the
country's economic collapse.
Because of Mauritania's economic and military weakness it had
been the prime target for Polisario raids that soon demoralised
the administration and severely disrupted the economy, dependent
as it is on the extraction and export of iron ore. The racial
and other tensions within Mauritania also meant that a section of
the population, the young in particular, not only opposed the
continuing war in Western Sahara, but openly expressed their
sympathy with Polisario. 	 They perceived the war as a
'fratricidal' one and insisted that Moroccan aims in the 1970s
were the same as in the 1960s	 then they were against
Mauritania, now it was Western Sahara. 	 Mauritania should
therefore be supporting Polisario and Algeria. It was the bait of
partition, the promise of French protection and the veiled threat
of Moroccan intervention that had ensured the 'voluntary'
collaboration of Ould Daddah.
Immediately following the coup in Nouakchott, Polisario was
able to announce a unilateral cease-fire on the front with
Mauritania, while the new regime sought a rapprochement with
Algeria - recalling the good relations that had persisted between
the two countries prior to the Tripartite Agreement of 1975. In
- 86 -
August 1979 Mauritania concluded a peace treaty with Polisario in
Algiers.	 At the same time Mauritania renounced all claims on
the	 Western	 Sahara	 and	 recognised	 Polisario	 as	 the
"representative of the Saharawi people". 	 It subsequently
'restored' to Polisario the southern part of the Sahara (Tins Al
aarbiya) which it had occupied in 1975, although Moroccan troops
pre-empted the move by occupying the territory first. Where the
Algerian media welcomed the Mauritanian action as a "victory for
reason", the Moroccan press denounced it as "unconditional
surrender".
The Mauritanian coup marked the lowest point in Moroccan
fortunes, before the construction of the sand walls which would
effectively secure the perimeter of Western Sahara from outside
penetration.	 Moroccan troops occupying the territory, who now
numbered upwards of 150,000, had suffered several important
reverses and morale was	 reported	 to be dangerously low.
The Algiers Agreement effectively isolated Morocco which had
already been put into a minority position at the previous OUA
summit in Monrovia. 	 Even the French, confronted by austerity
and rising unemployment at home, had hastened to lower their
military profile in Africa, shifting their attention to the
resource-rich states of Central Africa which made a positive
contribution to the French balance of payments.
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Towards a diplomatic solution?
At the start of the 1980s Morocco felt vulnerable and
isolated.	 Despite the deployment of large military forces the
country's perimeter was now more extensive and more difficult to
secure.	 The initiative remained with Algeria and the small
Polisario forces whose successful attacks inside Moroccan
territory, in 1979 and again in 1980, were aimed not at
inflicting	 military	 defeat	 but	 at	 weakening	 Morocco
diplomatically.
	 They were scheduled for the eve of the OAU
summits at Monrovia and Freetown, in 1979 and 1980 respectively,
before the Non-Aligned summit held at Havana in 1979, and prior
to the debate on the Western Sahara at the UN General Assembly in
October 1980. Meanwhile the death of Boumedienne at the end of
1978 and the appointment of Benjedid Chadli as Algerian
President, early in 1979, held out some prospect of diplomatic
contact between the two Maghrebin powers - some four years after
relations had been severed.
The nationalist IstiVal press in Morocco continued to single
out Algeria rather than Libya or the Soviet Union as "the major
threat to our territorial integrity" e
	As Libya could not
intervene directly in the Western Sahara dispute, notwithstanding
its support for Polisario, it was clear that without Algeria
there would be no war. Algerian backing for Polisario was also
apparent in other diplomatic quarters.
	 The same newspaper
insisted that Algeria was supporting Iran in the Gulf war "solely
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because Iraq had refused to recognise Polisario". 9 Government
moves for a rapprochement with Algeria were criticised by
Istiqlal as a sign of weakness. Another political movement, the
Moroccan Socialist Party (USFP), had earlier criticised Moroccan
overtures to the new Algerian government, arguing that the move
would be misinterpreted and would lose Morocco the support of its
traditional allies "first in Black Africa, then in Europe, and
after that at the United Nations". 10
There were nevertheless signs of rapprochement between Rabat
and Algiers in October 1980.	 An attack on the border town of
M'Hamid was attributed by King Hassan not to Algerian provocation
but to an outside conspiracy directed against both states. Using
the occasion of the state opening of parliament, Hassan suggested
that others (perhaps Libya?) were seeking to de-stabilise the
region by engineering a war between Algeria and Morocco.
Meanwhile the tragic earthquake at Al Asnam, in October 1980,
enabled the King to express his condolences to President Chadli.
The Moroccan people were invited to assist the victims of the
earthquake by donating the skins of the three million sheep
ritually slaughtered during the religious festival of sacrifice
(Aid Al Adba).
	 Such gestures of good will failed, however, to
persuade Algeria to abandon the cause of the Saharawi.
	
The
Algerian economy had benefited from the oil price rise of 1979
and there was still considerable diplomatic capital to be made
from the government's support for Polisario and for the principle
of self-determination.
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The question of the Western Sahara was finally included on
the agenda of the OAU summit scheduled for June 1981. This was a
victory for Algeria as previously Hassan had been able to
circumvent discussion of the issue by threatening to quit the OAU
along with a number of other conservative, francophone states.
In 1981 Hassan had to agree to the holding of a referendum on
self-determination for the Western Sahara although the terms of
the consultation were not specified. Where Algeria and Polisario
wanted it held under UN auspices and only after the withdrawal of
Moroccan administration, Rabat wished to supervise and administer
the consultation. In any case the issue for Morocco was one not
of self-determination but the re-affirmation of the ethnic,
cultural and historical ties between the disputed territory and
the Moroccan throne.	 It was a question of national re-
unification, following colonial intervention and misrule. 	 For
Algeria the issue was national independence for the people of the
Western Sahara from colonial rule first under the Spanish and now
under Morocco and Mauritania. Even more basic was the question
of the electorate : who was entitled to vote?	 Here Morocco
insisted on the results of the Spanish census held in the mid
1970s, which recorded some 60-70,000 Saharawi inhabitants. 	 At
the same time Morocco saw Polisario as unrepresentative of those
inhabitants and as mercenaries in the pay of Algeria and, more
recently, Libya. Algeria estimated that Saharawi population more
generously at 100-300,000 and insisted on the representative
nature of Polisario.
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Time, however, was on the side of the Moroccans who began in
the 1980s to receive substantial financial assistance from Saudi
Arabia as well as large supplies of military equipment from the
United States - mainly with a view to containing the Libyan
'threat' in the Sahel and strengthening the conservative Arab and
African regimes.	 Morocco was thus able to embark on the
construction of the multiple and extended sand walls, heavily
mined and containing sophisticated electronic censors capable of
detecting movement in the surrounding desert. This substantially
limited the effectiveness of the small Polisario forces while it
also served to reduce Moroccan casualties and to relieve some of
the pressures building up around the throne, most notably from
the army.	 And while phosphate prices remained low, the sudden
and steep drop in oil and gas prices, beginning in 1981 and
continuing through the mid 1980s, combined with the inefficiency
of Algerian industry and agriculture to cause considerable
financial embarrassment to the new Algerian administration.
The result was a hardening of the Moroccan attitude as the
administration temporised about the promised referendum on the
Western Sahara - finally opting to withdraw from the OAU in
1984. Hassan nevertheless claimed that
With or without a referendum the western Sahara is and
will continue to be Moroccan territory.. .Even if the
result of the referendum were to be negative, incredible
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as that may seem, nothing will force us to hand over the
Sahara on a silver plate to a bunch of mercenaries."
However, Hassan never lost hope of extracting concessions from
Algeria, particularly after the reconciliation summit between
Chadli and Hassan, held in February 1983. Chadli himself wanted
to improve economic ties between Algeria and its Maghrebin
neighbours and to expand regional trade. While Algeria was
particularly anxious to secure new markets for its surplus oil
and gas production, Morocco continued to import most of its oil
from Iraq. After the summit there seemed to be steady progress
towards a full normalisation of relations. In April 1983 the
border between the two states was re-opened to allow Moroccans in
Algeria and Algerians in Morocco to return to their homes.
Algeria now held that a solution to the Western Sahara
problem lay in improved economic cooperation between the
Maghrebin states. There were projects for the joint exploitation
of the Gara Jebilet iron ore deposits, situated on the Algerian-
Moroccan border, as well as proposals for a gas pipeline through
Morocco and under the Mediterranean to Spain - the counterpart of
the pipeline that now supplies Algerian gas to Italy. The
Moroccans, who import their energy requirements from abroad,
might be allowed access to this gas at concessionary prices.
There was even talk of reviving the idea of a Maghreb Common
Market - first launched in the mid 1960s when it had quickly
lapsed for want of trade as much as for lack of political will.
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In some very limited respects the Algerian and Moroccan economies
are, indeed, 'complementary' with Algeria's concentration on
heavy industry and energy-related sectors, and Morocco's emphasis
on import substitution and the production of consumer goods. But
the fact remains that trade within the Maghreb is but a minute
fraction of the trade that each year crosses the Mediterranean.
Any expansion of intra-Maghrebin trade would be dependent on
heavy investment from overseas that is unlikely to be forthcoming
in the present global economic context.
	 In any case serious
doubts will remain about the political will for cooperation
within the Maghreb as long as the conflict in Western Sahara
continues.
Algeria has continued to insist that there can be no military
solution in Western Sahara and that any negotiated settlement
must be between Morocco and Polisario.
	 However, to consider
these and other obstacles to Maghrebin cooperation, King Hassan
was invited to participate in a Maghrebin summit, to be held in
May 1983 in Algeria.
	 The summit was planned in advance by
Algeria and Tunisia, the two states drawing closer together as
the nucleus of a wider North African grouping.
	 President
Bourguiba was anxious to improve relations with Algeria in view
of the constant threats from neighbouring Libya : he also hoped
to create a climate conducive to closer Maghrebin relations that
would also ease the pressures on his own small state.
	 His
earlier diplomatic intervention, at the end of 1974, to effect a
diplomatic rapprochement between Mauritania and Morocco, had not
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been well received in Algiers by President Boumedienne. But there
was a new leadership in Algeria and Bourguiba wished to take
advantage of the situation to cement his own relations with
Algeria and to seek a reconciliation between Algiers and Rabat.
Hassan, however, was unhappy about the new Algerian-Tunisian
accord, which appeared to be directed as much against Morocco as
against Libya. As a result the meeting was boycotted by Morocco
and Libya and the immediate, if unexpected consequence, was the
Moroccan-Libyan 'union' concluded after Kadhafi's visit to Oujda,
in August 1984.
Far from creating a climate of detente, the 1983 meeting in
Algiers between Chadli and Bourguiba served only to deepen the
divisions within the Maghreb and to confirm the Libyan presence
within the Maghrebin system. Meanwhile the issue of the Western
Sahara remains unresolved despite the growing entrenchment of the
Moroccan forces. Not only does Morocco refuse to negotiate with
Polisario but as recently as 1984 Hassan was threatening to
revive the old border issue with Algeria, and his country's
claimc to the area of the Sahara around the Algerian town of
Tindouf -	 should Chadli continue his support for Polisario.
"When I went into exile with my father, in 1953, the stamp used
In Tindouf was that of the Sharifian Kingdom." 12 This veiled
threat followed a series of diplomatic reverses for Morocco.
These began in November 1983 when Mauritania announced that it
would recognise the SADR should Morocco fail to comply before the
end of the year with the OAU resolution demanding a referendum on
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self-determination. Like Tunisia, Mauritania was clearly anxious
to renew its former good relations with Algeria and, on February
27, 1984, Mauritania gave official recognition to the SAD.
Morocco's diplomatic isolation within Africa was now
complete. The admission of the SADR as a full member was on the
agenda of the OAU at its 20th summit in Addis Ababa, in November
1984.	 The conference followed several earlier (and abortive)
attempts to convene in Tripoli when Kadhafi had been ready to
exclude the Polisario delegation to ensure the success of the
summit and his own election as chairman of the OAU. At Addis
Ababa the African states, led by Nigeria, were looking for
consensus on the issues that had earlier divided them, including
Chad and the Western Sahara as well as the leadership of the OAU
for the next year. In Africa Nigerian support for the SADR proved
critical in winning over other 'moderate' states and providing a
majority for recognition of the proposed new state. Once the OAU
had agreed to full membership for the SADR, Morocco had little
option but to walk out of the summit. However, thanks to the
Nigerian stand and the ensuing divisions among the francophone
states, Morocco was joined only by Zaire - recalling Morocco's
earlier military support for Zaire at the time of the Shaba
Invasions in 1977/1978.
Already, in June 1984, President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire
had called on black African states to break away from the then
paralysed and largely ineffectual OAU and to form a new regional
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organisation - without the participation of the North African
states.	 In his view the conflicts in Chad and Western Sahara,
which had been largely responsible for the deadlock within the
OAU, were essentially Arab and not African problems and were
therefore the responsibility of the Arab League. In place of the
OAU he now called for the creation of a "League of the States of
Black Africa"!
3
 This was not the first time that a French-
speaking state had advanced such a proposal but it now coincided
with diplomatic efforts by Zaire and some other francophone
states to improve relations with Israel while distancing
themselves from their former Arab partners."- The Arab League
was, in any case, favourable to the Moroccan position on the
Western Sahara and Morocco had long argued that the Arab League
and not the OAU was the appropriate forum for any debate on the
Sahara.
After leaving the OAU Morocco would ask for full membership
of the European Community (EC) - a request that was later
repeated by King Hassan on the occasion of his visit to the
United Kingdom, in July 1987, but was rejected as incompatible
with the statutes of the EC. Morocco had also tried, through the
1980s, to implement a kind of Hallstein doctrine, severing
relations with states that recognised the SADR. But that policy
met with no greater success and, indeed, proved counter-
productive. Having severed ties with Cuba in April 1980, Morocco
then broke with Yugoslavia in 1984.
	 As these were leading
members of the Non-Aligned Movement the effect was only to
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underline the extent of Morocco's isolation - to the benefit of
Polisario and Algeria. In a message to the new Chairman of the
OAU, Julius Nyerere, King Hassan dated his country's withdrawal
from the twentieth summit which had seen the admission of the
Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic as the fifty-first member. He
complained that Article 4 of the OAU Charter had not been
respected by the majority at the summit and insisted that Morocco
did not, therefore, regard itself as being bound in any way by
Article 32 under which her withdrawal would only become effective
after an interval of a year.'6
The Arab states of the Middle East have been concerned lest
the Western Sahara conflict divert attention away from the more
important Palestinian issue and the continuing war between Iran
and Iraq. Most Arab states, being conservative and pro-western,
have nevertheless supported Morocco, and they include Saudi
Arabia and the conservative Gulf states as well as Jordan. There
was also Hassan's long and close relationship with the former
Shah of Iran and their joint identification with American policy
and western security. 	 He was thus singled out for particular
criticism from the new revolutionary regime in Teheran. This and
his public stand against the Ayatollahs won him considerable
sympathy and support from the Arab side of the Gulf. Conversely,
many Arab states were uneasy about Algeria's friendly relations
with Iran after 1979, although it could largely be explained by
Algeria's former opposition to the Shah. Even the alliance in
the 1980s between socialist Iraq and conservative Morocco was not
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that strange.	 Being opposed to Khomeini Hassan found himself,
after 1980, supporting Iraq in its confrontation with Iran, while
Iraq reciprocated, supplying Morocco with most of its oil.
TheIraqi leadership also resented the role Boumedienne and
Algiers had played in 1975 in hosting the conference called to
consider the dispute over the Iran-Iraq border.
	 The agreement
reached at that conference was later held by President Saddam
Hussein of Iraq to have been unduly favourable to Iranian
interests.
Tunisia, despite its weakness in terms of resources and
military power, was initially supportive of Morocco, while
President Sadat of Egypt met Hassan's request for aid by sending
shipments of arms, ammunition and spare parts. 16	Morocco and
its conservative Arab allies fear the creation of a 'mini'
revolutionary state along its southern border - just as
conservative Arab states in the peninsula (and Jordan) fear the
creation of a revolutionary Palestinian state which would
threaten existing regimes. More recently, however, Morocco has
COME under some pressure from America, France and Saudi Arabia -
all looking for flexibility from Rabat and a more positive
response to the new administration in Algiers. The decline in
oil prices was a major factor in Saudi pressure for a settlement,
as the Saudi government was heavily subsidising the Moroccan
campaign, including the construction of the defensive perimeter
around the Western Sahara. But King Fand of Saudi Arabia also
appears to be increasingly sympathetic to President Chadli's
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government in Algeria, perhaps because it is one of the few Arab
states to enjoy the confidence of the revolutionary leaders in
Teheran, Algeria seems a likely intermediary in any future peace
talks within the Gulf. Moreover, from the Saudi point of view, a
Moroccan-Algerian rapprochement would further the isolation of
Kadhafi. While King Fand undoubtedly feels closer to the Moroccan
monarch, it is unlikely that he would have condoned, let alone
approved the act of union signed by Hassan and Kadhafi in 1984.
Meanwhile the United States, having earlier supported
Morocco, its traditional ally in Africa and the Mediterranean,
has also modified its position in the light of Algeria's shift
away from 'socialism' and towards the West	 under President
Chadli. Washington is now ready to acknowledge that there is no
East-West component in the conflict over Western Sahara. This is
because Algeria, unlike Libya, is regarded as being genuinely
non-aligned.	 The United States is also aware of the rivalry
between Algiers and Tripoli and sees Algeria as a useful support
for Tunisia as well as an obstacle to Libyan penetration of the
Sahel. Algeria's role in securing the release in January 1981 of
the Americans held hostage in Teheran has also improved its image
with the American public as well as with the administration. In
the early 1970s Algeria had been regarded as a haven for
'terrorists' and for Black	 Power	 militants. For the Reagan
administration King Hassan II remains America's most reliable and
trusted ally in the Maghreb. But there are pressures for a more
even-handed approach not the least of which is the growing trade
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between America and Algeria - coupled with demands for some
reduction in military assistance to Morocco to offset the large
budget deficit.
The Algerian government is no doubt anxious for peace in the
region and for improved relations with Morocco.	 It would not,
however, be easy for President Chadli to abandon a cause with
which Algeria has been closely identified since 1975. That cause
is also enshrined in the Charters of the United Nations and the
OAU.	 Over sixty states, half of them African, have now
recognised the SADR, and the OAU at its Summit in 1983 clearly
identified Morocco and Polisario as the parties to the dispute -
thereby placing Algeria outside the conflict.	 Meanwhile
Polisario has grown into a relatively homogeneous and efficient,
if numerically small force. 	 It is well equipped with military
materiel and its combattants are highly trained and efficient.
Any agreement between Algeria and Morocco at the expense of
Polisario would cost Algeria a good deal of diplomatic support
among the African states that have now recognised the SADR,
although by way of compensation Algeria could expect to improve
her relations with the conservative majority of the Arab League.
Libya would doubtless be quick to take advantage of any break
between Algiers and the Polisario leadership, but Kadhafi is not
well placed to give direct military support to Polisario and in
any case needs Algerian support if only to shield his country
from further American reprisals. His own cavalier treatment of
the Polisario leadership at the time of the abortive Tripoli
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summit of the OAU and his recent reverses in Chad would suggest
reticence rather than a confrontation with the rest of the
Maghreb.
A lasting settlement of the Western Sahara issue would seem
to require some kind of diplomatic rapprochement between Algeria
and Morocco.	 President Chadli inherited the issue from his
predecessor when he took office in 1979.
	 He was not himself
directly involved in the events and actions of 1974-5 that
precipitated the conflict in the first place. Moreover, he has
had to confront new problems in the 1980s, with falling oil and
gas prices, a large population whose growth is outstripping any
improvement in Algeria's food production, as well as the steady
depletion of the country's oil reserves. Which means a search
for new policies, a review of existing partnerships, and some
attempt at reconciliation with old rivals and opponents.
	
King
Hassan is also under pressure to reach an agreement with Algeria
reinforced by the	 sharp decline in phosphate prices, the
mounting domestic debt and a poor harvest in 1987. It is
difficult, however, to see how Hassan can afford to make major
concessions over the Western Sahara, e.g.,	 involving the
organisation of a fair and free consultation on the issue of
self-determination.	 Having failed in his bid to absorb
Mauritania, he cannot afford a second defeat, whether diplomatic
or military.	 Sovereignty does not therefore seem to be
negotiable, at least for the present, but Hassan has indicated
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his willingness to consider granting the Sahara a measure of
autonomy.
Meanwhile Hassan has two main strengths. 	 He has 150,000
troops in effective occupation of the more settled areas of
Western Sahara and those troops are now protected by the
elaborate network of sand walls, electronic 'listening' devices,
and lethal minefields. Although still liable to the occasional,
surprise attack, the morale of the Moroccan troops would appear
to be better than in the late 19705 and early 1980s. Hassan's
other strength is the concern of other Maghrebin leaders, and
notably the Algerian government, with the stability of the region
as a whole, and their preference for the present regime in
Morocco - given the likely alternative in the event of a
successful coup.	 The Maghreb states are already more
'developed', in social as well as economic terns, than most of
their African and many of their Arab counterparts. Their elites
have come to see political stability and an orderly succession at
the top as a pre-requisite of further development. Hence the long
and delicate consultations that followed the death of Houari
Boumedienne in 1978; and the complex intrigue that led to the
replacement of President Bourguiba in 1987. Only Kadhafi's Libya
has an interest in regional de-stabilisation and an open contest
for power inside the other Maghrebin states.
Algeria's own concern for stability within the Maghreb is
well reflected in her relations with the left inside Morocco.
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Where the Moroccan socialists had since 1962 looked to Algeria
for support in their opposition to the monarchy, Algerian
governments have insisted that their revolution is for emulation
- but certainly not for export.
	 Even when Hassan was under
severe pressure at hone, in 1972, Boumedienne sought to maintain
friendly diplomatic relations with Rabat - no doubt with an eye
on the border agreement yet to be ratified by the Moroccan
parliament.	 In 1970i, at a time of mounting opposition to the
King, a number of political refugees from the Moroccan left were
forcibly repatriated to Morocco where they were tried and
executed.
	
Which doubtless contributed to the 'reconciliation'
effected between the Moroccan socialists and the throne in the
aftermath of the Green March. 	 It was then the turn of the
Algerian authorities to accuse the Moroccan left of betraying
their cause and departing from the message and the example of
earlier socialist leaders like Mehdi Ben Barka who was
assassinated in France in 1965, at the instigation of the (then)
Moroccan Minister of the Interior, General Mohammed Oufkir.''
Despite its rivalry with Morocco, Algeria has a strong
interest in maintaining the monarchy in Rabat. It bears witness
to the revolutionary and republican credentials of the Algerian
rulers - all the more important as the emphasis of the regime has
begun to shift from socialism to a form of economic liberalism.
Even more important, however, it serves as an insurance against
the advent either of a more stridently nationalist regime, with
its base in the Moroccan army, or, much less likely, of a left-
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wing revolutionary regime, close perhaps to Kadhafi or to the
Ayatollahs. The inherent conservatism of the Algerian rulers was
never more clearly demonstrated than in their continued support
for the regime whose claims to the Western Sahara they have been
contesting for over a decade. The explanation for this apparent
paradox is simple. While the Algerian state is the embodiment
of the revolution, which has been institutionalised and
Internalised within the army and the bureaucracy, it is the
function of Algerian diplomacy to maintain stability within the
region, permitting economic forces to complete the social
transformation that began with independence in 1962.
Conclusion 
There is no doubt that the primary importance of the Western
Sahara lies in its untapped mineral wealth, including iron ore
and, above all, an estimated 1.7 billion tons of phosphates -
reportedly the largest deposit in the world. This can be seen as
the major contributing factor to Moroccan intransigence over this
territory.	 Rabat no doubt estimates that, with the riches of
Western Sahara, it can counter Algeria's economic superiority and
advance a more credible claim to Maghrebin leadership. Hence the
commitment by the Moroccan government, in 1977, to a massive
civil aid programme, entitled the "Emergency Plan" and costing
$260 million to administer. 19	Indeed, the very size of the
Moroccan investment in the otherwise small territory, and the
cost of its recently completed and very elaborate fortifications,
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is a major incentive for the government to continue its present
occupation.	 To surrender the territory to Polisario, with its
pro-Algerian leanings would be to confirm
	 Algeria's present
dominance, both political and economic, within the Maghreb.
	 It
would also provide Algeria with an outlet to the Atlantic while
limiting the potential for economic growth in Morocco itself and
barring any further territorial expansion. Even the Secretary-
General of the Moroccan Communist Party, All Yata, warned in 1980
against the machinations of Algeria whose purpose was to prevent
Morocco "achieving its territorial unity".''
Meanwhile Algerian-Moroccan relations are likely to remain
strained as long as the conflict in Western Sahara persists. The
attempt to impose a military solution would benefit neither side.
At a press conference in Marrakesh, in March 1985, King Hassan
acknowledged
I have a code for war : if you cannot defeat your
adversary within a generation, then do not go to war
against him. Morocco cannot defeat Algeria and Algeria
cannot defeat Morocco.2°
A generalised war within the region could prove catastrophic for
the two principal antagonists, particularly in the present highly
unfavourable economic climate.
	 In numbers and materiel neither
military has a clear advantage and both are now heavily dependent
on the United States for military supplies and equipment -
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although Algeria still has large stocks of Soviet arms, tanks and
aircraft.	 It is unlikely that either super-power would want to
risk a direct confrontation here - or that the French and
Americans would long tolerate an armed conflict in such a
sensitive strategic area. 	 The main beneficiary of such a
conflict could only be Libya. Meanwhile the 'war of attrition'
continues and is both difficult to manage and costly to run.
Hassan undoubtedly has more at stake, including his throne.
He has the problem of trying to keep the Western Sahara without
waging all-out war against Algeria. 	 And at home there is
mounting pressure for the 'democratisation' of political life
which threatens the regime's fragile domestic base. The strikes
of 1978 interrupted the "social peace" which the King obtained as
a result of his Green March in 1975. The food riots of 1984 were
a further reminder of the domestic problems facing the monarchy.
The Western Sahara campaign in its initial stages was a great
propaganda success for the throne - which received unprecedented
support across the whole spectrum of Moroccan parties, from
IstiVal on the Right, to the Communists and Socialists on the
Left. The occupation of the Sahara remains a unifying crusade
within the country and would therefore seem to be a condition for
future domestic stability.
For the Chadli administration the war in the Western Sahara
provides a sense of national mission and a measure of continuity
with the Boumedienne regime at a time when the government is
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abandoning many of the political symbols that were central to
the revolutionary state. Moreover, for Algeria the costs of the
war are largely indirect - mainly the loss of potential markets -
although the economy can ill afford the present high levels of
military spending. The fact remains that the present stalemate
reflects both the success of Algerian diplomacy and the ingenuity
of the Moroccan strategists and their American advisers. 	 The
completion of the sand walls and construction of the defensive
perimeter gives the Moroccans effective territorial control of
the disputed territory. 	 Pending a satisfactory plebiscite,
however, their occupation has yet to receive international
recognition. Hence the importance of India's recognition of the
SADR in October 1985. This marked the successful culmination of
a long campaign to secure international recognition for
Polisario, a campaign conducted for the most part by the Algerian
foreign ministry. Where Nigeria had earlier given a lead to the
other states of the OAU in recognising the SADR,
	 India's
decision is likely to reflect the opinion of a majority within
the Non-Aligned Movement.	 Which is not, however, to overlook
either the military potential of Algeria (and Polisario), or the
diplomatic support that Morocco can command from its Western
allies and within the Arab League.
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CHAPTER FOUR : ALGERIA AND TUNISIA 
The problems of a small state 
Tunisia is the smallest state in the Maghreb region in terms
of territory and, like Mauritania, is weak militarily. The main
objective of her foreign policy is therefore to ensure the
survival of the state largely by a policy of appeasement directed
at her more powerful and radical neighbours, Libya and Algeria.
In the 1960s the image of a 'revolutionary' Algeria was perceived
as a threat to Tunisia's security and stability. From the early
1970s, however, the threat seemed to come rather from the eastern
frontier and the new radical regime of Muammar Kadhafi. Tunisia
hastened, therefore, to settle its differences with Algeria
looking for protection from that quarter against Kadhafi's more
provocative policies whch included a proposed 'union' between
Libya and Tunisia.
	 This move by Kadhafi, in January 1974,
coincided with the opening in Tunisia of the so-called
'succession' crisis - following a sudden and marked deterioration
in the health of the President. The crisis would not be resolved
until 1987 and for much of the intervening time Bourguiba often
seemed preoccupied with the need to reinforce his personal
authority and to emphasise his control of policy, domestic and
foreign.	 Where Bourguiba had initially accorded a rather
favourable reception to the Libyan proposals of 1974 the
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administration soon returned to its more traditional concern with
survival which meant closer ties with Algeria.
From this point of view the beginning of the de-colonisation
crisis in Western Sahara, in 1975, was unfortunate as Bourguiba
had been personally involved in the negotiations that led to the
tripartite agreement. The Tunisian President seems to have been
concerned to avoid a breach between Algeria and Morocco at a time
when Kadhafi was switching the direction of Libyan policy away
from Egypt and the Sudan and towards the Maghreb and the Sahel.
Through the 1960s Tunisia had consistently opposed Moroccan
designs on Mauritania, identifying instead with the policy of
self-determination and independence supported also by France and
the great majority of francophone states. 	 By 1975 the
independence of Mauritania was no longer in question : indeed, it
was the decision by President Mokhtar Ould Daddah of Mauritania
to join with his former opponent,, King Hassan II, in the
partition of the Spanish Sahara that caused alarm and
consternation in Algiers.	 It even seemed for a time as if
Bourguiba's initiative would in fact provoke the very
checkerboard response which the Tunisian administration had
worked so long to avoid. Circumstances in 1975 worked to produce
a temporary alliance between Algeria and Libya, over the issue of
Western Sahara, and coinciding with the brief Tunisian-Moroccan
consensus over the sane question. Before long, however, Tunisian
policy had re-assessed the strength of Algerian sentiment in
opposition to the tripartite agreement and had begun to distance
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itself from the more aggressive, unilateral line adopted by
Morocco, beginning with the Green March. Algeria, for its part,
was hostile to Kadhafi's evident designs on the Sahel states and
suspicious of the new Libyan interest in the Maghreb region.
And, if the Tunisians were anxious to avoid a closer entente
between Algeria and Libya, Algerian policy-makers were just as
concerned to prevent a Tunisian-Moroccan alliance.
By now the problem was no longer one of differentiation, or
nation-building, which Zartman has identified as the main factor
contributing to 'checkerboard' politics in the 1960s.
	 That was
perhaps more of a problem for Polisario after 1975. But for the
existing states in North Africa it was rather a question of
'hegemony' - the search by states for a position of dominance
over their immediate environment. This was no longer defined, as
It had been in the 1960s, in terms of securing the inherited,
often artificial colonial frontiers. Instead it was the attempt
to maintain a rough but supportable balance of power within the
region, while seeking to exploit any opportunity that would tip
the balance decisively in favour of one's own state. Short of
internal collapse or intervention by a major external power, such
'opportunities' were likely to be few and far between. Colonial
withdrawal, as in the case of Mauritania and the Spanish Sahara,
therefore assumed more critical dimensions here - as in Djibouti
(Territory of the Afars and Issas) and, of course, southern
Africa - than in other areas of the continent where there were no
established states competing for dominance. The absence of real
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or effective 'power', far from being an obstacle to the emergence
of such conflicts, is in fact a stimulus, particularly in a
continent where 'instant' acquisitions are not easily had (or
retained) and where alternative routes to power, whether based on
industrial growth or other forms of resource accumulation,
involve lengthy and often painful adjustments - with little
certainty about the outcome.
After 1975 Tunisian policy was looking for an improvement in
relations with Algeria seeking to play down the inevitable
tensions that would continue to arise from time to time. Tunisia
derived a sense of security from her international status,
carefully nurtured by President Bourguiba. She was never likely
to follow Morocco into a kind of African and international
isolation - particularly as there were no tangible benefits
for Tunisia itself. 	 Tunisia's one real interest in the
Western Sahara was in containing the conflict and avoiding an
open confrontation in the region that would inevitably threaten
Tunisia's stability and perhaps its survival as an independent
state.	 As the conflict entered on a period of stalemate in the
early 1980s, with a political solution apparently as remote as
ever, Tunisian policy moved even closer to Algeria.
	 The high
point in this new understanding was reached in March 1983 with
the Treaty f Friendship between the two states, which would be
extended to include Mauritania before the end of the year.
Morocco and Libya were excluded from the Treaty apparently
because of their expansionist designs and their refusal to accept
existing (and formerly colonial) borders. They responded in 1984
with their own short-lived 'Union'.
This time the issue went far beyond the defence of frontiers
and the related issues of differentiation. 	 For the regional
powers, Algeria and Morocco, the rhetoric, the diplomatic
gestures and the military confrontation were necessary
ingredients in the struggle for regional 'hegemony'.	 For
Tunisia, as for Mauritania, however, the aim was not domination
but rather the need to avoid subordination or forcible
incorporation by one of the two major predators, Libya and
Morocco.	 Together with Somalia these two states have
consistently campaigned for the revision of colonial frontiers in
Africa to accommodate more 'traditional' affinities based on
language and history or,	 in the case of Libya, some
'revolutionary' and anti-colonial imperative.
	 However, foreign
policy is not the monopoly of the powerful, or of potential or
pseudo-powers, it is also the first (and perhaps the last) resort
of the otherwise powerless. Perhaps more than any other country
in Africa Tunisia has shown since independence that a state can
quickly develop a distinctive foreign policy that not only
secures the respect and attention of other states but by the same
token creates linkages with larger, more powerful international
partners - sufficient to deter the most predatory of neighbours.
Which is why the smallest African states are such keen
participants in African and international organisations. Under
Ould Daddah, Mauritania sought to publicise its role as a link
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between Arab North and Black West Africa and between francophone
and anglophone states.	 Hence its membership of the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), as well as its
participation in the more restricted West African Economic
Community (CEAO) and its efforts to attach itself to the Maghreb
Union and Algeria.	 Under Bourguiba, Tunisia aspired to be the
link between Maghreb and Machrek, as well as between Arab,
African and other members of the francophone community, and
between Western Europe, the Middle East and Africa.
From Suspicion to Understanding 
Tunisia had served as a sanctuary and base for Algerian
fighters from the beginning of Algeria's struggle for
Independence in 1954. An estimated 20,000 Algerian Moudjahidin
were stationed in Tunisia during that period.'	 It was their
presence that led, on February 8, 1958, to the bombing by the
French of the Tunisian border town of Sakiet Sidi Youssef. A
year earlier, in March 1957, President Bourguiba and Colonel Amar
Ouamrane, a prominent member of the FLN, signed the first formal
treaty ever concluded by the Algerian nationalist movement.
Under the terns of the agreement the traffic in arms across
Tunisian territory would be the responsibility of the country's
national guard, while Algerian wounded would be treated in
Tunisian hospitals. The FLN, for its part, agreed not to meddle
in the country's internal affairs and to limit its presence to
areas officially designated as Algerian National Liberation Army
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(ALN) camps.
	
As Tunisia would in future deliver arms only to
accredited units of the FLN, the FLN gained a useful means of
leverage over dissident groups while Tunisia increased its own
leverage over the FLN.	 In 1957, too, Bourguiba succeeded in
moving the FLN seat of command from Cairo to Tunis where it would
be subject to his moderating influence. And in April 1958 there
was the Tangiers conference in Morocco between the Algerian FLN,
the Tunisian Neo-Destour and the Moroccan Istiqlal parties. The
purpose of such a meeting would seem to have been the
confirmation of a Maghreb identity which would better enable the
participants to resist Nasser's revolutionary influence which was
then expanding throughout the Middle East.
The quartering of a big Algerian force - larger than
Tunisia's own army - on Tunisian territory was bound to provoke
friction.	 The government was under constant pressure from the
loosely organised and imperfectly controlled guerrillas as well
as being subject to threatened retaliation by the French. There
were protests from the Algerian leadership when Tunisia agreed,
in 1958, to a French request to receive the oil pipeline from
Ejele, in Algeria, with its outlet in the Tunisian port of La
Skhirra.	 Bourguiba, moreover, found it difficult after 1962 to
accommodate the revolutionary rhetoric of an independent Algeria
which identified with the 'progressive' Arab states, led by
Nasser's Egypt, rather than with the more 'moderate' camp of
which Tunisia was a prominent member. And here, as elsewhere in
Africa, independence
	
brought the inevitable crop of border
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disputes which, as Zartnan has pointed out, were such a prominent
feature of African international relations in the 1960s, Prior
to 1970 Tunisia sought to advance her claims to a part of
Algerian territory, citing the controversial nature of the French
frontiers in the Sahara, drawn up shortly before Tunisian
independence in 1956 and favouring Algeria which was then still
under French control.
	
In 1970, however, Tunisia and Algeria
concluded a Treaty of Brotherhoodand Cooperation, valid for
twenty years."' This was the result of efforts by the Algerian
Foreign Minister, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, to persuade Bourguiba to
abandon his country's territorial claims on Algeria - which he
was in no position to enforce - in return for economic advantages
offered by Algeria.
Bourguiba in any case had long identified with the moderate
African consensus that insisted that existing frontiers could
only be altered by mutual agreement. 	 Hence his refusal to
support Morocco in 1963 when she attempted to assert her
sovereignty over what was now Algerian territory - and his
rejection of Moroccan claims on Mauritania. But Bourguiba had
even more pressing concerns in 1970. The emergence of a radical
regime in Libya, after the coup of September 1969, had been
enough to convince Tunisia of the need for a rapprochement with
Algeria - if only to avoid being squeezed by its two radical
neighbours who were already concerting their policies within the
Organisation	 of	 Petroleum	 Exporting	 Countries	 (OPEC).
Accordingly, the 1970 treaty between Algeria and Tunisia settled
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the border problem as Tunisian claims were withdrawn. 	 An
exchange of visits between Presidents Boumedienne and Bourguiba,
in April and May 1972, respectively, helped to symbolise the
search for detente and consensus in the Magrheb. But even such
manifest good-will on both sides could not conceal the underlying
differences, particularly of economic strategy, which helped
shape the direction of their foreign policies. While the state
played a prominent role in economic management in both Algeria
and Tunisia, the relatively liberal and pro-western economic
policies of Tunisia were in marked contrast to the state
socialist policies in force in Algeria after independence.
Tunisia's friendship with the West, especially with France and
the United States, was yet another obstacle to closer Maghrebin
cooperation across the Algerian-Tunisian frontier.
Algerian-Tunisian relations since 1973 have been defined
largely by Libya's expansionary policies directed at Tunisia,
Chad and the Sahel, and by Morocco's irredentist policies aimed
at the incorporation of most of the Western (former Spanish)
Sahara.	 While the first seemed to require an even closer
rapprochement with Algeria, the second created new sources of
tension between Tunis and Algiers which would not be overcome
until the early 1980s. Meanwhile, a deterioration in the health
of the Tunisian President in 1974 raised the issue of the
succession just as the Maghreb as a whole was entering a new
phase of tension, with the imminent risk of armed conflict
between its two major powers. Co-habitation in Tunisia, between
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the President on the one hand and his Prime Minister and
government on the other, also entered a long and increasingly
troubled period, The broad lines of the country's foreign policy
remained intact but there was less cohesion and consistency in
its application and increasing confusion about the source of
policy-making.
The Western Sahara : a new source of tension 
As in the case of Algerian-Moroccan relations, the conflict
in the Western Sahara after 1975 served to revive earlier
mistrust and to aggravate existing tensions. Bourguiba had been
the first head of an Arab State to recognise Mauritania, and even
to encourage and facilitate its membership in the United Nations,
thereby provoking a crisis with Morocco.
	
In the case of the
Western Sahara, however, Tunisia failed to recognise either
Polisario or the SADR.	 Instead Tunisia aligned itself with
moderate Morocco while trying to limit the damage to her
relations with Algeria. 	 Thus, in October 1975, Bourguiba
expressed the hope that the issue would not affect his country's
ties with Algeria. He recalled that President Boumedienne
had himself confirmed to me that the only thing that
concerned Algerians was the evacuation of the territory
by the Spanish. In the light of this I advised Morocco
to review the future of the territory in association with
Mauritania.3
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It seems probable that Bourguiba played an active role in the
reconciliation between Mauritania and Morocco at the end of 1974
that made possible the tripartite agreement over the Western
Sahara in 1975 - when Bourguiba again seems to have been
prominent.	 President Boumedienne does not appear to have
anticipated the switch by Mauritania, from her former ally,
Algeria, to an alliance with her 'traditional' antagonist,
Morocco.	 This reversal of the normal pattern of alliances in
the Maghreb threatened to exclude Algeria from any direct role in
the outcome of the issue - and, more important, to effect a
significant change in the balance within the Maghreb in favour of
Morocco.
Algiers then stepped up diplomatic and military support for
Polisario threatening to involve the Maghreb as a whole in a much
wider and possibly prolonged confrontation. Libyan backing for
Polisario left Tunisia in an exposed and rather vulnerable
position as Bourguiba attempted literally to 'mend his fences'
with Algeria by advocating a negotiated solution within the
Maghrebin framework.	 This became much less viable after King
Hassan's Green March into the Western Sahara in 1975 and the
occupation of the territory by Morocco and Mauritania.
	 The
conflict entered yet another and more serious phase in 1977, when
President Giscard d'Estaing of France authorised the use of
French Jaguar aircraft, operating from French military bases in
Senegal, to attack Polisario guerrillas based in Algeria. When
Houari Boumedienne then called on Tunisia to condemn the French
-118-
action,	 Bourguiba refused to do so. Irritated by Bourguiba's
failure to support the Algerian position, Boumedienne seems to
have offered 'support' to the domestic opponents of the Tunisian
regime.
Given the deterioration in the domestic climate since the
opening of the 'succession' crisis, in 1974, this gesture assumed
a more significant and threatening aspect - although it is
doubtful whether Algeria had any real diplomatic interest in
provoking unrest in a neighbouring state. Nevertheless, Kadhafi
later alleged that a commando attack in January, 1980, on the
town of Gafsa, in Tunisia, which was an open attempt to de-
stabilise Bourguiba's regime, was originally prepared not by
Libya - as was generally believed - but by Boumedienne. Although
the raid was first conceived
	 in 1978, before the Algerian
President's death, there was connivance by some of his advisers
in its later execution.
	 Kadhafi conceded that the arms and
finance for the Gafsa affair were supplied by Libya but
complained that
it is unjust to say that we were responsible for the
affair. The real instigator was Boumedienne, who asked
for my help.	 He is dead but his collaborators who
organised the affair are alive and with us...One day, in
January 1978, Boumedienne returned from Tunisia in a
furious mood, having had an altercation with the then
Prime Minister, Hadi Nouira, and the Defence Minister,
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Abdullah Ferhat.	 I believe they had refused to condemn
the intervention of the French Jaguars in the Western
Sahara...Thereupon Boumedienne telephoned me to ask for
our collaboration in a scheme to shake up Tunisia and
overthrow Nouira.4
Tunisia nevertheless refrained from denouncing Algerian
involvement, despite further rumours that a section of the
commando, armed and trained by Libya, had in fact reached Gafsa
via Algeria - and that there had been some collaboration from the
Algerian authorities, albeit without the knowledge and approval
of the new Algerian President, Chadli Benjedid. 	 If true,
Kadhafi's account would suggest that Algeria's involvement was
the work of Boumedienne's associates who, perhaps, did not wish
to see an improvement in Algerian-Tunisian relations at the
expense of Algerian-Libyan ones.	 Meanwhile Bourguiba may have
calculated that, while reconciliation with Bounedienne would have
been difficult if not impossible, his successor, Chadli, might be
better disposed - coming as he did from eastern Algeria,
bordering on Tunisia. Where Boumedienne (and Kadhafi for his own
purposes) may have sought to exploit the 'succession' crisis in
Tunisia, there was nothing to prevent Bourguiba (and again
Kadhafi for his own purposes) seeking to take advantage of the
change of leadership in Algeria.
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Perhaps it was to prevent such a rapprochement, between
Bourguiba and Chadli, that Kadhafi had hastened to implicate
Algeria in the Gafsa affair. He may even have been assisted by
those members of the 'old guard' in Algeria who feared and
resented the prospect of a more 'liberal' economic regime after
1979, and a movement towards a more 'balanced' position in
international politics. Certainly Bourguiba had every reason to
work for closer relations between Tunisia and Algeria. 	 In the
last resort, he could expect to receive French and American
support in any confrontation with Libya, but he might not be able
to count on the same degree of cooperation in the case of a
conflict with Algeria. And Bourguiba's pragmatism would in any
case restrain him from involving his country in any permanent
tension with his more powerful neighbours.
Towards mutual understanding in the 1980s 
In fact relations between Tunisia and Algeria had evolved
considerably starting as far back as 1979 when Chadli had relaxed
restrictions on Algerians travelling abroad, particularly to
Tunisia,	 mainly in search of goods not readily available in
their own 'controlled' market.	 That summer some 350,000
Algerians were able to visit Tunisia. Meanwhile Tunisia, which
lacked econOmic resources and needed fresh revenues, was promised
a share in the proceeds from Algeria's exports of gas to Italy -
through a projected pipeline to be constructed across Tunisian
territory.	 Tunisia's energy requirements would also be
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supplemented by the same pipeline. There were, however, tangible
limits to cooperation between the two states set in part by
Tunisia's	 frequent	 appeals	 for	 an	 Algerian-Moroccan
reconciliation on the issue of the Western Sahara. In September
1979 Tunisia had proposed to convene a summit between Algeria and
Morocco to find an exit from the Western Saharan impasse. There
was a favourable response from Morocco who had always insisted
that the real conflict was between itself and Algeria. Algeria,
on the other hand, rejected the proposal recalling that the issue
was rather between Morocco and Polisario.
It is wrong to ask Algeria to play the same role on
behalf of the Saharawi people that Egypt plays vis-a-vis
the Palestinians...Regional and international organis-
ations are agreed in insisting that the population of the
Western Sahara should freely determine its own future.s
There was again irritation in Algiers, in January 1982,
following a statement by the Tunisian Prime Minister, Mohammed
Mzali, once more inviting Algeria and Morocco to engage in
negotiations on the western Sahara.
	 Relations deteriorated
further, in February 1982, after the Tunisian delegation had
withdrawn from the summit of the OAU to which the SADR had just
been admitted. The Tunisian authorities, for their part, did not
take kindly thsconnent by the Algerian media concerning Tunisia's
close relations with the United States as revealed by Prime
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Minister Mzali's visit to the United States in April 1982. There
he had signed an agreement for the purchase of American military
equipment.	 The mounting tension between the two countries
resulted in the partial closure of their common border in the
summer of 1982.
	 Other, contradictory pressures were also at
work,	 however,	 and in favour of an Algerian-Tunisian
rapprochement.
Under Boumedienne Algeria had maintained good relations with
Libya while relations with Tunisia had cooled considerably
following Bourguiba's intervention in the Western Sahara issue in
1974-5.
	 Atfer 1979
	 President Chadli sought to reverse the
direction of his predecessor's foreign policy.
	 Libya's new
involvement in the Maghreb and, above all, her military
intervention in Chad, and her involvement elsewhere in the Sahel
- notably attempts at de-stabilisation in Niger and Mali in
particular - all posed something of a challenge to Algeria's own
ambitions in the francophone (and Islamic) territories south of
Tamanrasset.	 But the real motive for the change of policy
towards Libya was the determination of the new Algerian
leadership to break with the economic policies of previous
administrations and to compensate for rapidly falling oil and gas
prices by wooing western energy consumers while offering
Incentives for private capital investment at home. Algeria could
not change the broad outlines of her foreign policy without
losing friends, face and identity.
	 The administration could,
however, place less emphasis on radical rhetoric and more on
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pragmatic solutions, particularly in the economic sphere, without
repudiating all the policies and commitments of the previous
regime.
By distancing itself from Kadhafi's Libya the new
administration could extend the available range of options and
partners without sacrificing existing allies.
	
By looking for an
accommodation with Tunisia, Chadli might hope to ingratiate
himself with Bourguiba's main western partners, France and the
United States.	 And Algeria was much better placed to help
contain Libyan expansion westwards than Tunisia or even Morocco.
Finally, the cordial relations that Algeria enjoyed with the
revolutionary regime in Iran after 1979 greatly increased her
value as intermediary particularly with western governments whose
nationals were held hostage in Teheran or Beirut. Without the
Iranian revolution it would have been exceedingly difficult for
President Chadli to establish good relations with the Reagan
administration after 1981, and the government of Jacques Chirac
in France after 1986.
Meanwhile Tunisia was the main beneficiary of the change of
direction in Algerian policy after 1979 and the growing distance
between Algiers and Tripoli.
	
There were tangible gestures of
good will towards Tunisia including the condemnation in 1983 of
an Algerian officer detained earlier for his role in the Gafsa
raid of January 1980. On March 19, 1983, Chadli himself visited
Tunisia and Joined with Bourguiba in signing the Treaty of
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Friendship between the two countries.
	 The treaty, valid for
twenty years, was to be the basis for a wider Maghrebin alliance
whose rules of association manifestly excluded those states like
Morocco and Libya that rejected the political status quo in
favour of expanded frontiers, were ready to resort to force to
secure their territorial objectives, and failed to respect the
sovereignty and political independence of other states.
	 In May
1983 it was the turn of Bourguiba to visit Algiers for the second
'summit' meeting, at which Tunisia undertook to endorse the right
of the Saharawi people to self-determination.6
The meeting in May 1983 was heralded as a Maghrebin summit,
yet there was little chance that either Kadhafi or Hassan II
would attend.
	 Instead Bourguiba and Chadli were joined by the
Mauritanian President, Quid Haidallah who, at the end of the
year, also signed the Treaty of Friendship. 	 If the Treaty was
supposed to be directed mainly against Libya, the effect was
undoubtedly to isolate Morocco, in geographical as well as
diplomatic terms - in an attempt to force Hassan to make
concessions over the Western Sahara.
	 Instead Hassan surprised
almost everyone by signing the Moroccan-Libyan 'Union of States'
in August 1984.
	 The Union threatened to tilt the balance of
power in the region in favour of the Moroccan-Libyan axis, given
the human and military potential of Morocco and the large
military arsenal stockpiled by Libya. To offset this discrepancy
Algeria made formal approaches to the United States while
President Chadli became, in April 1985, the first Algerian
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President officially to visit Washington. The Reagan administrat-
ion then agreed to sell American weapons to Algeria which, like
Libya, had traditionally purchased its arms from the Soviet
Union.
When Tunisia was threatened by Libyan provocations in the
summer of 1985, President Chadli openly assured Bourguiba of
Algeria's readiness and determination to protect Tunisia against
any outside intervention. 	 Meanwhile trade between Tunisia and
Algeria quadrupled during 1984. 	 Algeria's rapprochement with
Egypt, in 1985, also seems to have been a diplomatic echo of the
Oujda agreement between Morocco and Libya. 	 Where Egypt, under
Presidents Sadat and Mubarak, had maintained close relations with
Morocco, Cairo may now have wished to indicate its unease at
Hassan's new alliance with Libya. 	 Likewise the French, the
Americans and the conservative Arab monarchies displayed varying
degrees of astonishment and disapproval of the Moroccan action.
It is doubtful whether Hassan II ever took the 'Union' with Libya
as anything other than a diplomatic ploy - to counter Algeria's
threats of encirclement and isolation and as a warning to his
Western allies not to take Moroccan support for granted. While
Morocco and Libya shared expansionist designs the prospects for
practical military collaboration were almost nil.	 But the new
agreement did have the useful effect of stopping further Libyan
supplies of arms for the Polisario guerrillas. Where Boumedienne
had resented Algeria's exclusion from the tripartite agreement of
1975, Hassan was now displaying similar pique at his country's
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exclusion from the Treaty of Friendship which suggested 	 a
privileged status within the Maghreb for Algeria and Tunisia.
Morocco could not accept subordinate status within a regional
alliance where the terns of entry were in fact being dictated
largely by Algeria.
Where Bourguiba had chosen Morocco as a privileged partner in
the mid 1970s, the continuing threat from Libya dictated the
alliance with Algeria in the 1980s, 	 Tunisia was ideologically
closer to Morocco while Algeria and Libya both claimed to be
'radical' and 'revolutionary'.	 But fear of Libya prompted the
re-alignment of Tunisia with Algeria, while Algeria took the
opportunity to re-assert its own leading role within the Maghreb,
scoring off its rivals in the process. Assured of Algerian
support against Libya, Tunisia could resume the search for a
diplomatic settlement of the Western Sahara dispute. Meanwhile
Algeria hoped to improve its own position in any future talks on
the issue.	 Like Tunisia, Algeria under President Chadli was
greatly concerned about Libyan intervention in West Africa and
the Sahel, and the possibilities for Libyan mischief-making in
the Maghreb itself.
Hence Algeria's alarm at the prolonged succession crisis in
Tunisia and the more recent conflict between the Tunisian
government and the Trade Union Confederation (UGTT) 	 which, in
the view of Algiers, has Kadhafi's support. And, whereas Morocco
has failed to ratify her border treaty with Algeria, Libya is the
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one state adjoining Algeria which actively persists with her
territorial claims.
	 Perceptions like the above led Algeria to
deploy its troops, en masse, along the Libyan frontier at the end
of 1985. 7
 That also help to explain why the Chadian President,
Hissene Habre, who in 1983 was described by Algeria as an
"American puppet", had two years later become a "nationalist
patriot" and the leader best placed to defend Chadian national
unity.. 6'	 For Algeria
	 the continuing conflict in the Western
Sahara was a dangerous distraction from the real problems
confronting the Maghreb, notably the economic crisis and the
opportunities for Libya to exploit that crisis. However, the
immediate effect of the 'Friendship Treaty' was to threaten
Morocco with encirclement and isolation - prompting the 'unholy'
alliance with Libya.
Indeed, the Moroccan-Libyan Union threatened to turn the
tables and outflank both Algeria and Tunisia. Superficially, it
was the 'checkerboard' pattern once again - but this time with
the wrong partners 	 On closer examination it is clear that, far
from marking a revival of 'ideological' confrontation, focussed
on 'bad neighbour' relations, the division of the Maghreb into
two rival camps in 1983-4 was not based on ideology - Libya and
Morocco had even less in common, ideologically, than Algeria and
Tunisia : Algeria and Libya, Morocco and Tunisia were the
appropriate 'ideological' pairs.
	 Rather it was dictated by
'realpolitik' and cold, calculating 'rationality', at least on
the part of Morocco. Realpolitik would also determine the end of
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the unlikely alliance in 1986 - given Morocco's evident
reluctance to repudiate the American attack on Tripoli and
Bengazi, and her failure to honour the terms of the 'Union' by
offering military support to Libya. Which is not to say that the
'Union' had no rational base.
	 Morocco and Libya appeared as the
two 'revisionist' states, bent on territorial acquisition, while
Algeria, Tunisia and now Mauritania were anxious to preserve at
least the territorial (if not the economic) status quo.
Differentiation, boundary de-limitation and nation-building were
largely irrelevant here.
	 Instead, the real issues concerned
state-building, boundary revision and the regional balance of
power. The main parties to the dispute were possessed of large,
modern armouries and the capacity to deploy them.
	 And if the
alliances were in the end makeshift and failed to result in new,
broader and more coherent groupings that surely reflects the
international context and the wider pressures acting on the main
participants, and their own perception of their immediate
interests rather than the rigid logic of the 'checkerboard'
pattern of relations.
In Tunisia, the combination of the 'succession' crisis,
apparently resolved only towards the end of 1987, and the
continuing Libyan 'threat', following Tunisia's rejection of
Kadhafi's proposed union in 1974, effectively pushed Tunisia into
closer alliance with its far larger neighbour, Algeria.
	 The
alliance, cemented in 1983, was certainly facilitated by the
change of leadership in Algeria as a pragmatic style of diplomacy
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- already obvious under Boumedienne - was wedded by Chadli to the
promise of greater economic liberalism.	 But the real basis of
the Friendship Treaty was the growing political and constitut-
ional crisis inside Tunisia itself. 	 Tunisia has always
relied on the French or Americans to provide the necessary
'protection', while trying to buy additional security 	 by
involving itself in numerous international agreements - to such
an	 extent that a Tunisian presence and a certain Tunisian
'style' are deemed indispensable to the transaction of a wide
range of diplomatic business.
Since 1979 Tunis has played host to the headquarters of the
Arab League - precipitating an Israeli attack on Tunisian
territory in the aftermath of the hijacking of an Italian cruise
liner.	 The incident seems to have somewhat shaken Bourguiba's
usual confidence in his diplomatic skills : and it undoubtedly
helped undermine the confidence of the domestic political elites
in his conduct of affairs of state.
	 In these rather ominous
circumstances it became apparent to many interested observers
that the govenments best placed to intervene in the 'succession'
crisis were those of Tunisia's neighbours, Libya and Algeria.
From the viewpoint of the Tunisian elites and of the Western
powers, mainly France and America, closer Algerian involvement to
guarantee internal stability and a broad continuity of policy was
preferable to Libyan de-stabilisation.
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Bourguiba himself was reported to have told the French
Foreign Minister, Roland Dumas, in the summer of 1985
I am concerned about Tunisia's security after my death.
You	 must know that I have confided its security to
Algeria and to President Chadli Benjedid.9
The fall of the Prime Minister, Mohammed Mzali, in 1986 did not
seriously damage Algerian-Tunisian relations, although Mzali had
been one of the architects of the Treaty of Friendship and was
held in high esteem in Algiers.	 Indeed, Algiers helped
facilitate his flight to Switzerland after his dismissal by
Bourguiba - notwithstanding a Tunisian warrant for his detention.
Nevertheless, the new Prime Minister, Rachid Sfar, paid an
official visit to Algiers in October 1986 and the Tunisian
authorities were careful not to criticise the Algerian action.
Heading the agenda for his talks with President Chadli was the
question of "economic complementarity" between their two
countries - whose economies have both been seriously hit by the
current economic crisis. The subsequent replacement of Sfar and
the appointment of yet another Tunisian Prime Minister, in 1987,
signified the climax of the 'succesion' crisis. 	 It would be
resolved at the end of the year as the new Prime Minister, Ben
Ali, a former Minister of the Interior, who was also a general
and had long been responsible for security, deposed the senile
President and himself assumed the office. All indications are
that the substitution was effected with the knowledge and
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cooperation of the Algerian government - and, presumably, with
the support and connivance of the French and American
authorities.
	
With Ben All as the new President, the former
Ambassador to Algeria, Hedi Beccouche, was then nominated Prime
Minister.	 He had been prominent in the negotiations that
preceded the signing of the Friendship Treaty and his appointment
was popular with the government in Algiers.
	
It also provided
tangible evidence, if any were still needed, of the mutual
confidence and the close ties that now exist between Algeria and
Tunisia.
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CHAPTER FIVE : ALGERIA AND LIBYA 
FROM ALLIANCE TO LATENT CONFRONTATION 
Libya : between the Machrek and the Maghreb 
Of the Maghreb states it is Libya which most closely
approximates Zartman's model of a Third World state with an
"underdeveloped" foreign policy.
	 Isolated in North Africa
between former British and French zones of influence an
independent Libya had to secure its frontiers and its control of
its new-found oil wealth while at the same time seeking to
integrate its small but dispersed population and to define its
place in the Middle East and its role in the Arab world.
Following the defeat of the Arab states by Israel in 1967 King
Idris and his advisers were unable to contain the upsurge of
national Arab sentiment, particularly in the military, whose
officers had been strongly influenced by Yasserism and by anti-
colonial sentiment at least since the time of the abortive Suez
expedition in 1956. Pan-Arabism was the dominant sentiment among
the young officers who seized power in Tripoli in 1969 at a time
when Nasserism was on the decline elsewhere in the Middle East
and, most notably, in Egypt itself.' Where Nasser at the end of
his life may well have identified with the new Libyan leadership
and with the youthful enthusiasm and militant ideals of Muamnar
Kadhafi, it was the pragmatic and 'moderate' Anwar Sadat who
succeeded Nasser upon his death in 1970.
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Kadhafi was never reconciled to the advent of Sadat who
quickly managed to consolidate his rule by appealing to Egyptian
national sentiment and contrasting his own secular, liberal views
with the more extreme, less tolerant version of Islamic socialism
associated with Kadhafi and his 'revolution' in Libya. Nor would
Kadhafi ever be reconciled to his deliberate exclusion from the
Arab coalition that planned and executed the successful crossing
of the Suez Canal at the outset of the Yom Kippur war in 1973.
The determined opposition of Sadat had effectively blocked
Kadhafi's attempt unilaterally to impose a Libyan-Egyptian merger
on the eve of the war.
	 After the conflict, Kadhafi found his
aspirations for Arab leadership in the Middle East blocked by
Egyptian military strength and by the growing economic power of
the Saudis and their conservative allies in the Gulf. While the
separate peace treaty concluded between Egypt and Israel, in
1979, divided the moderate camp and led to Egypt's exclusion from
the Arab League, the headquarters were removed to Tunis and not
to Tripoli.	 Kadhafi's isolation was soon more complete and
lasting than that of Egypt.
It was Egyptian not Libyan forces that crossed the canal in
1973. It was Saudi Arabia (and Kuwait) and not Libya who had the
final word within the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting
Countries.	 It was Syria that intervened in the Lebanese civil
war early in 1976 Just as it would return a decade later,
registering its interest in the future of that troubled territory
as well as its claim to a prominent place in any future
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international conference on the Middle East. In 1979 Kadhafi was
upstaged by the Iranian Ayatollahs in his efforts to exploit the
revolutionary potential of Islam.
	 Morocco hosted the Arab
summits of 1981 and 1982 while it was Algeria that finally
organised the Palestinian conference of April 1987 in a partially
successful bid to reconcile the factions that had been warring
openly since the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Libya had
more success in Africa where its arms and subsidies enjoyed a
small but appreciative audience. There, too, however, there were
serious setbacks.
The fall of Amin in Uganda in 1979 saw the hasty evacuation
of perhaps three thousand supporting Libyan troops.
	 Kadhafi's
shift of attention to the Sahel in the 1970s, which coincided
with the severe drought in the region and a weakening of France's
economic role, also failed to bring the hoped-for results.
Whatever influence Libya may have achieved with Presidents Hamani
Diori of Niger and Francois Tombalbaye of Chad, did not long
survive their removal in 1974 and 1975 respectively.	 In the
Sudan, Nimeiry, the one-time revolutionary, was more than a match
for Kadhafi until the 1980s brought insurmountable economic
problems and a recurrence of the earlier civil war in the south.
Popular unrest and military intervention finally secured his
removal in April 1985.	 But here, as in Liberia, Ghana and
Burkina Faso, new and often junior military leaders seem to have
used the threat of a rapprochement with Libya mainly to ensure a
continuation of financial support from other, more traditional
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quarters - namely the United States, France and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF).
There are some obvious (if limited) similarities between the
Libyan approach to foreign policy under Kadhafi and the
aggressive policies pursued by Ghana under Kwame Nkrumah after
independence in 1957.
	 Both leaders have been described as
charismatic.	 Both were concerned to centralise power in their
own hands as well as to project a radical, anti-colonial image of
their respective countries on the international and African
scene.	 By articulating distinctive foreign policies each hoped
to create an identity for his state and to define a mission that
would enable them to transcend the territorial and other
limitations of their post-colonial inheritance. 	 While Nkrumah
and Kadhafi did both, in their different ways, work to forge a
sense of national rather than 'tribal' or 'parochial' identity,
neither made any real attempt to give substance to the notion of
a 'national' interest as such, other than in a negative anti-
colonial, anti-western context.
Nkrumah's pan-African zeal had its counterpart in Kadhafi's
pan-Arab enthusiasm. But where pan-Africanism was finally buried
at the constituent summit of the OAU, in 1963, pan-Arabism
received its formal quietus in 1967 after the Arab defeat at the
hands of Israel. In both cases ideology was used as a substitute
for effective power, and there was a preference for rhetoric in
place of stable alliances grounded on firm national and material
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interests.
	 Nkrumah committed himself to the Union of Ghana,
Guinea and Mali as the microcosm of a United States of Africa.
Kadhafi, too, sought union, first with Egypt, Syria and the
Sudan, then with Egypt in 1973, with Tunisia in 1974, with Chad
in 1981, with Morocco in 1984, and most recently with Algeria,
in 1987.
	 Threats of subversion and 'terrorism' also featured
prominently in the vocabulary of the two states as foreign policy
came increasingly to resemble a 'spoiling' operation.
	 'Bad
neighbour' relations were largely the order of the day between
Ghana on the one hand and the adjoining countries on the other -
at least until 1965.
Much the same has been true of Libya's relations with the
adjacent states since the arrival in power of Kadhafi.
	 In the
final analysis, however, neither Ghana under Nkrumah nor Libya
under Kadhafi has had the power to impose itself, even on its
immediate environment.
	 Confronted by impending international
isolation, and threatened reprisals, Nkrumah and Kadhafi have
sought relief and a measure of security through more conventional
diplomacy. Where Nkrumah had finally in 1965 to come to terms
with African 'realities', namely the weight of moderate Nigerian
influence and the strength of conservative francophone
resistance, Kadhafi, two decades later, has had to conjure with
the reality of Egyptian power and American as well as French and
African resistance. In both cases the outcome was concerted
pressure by neighbouring states and other interested parties to
isolate the 'contagion' and to try and enforce on the
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'delinquent' states a greater measure of conformity with accepted
international diplomatic practice.
Algeria and Libya : allied in "the struggle against reaction" 
Libya's growing association with the Maghreb (and with West
Africa) dates largely from 1973 and was a direct reaction to
Libya's exclusion from the Arab-Israeli war of October 1973.
While certain other Arab leaders, including President Boumedienne
of Algeria, were given advance notice of the war, Kadhafi had not
been among them. Sadat had little use for the Libyan leader's
revolutionary rhetoric - and still less for his pretensions to
leadership of the Arab world. His efforts to impose an Egyptian-
Libyan union on the reluctant Sadat culminated in July 1973 in a
threat by Kadhafi to lead a peaceful invasion of Egyptian
territory. The enterprise was halted only by the threat by Egypt
to use force to repel any such incursion.	 The October war
produced a marked shift in Libyan priorities : pan-Arabism lost
ground as Kadhafi focussed on 	 the wider struggle against
'imperialism' which began, not in the Sinai or along the Golan
heights, but in Africa and at the frontiers of the Libyan state,
themselves part and parcel of the alien colonial order. Kadhafi,
together with the Iraqi President, Ahmed Hassan Al Bakr, declined
to attend the 'victory' summit of the Arab League held in Algiers
at the end of Movemnber 1973. 	 He described it as a
'capitulation' summit.
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Boumedienne strongly criticised the action of the Libyan and
Iraqi leaders which detracted from the Arab cohesion that had
been one of the more remarkable features of the recent war. But
even the Algerian leader does not appear to have anticipated
Kadhafi's next move which was a widely publicised attempt at
fusion with Tunisia, in January 1974, The Dierba agreement, which
carried the signature of the Tunisian Foreign Minister, was
accompanied by broadcast appeals from Tripoli calling on
Algerians to rise in revolt against their government. For their
part the Algerians were anxious for closer economic cooperation
with their immediate Maghrebin neighbours, but they were no more
receptive than. al. Anwar Sadat to Kadhafi's appeals for political
and territorial union. And where Kadhafi had not been consulted
In advance about the October war, it was now the turn of the
Algerians to complain that there had been no diplomatic contact
with Tripoli or Tunis before the proposal for union had been
published.
Bourguiba's own role and motivation in the affair remains
obscure. He may at first have favoured closer economic. ties
with Libya hoping thereby to develop his economy - and large
numbers of Tunisian workers were soon employed in Libya, to some
extent replacing earlier Egyptian workers, while their
remittances helped swell Tunisia's reserves of foreign currency
which had been depleted as a result of the steep increase in the
price of imported oil during the previous year. 	 Bourguiba may
also have hoped to exercise a moderating influence on the young
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and idealistic Libyan leader - at a time when the French
government was anxious to secure supplies of oil from Libya in
exchange for sales of military hardware and jet fighters.
Algiers seems to have had considerable misgivings about the
new direction in which Libyan policy was moving. After a visit
by Kadhafi to Cairo, in February 1974, Boumedienne reminded his
Algerian audience of their country's own revolutionary heritage.
Kadhafi declares that he is a Nasserite but we are
neither Nasserites nor anything else.
	 We are simply
revolutionaries,	 We have survived the revolution which
gave birth to us. Kadhafi speaks of revolution but where
is this revolution?
	 He says that he nationalised his
oil! But we did that a long time ago.2
By the end of 1975, however, as the Algerian government feared
diplomatic isolation over the Western Sahara, or a possible
military confrontation with Morocco whose army was now quartered
in the occupied territory, it turned for assistance to Libya.
The threatened union of Libya and Tunisia had proved abortive and
the two North African members of OPEC were already collaborating
inside that organisation to try to maintain the real value of the
price increases won in 1973 - and against strong resistance from
Saudi Arabia.	 After a series of talks in Algiers and Tripoli
the Algerian President was therefore able to describe Libya as "a
natural ally in the struggle against reaction".3
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In December 1975 an important agreement was concluded between
the two states at Hassi Messaoud, in southern Algeria, under
which the two Heads of State agreed to assist one another in case
of outside aggression. 	 For the first time Libya was openly
admitted to partnership within the Maghreb.
	 Despite the
agreement, however, and a succession of meetings, the Libyans
held back from recognition of the Saharawi Arab Democratic
Republic (SADR).	 Indeed, Libya did not recognise the SADR until
April 1980 - more than four years after the announcement of its
creation, and only after thirty-seven other states had given
their recognition, including some twenty-one African states.
Together with the majority of member-states of the Arab
League, Kadhafi is opposed to the creation of multiple Arab
entities which it is feared would detract from the ideal of pan-
Arab unity. And like most other Arab and African states, Libya
has experienced the damaging effects of ethnic/communal and other
internal tensions.	 However, Kadhafi has been favourably pre-
disposed towards the Saharawi cause if only on account of his
particular hostility to King Hassan II of Morocco, and his
disaffection towards the Arab monarchies generally.
	 Libya's
support for the agreement with Algeria was especially welcome in
Algiers where the government suspected and feared French and
American complicity in the demands being advanced by Morocco.
In February 1976 Kadhafi and Boumedienne went so far as to agree
to a detailed study of ways and means to implement the "organic
ties" between their two countries, thus helping to realise their
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"common destiny". 4.	 Which seemed to be a diplomatic way of
calling attention to their readiness at least to consider a
fusion of their two countries.
Under the 1975 agreement each of the two countries was
obliged to come to the assistance of the other in case of
extenmAL threat or aggression.	 Two years later, however, in
July 1977, it became clear that Algeria would not allow itself to
become involved in Libya's border clash with Egypt. Nor did it
support Libyan aid to Idi Amin's regime in Uganda, or to Jean-
Bedel (Emperor Jean) Bokassa's self-styled Central African
Empire. As the initiative for the Algerian-Libyan entente came
mainly from 'above', it did not comply with Boumedienne's later
conditions for a 'Maghreb of the peoples'.
	
In any case, with
Boumedienne's death in 1978, relations between Algeria and Libya
suffered a gradual but steady deterioration.
	 While the new
Algerian administration was mending its fences with France and
the EEC in the early eighties, Libya stepped up its attacks on
French policy in Africa and, most notably, in Chad where Libya
had been supporting an opposition since 1968.
The end of the Algiers-Tripoli axis 
Meanwhile other African states registered their disapproval
of Libyan involvement in Chad and elsewhere on the continent by
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boycotting the O.A.U. summit due to have been held in Tripoli in
the summer of 1982.	 If, as seems likely, the intention was to
deny the chairmanship of the OAU to the Libyan leader, the
manoeuvre, largely coordinated by the more conservative franco-
phone states,	 was successful.
	 Libya's isolation was most
apparent in February 1983, when Kadhafi found himself effectively
excluded from talks aimed at achieving détente and an early
rapprochement between Algeria and Morocco. In February President
Chadli Beniedid met with King Hassan II - a move encouraged
by the Saudis and perhaps prepared at the Arab summit of
September 1982.	 The Libyans interpreted this as yet another
manoeuvre by conservative states to contain and isolate them -
just as Nkrunah's Ghana had been ringed by a cordon sanitaire
back in 1965. And, while Algeria had been seeking a diplomatic
accommodation with Morocco focussing on the vexed problem of the
Western Sahara, Libya had deliberately intervened to raise the
stakes,	 threatening
	 to outbid Algeria in its support for
Polisario.
On March 2, 1983, Kadhafi responded by making the quarrel
with Algiers official - demanding, in a broadcast speech, the
application of the Dierba agreement with Tunisia and the Hassi
Messaoud agreement with Algeria. Otherwise the Libyan government
would have to ' resort to violence in order to realise Arab unity
there would be an appeal to the Tunisian and Algerian peoples
over the heads of their respective leaders. s Kadhafi was even
reported at this stage to have threatened President Chadli with
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assassination.' Later in March President Bourguiba was received
in Algeria at a mini-summit which saw the conclusion of the
Treaty of Friendship between Tunisia and Algeria. The admission
of Libya to the Treaty would be subject to a resolution of the
outstanding differences between Algiers and Tunis on the one hand
and Tripoli on the other.
	 Tunisia's conditions included
delimitation of the continental shelf along the Gulf of Gabes and
an end to the training in Libyan camps of opponents of the
Bourguiba regime.	 Algeria likewise wanted agreement with Libya
on frontier demarcation - along the lines of similar agreements
with Tunisia, Mauritania, Mali and Niger - as well as an end to
Libyan subsidies for those groups in Algeria who were opposed to
the government and its policies.
	 Former president, Ahmed Ben
Bella was reported to have received $20 million from Tripoli.7
Where Kadhafi had once seen in Algeria "a revolutionary
sister state", °' he had quickly turned against the government of
President Chadli Benjedid, probably supporting the Islamic
fundamentalist group headed by Ahmed Ben Bella.
	 Kadhafi's
impatience with the Chadli administration seems to have grown
after the failure of the OAU to convene in Tripoli for the
nineteenth summit in 1982. While Algeria was willing to attend
that summit, President Chadli was also active in the negotiations
that finally led to the compromise decision to hold the 1983 OAU
summit in Addis Ababa, and to elect Colonel Haile Mariam Mengistu
as chairman in place of Kadhafi.
	 The fact that the moderate
African states had preferred a Marxist leader, allied openly with
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the Soviet Union and Cuba, to Kadhafi, did nothing to reduce the
latter's sense of growing isolation and encirclement. The Libyan
leader has also accused President Chadli of wanting to exercise
exclusive political influence over the Polisario Front while
Libya in fact provides it with some eighty per cent. of its aid.
Moreover, Algeria's policy of rapprochement with the Sahel
countries - Niger, Mali and Mauritania - was seen by Libya as a
move to thwart Kadhafi's proposed 'United States of the Sahara'.
Algeria had long been hostile to the Libyan annexation in
1973 of the Aouzou Strip in Northern Chad, partly because of her
own interest in the Sahel territories and partly because of
outstanding Libyan claims to Algerian territory.	 The Libyan
claim to the northernmost region of Chad is based on the Laval-
Mussolini accord of 1935,	 which awarded the Aouzou Strip to
Libya but which was never ratified by the French. Algeria has
submitted a counter-claim to the effect that the same treaty
wrongly incorporated the Ghat region from Algeria into south-
west Libya. The Algerian view is that existing borders offer the
only stable basis for African political and economic development.
The Algerian-Libyan frontier was defined by the Franco-Libyan
accord of 1956 which the French did ratify. Whether or not the
treaty gave an unfair territorial advantage to Algeria - which
the French still considered an integral part of the metropole -
is held to be beside the point.
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Algeria, with its own ambitions to play a leading role in
Africa, remains suspicious of Libya's quest for influence in the
continent and for a dominant role within the Sahel and, possibly,
the Maghreb.	 As the present balance of power in North Africa
favours Algeria, successive Algerian governments have identified
with the existing pattern of states inside	 their inherited
borders.	 President Chadli has been more concerned, at least
initially, to consolidate his domestic position and to provide
fiscal incentives and a liberal economic climate more conducive
to recovery and growth. He is understandably less sympathetic to
the regime in Libya than was the avowedly socialist Houari
Boumedienne.	 Thus Chadli repeatedly warned Kadhafi in 1981
that Algeria would not tolerate Libyan efforts at destabilisation
directed at Tunisia, Mali, Niger or what was then Upper Volta
(Burkina Faso). He publicly disapproved of Kadhafi's plan for a
merger with Chad and of his intention to garrison Libyan troops
there.	 "Episodes of this nature are likely to create unrest
within	 the	 region	 and	 invite	 colonialist-sponsored
provocations."9
The Sahel region, to the South of Algeria itself, has twice
suffered extensive drought in the course of the 1970s and 1980s
and includes a number of the poorest, most under-developed states
of the Third World.	 While Algeria has long contested the
dominant role of the French, the former colonial power, Algiers
Is unwilling (and probably unable) to compete with Libya and
others in the distribution of economic and military subsidies.
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Nor can the Algerian leaders exploit the same Islamic
'fundamentalist' appeals as their Libyan rivals. 	 Nevertheless
Algeria has closely monitored Libyan actions in Chad, at times
offering an alternative haven to the leader of the GUNT
opposition, Goukkouni Oueddei, whenever he sought to resist or
escape Libyan pressures.	 Algeria has also been wary of Libyan
support for various dissident groups in Niger - perhaps recalling
Xkrumah's much earlier support for Djibo Bakary - as well as its
sponsorship of an opposition movement in Mali, the Liberation
Front of Northern Mali. At a summit conference of the Saharan
states, held in Nouakchott, Mauritania, in March 1982, which
Kadhafi declined to attend, Chadli pointedly insisted on the need
for stability within the region if the governments were to begin
to tackle the many and serious problems comiromting its
peoples. '°
At the beginning of 1982 Kadhafi failed in yet another fusion
attempt - this time with Mauritania - despite a prior agreement
with the then Prime Minister, Sid Ahmed Ould Benejira. Nor did
Kadhafi succeed in an attempt to replace Algeria as the main
Influence behind Polisario , notwithstanding his disproportionate
contribution, in arms and money, to the liberation movement.
Finally, there was Libya's exclusion from the "Maghrebin
unification process" as Algeria looked for some way out of the
Western Saharan impasse, signing the Treaty of Concord with
Tunisia in March 1983. with which Mauritania was also to be
associated later that year. Under mounting African and Western
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pressure in Chad, Kadhafi sought to reinstate himself in the
Maghreb by trying to effect a reconciliation with his now
traditional opponent, King Hassan II of Morocco. 	 Where Hassan
would doubtless have preferred reconciliation with Algeria, the
latter's support for Polisario created difficulties for both
sides that were apparently insuperable. Libya on the other hand
had already shown its readiness to subordinate the interests of
Polisario to its own - when it was a question of Kadhafi's
ambition to become chairman of the 0.A.U. in 1982. Moreover, a
Libyan offer to withhold further supplies of arms from Polisario,
was attractive to the Moroccans as it would reduce the pressure
on their beleaguered forces until the defensive fortifications
around the Western Sahara could be completed.
The first meeting between Kadhafi and Hassan was from June 30
until July 3, 1983,	 This was clearly a response to the failure
of the earlier talks between Chadli and Hassan in February and
the Algerian-Tunisian 'summit' in March. Hassan was quickly able
to judge the repercussions on his African and western allies.
African support for Morocco had already been greatly weakened as
a result of Moroccan intransigence over the question of self-
determination for the Western Sahara. The leaders who remained
loyal to Rabat were mostly drawn from conservative, francophone
states, which looked to Morocco to contain the spread of Libyan
influence in West and Central Africa.	 Fear of an impending
reconciliation between Morocco and Libya had the effect of
pushing several of these states in the direction of Algiers.
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Morocco's reconciliation with their enemy (i.e., Libya) led them
to a rapprochement with Algeria, Morocco's traditional enemy.
After the June 1983 OAU summit at Addis Ababa, Senegal,
formerly a staunch supporter of the Moroccan position over the
Western Sahara, became reconciled with Algeria. The Senegalese
Head of State, Abdou Diouf, paid a visit to Algeria from 14-17
October 1983, where he called for direct negotiations between
Morocco and Polisario on a cease-fire and the organisation of a
referendum.	 That was an important and positive gesture in the
direction of his Algerian hosts. Diouf's visit was followed by
that of the President of the National Assembly in Guinea - also
an ally of Morocco - from October 17-20, 1983.
	 This, in turn,
was a prelude to the visit to Algeria of the President of Guinea,
Ahmed Sekou Toure, in 1984 and shortly before his death. Morocco
nevertheless decided to proceed	 with the controversial
'Union of States', concluding a treaty with Libya in August 1984.
This had its sequel at the OAU summit in Addis Ababa, in November
1984, when the SADR was admitted to full membership of the
African community - following formal recognition of the SADR by
Nigeria. Presumably the Moroccans had by then already discounted
the diplomatic fall-out that would inevitably follow this
uncertain alliance between two contrasting and formerly opposed
states.
By its treaty Rabat had succeeded in disconcerting former
opponents and allies alike. On paper the 'union' seemed to have
created a new and, from the Moroccan point of view, much
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more favourable balance of power within the Maghreb. If Morocco
had been defeated in the diplomatic sphere, Hassan had taken much
of the pressure off his forces which had long been on the
defensive inside the Western Sahara. He had bought time in which
to complete the sand walls that would soon surround the occupied
territory. Without a political settlement, however, he could not
legitimise what was, in effect, a military conquest. And there
could be no political settlement without Algerian support.
Inside Africa, Algeria had largely succeeded by diplomatic means
in isolating Morocco.	 The Friendship Treaty with Tunisia
threatened to rebuild the Maghreb essentially on Algerian terns
and with a privileged central nucleus comprising Algeria and
Tunisia.
The Moroccan-Libyan riposte threatened to outflank the two
more central states leaving Morocco and Libya free to pursue
their separate territorial ambitions. Morocco therefore abstained
from intervention in Chad while Libya withheld arms from the
Polisario guerrillas.	 King Hassan doubtless calculated that he
had much to gain, at least in the short term, and little more to
lose by his treaty with Libya. His Western and Arab allies would
no doubt disapprove, but were unlikely even to consider let alone
implement sanctions against Morocco.	 And withdrawal from the
OAU, while something of a tactical retreat, did not mean that
Morocco thereby cut itself off from the leading consrvative
African states, including Nigeria, Zaire, and Ivory Coast. While
African leaders continued to see Marxist and radical regimes as a
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'threat' to their own security, there would be a market, in
Africa and elsewhere,	 for the kind of military support that
Morocco was prepared to offer.
In the Maghreb there is now an Algiers-Tunis axis, with which
Mauritania is also associated.	 This is a replacement for the
Algiers-Tripoli axis that dominated Maghrebin politics between
1975 and 1979. More recently there has been the Libyan-Moroccan
alliance of 1984-6, that threatened to upset the balance in the
Maghreb and even to displace Algeria as the key, central power.
This, however, proved to be only temporary. It was in fact
defensive rather than offensive in character. The two regimes
were under severe military pressure abroad and financial pressure
at home.	 Each was isolated diplomatically - at least in the
African context - and there was the additional threat of
encirclement.	 Considerations of national security seem to have
been paramount where the Libyan and Moroccan leaders were
concerned, mixed with realpolitik or statecraft, and a will to
survive.	 The division of Africa into rival ideological camps
seems to have been largely irrelevant although it would be quite
wrong to suggest that the ideological divisions are no longer
there or that Africa is now aligned according to other issues.
The older problems do persist and the patterns of political
behaviour associated with them. 	 Where Tunisia's rapprochement
with Algeria in the 1980s has its explanation in the need to
counter Libyan threats, Algeria saw it as a means both to thwart
the Libyan drive for leadership in the Maghreb, and also to
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prevent a possible alliance between Morocco and Tunisia based on
similar ideological perspectives.
An examination of the patterns of alliance resulting from the
conflict in the Western Sahara suggests that raison d'etat was
featured more prominently than ideology in the behaviour of the
relevant African leaders.	 If the alliances were often short-
lived and inherently unstable it was not because the national
interests they served were ill-defined or incoherent, but rather
because rapidly changing circumstances after 1973, in the Sahel
and Western Sahara, as well as in Africa as a whole, forced
corresponding adjustments of foreign policy.	 It is significant
that diplomacy was preferred to open confrontation, certainly
where Algeria and Morocco were concerned. 	 But neither state
could in the 1970s and 1980s be described as powerless. It was
not so much lack of military capability that prevented outright
war as the realisation by both parties that armed confrontation
was unlikely to serve their national interest either in the long
or the short term. The response of the Maghrebin states to the
American raid on Libya in April 1986 was quite instructive in
this regard.	 Where the conservative and pro-western Moroccans
were embarrassed, not least because of their mutual defence
treaty with Kadhafi, the President of radical and non-aligned
Algeria, Chadli Benjedid, took the opportunity not only to
condemn the attack but also to criticise Kadhafi's position on
the question of 'terrorism'. While on a visit to Sweden, in late
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April, Chadli was reported to have told Swedish journalists that
Kadhafi is an old friend but we cannot accept the methods
Libya	 uses...People	 who are fighting for their
independence have the right to use what others may call
terrorism, but not in the territory of an uninvolved
friendly nation."
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CHAPTER SIX : LIBYA AND MOROCCO 
AN UNHOLY ALLIANCE 
Kadhafi : no love for Arab monarchies 
Since his overthrow of the Senoussi dynasty in Libya, in
1969, Kadhafi has not attempted to conceal his antagonism towards
the Arab monarchies which he perceives as anachronistic and which
he holds responsible for the backwardness, the weakness and
divisions of the Arab peoples. 	 For over a decade the Alawite
monarchy of Morocco was the target of Kadhafi's pan-Arab
nationalism. He openly celebrated news of the two coup attempts
in Morocco in 1971 and 1972 and expressed disappointment at their
failure. King Hassan II, on the other hand, has identified Libya
as the principal threat to the stability of his kingdom,
particularly through its encouragement and support for the
domestic opposition.	 Until the early 1980s relations between
Morocco and Libya were relatively uncomplicated, based as they
were on straightforward enmity.
The spectacular Libyan-Moroccan rapprochement of 1984 has to
be seen partly as a reaction against the isolation of the two
regimes, at both the regional and international levels, as a
result of their respective policies in Chad and Western Sahara.
Partly, too, it was engineered as a response to the Treaty of
Friendship concluded between Algeria and Tunisia in 1983.
Morocco was able to use the time gained to consolidate its
military position in Western Sahara while Libya experienced an
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uninterrupted series of military setbacks in Chad, following the
overthrow of Goukouni Oueddei as President of Chad and his
replacement by his former colleague in arms, Hisséne Habre, now
close to the French and the United States.
	 Mounting tensions
between Kadhafi and Oueddei, detained for a time in Libya, and
the African consensus in favour of the withdrawal of all foreign
troops from Chad, did nothing to relieve the sense of isolation
in Tripoli.	 Even in the face of the American attack in 1986
Kadhafi received no tangible support from any Arab state - having
to be content with expressions of regret at
	 the nature and
extent of American intervention whose ambivalence was doubtless
intentional.
Meanwhile Morocco's 'union' with Libya had served as a
warning to Hassan's western allies who were being actively
courted by the Chadli administration in Algeria.
	 Morocco also
secured an interruption in the flow of arms from Libya to the
Polisario guerrillas.	 It bought valuable time in which the
military could consolidate their defences and secure their
occupation of the Western Sahara.
	 Perhaps most important, it
distracted attention from the country's growing diplomatic
isolation and helped conceal Hassan's failure to deliver a
political, as distinct from a military settlement in the Saharan
conflict after a decade of hard campaigning. There had never been
any question of real integration between Morocco and Libya - just
as two decades before there had been no question of effective
integration between Guinea and Ghana. That union had briefly
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helped to rescue Guinea from economic collapse and diplomatic
isolation, whereupon Guinea had almost immediately begun to
distance itself from its English-speaking partner. In the light
of American sentiment antagonistic to Libya and the new, more
conservative government in France, since the elections of 1986,
Rabat concluded that the only realistic course was, after a
decent interval, to repudiate the agreement with Libya. Any
reluctance to quit the 'union' was largely on account of
	
the
financial benefits that had accrued to thousands of Moroccan
workers employed in Libya in place of 	 a similar number of
Tunisian workers expelled by Kadhafi in 1985.
The hostility between Kadhafi and Hassan II began soon after
the successful coup in Libya in 1969 and the establishment in
Tripoli of the Revolutionary Command Council under Kadhafi's
leadership.	 Libya had even sent a premature message of
congratulations at the time of the attempted coup against Hassan
in July 1971. Early in 1973, after Hassan had despatched Moroccan
troops to Syria, in the aftermath of Israeli raids on Lebanon and
the shooting down of a Libyan civilian airliner, Libyan Radio
criticised the Moroccan action accusing the King of attempting to
rid himself of revolutionary elements in the Moroccan army. The
car
Libyan media were also responsible rbroadcasts directed, twice-
weekly, at Morocco and the other Maghreb states.
	 These
encouraged Moroccan soldiers to rebel against the monarchy and
dismissed Hassan's support for the Palestinian cause as no more
than verbal platitudes, while he himself was described as being
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'soft' on Israel. Supporters of the Moroccan opposition had the
opportunity to publicise their cause in regular broadcasts in
both Berber and Arabic languages.
	 The authorities in Rabat
responded with just one radio programme, beamed at Libya on a
twenty-four hour, non-stop basis, and consisting exclusively of
the sounds of yapping dogs.'
The October 1973 war against Israel brought a respite in the
media war with the suspension - on October 13 - of Moroccan
transmissions denouncing the Kadhafi regime. It was presented as
a gesture of Arab solidarity in a time of crisis and came after
Libya had agreed to facilitate the transit of Moroccan troops to
the 'front'.
	 Despite his rejection of those conservative Arab
leaders whom he accuses of treachery and corruption, Kadhafi has
usually presented himself as working for Arab unity and against
any further 'balkanisation' of the Arab camp.
	
Thus, while
Kadhafi was increasingly alienated after 1973 by the
conservative, pro-western bias of the Arab League, dominated by
Egypt and the wealthy oil-producing monarchies, he did take the
opportunity in 1975 to associate himself with the Maghrebin case
for de-colonisation in the Spanish Sahara. In 1975 Libya went so
far as to applaud Moroccan policy on the Sahara, offering to
provide troops to assist Morocco and Mauritania in their campaign
against the Spanish presence. While diplomatic relations between
Libya and Morocco had been broken in July 1971, as a result of
Libya's support for the abortive military coup of that month
-157-
against Hassan, they were resumed from January, 1975, at an
ambassadorial level.
In June 1975. Moroccan journalists visiting Tripoli were told
of Kadhafi's willingness to place his army at the disposition of
Morocco so that "its" Sahara might be liberated. After reminding
his audience of his opposition to the multiplication of separate
national entities, and the division of "the Arab nation", Kadhafi
declared
It is important for the Moroccan people to know that it
has an ally in the Libyan Arab Republic. Morocco is a
part of us and we are a part of it. We will therefore be
at its side when it engages in the struggle for the
liberation of Ceuta, Mellila, Rio d'Oro and Saquiet Al
Hamra.
After Spanish withdrawal from the Western Sahara
	 and the
transfer of responsibility to Morocco and Mauritania, Libya
like Algeria, gave its support to the Polisario Front whose aim
has been the complete independence of the territory.
	 Kadhafi
seems to have reasoned that support for this genuinely
revolutionary force would help unseat the obsolete and decadent
dynasty in Morocco, and that Arab unity could then be realised in
accordance with revolutionary principles and with Kadhafi's own
designs.
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Fragmentation of the Arab nation was to be avoided at all
costs - the experience of British 'de-colonisation' in the Gulf,
after French 'de-colonisation' in North Africa was sufficient
proof of the dangers of 'balkanization' and the creation of mini-
states dependent on and subservient to western interests.
Arguing from these premises Kadhafi seems to have inclined
initially towards the incorporation of the whole Spanish Sahara
into Mauritania.
	 But when Mauritania and Morocco became joint
beneficiaries of the tripartite agreement, and proceeded to
occupy and partition the territory, Kadhafi announced his support
for the Saharawi nationalist movement, Polisario, supplying it
with arms and equipment along the so-called piste de Kadhafi,
(Kadhafi trail), through southern Algeria and northern Mali. To
justify this shift of position Kadhafi maintained that the
liberation of the Western Sahara and its incorporation with its
Arab neighbours should have been the result, not of military
conquest but of a popular or people's union. "If the Sahara is
Moroccan, then why are tens of thousands of Moroccan soldiers
fighting in the Sahara?"
Libya, Algeria, and the Western Sahara 
-rhe emergence of the Western Sahara issue widened differences
between the Moroccan and Libyan regimes at a time when Kadhafi
had seemed instead to be looking for rapprochement. Now Libya
would return to its earlier policy of support for Hassan's
opponents, at home and abroad, while the Moroccan sovereign
-159-
sought to return the compliment.
	 And, in a further effort to
isolate the King and to bring Polisario more closely under his
personal control, Kadhafi undertook to supply the Polisario
guerrillas with lavish quantities of often sophisticated Soviet
weapons,	 while continuing to provide moral support.	 He
nevertheless refrained, until 1980, from according recognition to
Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), as a distinct and
would-be independent entity, demanding instead the creation of a
revolutionary front that would comprise Libya, 	 Algeria,
Mauritania and Polisario.
Libya's interest in the Saharan issue, which seemed to
diverge also from that of Algeria, seems to have had three main
objectives.	 Firstly, there was support for the revolutionary
guerrilla campaign that would, hopefully, shake the Moroccan
monarchy and de-stabilise it through a war of attrition. Then
there was the more distant goal of a new Islamic state in the
Sahara, incorporating Mauritania as well as the territory now to
be liberated and perhaps other states as well - under Kadhafi's
influence and Libyan control.	 And finally there was the
objective of exporting the Libyan revolution by promoting the
"cause of popular democracy" in what was undoubtedly a strategic
corner of North West Africa. Possibly Kadhafi hoped to erect a
non-Marxist but radical state in the North West that would be the
military (and Islamic) equivalent of the Mengistu regime in the
Horn of Africa.	 It is not clear, however, how Kadhafi hoped to
overcome Algerian suspicions, let alone the opposition of French
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and western powers, to say nothing of the resistance of other
Middle Eastern and African governments.
What is clear is that, with the death of the Algerian
President, Houari Boumedienne, in December 1978, and the shift of
emphasis by the new administration of Chadli BenJedid - away from
socialism and towards moderation, at home and abroad - Kadhafi
seemed an increasingly isolated figure. 	 He seemed to have
respected Boumedienne in a way that he could not respect his
successor. After all it was Boumedienne who, through the Treaty
of Hassi Messaoud, in 1975, had first brought Libya into the
Maghrebin sub-system as a full partner. Chadli's insistence on
"good neighbourliness" and his search for reconciliation in the
Maghreb threatened in the 1980s to return Libya to her former
isolation. Thus, after a Libyan-backed commando was implicated
in an abortive attempt to de-stabilise the Bourguiba regime - by
an attack on the Tunisian border town of Gafsa, in January 1980 -
Hassan II at once declared his solidarity with his Tunisian
colleague. "If Tunisia is attacked Morocco is prepared to come
to its defence and has set in train whatever military steps are
necessary to ensure that we can take our place alongside the
people of Tunisia."4
The Libyan response was to recognise the SADR, on April 18,
1980, which then led Morocco once again to break off diplomatic
relations with Tripoli. Only for a short time, however. A year
later Kadhafi's envoy, Colonel Mansour Abdulhafid, was received
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by King Hassan II and later revealed that diplomatic relations
would be restored for the sake of Arab unity and the Palestinian
cause.	 Despite these developments Tripoli was unhappy about
the situation in the 1980s, both in the Maghreb and in Africa as
a whole.First there was the failure of the 19th OAU summitto
convene in the Libyan capital - which deprived Kadhafi of his
turn as Chairman of the African organisation. This was followed
by Chadli's efforts, at the beginning of 1983, to effect some
kind of reconciliation with Morocco, in response mainly to Saudi
intervention and the need for a display of Arab unity after the
Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Kadhafi was nevertheless convinced
that Algeria was betraying its revolutionary principles. Where he
may have anticipated an open confrontation between Algeria and
Morocco - with Libya well placed to take advantage of the
subsequent weakness of both states - the contending parties
seemed more interested in achieving a negotiated settlement that
would enable them to save face and cut their military
expenditures.
	 Neither side seemed anxious to extend the
conflict.
Morocco was also under increasing diplomatic pressure as
growing numbers of states accorded formal recognition to the
Saharawi Arab and Democratic Republic (SADR).
	 But as long as
Algeria continued, to support Polisario - and refused to apply
pressure for a cease-fire - Morocco had little alternative but
to pursue and extend the military campaign in the south while
contriving to limit the inevitable political and diplomatic fall-
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out. Meanwhile Libya and Morocco both came increasingly to see
Algeria as responsible for their growing isolation and for their
double failure at the 19th summit of the 0.A.U.
	 Where Morocco
had failed to prevent the admission of the SADR as a full member,
Libya had likewise failed to defeat a resolution calling for the
withdrawal of all foreign forces from the troubled state of Chad.
Algerian diplomacy had been active and ultimately successful in
putting together a majority in favour of both resolutions.
Having abandoned his claims on Mauritania at the end of the
1960s, King Hassan was in no mood to surrender his claims to the
Western Sahara. Since 1975 the territory has served as a symbol
of national unity and of political reconciliation inside Morocco.
It has provided a welcome respite from internal opposition and
military and labour unrest. Morocco is in effective occupation
of a territory which also serves as a link with black Africa.
providing a useful counter-weight to Algeria's own Saharan
region. From the Libyan point of view northern Chad is seen as a
part of their own "vital space" and as contributing the mineral
resources needed to confirm Libya's pretensions as a nuclear
power.	 It also provides a channel for Libyan ambitions further
south, among the Islamic states of the Sahel and the Sahara.
Hence Libya's annexation of the Aouzou Strip, in northern Chad,
in 1973, its attempted 'fusion' with Chad in 1981, and its goal
of one day constituting the 'United States of the Sahel
(Sahara)'.
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During 1983-4 events conspired to overturn the alliance of
Algeria and Libya that had been the dominant feature of the North
African political landscape since 1975 - in favour of an even
less stable and less likely alliance between Morocco and Libya.
Kadhafi resented Libya's exclusion from the Treaty of Concord and
Fraternity signed in March 1983 between Algeria and Tunisia -
largely in response to Libyan threats directed at both, and most
immediately at Tunisia. 	 The treaty marked the lowest point in
relations between the two former radical partners, as Algeria
made Libyan acceptance of their common frontier a condition for
participation in the Maghrebin alliance. 	 The former Libyan
ambassador to Jordan, M. Omar Chenib, who resigned in July 1983,
maintained that he had himself been asked by Tripoli to execute
King Hussein of Jordan, while Kadhafi had also ordered the
assassination of President Chadli Benjedid.6
Kadhafi certainly blamed the new Algerian leadership for
deserting the 'Rejection Front', formed in December 1977 by
Libya, Syria, Algeria, South Yemen and the Palestine Liberation
Organisation (PLO), following Sadat's visit to Jerusalem.	 The
two states also differed in their approach to the PLO after its
eviction from Lebanon in 1983. 	 Algeria consistently supported
the Chairman, Yasser Arafat, and his more conciliatory approach
to Middle Eastern issues, while Kadhafi, like President Hafez
Assad of Syria, backed more extreme factions of the PLO who
refused to accept Arafat's leadership.	 Kadafi also resented
Chadli's conscious attempts to improve his country's relations
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with France following the election of the socialist leader.
Francois Mitterrand, as President in 1981. The French presence in
Africa was increasingly resented by Kadhafi who saw it as an
obstacle to the realisation of his ambitions in Chad and
elsewhere in the region. Finally Algeria was accused by Tripoli
of seeking to undermine Libyan influence both in the Maghreb and
with Polisario and with the Sahelian states as a whole.
A marriage of convenience 
In the circumstances it was perhaps not so astonishing that
Kadhafi should seek to outflank the Algerian position by
attempting a reconciliation with some of his staunchest enemies.
From June 8-12, 1983, Kadhafi visited first King Fand of Saudi
Arabia, at Riyadh, before going on to North Yemen and Jordan and
concluding his journey in Morocco where he was received by King
Hassan. This was in the context of Saudi efforts to organise an
Arab consensus on Middle Eastern problems in anticipation of a
new international peace conference. Where Algeria had tried to
use Saudi influence earlier in the year to effect a détente with
Moroco, Kadhafi had rather different reasons for seeking a
reconciliation with Hassan.
	 Their meeting was the first in
fourteen years.'
	 It was aimed largely at breaking their
diplomatic isolation and underlying the discussions was their
recognition that each had a common interest in upsetting the
territorial status quo and that each was under considerable
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pressure to explain and justify their military involvement
outside their own frontiers - in Chad and the Western Sahara.
Similar circumstances had, in the early sixties, first
brought together Morocco with Nkrumah's Ghana and Sekou Toure's
Guinea in the 'Casablanca' bloc - formed at the start of the
1960s, ostensibly in opposition to colonial influence.	 On that
occasion the pan-African and radical 'socialist' ideals of Kwame
Nkrumah and his ally,Toure, had found little echo in Rabat where
the conservative monarchy was pursuing more traditional dynastic
claims against its southern neighbour, Mauritania.	 There was,
however, convergence even then betwen the Moroccan and the
radical point of view.	 Both wanted an end to French rule in
Algeria - albeit for rather different reasons - while both hoped
to benefit from a weakening of French influence elsewhere in West
Africa, particularly in the Sahel.
After the passage of two decades, ideology had even less to
do with the political 'union' that would emerge in 1984 as a
result of Kadhafi's meeting with King Hassan. The basis of this
new alliance was not a shared ideology or common political
perspective, but the imperatives of statecraft : raison d'etat,
the sense of mounting isolation, playing for time, hoping to
raise the stakes for one's opponents, and a measure of pique at
being excluded from the Fritndship Treaty recently concluded
between Algeria, Tunisia and Mauritania. 	 It was even suggested
that Hassan was prepared to drop his opposition to Libyan moves
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in Chad provided Tripoli ceased its logistical aid to the
Polisario	 guerrillas
	 active	 in	 the	 Western	 Sahara.
Interestingly, Kadhafi in his visit to Morocco in 1983 declared
that Libya was now "neutral" on the question of the Sahara.a
The idea of a 'deal' between the two countries received some
substance when Hassan declared, in late 1983, that there was
historical justification for Kadhafi's claims in Chad : "There
were blood ties between northern Chad and southern Libya".' The
rapprochement between Morocco and Libya reached a peak on August
13, 1984, when Kadhafi arrived in Oujda, in western Morocco, to
attend a mini-summit with Hassan and possibly Chadli, who had
also been invited.
	
Chadli, however, refused to attend - just as
Hassan had declined to attend an earlier mini-summit convened in
Algiers in March 1982. The outcome of the meeting was a 'Union
of States' treaty signed between Kadhafi and Hassan II, which
would later be 'endorsed', on August 31, by 99.97% of Moroccans
voting in a referendum organised for that purpose.
The speed and the ease with which the union was ratified by a
plebiscite contrasted with the reluctance of the Moroccan
parliament to ratify the earlier border agreement between Hassan
and Boumedienne concluded in the early 1970s. Since one of the
objects of the 'union' was to 'buy time', Hassan had nothing to
gain by postponing ratification. In any case he could the more
readily approve of the 'union' in the conviction that it would
never be implemented - particularly the clauses concerning mutual
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defence and political fusion.	 The two states, besides their
other very obvious differences, and the contrasting outlooks,
policies and temperaments of their leaders, had no common
frontier - which, admittedly, eliminated one possible source of
contention.	 Otherwise Kadhafi might himself have had second
thoughts about the wisdom of union given Morocco's advantage in
terms of its population and given the extent of popular support
for Hassan since the Green March of 1975. The union nevertheless
brought a temporary respite after fourteen years of mutual
recrimination and insult.
Hassan seems to have been influenced mainly by the prospect
of ending Kadhafi's financial and military support for Polisario
whose activities, since 1975, had done so much to drain the
Moroccan economy - suffering from the combined effects of higher
prices for imported oil after 1973 and again in 1979, and much
lower prices for Morocco's principal export commodity,
phosphates.	 Hassan would also have hoped to exploit Libya's
seemingly insatiable appetite for foreign workers - their
remittances would greatly benefit a country crippled by an
unemployment rate of at least 20% and an estimated $12 billion in
foreign debts. 1 ° Kadhafi, on the other hand, argued that the
rapprochement with Morocco was designed only to rescue their Arab
brothers from their abject misery and to guarantee them a better
future in association with their Libyan compatriots.
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While the union seems to have been mainly a response to
immediate pressures on both states, one cannot rule out more
strategic and longer term considerations - certainly on the part
of Kadhafi.	 While Kadhafi has been active in his efforts to
encourage and exploit the 'succession' crisis in Tunisia,
following the evident deterioration in Bourguiba's health in
1974, there was much less opportunity for intervention in
Morocco, whether direct or indirect, particularly after Hassan's
success in mobilising popular support for his dynasty by means of
the Green March. Through a policy of 'fusion' Kadhafi may have
hoped to penetrate Hassan's formidable security apparatus.
	 He
might build up support in Morocco either by mobilising and
indoctrinating Moroccan emigrant workers before repatriating them
homewards (Trojan horse), or by creating a core of 'free
officers' within the Moroccan army, who could then seize power
and overturn the monarchy (Fifth column)."
	 In either case
Kadhafi is at a distinct disadvantage in Morocco, compared with
Tunisia, if only because of the distances involved and the very
distinctive political and cultural traditions of Morocco.
Hassan has himself remarked, in a radio broadcast, that the
decision to offer some form of union with Libya was made without
premeditation and on the spur of the moment : "I myself was
personally surprised." 12
 He added that the proposal was received
by Kadhafi with evident amazement. While the Libyan leader has
certainly been known to act precipitately, that has not been a
pronounced feature of the Moroccan ruling family. Moroccan
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foreign policy has always given every sign of long preparation
and careful consideration. No doubt Hassan was under
considerable pressure to justify his new alliance to those of his
more conservative allies who had been under the impression that
his opposition to Kadhafi was unshakeable. But there was no
chance of the 'union' surviving long. Since coming to power, in
1969,Kadhafi has signed no less than six abortive union
agreements : two with Egypt, two with Sudan, and one each with
Tunisia and Syria. The treaty of Hassi Messaoud, concluded with
Algeria in 1975, although it looked forward to a possible union,
never evolved beyond an agreement for mutual aid and defence that
neither side ever cared to invoke. The fusion with Chad in 1981
was the result of an 'agreement' signed by Goukouni Oueddei but
in circumstances that left him little if any option. Nor was the
treaty with Morocco Kadhafi's last attempt at Arab union. Some
three years later he again wanted fusion, this time with Algeria!
Conclusions 
In explaining the background of the Libyan-Moroccan treaty
one should not, perhaps, ignore the 'personal' factor and the way
that relations fluctuated over time between the various Maghrebin
leaders. While personalities remained important in Maghrebin
politics, however, the twenty-five or thirty-years that have
elapsed since independence have also seen a considerable growth
in the bureaucratic apparatus and some attempts at refining the
concept of national interest.
	 Groups have also emerged with a
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specific interest in particular aspects of foreign policy while
foreign policy has itself become involved with the other concerns
of government including trade,
	 industry, energy, defence,
education, natural resources and agriculture. While the leaders
certainly insist on taking what they consider to be the most
important and most pressing foreign policy decisions, they are
subject to many domestic as well as external constraints.
Nevertheless, the Moroccan-Libyan union, although it served
many distinct purposes, was formed in response to and in reaction
against the Friendship Treaty of 1983 between Algeria and Tunisia
which seemed to discriminate againstMorocco and Libya - and to
establish a privileged nucleus or group of states within the
Maghreb who could then set conditions for the admission of the
remaining states.
	 But for the Algerian initiative, which was
perhaps aimed more at Libya than at Morocco, it is doubtful
whether Kadhafi would have made common cause with the "corrupt
and decadent" monarchy in Rabat. But Algeria was determined to
exclude Libya from the terns of the agreement until such time as
Kadhafi agreed to 'play the game' according to the rules set out
in the Charter and contained in . the Statement of Principles of
the OAU.	 Meanwhile Hassan had also been anxious for a
rapprochement with the new administration in Algiers. aware of
its interest in ending the conflict in Western Sahara and in
expanding trade with its regional neighbours. Hence the meeting
between Hassan and Chadli in February 1983, which Saudi Arabia
had helped prepare.
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But Chadli was unwilling or unable at the time to endorse
Morocco's continued occupation of the Western Sahara; nor does
Chadli seem to have been prepared to apply pressure on Polisario
to accept a cease-fire and possibly a plebiscite that would
confirm and legitimise Morocco's claim to the territory. The
Moroccan reaction was to demonstrate both her own effective
occupation of the territory and the inability of the Algerians to
make good their promise of self-determination for the Saharawi
and of independence for the SADR. Instead of détente the outcome
was a continuation of the conflict, but at a lower level of
intensity and with the emphasis now on a political and diplomatic
rather than a military solution. 	 Through a shifting pattern
of local alliances each of the states attempted to occupy the
most favourable ground in preparation for what promised to be the
last phase of the conflict : the end game.
The Moroccan-Libyan union elicited a wide range of external
comment. The event itself was a fait accompli - unpalatable to
Morocco's conservative and western allies and Just as
disconcerting to Libya's remaining radical supporters, who by now
were probably accustomed to the unwanted and the unexpected. In
different ways the Saudis and the Americans both seem to have
shown some	 diplomatic displeasure, the one by moving to cut
their economic subsidies, the other by threatening to reduce
levels of military and other funding. The Saudis in any case had
previously indicated that some settlement of the Saharan conflict
was highly desirable and they seem to have pressed the Maghrebin
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states to reach a negotiated settlement. They had helped promote
Chadli's meeting with Hassan in 1983 - and a subsequent meeting
in 1987. They probably also encouraged Kadhafi to go on to Rabat
after leaving Riyadh in '1983.
	 They may even have hoped that
Morocco would exert a moderating influence over Kadhafi, perhaps
returning him to the mainstream of Arab politics, thereby easing
the way towards an Arab consensus on Middle Eastern questions in
preparation for a future international peace conference.
	 What
they do not seem to have anticipated, or indeed wanted, was the
emergence of new and rival alliances within the Maghreb between
Algeria and Tunisia on the one hand, and Libya and Morocco on the
other.
The French also had an obvious interest in the Moroccan-
Libyan alliance in so far as Hassan might now have sufficient
influence to be able to persuade Kadhafi to withdraw his forces
from Chad, as a quid pro quo for a similar French withdrawal. It
is perhaps significant that President Mitterrand of France
claimed to have reached an agreement along these lines with
Kadhafi in September 1984, shortly after the conclusion of the
Moroccan-Libyan union and following several days of talks between
Mitterrand and Hassan. French hostility to the 'union' seems to
have grown as it became evident that Kadhafi would not in fact
withdraw all his forces from northern Chad.
The American administration showed less sympathy for and
little comprehension of the Moroccan position - as they were
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convinced, in any case, that Kadhafi was not amenable to
diplomatic pressures and would respond only to direct military
action. They would soon make their own position clear with the
bombardment of Tripoli and Benghazi by American aircraft in April
1986.	 Meanwhile Moroccan diplomacy had been active trying to
retrieve what support they may have lost in Washington as a
result of the alliance with Libya.
	 Shortly after the American
attack on Libya, when Morocco failed to come to the aid of its
most recent ally, Hassan nevertheless received an official visit
from the Israeli Prime Minister and Labour Party leader, Shimon
Peres, ostensibly in connection with the setting up of an
international conference on the Middle East.
The visit was not well received in Arab capitals and the
Moroccan initiative was vigorously attacked by Colonel Kadhafi.
Hassan was then able to use this as an excuse to terminate his
own increasingly embarrassing 'union' with Libya and on an issue
guaranteed to win maximum publicity and support in Washington and
the other West European capitals.	 Morocco's former African
allies were less forgiving than the Americans but were also less
well placed to give substance to their disapproval.
	 President
Hissêne Habre of Chad nevertheless voiced his readiness to Join
the majority of African states in recognising the SADR
Notwithstanding the critical western reaction to the
agreement with Libya, King Hassan gave first priority to his own
state's national interests.
	 As the European Community's
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protective tariffs and farm subsidies made it increasingly
difficult for Morocco to export and market its large agricultural
surplus - and to earn the foreign exchange needed to repay her
mounting debts - Morocco, like other African states, was tempted
to divert some of Libya's oil revenues to help meet her socio-
economic problems.	 Declining subsidies from Saudi Arabia and
American problems with a growing domestic deficit threatened at
the sane time to undermine the Moroccan effort in the Western
Sahara - Just as the defensive perimeter was nearing completion.
On balance the immediate political and economic advantages of a
union with Libya seemed to outweigh temporary embarrassment or
diplomatic inconvenience.
	 With the Western Sahara perimeter
secured, with a series of good harvests - including a record
cereal crop in 1985 - and renewed credits from the IMF and the
World Bank in 1986, Morocco could afford to sever the Libyan
connection and resume its traditional conservative stance.
Following the visit to Morocco of the Israeli Prime Minister,
in July 1986,	 Kadhafi denounced the "treachery" of his former
Maghrebin partner. King Hassan for his part renounced the treaty
of union with Libya at the end of August while, in September,
Kadhafi declared
Perhaps this break was imposed on the King, signifying
that Morocco is not yet a free country. I do not believe
that the King is in his right mind;
	 perhape he is
experiencing a crisis like Reagan.13
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In breaking with Kadhafi and Libya, Hassan was obviously anxious
to avoid an even more embarrassing situation should the United
States again decide to mount an air or naval strike against
Libya. When America bombarded Libya in April 1986, Morocco was
able only to assure Libya of its "total solidarity" - which was
the least that could be expected in view of the terms of the
Oujda treaty which stipulated that "any aggression against either
of the two states is to be considered an aggression against the
other."
	 Yet, to balance his position and to please the
Americans, Hassan firmly condemned 1 terrorism".1* And in receiving
the Israeli Prime Minister later in the year he sought to
convince American opinion of his loyalty and to remind them of
the useful and sympathetic role he continues to play in the
complex affairs of Africa and the Middle East.
-176-
CHAPTER SEVEN : LIBYA AND _TUNISIA 
THREATS AND APPEASEMENTS 
Unsuccessful appeal for union 
Rebuffed in the Arab Middle East, in 1973, where he aspired
to play a leading role in the promotion of pan-Arabism, Colonel
Kadhafi turned instead to the Maghreb where he envisaged a
similar role.
	 His first efforts in this direction involved an
attempted fusion with his western neighbour, Tunisia.
	 But the
failure of the Djerba agreement, initialled by Libya and Tunisia
in January 1974, would profoundly affect subsequent relations
between the two adjacent states - in terms of population the
smallest in North Africa but with a considerable imbalance in
terms of their respective economic and military strengths. There
followed a series of attempts by Libya to de-stabilise the
government in Tunisia, including an assassination attempt, two
years later, against the Tunisian Prime Minister, M. Hedi Nouira,
whom the Libyans rightly held responsible for the failure of the
union project. The Libyans also threatened a confrontation over
the continuing dispute regarding the delimitation of the
continental shelf in the Gulf of Gabes.
However, the most serious consequence following the collapse
of the Djerba agreement was the Gafsa affair of January 1980,
when a Libyan-sponsored commando attacked the southern Tunisian
town of that name - with the evident aim of threatening the
government. The Libyan action was widely condemned, most notably
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by Tunisia's western allies,	 During the 1980s Tunisia drew
closer to its other large neighbour, Algeria, while the new
Algerian administration of President Chadli sought to distance
itself from the socialist bloc and to move closer to the United
States and France. The rapprochement with Algeria culminated in
the Treaty of Friendship, signed in March 1983, from which Libya
was pointedly excluded along with Morocco. This was a source of
considerable and deep irritation to the Libyan leadership which
had doubtless hoped to take advantage of Algeria's preoccupation
with its own change of government after 1978, and the mounting
problems in Western Sahara, to exercise a more direct and
effective influence on the outcome of the Tunisian 'succession'
crisis.	 In an endeavour to raise the stakes when the Tunisian
authorities were already under severe economic pressure - in the
aftermath of the serious bread riots of 1984 - Kadhafi embarked
on the mass deportation of Tunisian migrant workers in the summer
of 1985.	 Algeria responded, however, with the promise of
additional protection while Rabat sought to take advantage of the
new situation, and their previous 'union' with Libya in 1984, to
substitute Moroccan for Tunisian 'guest' workers.
Tunisia was, until recently, one of the few Third World
countries to have enjoyed a long period of relative tranquillity
from the beginning of the 1960s. Apart from the eviction in 1969
of M. Ahmed Ben Salah, the Economics Minister who tried to
dragoon the entire Tunisian economy into a new pattern of
cooperative socialism, the only major upheavals were as a direct
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consequence of the abortive attempt at union with Libya in 1974 -
which seems to have been related to the discovery, two years
later, of an assassination plot against Bourguiba's Prime
Minister, Hedi Nouira.
	 The fall of Ben Salah was generally
intrepreted as a clear move to the right on the part of the
regime and a further consolidation of President Bourguiba's own
authority within the country. It occurred, moreover, oaly
	 tew
days after the Libyan revolution of September 1, 1969. And there
is no doubt that Bourguiba has since perceived the ambitions of
his wealthy and restless neighbour as the most serious threat to
his small country's security and his government's internal
stability.
The continuing problems in Libyan-Tunisian relations were
undoubtedly compounded by the differences in age and temperament
on the part of their two leaders, to say nothing of their
contrasting ideological positions.
	 Tunisia's moderate, secular
nationalism and its pro-western, francophone orientation are
anathema to Kadhafi and his brand of revolutionary pan-Arabism
with a strong and deep undercurrent of Islamic piety. Bourguiba
has always approached the question of Arab unity from a regional
and territorial, rather than a supra-nationalist point of view,
and with an emphasis on pragmatism and the pursuit of material
advantage for his people. The approach to unity is evolutionary
as well as 'functional' - through economic cooperation.
	 Thus,
when the Tunisian Prime Minister, Hedi Nouira, met the Algerian
Minister of the Interior, at Sakiet Sidi Youssef, in February
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1974, after the failure of the Libyan-Tunisian merger, he took
the opportunity to emphasise that : "For us, Tunisians and
Algerians, unity consists first in speaking the same language -
that of reason, realism and a common interest above all."I
The main architects of the abortive union with Libya were
Kadhafi, himself, and the Tunisian Foreign Minister, M. Mohammed
Masmoudi, who shared some of the Libyan leader's pan-Arab
enthusiasm. The Djerba Agreement, signed on January 12, 1974,
proclaimed the unity of the two countries in a single "Islamic
Arab Republic", with one constitution, one flag, one army, and
one President!	 Interestingly, Bourguiba was to be the first
President with Kadhafi as Vice-President, while Mohammed Masmoudi
would remain as Foreign Minister.
	 A referendum to approve the
agreement was scheduled to be held in the two countries on March
20, 1974 - the 18th anniversary of Tunisia's independence.
Perhaps confronted by a rather unwelcome fait accompli, Bourguiba
tried to extract what advantage he could from the situation while
looking for possible ways out of his unenviable predicament.
Trapped by the wave of popular enthusiasm, in the wake of the
October 1973 war against Israel, Bourguiba declared in a more
forthright tone than usual
Libya and Tunisia wish to be Joined by Algeria,
Mauritania and, perhaps, Morocco when it has overcome its
domestic problems...Thanks to this unity we are able to
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confront and challenge our enemies and, in particular,
Israel2
Just a year before, however, Bourguiba had more skilfully
parried an earlier suggestion by Kadhafi that their two countries
should merge.	 He had then taken the opportunity to remind
Kadhafi that
Unity between two underdeveloped countries has never yet
given rise to a new power. Uniting two million Libyans
and five million Tunisians will not greatly transform the
present situation of the two peoples.. .Unity requires
decades, even centuries of efforts, otherwise we will
make the same mistake as others in the Arab world who
have created short-lived and artificial unions which fell
at the first obstacle.3
Not surprisingly, perhaps, Masmoudi was dismissed as Foreign
Minister within days of the conclusion of the Dierba Agreement.
He was removed on the authority of the Prime Minister, Nouira,
who had been on an official visit to Iran when the agreement was
signed.	 The agreement itself was then revoked by the Tunisian
authorities.
Masmoudi was later expelled from Bourguiba'sParti Socialiste
Destourien (PSD), at its 9th congress in mid-September, 1974.
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Shortly after his enforced departure he declared that he had
earlier been dismissed from the government following intervention
by the United States which had complained of his good relations
with the Palestinian resistance, his support for China's
admission to the United Nations, and his recognition of the
government of Prince Sihanouk government in Cambodia. 4 Nouira
who had acted to block the merger, presumably with the consent
and possibly at the prompting - of President Bourguiba, told the
National Assembly on February 1 that : "without a consensus of
the Maghrebin states, union with Libya is out of the question.fis
He then launched an appeal for national unity and the creation of
a 'Greater Maghreb' which attracted the particular censure of the
Libyan President.
The 'Arab Islamic Republic' was ephemeral like most of its
successors.	 Kadhafi had turned to the Maghreb only after his
advances to Egypt and other leading Arab states had been
rebuffed.	 His Maghrebin neighbours seemed less well placed to
offer effective resistance, particularly in view of Algeria's own
revolutionary and anti-colonial aspirations. What he did not at
the time realise was that, with the exception only of Libya,
nationalism was a stronger force than pan-Arabism, at least among
the Maghrebin leadership. The three former French territories
had all had.
 to struggle for their independenced and nowhere was
nationalism felt more strongly, perhaps, than in Tunisia. Since
1920 the Destour Party and its successor i n 1934, Neo-Destour
had been among the first to be formed in Africa, antedating both
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Messali Hadj's Mouvement National Algerien (MNA) (1926) and the
isticilal Party in Morocco (1944).
The point was clearly made by President Bourguiba when, on
March 18, 1974, he had spoken at length of the importance he had
always attached to the preservation of national identity. Only
cooperation could "open the path for a union which will take
centuries to realise". Meanwhile it was his ambition to realise,
before his death, the equality of the sexes in Tunisia. 	 The
nationalist theme featured prominently in another speech by
Bourguiba, in September 1974, when he remarked that
Kadhafi dreams of a fusion of the Arab countries that
will never take place...We have problems enough in trying
to integrate the regions of a single country...In any
case we in Tunisia have no need to depend on others. We
can realise our plans and objectives without having
recourse to someone who wants to impose on us his own
conditions.6
Neither Algeria nor Morocco seems to have been advised of the
proposed merger between Libya and Tunisia and their angry
reactions translate their misgivings as to Kadhafi's objectives
and this unilateral approach to regional cooperation. In Algeria
El Moudiahid queried whether the simple fact of a meeting of
personalities at Djerba, and the brief verbal exchanges that took
place there, were sufficient to dictate the fate of two peoples
who in all numbered some seven million. 7 President Boumedienne
had evidently not forgotten Kadhafi's refusal to attend the
summit of the Arab League in Algiers in November 1973, after the
October war, which Kadhafi had dismissed as the "capitulation
summit".	 Morocco viewed the Libyan initiative with the same
suspicion and hostility it had already shown for Kadhafi's
earlier ventures in the Maghreb and elsewhere - including his
alleged involvement in the two coup attempts against King Hassan
II, in Jul-1 1971 and August 1972.	 Meanwhile the assessment of
most Arab leaders was that Kadhafi had engineered the move mainly
as a way of hitting back at Egypt for its failure to implement
the earlier agreement, in September 1973, that had provided for a
merger between Egypt and Libya.
	 President Sadat's rather
impatient and peremptory dismissal of Kadhafi's suit, and his
pointed exclusion of Libya from the inner circle of Arab states
who would be associated with the October war against Israel,
provoked Kadhafi to an abrupt change of focus - away from the
Machrek and towards the Maghreb.
A palicy of blackmail 
After the failure of the Djerba agreement, relations between
Tunisia and Libya deteriorated rapidly. On the 20th anniversary
of Tunisian independence, March 20, 1976, the government
announced the arrest in Tunis of three Libyans said to have been
implicated in a plot to assassinate the Prime Minister, Hedi
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Nouira. The choice of the Prime Minister as the intended victim
and the alleged complicity of the Libyan Embassy all pointed to
the abortive merger as the principal motive for the plot. Where
Kadhafi had previously viewed the ageing Bourguiba as the one
serious obstacle to the realisation of his ambitions vis-a-vis
his western neighbour, he had also had to contend since 1974 with
the opposition of Bourguiba's younger "constitutional successor".
If anything Nouira seemed even more hostile to a fusion of the
two states. A climate of mutual suspicion and hostility followed
the breakdown of the merger proposal, feeding on a number of
existing disputes, including the dispute over the ownership of
the off-shore continental shelf and its potential oil reserves.
In a speech on the 9th anniversary of the Libyan
'revolution', on September 1, 1978, Kadhafi recalled the Djerba
agreement only to observe that other, more revolutionary methods
would have to be devised if Arab unity was ever to become a
reality. The impetus for unity would have to come from below, in
this case from popular revolutionary committees to be established
all over the Arab world with a view eventually to seizing power
and removing existing obstacles to union. Already at the end of
1978 the Tunisian authorities claimed to have unearthed
quantities of arms buried along the Libyan-Tunisian border.
	 In
January 1980 Libya seems to have mounted a commando operation
whose immediate objective was the capture of the southern
Tunisian town of Gafsa. Those involved were recruited from the
substantial Tunisian community inside Libya - estimated at around
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90,000, most of whom had come as immigrant workers from the Gafsa
region with its phosphate deposits.
	 According to Kadhafi the
commando was part of an "Arab and African Liberation Army", which
had paraded in Benghazi on September 1, 1979, and was said to
number around 7,000 men. At the head of each unit in this army
there was a Palestinian - a symbol of the army's ultimate goal,
the liberation of Palestine.'
Four members of the commando squad were killed in the
unsuccessful raid, together with twenty-two members of the
Tunisian forces and some fifteen civilians. The Tunisian press
was prompt to attribute the responsibility for the Gafsa attack
to the Libyans. The
aggression must be attributed to a neighbouring country
which has no respect for the rules of good
neighbourliness	 and	 which	 defies	 international
law...Intoxicated by its wealth and the size of its
military arsenal that country has launched itself on a
most dangerous course.'
Bourguiba spared Kadhafi nothing.
He of course plays the Soviet game but is too weak to be
of any use to them...He believes that with his dollars
and oil he can buy territories and consciences. Wherever
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there is chaos we can find traces of his passage : in the
Philippines, in Northern Ireland, even in Corsica. And
just what does he hope to achieve in CorsicaT°
In the circumstances even the Tunisian opposition hastened to
condemn the attack, including Mohammed Masmoudi, who was thought
to be the architect of the Tunisian-Libyan merger. He was said
to have cabled his support for Bourguiba : "The first priority is
to close ranks around you in order to bar the route to any and
all foreign intervention."" As in Morocco where the opposition
parties had won a degree of tolerance by reason of their support
for the regime's policies in the Western Sahara after 1975, so
too the Tunisian opposition won formal recognition from President
Bourguiba a year after the Gafsa affair and were accorded the
right to participate in parliamentary politics.
	 Far from de-
stabilising the regime, the Gafsa raid considerably strengthened
the position of the President - with statements of support from
the strong (but illegal) opposition parties.
	 In much the same
way the outbreak of war between Morocco and Algeria in 1963 had
swung the Kabyle opposition behind the Algerian President, Ahmed
Ben Bella.
	 It is clear that, in the Maghreb at least, a threat
•to national security is likely to re-unite the population and to
strengthen the political consensus.
After Gafsa the French navy patrolled the Tunisian coast
with the aim of protecting and safeguarding the threatened
country. Libya, which denied its involvement in Gafsa, reacted
angrily to the French move, describing it as an insult to the
Tunisian people. There was criticism in Tripoli of the action of
the Tunisian authorities who had "resorted to a foreign and
imperialist power to threaten the interests of two brother
peoples who were bound together by fraternity,	 good
neighbourliness and their common participation in the anti-
imperialist struggle".	 The Tunisian government was prompt to
justify its appeals for support. As M. Mohammed Sayah, Director
of the PSD, explained : "While remaining non-aligned Tunisia
lacks logistical resources comparable with those available to and
deployed by the adversary." 12 Relations between Libya and France
deteriorated to the point where each recalled its respective
diplomats.	 The Libyans, for their part, demanded a meeting of
the Arab League and an emergency session of the OAU - to stop
French "intervention" in Tunisia. 	 Meanwhile the United States
agreed to despatch a large consignment of arms to Tunisia which
were due for delivery in 1981.
Morocco, which had joined Saudi Arabia in despatching aid and
assistance to the Tunisian government, accused Libya of acting to
undermine the stability of governments in the region - on behalf
of the Soviet Union. The Moroccan government condemned the Libyan
conspiracy, whose objective was to de-stabilise the entire
region, and called an the leaders of the Maghreb states to
"forget their differences in order to confront the subversive
actions of Kadhafi and his masters".	 In a personal message to
President Bourguiba, King Hassan II expressed his willingness to
provide military assistance for Tunisia.
There is no need to explain matters to me. I understand
everything only too well which is why I am taking the
initiative in proposing to send you, without delay and
without condition, whatever you need - and to the full
extent of our resources. Our military resources are also
at your disposition. '3
Soon after, on February 18, 1980, Kadhafi was advising the
correspondent of the left-wing Paris newspaper, Liberation, that
Gafsa marked the "beginning of the end for the Tunisian regime.
Henceforth our opposition will be irresistible."14
Ownership of the continental shelf extending out into the
Gulf of Gabes has long been the subject of opposing claims by the
Libyan and Tunisian governments, particularly after reports of
important under-water oil deposits. The issue first appeared at
the start of the 1970s but the conflict escalated with the
collapse of the Djerba agreement in 1974.	 With its small
population and petroleum surplus Libya sees the dispute over the
continental shelf as yet another opportunity to harass and
threaten the Tunisian government. 	 A crisis was engineered in
February 1977 when Libya installed a drilling platform in the
Gulf of Gabes, at the centre of the disputed zone. 	 Tunisia
complained that its sovereignty was being threatened and placed
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its army on full alert.
	 The following May, and presumably in
response to the Tunisian protest, the Libyans dismantled the
offending oil rig.
	 In June the dispute was, by common accord,
submitted to arbitration by the International Court of Justice.
Despite its efforts to industrialise Tunisia is relatively
deficient in sources of energy - unlike its two North African
neighbours. It has been estimated that the off-shore reserves of
the continental shelf could increase Tunisian oil production
five-fold - its output in 1980 having reached five million tons a
year and representing Tunisia's first and only source of exports.
The reserves in the Gulf of Gabes are estimated at some two
hundred million tons'.	 Hence the Libyan interest in denying
access to the oil to the present Tunisian regime. Moreover, in
December 1981 Libya vetoed Tunisia's admission to the
Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC), with
Its headquarters in Abu Dhabi. Libya seems to have feared that
Tunisia would benefit from the Organisation's support should the
International Court give judgement for Tunisia. In the event the
decision of the court, in 1982, favoured Libya - after which
Tunisia was admitted to OAPEC, on March 2, 1982, as its tenth
member. "1 In late 1985 Tunisia asked the court to re-consider
Its verdict in the light of new evidence since acquired by
Tunisia. The court, however, rejected the request on the grounds
that if the evidence was not available to Tunisia in 1982 it was
because of the government's own negligence."
Conflict between Libya and Tunisia has been sharpened by the
failure of the Tunisian leadership to support Kadhafi's
Interventions in Chad as well as by its refusal to condemn the
French presence in that territory.	 According to Tunis the
solution of the conflict in Chad lies with the OAU and the
Chadian people themselves. In 1980 when Kadhafi launched a
campaign for mass mobilisation in Libya, together with appeals to
all Arabs living in the state to enlist in the army, Tunisia,
fearing a threat to its own security, requested a special session
of the African group in the United Nations to examine the "grave
situation which prevails in Chad and which presents a threat to
peace and security in Africa".'e
The succession of BenJedid Chadli in Algeria, following the
death of Boumedienne in 1978, brought Tunisia closer to its
Western neighbour - at the expense of Libya whose conduct was
becoming increasingly threatening. The Tunisians were reassured
by Chadli's new approach to regional politics with its emphasis
on "good neighbourliness" as a substitute for Boumedienne's
"Maghreb of the peoples".	 The Treaty of Friendship concluded
between Tunisia and Algeria in March 1983 signified the temporary
exclusion of Libya from the Maghrebin arena - although it was
soon the turn of the Moroccans to enlist Libyan support in their
own national cause.
	
When the Libyan opposition launched a
commando attack on Kadhafi's own barracks in Tripoli, in the
summer of 1984, the Libyan authorities accused Tunisia of
harbouring dissidents. Later they allowed the tension to subside
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as the Libyan Foreign Minister, Ali Abdu Salam Tureiki, proposed
a "joint security commission" to examine and report on issues in
dispute between the two states.
	 Having few opportunities to
intervene in Libyan affairs, the Tunisians immediately accepted
the suggestion.	 Kadhafi may have offered the commission as a
concession, hoping thereby to secure his inclusion in the Treaty
of Friendship. Later that summer he would be in Rabat proposing
a very different kind of alliance to King Hassan.
Following the signing of the Oujda treaty of August, 1984,
Kadhafi threatened to repatriate some 90,000 Tunisians working in
Libya, who would then be replaced by a similar number of
Moroccans.	 Both governments were well aware of the economic
problems that would confront Tunisia should the Libyans proceed
to implement their threat. 	 In the event many Tunisian workers
were expelled in the summer of 1985, which resulted in the
rupture of diplomatic relations between the two states.
	 Given
the continuing 'succession' crisis within the Tunisian state
there were growing fears for national security since the
Tunisians living in Libya included some leading critics of the
regime. The Tunisian authorities also expressed concern for the
safety of leading members of the
	 Palestine Liberation
Organisation, who had moved to Tunis after their expulsion from
Lebanon and who had since quarrelled with Kadhafi.
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In September 1984 Kadhafi made yet another threatening speech
warning that
The Libyan revolution has an historic responsibility for
the construction of Maghrebin unity...I declare that
there is no longer any frontier between Libya and
Tunisia.	 Libyan forces have been strengthened for the
express purpose of liberating peoples and destroying
frontiers.19
What Kadhafi continues to ignore, however, is that the frontiers
between states in North Africa no longer appear simply as
artificial obstacles and impediments to trade and traffic.
Together with the creation of states there has emerged and
crystallised a real and (surprisingly) well entrenched sense of
nationalism and national identity.	 And no where is this more
obvious than in Tunisia. It is difficult to export revolution to
territories where national sentiment is already strong and which,
in terms of their living standards and social composition, do not
resemble the Chadian mosaic.
In the summer of 1985 Kadhafi finally ordered the mass
expulsion from Libya of Tunisian workers. In August alone some
30,000 were repatriated.
	 The official rationale for the
expulsions was that their remittances were helping to sustain
regimes that were "capitulationist" and "colonialist" in
outlook.In the words of Mohammed Charaf, Libya's Secretary of
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Information : "Libya would not consent to support reactionary
regimes with the billions of dollars that are sent home by their
workers.° He made no mention, however, of the 50,000 Turks
who remain in Libya and whose country is a full member of NATO,
to say nothing of the 15,000 workers from South Korea, which is
even closer to the United States - or the many American, British,
Italian and Danish technical advisers and experts! And in 1984
Libya had allied itself with Morocco, one of America's closest
military allies, which offers military facilities for the
American Sixth Fleet, and whose government helped orchestrate the
Camp David agreements - the symbol of "capitulation" in most
countries of the Arab world.
The expulsion of Tunisian workers was clearly intended to
undermine the fragile economy of the country and also,
presumably, to precipitate the long-awaited 'succession' crisis.
Certainly the economic pressures on the government in Tunis -
with the fall in receipts from tourism and the mounting interest
payments on the national debt - were formidable. 	 On September
26, 1985, Tunisia broke off diplomatic relations with Libya -
citing the latter's violation of Tunisian air space and the
apparent discovery of explosives contained in letters from Libya
concealed in diplomatic cases. 21	On October 1, 1985, the
Tunisian government was even more embarrassed by an Israeli raid
on the headquarters of the PLO in Hammam Chatt. No warning seems
to have been received and, while relations between Tunis and the
PLO leadership had recently been showing distinct signs of
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strain, the incident did nothing to bolster Bourguiba's authority
in the capital. His moderate views on Middle East questions were
often unpopular with the Tunisian public and the Israeli attack,
coming shortly after the Libyan reprisals against Tunisian
workers, did nothing to reduce the mounting tensions within the
country. The small Jewish community in Tunisia, numbering around
5,000 - about 20% of whom lived in DJerba - were quick to condemn
the Israeli action as "an act of aggression committed against the
territorial integrity of Tunisia."-22 Nevertheless, on October 8,
three Tunisians, two of them Jews, were killed by a state
security agent in Dierba.
After the American air strike against Libya, on April 15,
1986, the Tunisian armed forces were placed on high alert.
Libyan media accused Tunisia of allowing the United States to use
its air space although this was denied by the Pentagon. 	 There
were demonstrations in Tunisia directed against America and
against the government which was virtually alone in the Arab
world in failing to condemn the American raid. 	 Tunisian
conditions for a reconciliation with Libya now include full
payment and financial compensation for all Tunisians expelled
since 1985. President Chadli of Algeria argued the Tunisian case
during his meeting with Kadhafi at Ain Amenas, in southern
Algeria, towards the end of January 1986. Algeria has continued
since then to work for the normalisation of relations between
Libya and Tunisia and, indeed, within the Maghreb as a whole.
Having laid down the principles of "good neighbourliness", as a
-195-
condition for membership of the Treaty of Friendship, it remains
for Algeria to secure the compliance first of Libya and then of
Morocco.	 This was the principal item on the agenda of a
conference of foreign ministers of Algeria, Tunisia and
Mauritania, scheduled for Algiers at the end of 1987.
Towards cooperation in the Maghreb? 
Relations among the Maghrebin states have been governed
largely by mutual suspicion, endless rivalry, frequent conflict
and occasional confrontation.
	 Algeria's ambition to be
acknowledged as leader of the Maghreb has been countered by
Morocco's drive for territorial expansion and economic growth to
match Algeria's undoubted advantage in terns of size, resources,
a central location, and a reputation as a leading Third World
state. Tunisia, on the other hand, is the smallest state of the
Maghreb in terms of territory, resources and military power.
Accordingly it has adopted a low profile. trying to maintain a
'balance' in North Africa that will permit the exercise, here as
elsewhere, of its leader's undoubted skills particularly in
matters of diplomacy and statecraft.
The Libyan approach to foreign policy is different again.
Kadhafi has long neglected diplomacy, preferring to exploit his
ownpersonal charisma coupled with a variety of symbolic appeals,
mainly focussed on Arab union and anti-imperialist rhetoric.
joined to a conspicuous display of military and economic power.
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And if all else fails there is the
	
ever present threat of
subversion. Libya under Kadhafi, like Morocco under Hassan, is
prepared to dispute Algeria's claims to leadership of the
Maghreb. But Kadhafi prefers to direct his attention to 'soft'
targets like
	 Chad and Tunisia, presumably hoping that less
vulnerable states like Algeria and Morocco will succumb to
internal tensions, aggravated by the war of attrition in Western
Sahara, as well as by declining energy and commodity to say
nothing of escalating debt repayments.
Algeria is the largest and, in terms of resources, the
richest of the Maghreb states as well as occupying the strategic
centre ground.
	 It is the one North African state that at the
same time borders Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, Mauritania and the
Western Sahara, as well as Mali and Niger. At independence the
other states of the Maghreb attempted to secure a redistribution
of regional wealth by contesting the colonial frontiers which the
French finally defined only when Tunisia and Morocco were about
to gain independence. Believing that their occupation of Algeria
would continue indefinitely the French concentrated much of the
wealth of the Sahara inside its new borders. In 1963 Morocco had
failed to secure an adjustment of her eastern border with Algeria
after a brief and, on the whole, inconclusive war. Having also
failed in her bid to absorb the newly independent state of
Mauritania in the 1960s, Rabat was all the more determined to
assert its claim to the former Spanish Sahara once the Spanish
had withdrawn in 1975,
	 The Algerian aim in supporting the
Polisario movement and later in recognising the SADR was to block
Moroccan expansion southwards and to try to maintain the existing
(and favourable) balance within the Maghreb.
Despite its radical and socialist pretensions, Algeria is, in
terms of its foreign policy, an essentially conservative power
wedded to the status quo in North Africa. From that perspective
Morocco and Libya appear rather as 'revisionary' powers,
committed (to the extent of their limited means) to a policy of
territorial expansion. The Algerian view was well expressed by
the late President, Houari Boumedienne, when he disclosed his own
preferred solution to the Western Saharan problem.
President Giscard [d'Estaing] is favourable to Hassan's
point of view and to the re-establishment of a 'Greater
Morocco' which would have the effect of isolating and
even de-stabilising Algeria. Had France been consistent
with its earlier policies, however, it would have
favoured the creation of a Mauritanian-Saharawi grouping
which would contribute an element of balance and
stability to this region which is potentially the Ruhr of
the Maghreb.23
The existence of divergent ideologies and competitive, rather
than complementary economic systems, has been encouraged by the
rapid growth of separate, state-based nationalisms. From the
outset, as Zartman has indicated, the emphasis was on
distinctiveness.
	 A major contributing factor was the French
decision to grant independence to Tunisia and Morocco in 1956 but
to withhold it from Algeria. Despite a common language, a shared
history and a similar culture the prospects for closer
cooperation are not good. The 1970s began with an emphasis on
reconciliation and ended in near confrontation over Western
Sahara, The 1980s began with a widespread desire for détente on
the part of all the Maghrebin states other than Libya. As the
decade	 draws to a close the region finds itself divided by
competing alliances and unable to take a common stand even in the
face of external armed attack. If the domestic policies and the
external relations of three of the four Maghrebin states appear
to be converging - this has more to do with the external
circumstances than with any internal dynamic in faLvour of
cooperation.	 The weakening of Soviet influence in much of the
Middle East since 1972 and the debt crisis of the 1980s have been
the main factors in the shift within the Maghreb towards economic
liberalism and the West and away from state control and the
socialist and East European connection.
In the unique circumstances of North Africa the drive for
cooperation and unity becomes yet another factor differentiating
the Maghrebin states and their policies. The Algerian approach
to unity, like that of the Tunisians, is essentially 'functional'
and evolutionary.	 Integration begins with closer economic
cooperation among neighbouring states which is only possible
where there exists a basis for mutual respect and political
understanding. And that means non-intervention in the affairs of
other states and acceptance of existing frontiers.
	 It is
difficult to establish any common ground between this position
and that of the Libyan leader, Kadhafi, for whom 'union' means
nothing less than complete political integration with the
abolition of inherited borders and the replacement of
'reactionary' elites by governments who share his own radical and
Islamic aspirations. Morocco, for its part, remains wedded to a
more 'traditional' concept of the state based on a common history
and shared culture and focussing on the values, privileges and
territorial claims of the reigning dynasty. It is unlikely that
Hassan would willingly sacrifice any of those claims for the sake
of a Maghrebin unity based, not on the past, but on a decidedly
rational and technocratic blueprint for the future. These seem
to be the continuities that persist beneath the
	 shifting
alliances and the complex political manoeuvres of the years 1973-
1987.
Kadhafi's 'surprise' visit to Algiers in July 1987 recalled
similar 'surprise' visits in the past - to Tunisia and Morocco
and, before that Egypt - which ended in still-born or short-
lived treaties of 'union'.	 But Kadhafi must by now have
perceived that Algeria at least will not accept political union -
unless, of course, it is one dictated largely by Algiers itself.
And without Algerian cooperation it is difficult to see how any
form of cooperation can be established either in the Maghreb or,
indeed, in the Sahara. No doubt Kadhafi's object in 1987 was to
repair the damage to his reputation and to relieve his country's
obvious isolation in the aftermath of the American bombing and
the recent military setbacks in Chad.
	 In the Middle East, too,
Kadhafi has moved to rejoin the ranks of the other Arab states
by distancing himself from Iran, by calling for a cease-fire in
the Gulf war, and by seeking a reconciliation with Yasser Arafat,
and the majority of the PLO,	 whose moderation Kadhafi has
frequently denounced in the past.
President Chadli of Algeria has sought with considerable
success to project a more balanced image of his country's foreign
policy than was the case under his predecessors. In particular
he has taken every opportunity to be useful to Washington and
Paris, notably in their efforts to negotiate with the Ayatollahs
in Iran as well as with Amal, Hezbollah and the Islamic Jihad
groups active among the Shi'a population of Lebanon.
	 Algeria
has likewise cooperated with Saudi Arabia within the framework of
the Arab League to try to re-construct an Arab polit ical
consensus as a preliminary to an international conference on
Middle Eastern problems. In the Maghreb Algeria has been mainly
concerned to prevent Morocco securing international political
acceptance for its military occupation of Western Sahara. 	 By
means of the Friendship Treaty of 1983 Algeria and Tunisia sought
to define the basis of a future Maghrebin community, on grounds
that appeared to exclude both Libya and Morocco.
-201-
With the defeat in Chad Libya may now be prepared to accept
the conditions laid down for membership by Algeria and Tunisia.
By agreeing to receive Kadhafi for talks in 1987, President
Chadli would appear to be considering a new Libyan application to
join the 'Treaty' states - Algeria, Tunisia and Mauritania.
Libya would once again be 'admitted' to the Maghreb. It was his
predecessor, Boumedienne, who first involved Libya actively in
the affairs of the Maghreb : in 1975, when he was confident that
Algeria would remain the senior partner in an alliance of the two
'radical' states.
	 Chadli seems equally confident now of his
ability to retain the upper hand inside this new alliance which
would leave Morocco isolated within the Maghreb and under
considerable pressure to negotiate a political settlement of the
Western Sahara issue.
The return of Libya to Mahghrebin affairs - with the consent
of Tunisia - would go far to restore Algeria's old dominance,
threatened as it was by Morocco's occupation of the Western
Sahara in 1975 and her alliance with Libya in 1984. Re-assured
on this point Algeria may well be considering new overtures to
King Hassan.	 The resumption of more 'normal' relations would
help relieve the strain on both economies suffering the effects
of the conflict in the Sahara as well as more difficult trading
conditions inside the European Community and with the rest of the
world.	 It would then be left to Polisario to conclude the best
possible terns with the authorities in Rabat - on the strength of
their international position and the evident desire of the
Moroccan government to cut its defence expenditures and resume
closer control over the military itself.
Other developments in the region also seem favourable to
Algeria.	 The new Tunisian President, Ben Ali, is a pragmatist
who, like Chadli, is pre-occupied with the country's economic
problems and is more sympathetic than his predecessor to the idea
of tapping Tripoli's still considerable oil revenues and using
them to help finance Tunisia's debt repayments. The new economic
climate in Algeria is also congenial to the Tunisian government
which is no longer separated from its western neighbour by major
ideological differences. There is little fear now in Algiers of
an alliance between Algeria's two 'moderate' neighbours since all
three states are now moving, albeit slowly, 	 towards 'liberal'
economic policies.
Conclusions 
If there is a single pattern underlying inter-state relations
in the Maghreb then it would appear to be that of 'bad neighbour'
relations, outlined by Zartman in the mid 1960s. The picture is
one of recurring conflict rather than one of growing cooperation.
as disputes between the states over ideology, frontiers and the
ownership and control of resources are aggravated by differences
of personality, temperament and outlook among their leaders.The
description is also consistent with his model of a 'developing'
state's foreign policy, where the role of leadership and
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personality are emphasised, while the state and bureaucracy
occupy a subordinate place, national identity is at a discount,
and power is all but non-existent.
	 Meanwhile alliances retain
their parochial orientation and are preoccupied with such
'basics' as political differentiation and territorial integrity.
They are usually characterised by inconsistency, incoherence and
instability.	 In Zartman's view the 'mistake'	 of such
'developing' polities was to have chosen rhetoric and ideology in
place of the customary ingredients of a more 'developed' foreign
policy, namely pragmatism, a readiness to compromise, and a
preference for tangible, readily-identifiable objectives that can
be pursued by the usual diplomatic means.
That view of African foreign policies seems more appropriate
to the 1960s, when the new states were close to independence and
did, indeed,	 exhibit most of the features outlined by Zartman.
That was much less true, however, of the period 1973-1987. By
then the North African societies were showing the signs of
growing complexity;	 the constraints on leadership were more
obvious; and there had developed a much clearer sense of raison
d'etat, as well as a more consistent view of national interest
increasingly shared by different segments of the elite, whether
bureaucratic, military or, more recently, economic. 	 Of the
Maghrebin states it is Libya whose foreign policy most closely
resembles that of the 'developing' polity described by Zartman.
But there, too, the undoubted continuities in style may serve to
conceal a change of emphasis and direction after 1973 - away from
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pan-Arabism and an exclusively Middle Eastern orientation, and
towards a new and narrower focus on state and national interests
in so far as these related to the affairs of the Maghreb and the
Sahel.
PART THREE
THE MAGHREB AND THE MIDDLE EAST
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THE MAGHREB AND THE MIDDLE EAST 
Introduction 
The Middle Eastern wars of 1956, 1967 and 1973 were
major formative influences in the development of the North
African states and of their foreign policies. The war of
1956 saw the unsuccessful attempt by the British and Frenck
to re-occupy the Suez Canal and remove President Nasser of
Egypt. The impact on nationalist sentiment throughout North
Africa was substantial, the more so as it came at the height
of their own nationalist agitation against French rule.
This was the year when Tunisia and Morocco achieved
independence;	 and the year when the French took the
critical decision to use military rather than political
means to contain the growing rebellion in Algeria. Nasserist
sentiment was widespread in the Middle East, although the
North African states had already evolved their own
distinctive patterns of organisation and their own unique
brands of nationalism. These were based more on historical
factors and on the recent experience of the colonial
occupation rather than on notions of pan-Arabism and
Baathist socialism still prevalent in Syria, Iraq, Egypt and
also Libya.
But it was the Six Day war of 1967 that had the greatest
impact not only on the Maghreb but throughout the Middle
East. The scale and nature of the defeat and the loss of
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territory were such as to generate a new sense of solidarity
among Arab peoples throughout the region. But this was a
solidarity based on existing states and on cooperation
between governments rather than on a vague pan-Arab ideal.
There was a new awareness of the need to re-define the
nature and the goals of Arab unity.
	 Any future action to
recover the lost territories would have to take into account
the balance of military power within the region, which
heavily favoured Israel. That balance could not be changed
without enlisting international and, above all, American
support. And that, in turn, implied a willingness to seek a
negotiated political settlement of the problems of the
Middle East.
Meanwhile the balance among the Arab states themselves
was shifting - away from the traditional core states of
Egypt, Syria, Iraq and towards the conservative oil-
producing states of the Gulf, led by Saudi Arabia.
	 The
shift of Arab opinion was therefore in a rightwards
direction - which did not escape the notice of the Maghrebin
leaders,	 particularly
	 Algeria	 with	 its	 radical,
'revolutionary' regime. Meanwhile the Arab defeat and the
eclipse of the central Arab powers did serve to bring the
Maghrebin states into greater prominence within the Arab
world and to associate them more closely with the Arab cause
as a whole. It did not, howeve.r.,produce any convergence of
policy on the Middle East but seemed rather to provide new
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opportunities and new arenas within which to pursue existing
quarrels.
The war of 1973, which began with the successful
crossing of the Suez Canal by Egyptian forces, succeeded in
its otherwise limited aid of alerting international opinion
to the fact that the status quo in the Middle East was not
acceptable to Arab opinion, and was no longer tenable. The
sense of bitterness engendered by the defeat of 1967 gave
way to a spirit of optimism while the direction of Arab
policy in the 1970s was mainly determined by President Sadat
of Egypt, who had succeeded Nasser in 1970, and who was now
supported by a conservative Arab coalition largely
comprising the oil-rich states.
	 These last had not only
substantially increased their oil revenues in the course of
the year but had conducted their own economic offensive - an
oil embargo - against the United States and certain West
European states. While the embargo was short-lived and its
success was, at best, mixed, world opinion was nevertheless
alerted to the political as well as the economic
significance of the oil 'cartel'.
While the 1973 war was largely confined to Egypt and
Syria, the North African states nevertheless made a
contribution out of proportion to their size and, for the
most part, their resources. They helped to mould the short-
lived Arab consensus that followed the 1973 war and which
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was very much in line with their own pragmatic, state-based
outlook. They sought to involve the African and other Third
World states in their common cause for political and
economic justice - justice for the Arab states, for the
Palestinians, and for commodity producers everywhere.
Algeria's was "an African solidarity for an Arab
solidarity". But in this they were soon overtaken by the
Arab states of the Peninsula with their much greater wealth
and resources and their abiding suspicion of 'radical' Arab
states like Algeria and Libya.
The Maghrebin states were quick to adapt to the new
balance of power within the Arab world and to the prevailing
conservative sentiment. This was easier, on the whole, for
Morocco with its conservative monarchy and its pro-Western
orientation.	 In the case of Tunisia, Somrguiba's secular
outlook and his impatience with Arab religious and political
sensibilities cost	 him what influence he might
otherwise have had with the dominant Arab coalition. Unable
to compete within the Arab League with the larger and
wealthier states, Algeria opted instead in the 1970s for a
leading role in the Third World, North-South and Non-Aligned
Movements.
The North African states did not appear again on centre-
stage until the collapse of the Arab consensus after Sadat's
visit to Jerusalem in 1977, Camp David in 1978, and the
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separate Egyptian peace treaty with Israel in 1979. These
developments effectively took Egypt out of the Arab League
at the end of the 1970s. With Iraq involved in the Gulf war
after 1980 and Syria heavily committed inside Lebanon after
1976, the Arab leadership was increasingly dispersed,
divided and ineffectual. With the Arab states increasingly
leaderless and threatened by new pressures, not the least
of which was the fall-out from the Iranian revolution of
1979, the Maghrebin states pursued their own local contests
regardless, mainly in the Western Sahara but also in Chad
and the West African Sahel.	 Their participation in wider
Middle Eastern affairs was increasingly subordinate to their
rivalry within the Maghreb.
Morocco continued to draw on American, French and Saudi
good-will, in return for the many services it had services
rendered its ocnservative allies over the previous decade,
both in Africa and the Middle East.	 Algeria, meanwhile,
attempted to neutralise Moroccan influence in the West by
developing trade with the United States, by distancing
itself from the Soviet Union and from socialism, and by
courting American and French opinion through negotiating the
release of Western hostages held captive in Iran and
Lebanon.
	 Libya continued to pursue its idiosyncratic
foreign policies	 in the process shedding most of its
former allies and succeeding finally in provoking the
Americans into retaliatory action while their appeals to the
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new Soviet leadership and to other Arab states went largely
unheeded,
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CHAPTER EIGHT : ALGERIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST 
In Search of Arab Solidarity 
During the 1970s Algeria had to face up to the ever-growing
conservatism of the Arab world.	 Despite its substantial
contribution to the prosecution of the October 1973 war and its
militant attitude on issues such as the rights of the
Palestinians, the Algerian regime was suspect in the eyes of the
conservative Arab monarchies and there was a distinct and
mounting coolness in Algerian-Egyptian relations that had not
been there under President Nasser. Hence the support of a large
majority of the Arab League for Morocco in the dispute with
Algeria over the Western Sahara. As the centre of gravity in the
Arab Middle East shifted towards the large oil producing states,
and as the weight of vocal Arab opinion seemed to move away from
Nasserism and in favour of moderation, Algeria came under
pressure to adjust its Arab policy. The opportunity came with
the collapse of the fragile Arab consensus as a result of Sadat's
visit to Jerusalem in 1977, his endorsement of the Camp David
accords in 1978 and his signature of the Peace Treaty with Israel
in 1979, The suspension of Egypt from the League, following the
1979 Baghdad summit, severed the alliance between Egypt and the
oil-rich states of the Peninsula that had been effective since
1967 - and which had since set the tone of Arab international
discourse.
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The Maghreb had been increasingly involved in Middle Eastern
affairs, most notably after the Arab debacle of 1967, in the
artillery war that followed across the Suez Canal and, above all,
in the war of October 1973 when Moroccan soldiers saw active
service in Syria while Algeria despatched large quantities of
arms to the Egyptian front.
	 The departure of Egypt in 1979,
after playing a central role in the affairs of the League since
its inception, left a vacuum in Arab affairs which the Maghrebin
states tried to fill, playing a much more active and important
part.	 Moreover, the growing polarisation of opinion within the
Arab world, symbolised first by the Lebanese civil war in 1975-6
and later by the deliberations of the Baghdad summits, in 1978-
?9 provided an opportunity tor the Algerian leaderlEihip to
capitalise on its reputation for even-handedness and to exercise
Its undoubted talent for mediation.
The death of Boumedienne at the end of 1978 and his
replacement by President Chadli Benjedid early in 1979 was
equally opportune in that it made it easier for the latter to
volunteer his 'good offices' to the monarchs of the Gulf States
and Saudi Arabia, who had been accustomed to regard Algeria as
one of the more radical and intransigent of the Arab states.
Finally, the revolution in Teheran in 1979 was convenient in so
far as Algeria's support for revolution and for the Palestinian
cause, and her long opposition to Arab monarchy, quickly won her
the sympathy of the new leadership - particularly as Algeria's
principal antagonist, Morocco, insisted on proclaiming its
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support for the Shah even after his removal. Algeria was then
able to use its influence to help secure the release in 1981 of
the American hostages, captured when the Embassy in Teheran was
stormed by revolutionary guards.
Later Algeria was able to volunteer its services as mediator
in the long drawn-out Gulf War between Iraq and Iran - in the
course of which the Algerian Foreign Minister was killed in an
aircraft incident in May 1982. And more recently President Chadli
has been directly involved in negotiations to secure the release
of French hostages held in southern Beirut. There was also
the Algerian role in 1987 in effecting a reconciliation between
Yasser Arafat of the PLO and a number of his more radical
Palestinian opponents, which was thought to be a useful
preliminary for any future international conference on the Middle
East.	 In this and other ways the Algerian government has earned
the good opinion and gratitude of such leading conservative
figures as President Reagan, King Fand and now M. Jacques Chirac,
while managing to retain something of its earlier radical and
revolutionary reputation - sufficient at least to satisfy opinion
at home and to reassure Hafez Assad of Syria, if not Muammar
Kadhafi of Libya.
Given . these considerations it would be difficult to continue
to deny that Algerian diplomacy had 'come of age', benefiting
from the new divisions first in the Arab and then in the Moslem
world, while seeking to adjust to the new international balance
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in the Middle East since 1973 - and, in particular, the success
of the Americans in their bid to 'roll back' Soviet influence,
notwithstanding their own difficulties in Iran and Lebanon and
now in the Gulf.	 Chadli hopes no doubt that his new friends,
both in the Middle East and the West will reciprocate with
favourable trade, investment and energy agreements - and the
French have certainly done so by contracting, under President
Mitterrand and now under Prime Minister Chirac, to purchase
Algerian gas at prices well above the market rate. In that sense
Algeria's new Middle Eastern diplomacy complements President
Chadli's continuing reforms of the domestic economy in the
direction of greater liberalisation, the break-up of the old
state monopolies and the efforts to ensure efficient management
and profitable operation.
Zartman is no doubt right in emphasising that Algerian
diplomacy has always been firmly anchored in Maghrebin politics.
Behind the recent changes in Algerian foreign policy - beginning
perhaps as early as 1973 - lay more parochial considerations and,
in particular, the threat to the balance of power in the Maghreb
from Morocco's occupation of the Western Sahara in 1975.	 But
foreign policy at every level is the quest for allies and for
political, economic and military advantage - usually against some
identifiable rival or potential antagonist. 	 Algeria's rivalry
with Morocco has taken her close to the socialist camp and, more
recently, via Camp David, Teheran and Beirut, towards the West
and a truly remarkable reconciliation with her former colonial
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master. It only remains to be seen how détente between Algeria
and Morocco, a down-grading of the Western Sahara dispute, and an
escalation of the conflict in the Gulf - accompanied by the
return of Egypt to the Arab League - will in turn affect
Algeria's international position and her continuing bid for
leadership in the Maghreb.
1967-73 : an opportunity for militancy 
For the first years after independence Algeria lacked a
distinctive Arab policy, largely because of the priority given to
the Maghreb itself, as well as its involvement in the politics of
the African continent - to say nothing of Nasser's and Egypt's
hegemony in Arab politics.
	
Algeria nevertheless accepted
Egyptian leadership the more readily because of Egyptian support
for Algerian independence and the close ties later forged between
Nasser and the first Algerian President, Ahmed Ben Bella.
Ideological affinities were also made conspicuous when Egypt
backed Algeria in its brief border war with Morocco in October
1963.	 Algeria returned the compliment by supporting Nasser's
Involvement in the war in Yemen and it followed his diplomatic
lead in severing relations with Britain over Rhodesia in 1965.
For these reasons the change of regime in Algeria, in June 1965,
was not well received in Cairo. It was some time before Egypt,
in company with the Soviet Union and the more 'radical' of the
African states, abandoned their early attitude of suspicion and
hostility towards President Houari Boumedienne.
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Boumedienne, for his part, was irritated by Naser's rather
patronising attitude and for a time Algeria remained absent from
Arab conferences as the new administration devoted itself to
laying the basis of the new industrial and political structures
and to consolidating the domestic base of the regime. The Arab-
Israeli war of June 1967 nevertheless gave the government the
opportunity to proclaim its militancy and assert its pan-Arab
orthodoxy.	 Following the Israeli strike against Egyptian bases
on June 6, the Algerian Foreign Minister, Abdelaziz Bouteflika,
saw the secretary-general of the Arab League, Mahmoud Riyad, in
Cairo and assured him that Algeria would place all it possessed
in the way of military equipment at the disposal of Egypt. The
next day the Algerian ambassador was able to assure Riyad that
nineteen aircraft had arrived from Algeria while another fifteen
were on their way : he requested more Egyptian pilots so that
additional aircraft could be supplied.'	 Again, according to
Riyad, Algeria sent a battalion-size combat team of infantry and
artillery to Egypt, and about a hundred MIG fighter aircraft.2
But as the war only lasted six days neither the aircraft nor the
equipment were deployed in battle.
Acceptance of a cease-fire by Egypt, Syria and Jordan cane as
a blow to the Algerian government which had anticipated an
escalation of the war to include all Arabs. It is also possible
that Boumedienne, recalling the early humiliations he had
suffered at the hands of Nasser after taking power in 1965, saw
an opportunity to embarrass and strike back at the now ageing
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leader of a defeated Arab coalition.
	 Algeria persisted in the
conviction that 1967 was not a defeat because "we did not use all
our assets" - for example, by liquidating all western and Anglo-
Saxon interests in the Middle East including oil concessions and
military bases, by ordering the suspension of oil supplies to the
imperialist countries for a year, and the withdrawal of Arab
funds deposited in Western banks. 3 The implication was that the
Arabs were defeated not so much by Israel as by its western
allies - to say nothing of their own mismanagement of their
resources. In fact Algeria did sever its diplomatic relations
with the United states on June 6, having earlier broken off
relations with Britain over Rhodesia. The Algerian expeditionary
force remained stationed along the Suez Canal until July 1970,
anticipating
	 the	 collapse	 of	 American-sponsored	 peace
negotiations.	 Meanwhile Algeria refused to recognise United
Nations Security Council Resolution 242, of November 1967,
calling for the withdrawal of troops to secure and recognised
boundaries and for acceptance of the state of Israel by the Arab
states.
Algeria regarded the resolution as unfair since it persisted
in treating the Palestinians as mere refugees and its
implementation would, in effect, deprive them of their right to
regain their homeland.	 When Nasser emphasised the military
weakness of the Arab states, in a speech to the Arab Summit in
Rabat, in December 1969, and called for an increase in that
strength as a diplomatic counter in peace negotiation, Algeria
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and Saudi Arabia both demanded an absolute commitment to war,
each seeking to embarrass the Egyptian leader and to emphasise
Egypt's new dependency on its Arab brothers. And in a gesture of
protest at Nasser's decision to accept the Rogers' Plan, in
August 1970, Algeria withdrew some 2,000 troops from the Canal
zone and refused to attend the Arab Summit in Cairo in September
1970. 4
 The Rogers' Plan was rightly taken to reflect the advance
of American influence in the Middle East in the wake of the
earlier Israeli victory.
	 Algeria had also concluded that the
main objective of the front-line Arab states was to recover the
occupied territories - with little or no concern for the plight
of the Palestinians who would be left to fend for themselves.
This is one reason why Algeria was so outspoken in its
support for the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), after
its formation in 1964, and especially for the Fatah faction,
easily the largest in the PLO, and, like the PLO itself, led by
Yasser Arafat. s
 From the outset Fatah had been influenced in its
strategy - armed struggle - and its objectives - independence in
a national, secular state - by the example of the Algerian
revolution.	 After the Arab defeat of 1967 the PLO won
considerable prestige among Arabs who saw it as the only Arab
organisation actively engaging, harassing and, very occasionally
(with Jordanian military support), inflicting military reverses
on the Israelis - as at Karameh. The close identification of the
Algerian government with the Palestinian cause after 1967 made
Algerian foreign policy appear more radical than ever - even if
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Algeria could never provide the front-line bases which the PLO
now tried to establish, first in Jordan and then, after 'Black
September', 1970, in Lebanon. In that sense Algeria may be said
to have had the best (or worst?) of both worlds in the 1960s. It
won a militant and radical reputation without suffering direct
military defeat or being exposed to Israeli retaliation.
During the confrontation between the Jordanian government and
the Palestinians, from June 1970 to July 1971, Algeria openly
identified with the Palestinians, provoking the bombardment of
the Algerian Embassy in Amman by the Jordanian army in September
1970. Shortly afterwards, in January 1971, Boumedienne appealed
to all Arab leaders to intervene to prevent a massacre of the
Palestinians in Jordan. In July there were reports of arms being
supplied by Algeria to the Palestinians, through the Syrian port
of Ladhiquiyah.	 The consignment was said to be sufficient to
equip over 7,000 men.'
	 It was at this time that Algeria also
broke off diplomatic relations with Jordan : they were restored
only after Jordan had sent troops to the Syrian front during the
war of October 1973.	 By September 1971 Algerian aid to the
Palestinian resistance was estimated at $20 million in arms and
equipment, while 80% of the arms for Fatah were believed to have
been provided by Algeria. 7	Which suggests the symbolic
('revolutionary') importance to the Algerian leadership of the
Palestinian connection. 	 There is a special sense of
identification with the Palestinians who are struggling to
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liberate their homeland from foreign rule and settlement using
force where necessary.
Which does not prevent the Algerians from being openly
critical of the divisions within the PLO, the tactical blunders
of the movement's leadership, and its failure to conduct a
systematic and continuing campaign of indoctrination among the
Arab masses inside Israel and the occupied territories.
	 There
was criticism, too, of the way the Palestinians handled relations
with their host governments in Jordan and, more particularly, in
Lebanon.
	 Similar criticisms, of course, were once levelled
against the Algerian FLN itself, and its relations with its
Tunisian hosts - to say nothing of its internal divisions (Ben
Bella once likened it to "a zoo") and the absence of political
structures in much of Algeria especially after the brutal but
successful French campaign in 1957 to liquidate the movement in
Algiers and the surrounding countryside.
The gist of the Algerian argument was that the PLO should be
left to make its own decisions with as little intervention as
possible from other Arab states and leaders. This attitude was
well received by the PLO if not by the other Arab leaders who
found themselves under more direct and effective pressure either
to support or to restrain their own Palestinian combatants.
Boumedienne was also insistent that no one could negotiate away
Palestinian territory without the express consent of the
Palesinian people themselves. Which answered many of the fears
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of the Palestinians about the American-sponsored peace process
after 1967 - but was also intended to immobilise (and emasculate)
the now largely conservative majority within the Arab League.
Boumedienne summarised his government's thinking as follows
We think the three parties in question are Egypt, Syria,
and the Palestinian resistance, and we support any line
on which these three parties are agreed. But if there is
a dispute between the Palestinian resistance and one of
the other parties, we will stand by the resistance.'
The Algerian commitment to the Palestinian cause was sufficient
to bring allegations from the Israeli newspaper, Haaretz, that
Algeria was training pilots for the Palestinian Liberation Army.
In May Boumedienne was quoted by Reuters, as rejecting a
politically flexible approach on Israel.
I do not believe that the Arab lands can be liberated
without a heavy price being paid...a tough line must be
adopted.	 Egypt must adopt the same policy as that of
Vietnam.
1973-79 an active diplomacy for the Arab cause 
The Arab-Israeli war of October 1973 re-awakened Algerian
hopes for a united Arab front and renewed and lasting Arab
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solidarity.	 Algeria made a substantial contribution to the war
effort where the principal burden necessarily fell on Egypt and
Syria.	 As in 1967, the Algerian air force was again placed at
the disposal of the Egyptians. 	 The Algerian contribution to
Egypt and Syria has been assessed at several score of planes,
hundreds of tanks and armoured vehicles, and about 25,000 troops.
Only those troops despatched to the Syrian front were able to
participate in the fighting : those sent to Egypt arrived after
the cease-fire.	 Algeria also forwarded two complete medical
teams and twelve tons of medicines to Syria.'°
Another source has revealed that Algeria was responsible for
the transfer of some two million tons of oil to Egypt and half
that quantity to Syria, not to mention the $200 million paid to
the Soviet Union during Boumedienne's visit to Moscow, on October
14-15, 1973, so that the Soviets could at once despatch tanks to
the beleaguered Arab armies." That amount was the equivalent of
the remittances transferred each year by the million Algerian
workers in Europe.	 The Algerian contributions to Egypt also
compared favourably with those of the Libyans and Moroccans - an
armoured brigade each from Algeria and Libya but three squadrons
of MIGs and Sokhois from Algeria compared with two squadrons of
Mirages from Libya.
There was also an infantry brigade from Morocco and a
battalion from Tunisia. It is even possible that Boumedienne was
notified in advance of the impending war in October - which would
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be a further tribute to his sense of commitment and
responsibility.	 As early as August, in an interview with a
Lebanese journalist, he had underlined his country's preparedness
in the event of a war against the Israeli enemy. Afterwards a
senior Syrian officer was said to have credited Boumedienne, his
government and his people with "an extraordinary role in the
war", 12	 In the context of Arab solidarity Algeria resumed
diplomatic relations with Jordan on October 13, after the
Jordanian forces had engaged the enemy on the Syrian front.
Algeria maintained a fairly discrete silence about its
contribution to the war - in contrast to the publicity emanating
from Rabat about the important but much smaller Moroccan effort.
Algeria was also direly involved in the oil boycott decreed on
October 20 by the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting States
(OAPEC) and directed at those western consumers most closely
identified with Israel. ' 3	 After President Nixon had formally
asked Congress to approve $2.2 billion in emergency funds to
finance a massive airlift to Israel, King Faisal of Saudi Arabia
declared an immediate 10% cut-back in Saudi production without
even consulting his fellow oil producers.	 Some days later he
suspended all shipments to the United States. The example was
followed by other Arab producing states and was the kind of
embargo Algeria had first demanded at the time of the
unsuccessful 1967 war.	 Operation 'Badr' was a limited success.
As a non-Arab state Iran did not participate. 	 Iraq publicly
dissociated itself from the decision of the other Arab producers,
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describing the strategy as counter-productive and the result of
pressure from the Saudis who would never sanction effective
action against their American allies. 14
	Instead the Iraqis
nationalised the shares in Iraqi oil first of American and then
of Dutch companies, before finally imposing an embargo on both.
The producing states had not prepared for the boycott in
advance and before long there was pressure, particularly from the
Gulf states, to relax the embargo.	 The Gulf producers were
suffering as a result of Iranian competition while the Saudis
were under mounting pressure from their American partners.
President Boumedienne nevertheless upheld the oil boycott as an
indication of what the oil producing states could achieve given
western dependence on imported sources of energy. Commenting on
the Geneva peace conference of December, 1973, he maintained
We are the only ones who have the solution to the Middle
East problem...Israel and the United States have reached
a dead end. There is in fact the prospect of a solution
which would be both acceptable to the Arabs and
relatively honourable. Today we can deal as equals with
the big powers.'
Although the loss of revenues adversely affected the
implementation of the Algerian plan,
	 it was only with
considerable reluctance that Algeria consented on March 19, 1974,
-225-
to the OAPEC decision to lift the embargo on the United States.
Not only did the Algerians identify closely with the oil boycott,
but much of their oil production was destined for European
markets and not the United States. The Algerian leadership was
not averse to exploiting the predicament of the Gulf states,
whose income was heavily cut by the boycott. while emphasising
its own attachment to Arab militancy. By way of contrast Algeria
opposed the decision by the Arab producing states to maintain the
embargo against Holland.
On the diplomatic front Algerian action was equally
intensive. While Boumedienne was still presiding over the Non-
Aligned Movement, whose summit was held in Algiers in September
1973, he arranged for cables to 6c sent on October 7 to the
leaders of countries represented on the United Nations Security
Council inviting them to condemn Israeli aggression and drawing
their attention to a resolution of the recent Non-Aligned
Conference,
	 critical	 of	 Israel's open defiance of the
international community and of the United Nations. As mentioned
earlier, Boumedienne also visited Moscow on October 14-15 to
ensure the prompt delivery of arms to Egypt and Syria and to try
to extract from the Soviet leadership an unequivocal statement of
their support for the Arab cause. Notwithstanding his efforts,
the Soviet position remained ambiguous if only because the first
priority, as in 1967, was to safeguard the policy of detente and
coexistence with the United states. 	 In these circumstances the
best the Soviets could offer was a limited and conditional aid to
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the Arab states engaged in what, to Moscow, appeared a local or
at best a regional conflict.
Boumedienne was also active in other areas and organisations,
seeking to isolate Israel within the international community
while trying to mobilise support for the Arab cause.
	 With
Kadhafi, he succeeded in persuading a large number of African
states to sever diplomatic relations with Israel, maintaining
that the "cause of freedom is indivisible" whether the source of
oppression was Israel, Portugal, white Rhodesia or racist South
Africa.	 Algeria became even more active in the United Nations
after the election of the Foreign Minister, Abdelaziz Bouteflika,
to the presidency of the General Assembly, in 1974. That same
year also saw the recognition of the PLO by the Soviet Union (in
August) while Yasser Arafat was permitted to address the General
Assembly in October, being accorded the kind of reception usually
reserved for a Head of State.
Where Algiers had served in September 1973 as the venue of
the Non-Aligned Summit, Algeria was also host to the Arab League
Summit in November of that year. This was the conference that
Iraq and Libya declined to attend, dismissing it contemptuously
as the 'capitulation summit'.	 Jordan was represented but King
Hussein absented himself, personally, anticipating that the
Summit would see the recognition of the PLO as the sole
legitimate representative of the Palestinians. 	 Bounedienne_
singled him out for particular criticism, recalling that this was
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the second time Hussein had avoided doing battle for the Arab
cause - the first being the war of October 1973. It was also the
first Arab summit attended by Mauritania, close to Algeria since
the 1960s and true to its strategy of enlisting in any and every
organisation that could serve the goals of domestic unity and
economic development.
	 President Mobutu of Zaire also attended
the inaugural meeting of the conference as a symbol of African
solidarity with the Arab cause.
Already, however, there was evidence that Algerian policy was
adjusting to the new, more conservative Arab consensus, most
clearly reflected in President Sadat's earlier break with the
Soviet Union and his acceptance of Henry Kissinger's 'shuttle
diplomacy'.	 Indeed, Boumedienne was regularly consulted, in one
capacity or another, by the American Secretary of State.
Boumedienne, in his turn, was resolute in his determination to
allow nothing to undermine the display of Arab unity -
unprecedented in the history of the Arab League : hence his
strong censure of those like Kadhafi and King Hussein who, for
different reasons, had nevertheless absented themselves.
Increasingly, however, Algerian policy found itself aligned
with that of Egypt and the other front-line states whose first
priority was to recover the territories occupied by Israel in the
wars of 1967 and 1973. To that extent Algeria had backed away
from its earlier and unequivocal commitment to the liberation of
Palestine and the constitution of a single Arab nation as the
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principal goals of the Arab leaders. Arab diplomacy after 1967
and, more particularly, after 1973 was, as F. Ajami has
perceptively argued, dominated by the emergence of the State and
the substitution of state interests for the earlier doctrines of
pan-Arabism. The PLO had already broken with pan-Arab orthodoxy
after the 1967 war - so far as to demand the creation of a
Palestinian state.	 It was not surprising, therefore, that
Algeria, with its own recent and strong tradition of national
resistance to the French, should quickly identify with the new
direction being taken by Arab political discourse.
This was the gist of Boumedienne's remark that "we cannot be
more Egyptian than the Egyptians, more Syrian than the Syians, or
even more Palestinian than the Palestinians."' Then there were
his concluding remarks to a press conference at the end of the
Algiers Arab summit.
The war goes on notwithstanding the cease-fire agreed on
the battlefield by the two Arab belligerents and we are
still very much involved in it. The enemy continues to
occupy our territories of which it has surrendered not an
inch.	 Furthermore, nothing has been done as yet to
secure the rights of the Palestinians. The promises that
were made to them, in this context or that, remain mere
promises.19
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Algeria continued nevertheless to insist that the Palestinian
cause - the right to their Palestinian homeland - should not be
compromised by the insistence of the Egyptians and Syrians -
understandable in the circumstances - on recovering their own
lost territories.	 During the summer of 1974 Boumedienne
vigorously contested the argument presented by Egypt and Jordan
to the effect that the PLO was the legitimate representative only
of those Palestinians living outside the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan.	 For Algiers, the PLO had been recognised by the Arab
summit as the legitimate representative of all Palestinians
wherever they might be found.	 In the words of President
Bounedienne
If King Hussein asks us to choose between Jordan and the
Palestinian revolution, we will always and without any
hesitation come down on the sideofthe Palestinian
revolution.19
The Palestinians were evicted from their bases in Jordan
after 1971, with the PLO looking for sanctuary in the small, weak
and multi-confessional state of Lebanon, where Palestinians had
first settled after the 1948 war and which, by the seventies,
would harbour a Palestinian population of some 300,000. Tensions
were inevitable between the large Christian ,communities of
Lebanon on the one hand - notably the Maronites who supplied the
President and commander of the mixed military forces - and the
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Moslem majority on the other, comprising Shi'a as well as Sunni
Moslems.	 The 'balance' established among the different
communities, and between the Christian and Moslem populations at
the time of independence and embodied in the so-called 'national
pact' was increasingly contested inside Lebanon where the Moslems
were now a clear majority - reinforced by the presence of the
Palestinians. Large areas of the south of the country and whole
districts of Beirut, the capital, were policed by PLO guerrillas
to the exclusion of the national army. 	 Nor were domestic
relations between the rival communities improved by PLO attacks
across the frontier into Israel which then invited Israeli
retaliation against Lebanon.	 In 1978 and again in 1982 such
attacks would be cited by the Israelis as justification for the
invasion and occupation of Lebanese territory.
Meanwhile the tensions inside Lebanon reached a climax in
April 1975 as the right-wing Christian militias sought to
reinforce their grip on the country's political institutions and
to affirm its Christian character - largely at the expense of the
Palestinians whose guerrillas were to be disarmed, while the
Palestinian refugees, besieged in their camps, would be given
notice to quit Lebanon. The left-wing, revolutionary forces, on
the other hand, insisted on the country's Arab character and
demanded the reorganisation of the country's political structures
so as to reflect both that fact and the preponderance of Moslems
in the population.
	
To that end the left sought to enlist the
cooperation of the PLO military forces, which was resisted by
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Yasser Arafat and his lieutenants in Fatah until the Christian
siege of the refugee camps in Beirut threatened the Palestinian
population not only with starvation but also with extermination.
There followed a split in the Lebanese army, along confessional
lines with the defection of a large part of the Moslem rank and
file.	 Just as the military balance swung clearly in favour of
the revolution and of the left-wing coalition, Syrian forces
intervened in 1976, initially on the side of the Christians.
President Hafez Assad seems to have feared that a Moslem victory
in Lebanon would invite Israeli military intervention on behalf
of the Christian minority - now increasingly looking to Israel
rather than Britain, America or France for protection.
As tensions grew in the Lebanon after 1973 Boumedienne
exerted his personal influence with the Palestinian leadership to
try to ensure that the re-conquest of a Palestinian homeland
should not be at the expense of Lebanese national integrity and
that the rights of Lebanese citizens, whatever their religious
convictions, should be respected. Arafat himself seems to have
been aware of the threat and to have used his considerable
influence with the Fatah movement, and within the PLO, to counter
the views of more militant factions like the Popular Front for
the Liberation of Palestine, and its Marxist - previously
Nasserist - leader, George Habash, who from the outset of the
civil war in 1975 had openly sided with the revolution. However,
as in Jordan in 1970-71, Arafat's opponents were able to take the
initiative and force the pace while latent antagonism towards the
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Palestinians among a large section of the population (by no means
confined to the Christian community) soon threatened the
Palestinians not only with vicious and murderous reprisals but
with an inevitable blood-bath.
In the circumstances it was therefore unfortunate that
President Boumedienne., who inclined towards moderation and
conciliation in the Lebanon, and who was well placed to mediate
In the escalating dispute, was in 1975 pre-occupied with another
crisis - that in the Western Sahara. Here the consensus of the
moderate majority among the Arab states favoured Morocco rather
than Algeria : notwithstanding their commitment in one form or
another to the eventual creation of a Palestinian state, the Arab
leaders had always been wary of the militant Palestinian
leadership and displayed no enthusiasm whatever for the radical
and revolutionary programme of the Polisario movement.
	
The
creation of a Saharawi Arab and Democratic Republic (SADR) would
not only offend the Moroccans but could conceivably enlarge the
ranks of those Arab states critical of the 'peace process'
fearing that Palestinian interests were to be sacrificed to
Egyptian and Jordanian interests. In the event all Arab states
supported the Moroccan (and Mauritanian) position on the Western
Sahara, with the exception only of Libya, South Yemen and, of
course, Algeria.
	 Which ensured that the issue was not even
included on the agenda of the Arab League. Algeria, anxious as
ever to preserve the Arab unity forged in October 1973, preferred
to take its case instead to the Organisation of African Unity and
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the United Nations, where it cou id count on a more sympathetic
reception.
Algeria was therefore under pressure to accept the official
Syrian account of its intervention in Lebanon in 1976
notwithstanding the fact that Syria was effectively supporting
the Christian minority against what appeared to be a clear Moslem
and Palestinian majority. Where Egypt and Jordan were evidently
ready to make concessions on the Palestinian issue in return for
Israeli withdrawal to the pre-1967 frontiers, the Syrians gave
priority to the defence of their national interests over the
plight of the Palestinians in neighbouring Lebanon.
	 At the
beginning of Syrian involvement Palestinian forces armed and
trained by Syria even engaged in open confrontation with PLO
forces defending Palestinan settlements in the Lebanon.
	 If
Algeria refrained from denouncing the Syrian intervention it was
because Syria had remained neutral on the question of Western
Sahara - distancing herself from Morocco despite active Moroccan
military participation in the defence of Syrian positions in the
Golan Heights during the war of October 1973. After 1980 Syria
would, under Algerian pressure, finally recognise the SADR
Meanwhile, as an indication of its concern, the Algerian
authorities did permit Palestinians in Algiers to occupy the
Syrian Embassy, while anti-Syrian demonstrations were organised
on the streets of the Algerian capital. Meanwhile the Algerians
resorted to mediation, as the Education Minister, Abdulkrim Bea
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Mahmoud, joined Kadhafi's 'deputy', Abdul Salam Jallud, in
seeking a reconciliation between Syria on the one hand and the
Palestinians and Lebanese progressives on the other.
	 The fact
that such a junior minister was chosen to act for Algeria
suggests that the government was not optimistic about the
probable outcome of the mediation - and was content to allow the
Libyans and Kadhafi to bear the major responsibility. In an
attempt to influence Syrian policy, and perhaps to pre-empt other
Arab (or foreign) intervention, Algeria, Libya and Iraq did agree
to despatch symbolic contingents to the Lebanon, to serve
alongside the Syrian forces in a 'peace-keeping' role. Some four
hundred Algerian soldiers arrived in June 1976.
The Syrians refused, however, to evacuate Lebanon and their
role in the fifty-two day siege by Christian militia of the
Palestinian camp at Tell El Zaater, in the summer of 1976,
finally convinced the Algerian government of Syrian complicity
with right-wing phalangists to weaken the Palestinian resistance.
Where the Syrian authorities had long since emasculated the
Palestinian organisations formed in that state, they were now
seeking to subordinate the independent Palestinian formations in
Lebanon to their own will and interests. The weekly organ of the
Algerian FLN, Revolution africaine, even warned of possible
collusion between Syria and Jordan with a view to territorial
aggrandisement following the dismembering of the Lebanese state
and the absorption of the West Bank by Jordan. 2°	 For the
duration of the crisis in Lebanon the Algerian government
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preferred, however, to keep a fairly low profile, pleading
distance and other preoccupations closer to holm, which did not
prevent the authorities in Algiers from multiplying more discrete
diplomatic initiatives while, like Libya and Iraq, providing
financial assistance to the Palestinians allied with the Lebanese
progressives and the revolutionary coalition in Beirut.
Where the 'progressive' Arab countries were unable to obtain
a cease-fire in the Lebanon, the 'conservative' states achieved
just that - during the emergency Riyadh summit of October 17,
1976. Using their influence with the other Arab leaders as well
as their undoubted financial muscle, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were
able at the conference to effect a reconciliation between
President Assad on the one hand, and President Sadat of Egypt and
Yasser Arafat of the PLO on the other. The outcome recalled the
much earlier Cairo Agreement of 1969 when the Arab states had
intervened in the quarrel between the PLO and the Lebanese
government and army to ensure the continued independence of the
Palestinian military bases in Lebanon and of the forces involved
in the defence of the Palestinian refugee camps. 	 Where that
settlement had favoured the Palestinians, however, the Arab
intervention following the Riyadh conference saw the imposition
of a cease-fire betwen the contending forces in the Lebanon and
the creation of a deterrent Arab force to police the cease-fire.
In the circumstances this was predominantly Syrian with the
Saudis achieving some degree of leverage (where the radical Arab
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states had earlier failed) by offering to finance the entire
operation.
By now it was obvious that the balance of power in the Arab
world, and in the Middle East as a whole, favoured the
established order at the expense of the radicals. Arguably that
had been the situation since 1967 and the defeat of Nasser and
his Syrian and Jordanian allies. Certainly the death of Nasser
in 1970, the removal of the PLO camps from Jordan in 1971, the
expulsion the following year of Soviet personnel serving in
Egypt, and Sadat's participation in the American-sponsored 'peace
process' after 1973 - were so many milestones along the path
towards moderation and conformity with western designs.	 The
states that had intervened to secure the cease-fire in Lebanon in
1976 would soon challenge Algeria on what Boumedienne would have
considered his 'home ground'.
Since 1973 Algeria had been calling for an Afro-Arab summit
to underline the African commitment to the Arab cause in the
Middle East - and the reciprocal Arab commitment to African
development and the liberation of southern Africa.
	 When the
summit did finally convene, however, in March 1977, Egypt acted
as host while Saudi Arabia announced a surprise contribution of
$1 billion to the African states, followed by a pledge of $240
million by Kuwait, $136 million by the United Arab Emirates, and
$70 million from Qatar. Which was in addition to funds already
being channelled to Africa through the Saudi dominated Islamic
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Conference Organisation (ICO) and, since 1973, through the
Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting States (OAPEC). Three-
quarters of the Gulf aid pledged at the Afro-Arab conference
would be bi-lateral and not multi-lateral in character.
The direct challenge by the Saudis and their allies to
Algeria and Libya and the conscious and well publicised attempt
to reduce their role and influence on the African continent had
their counterpart in Saudi financial aid for Morocco and Gulf
support, generally, for the anti-communist and anti-Soviet
positions of the Moroccan sovereign, Hassan II. The success of
the Marxists in South Yemen, their support for the insurgents in
Dhofar province of Oman and the Marxist orientation of the
military regime in Ethiopia after 1974 had alerted the Saudis to
what they saw as a concerted communist bid for power in the
region as a whole. Thus, while Algeria was able to outmanoeuvre
Morocco inside the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), it did
not have anything like the sane success within the Arab League or
in other Arab bodies. Where Algeria could convince the majority
of the OAUthat the issue in Western Sahara was one of self-
determination, the Arab leaders could not be convinced that the
Western Sahara was, indeed, a second Palestine! There were even
some who might have been prepared to exchange Palestine itself
and the Palestinians for an undertaking that would help secure
their oil wealth and the political influence and material
comforts that came with it.
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In his speech of May 24, l9'7
	 in Algeria before
the fifth congress of the Association of Bbudjahidin (ex-
servicemen), President Boumedienne reproached Saudi Arabia -
though without naming her - for its lack of generosity towards
the poorest states, but especially for the diversion of Arab
funds to European or American banks, and their use to finance
counter-revolution in Africa and the Middle East. 2 '	 Algerian
relations with Kuwait and, more particularly, the United Arab
Emirates have not been subject to the same intense pressures.
Although basically supportive of Morocco, they have occasionally
displayed a certain neutrality which the Saudi leadership has
found to be both disconcerting and occasionally embarrassing.
Thus it was to the United Arab Emirates that Algeria entrusted
its diplomatic representation after breaking off relations with
Morocco and Mauritania in March 1976.	 The same country also
agreed to act for Algeria after ties were severed with Egypt, in
December 1977, following Sadat's historic visit to Jerusalem.
For Algeria, Sadat's journey to Jerusalem represented a
dangerous breach in Arab solidarity which threatened a serious
weakening of Arab resolve in the continuing confrontation with
Israel.	 It was to prevent such a breach that President
Boumedienne had laboured with such determination since 1973 and
the Algiers Arab summit. There was little, however, that Algeria
could do to deflect the Egyptians from their course of action -
particularly as the conservative Arab majority had abetted and
encouraged Sadat in his earlier pursuit of the 'peace process'
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and in his hopes of a negotiated settlement first of Egyptian
then of wider Arab claims. Algeria nevertheless joined with
Libya, Syria, South Yemen and the PLO in forming the
"Steadfastness and Confrontation Front" (Jabllat Al Somud Wal
Tasadi) which, at the constituent meeting in Tripoli, Libya, from
December 2-5, 1977,	 undertook to lead the Arab opposition to
Sadat's policy.
Already, from
	 1973 on, Iraq, Libya, South Yemen, and
several of the more radical groups within the PLO had opposed
Sadat and his participation in the 'peace process', forming
themselves into a "Rejectionist Front". Iraq declined, however,
to join the new Steadfastness Front, ostensibly because its
resolutions were not sufficiently "radical".
	 In reality, the
historical animosity between Iraq and Syria was largely
responsible for the defection of the former, together with the
(not unexpected) failure of her attempts to persuade the Syrians
to reject Resolution 242 of the United Nations which, among other
things, recognises the right of all states in the area, including
Israel, to secure borders.
The Tripoli conference called for the cutting of diplomatic
links with Egypt while inviting members of the Arab League to
consider a proposal to remove the headquarters from Cairo. They
should also institute a boycott of Egyptian companies engaged in
trade with Israel.	 In fact Egypt reacted first by breaking off
its diplomatic relations with the members states of the Steadfast
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Front while PLO offices in Cairo had been closed the previous
November after Sadat's visit to Israel. 	 The Gulf states and
Lebanon hesitated to take sides in the growing Arab confrontation
and were therefore labelled fabhat Al Samt (The Silent Front);
while Sudan, Morocco and Oman expressed their support for the
Egyptian initiative, forming the Jabhet Al Qubul (Front of
Support) or, as others called it, "Capitulation Front".
Most Arab countries, however, were later disappointed with
the results of the Sadat initiative, whatever the initial
response in Egypt itself which seems to have been largely
favourable.	 In March 1979 there followed the second Baghdad
summit of the Arab League , where the majority issued a statement
condemning the Egyptian action in signing a separate peace treaty
with Israel. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait reluctantly undertook to cut
off the generous financial support they had been giving Egypt
since Nasser's defeat in the 1967 war. Aid to Syria and Jordan
would, however, be continued. On May 3, twelve other Arab states
agreed to suspend relations with Egypt, including Jordan, Kuwait,
Saudi Arabia, The United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Lebanon,
Morocco, Tunisia, Mauritania, North Yemen and Djibouti (Territory
of the Afars and Issas).
President Boumedienne had criticised Sadat's participation in
Camp David before a conferfence of the ruling FLN party. Sadat
had received no authorisation to speak for or sign any document
on behalf of the Palestinian people. While it had to be admitted
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that independent etatee are eavereign entities and must be
presumed to "know their own interests best", nevertheless, "no
one was at any time authorised to speak out for or negotiate with
the Zionist State in the name of the Arab nation".The death of
Boumedienne at the end of 1978 was singularly unfortunate, coming
as it did at a particularly difficult and critical juncture in
the affairs of the Arab world. The contest for the succession in
Algeria, however orderly, did nevertheless distract attention
away from events elsewhere and weaken the impact of the country's
external policy.	 It then fell to President Chadli Benjedid, at
the very outset of his rule, to draw the lessons of Camp David
and the separate peace treaty signed in 1979 between Egypt and
Israel.	 He had then to re-orient Algerian foreign policy in
ways that might serve to revive her influence abroad and to
strengthen her economic base at hone. 	 Much later in 1983
President Chadli would describe the Camp David agreement as
a shock that distorted the political and geopolitical
balance in the area to the benefit of the Zionist
entity...What we have seen is but the first step in an
imperialist onslaught designed to compensate imperialism
for some of the damage it sustained in South-East Asia.23
1979-1987 : in accordance with the AraD consensus 
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With the death of Houari Boumedienne, Algerian foreign policy
moved even more rapidly towards moderation. In March 1980, just
over a year after his arrival in power, President Chadli
undertook a rapid tour of Middle Eastern states, which was
designed to project Algeria's new image abroad, to reassure
members of the Arab League of Algeria's continuing support, and
to consolidate his personal position back home.
	 The countries
visited included Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, South and
North Yemen, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait,
and Libya.	 Egypt was, of course, omitted but otherwise the
countries reflected a rather eclectic mixture of the more radical
as well as the more conservative elements in the Arab world. At
the summit of the Steadfastness Front in Tripoli. Libya, in
summer 1980, Chadli adopted a very moderate position and then
absented himself from the two subsequent meetings when Algeria
was not otherwise represented. That same year Algeria agreed to
upgrade its diplomatic representation in Cairo to ministerial
level which, in the circumstances, was a significant gesture
towards an isolated Sadat. 24
	Egypt eagerly reciprocated by
despatching a high ranking diplomat to Algiers.
Algeria nevertheless kept a foot in the 'radical' camp,
absenting itself from the Amman summit of the Arab League in
November 1980 - after the PLO had decided mot to attend along
with Libya, Syria and South Yemen.	 There was concern that The
Amman summit, being held in Jordan, might be ready to entrust
King Hussein with a more positive role in the resolution of the
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Middle East problem, to that extent threatening to nullify the
resolution of the 1974 Rabat summit which had recognised the PLO
as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.
The discomfiture of the Arab states was completed by the
invasion of Lebanon by Israel, in June 1982, and its sequel : the
defeat and pull back by the Syrian forces, their failure to
defend Beirut and the eventual eviction of the Palestinians,
first from Beirut and, in 1983, from the northern port of Tripoli
- following a split in the PLO and direct and hostile Syrian
intervention which reflected the bad blood between President
Assad and Yasser Arafat.
The Arab world, which had assumed responsibility for the
Palestinian cause since 1948, was paralysed by the traumas of
1982-83.	 After the short oil 'boom' of 1979, following the
steady fall in the 'real' price of oil after 1973, the producing
states had seen the start of a collapse in oil prices in 1981,
reflecting 'monetarist' policies and a recession
	 in the
developed economies.
	 The contraction of international markets
created severe problems for the OPEC states, aggravated by the
mounting competition from non-cartel producers like Britain,
Norway, Mexico and even Egypt after 1980. Meanwhile the Islamic
revolution in Iran, culminating in the eviction of the Shah and
the return of the Ayatollah Khomeini early in 1979, threatened
the stability of the Gulf area and the Peninsula as a whole,
while repercussions were soon being felt as far away as Lebanon
and even in Nigeria.
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The renewed tension in the border area between Iraq and Iran
erupted in 1980 in President Saddam Hussein's decision to invade
Iran, hoping to take advantage of the confusion following the
revolutionary upheaval. Hussein had never willingly accepted the
agreement arrived at between the two states on the demarcation of
their common frontier at the special conference in Algiers in
1975. Increasingly the war between Arab Iraq and Persian Iran
came to overshadow even the question of Israel and the
predicament of the Palestinians. The continuing enmity between
Syria and Iraq largely explains the defection of President Assad
from the Arab camp and his support for Iran - coupled with
generous Iranian subsidies for the bombed-out Syrian economy.
Libya, too, was drawn towards revolutionary Iran although
Khomeini's fundamentalism bore little resemblance to the Islamic
socialism of Kadhafi.
Then, as Iran was able to resume the offensive, after 1982,
taking the war onto Iraqi territory, the Gulf states began to
look for foreign allies who would interpose their own forces in
the event of an Iranian breakthrough or the collapse of the Iraqi
defensive perimeter. The United States and even the Soviet Union
found themselves being courted by the conservative monarchs of
the Gulf while Egypt, with the assassination of Sadat in 1981
and the assumption of office by Hosni Mubarak, again became
eligible for a more prominent role in Arab affairs. Meanwhile it
was the Saudis who attempted to fill the vacuum in Arab politics
and to provide the leadership and policy initiatives that had
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been so obviously lacking since Sadat's break with the consensus
in 1977-9.
The outcome of this Saudi initiative was the Arab summit at
Fez, in Morocco, in September 1982, after the adjournment of an
earlier summit in November 1981. At this, the last conference of
the Arab League for some five years , the Algerians, like the
PLO, fell into line behind the moderate plan advanced by Prince
Fand of Saudi Arabia and previously agreed by the Saudis and
their conservative colleagues of the Gulf Cooperation Council.
The Plan was strongly supported by two other Arab monarchs, King
Hussein of Jordan and King Hassan of Morocco who was sponsoring
the summit.
	
In Fez the Arab leaders agreed, with apparent
unanimity, to renounce the logic of war against Israel. Instead
they hoped to resume the 'peace process' by renewing their
support for international negotiations, effectively accepting as
definitive the division of Palestine in 1947 and offering their
support for the 'two state' hypothesis on condition only that
Israel should recognise the Palestinian right to a homeland. Of
the major Arab figures only Kadhafi refused to associate himself
with the proposals or even to attend the summit	 The President
of South Yemen walked out of the summit while Syria's position
remained ambiguous to the end and Yasser Arafat's qualified
acceptance was not considered binding by the PLO as a whole.
With the onset of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, in 1982,
Algeria sent Soviet weapons, valued at $20 million, as emergency
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aid to be delivered direct to the Palestinians from Moscow.
Which was in addition to several tons of arms despatched to the
PLO from army stocks in Algeria. 2s	 The disparity between
Algeria's contribution to the Lebanon in 1982 and that to the
Arab cause in October 1973 is an accurate reflection of the lower
priority President Chadli attached to confrontation with Israel
and to support for the Palestinian resistance
	 although
Algeria's commitment in principle to the Palestinian cause
remained as strong as ever. Meanwhile Algeria avoided taking up
any definite position on the dispute that has raged within the
PLO and that reflects animosities within the Arab world as well
as tensions inside the PLO itself.
While most Arab states have aligned with either the
'rejectionists' or the 'moderates', Algeria has preferred to
maintain friendly relations with the different tendencies and
factions, working instead for an eventual reconciliation.
	 There
is the risk, however, that by distancing herself from the
internal conflicts of the Palestinians, Algeria may forfeit her
earlier claims to be included among the Arab 'powers', along with
Iraq, Syria and Egypt. Egypt and Syria can claim to have been
directly involved on more than one occasion in the Arab/Israeli
confrontation, while Iraq now projects itself as leader of the
Arab military front attempting to contain Iranian expansion
westwards.	 Algerian policy, by contrast, seems to have turned
inwards, pre-occupied much more than before with economic issues
and in particular with the shift in priorities away from heavy
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industry and centralised state control and towards agriculture
and commerce, with a greater emphasis on incentives and
efficiency, investment and profit.
In the 1980s Algeria's role in the Middle East and in
international negotiations has emphasised mediation rather than
confrontation, conciliation rather than mobilisation, unity and
compromise rather than an orthodoxy maintaired by the threat of
exclusion.	 Arguably the strategic position that Egypt has long
occupied in Arab affairs was never more apparent than during her
recent absence from Arab counsels.	 In the absence of Egypt no
other Arab state had the political clout or the military muscle
to contain the old animosities between Syria and Iraq, or to
intervene effectively in the conflict in the Western Sahara, or
to hold the line against Iran along the Shatt-al-Arab. It is not
that Egypt was ever a force for consensus within the Arab world -
quite the contrary irrespective of whether Nasser or Sadat was at
the helm. Nor was Egypt able to prevent either the expulsion of
the PLO from Jordan or the civil war in Lebanon.	 But the
Egyptian presence in Arab councils did lend a semblance of
authority and offer a prospect of action that made a notable
contribution to their international as well as their regional and
local significance.
In their own ways neither Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia or
Algeria can hope to fill that role. 	 It remains to be seen
whether Egypt, with its massive economic problems, can do so
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again.	 Meanwhile Algeria under Chadli tries to keep alive the
Arab 'conscience' and to project its image, already developed
under Boumedienne, as the 'honest broker' - in the Middle East as
elsewhere - hoping by such services to enhance its reputation
abroad accumulating political capital that can hopefully be
exchanged for the inputs needed to rescue the Algerian economy
from stagnation and to avert the threatened conflicts at home.
In this new and somewhat more modest role Algeria has
nevertheless a number of achievements to its credit.
In concert with Saudi Arabia Algeria worked to preserve the
unity of the Palestinians and offered to host the Palestinian
National Congress (PNC) in contrast to Syria and Libya who
promoted the alliance of left-wing organisations formed in 1983
within the PLO to challenge the decisions of the Fez summit and
the conduct of the Chairman, Yasser Arafat, both there and in his
subsequent attempts at rapprochement with Jordan. A meeting of
the PNC was finally convened in Algiers in mid-February 1983
which approved the pursuit of 'dialogue' with Jordan although it
continued to reject the Camp David accords with their vague and
unsatisfactory provisions for an autonomous Palestinian entity.26
The consensus achieved at Algiers represented a victory for
Arafat and the moderates of the PLO, but the success was short-
lived.
There was a stormy meeting between Arafat and President Assad
of Syria in May 1983, which was followed by a revolt by Syrian-
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backed Fatah dissidents, led by Abu Musa and based initially in
the Beka'a Valley.	 Assad feared a negotiated peace between
Jordan and Israel, along the lines of the earlier peace treaty
with Egypt, which would leave Syria alone to confront the
Israelis in the Middle East - and with no immediate prospect of
recovering its lost territory in the Golan Heights, much of it
now formally 'incorporated' into Israel.	 After the eviction of
Arafat's PLO from Lebanon by the Israelis Syria was more than
ever determined to assert effective control of the Palestinian
movement, which meant removing Arafat as chairman - in view of
his preference for a negotiated solution of the Palestinian
problem. After his experience of the civil war in Lebanon and
the invasion of 1982 Arafat had no reason to be sympathetic to
the Syrian position. He could still count on a degree of Soviet
backing and, after his expulsion from Lebanon hastened in
December 1983 to visit Egypt and President Mubarak. The object
was to secure Egypt's re-admission to the Arab world with a view
to a new diplomatic initiative and the start of peace talks
involving Israel and the Palestinians.
Algeria expressed its opposition to any attempt by an Arab
state to bring the PLO under its effective control, although
there was sympathy in Algiers with the Syrian predicament and
suspicion of Hussein's motives in trying to draw closer to the
PLO despite the legacy of 'Black September'. But there was also
suspicion on the part of Arab governments that Assad was
cynically accumulating bargaining counters with a view to gaining
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some leverage over the Israelis in his efforts to recover the
annexed Golan Heights. Without Syria, however, there could be no
effective peace in the Middle East. Algeria nevertheless refused
to join Syria and Libya, the remaining members of the
Steadfastness Front, in their condemnation of the negotiations
between Israel and the new Lebanese government, conducted under
the auspices of the American Secretary of State, George Schultz,
in 1984. To indicate his appreciation of the Algerian attitude,
the Lebanese Prsident, Amin Gemayel, visited Algiers in November
of that year.
Algerian efforts to reconcile the warring factions of the PLO
were finally rewarded with success when leaders of many of the
tendencies met in Algiers in late April 1987, to discuss their
differences within the framework of the Palestinian National
Congress.
	 This long-awaited meeting of the PNC followed a
succession of 'fractional' conferences in the mid 1980s. Not all
the leaders attended the conference although most were in fact
present in Algiers at the time, thanks again to the efforts of
the Algerians. The conference was generally regarded as at least
a partial success both for Arafat and for the Algerians. Only
the Egyptians expressed their vocal displeasure at the critical
references to the Camp David accords, while some western
observers claimed to have seen Abu Nidal, one of the more extreme
Palestinian dissidents, in the Algerian capital.
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Algeria's involvement with the Iran-Iraq conflict went back
to 1975 when Boumedienne had convened a conference in Algiers to
effect a settlement in the long-standing dispute over the
demarcation of the frontier in the Shatt-al-Arab. The two sides
were threatening war as Iran attempted to exploit the discontent
of the Iraqi Kurdish population. 	 Algeria and the other OPEC
states were concerned lest the issue should compromise their
efforts to maintain the pricing advantage they had gained in 1973
over the western consumer nations. At the first OPEC summit in
Algiers, in March 1975, Algerian diplomacy did in fact achieve a
major breakthrough with a compromise settlement by both sides to
the dispute. In 1979 Algeria had welcomed the fall of the Shah
and friendly relations were soon established with the new
revolutionary government in Teheran.
	 Hence the crucial role
played by Chadli's Algeria in the release of the American
hostages in Iran in January 1981.
Like Libya Algeria had welcomed the Iranian revolution as a
defeat for imperialism in the region and a contribution to the
Arab cause in the Middle East.
	 When Iraq abrogated the 1975
agreement and launched its invasion of Iran in 1980, Algeria
therefore announced its support for Iran.
	 At the same time,
however, the Algerian Foreign Minister, Mohammed Seddik Ben
Yahia, engaged in intensive mediation to try to settle the
dispute which threatened to undue the earlier Algerian
achievements.
	 While actively involved in this mission he lost
his life somewhere along the Turkish-Iranian border in May 1982.
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With the escalation of the Gulf war after 1982 and, above
all, 1984, Algeria began to distance itself from Iran and to
adopt a more neutral stance in the expectation once again of
being asked to play a conciliatory role. That was, indeed, the
main purpose of King Fand's visit to Algiers, on March 11-12
1985, as the Saudi monarch looked for leverage to restrain the
more militant of the Ayatollahs and to avert the impending
Iranian military offensive against the besieged city of Basra.
King Fand also expressed his support for Algerian efforts in re-
uniting the Palestinian factions, while his subsequent visit to
Morocco was intended to reduce tension in this region with a view
to bringing together the leaders of the two countries.
	 That
would meet Chadli's own hopes for detente with Morocco while
enabling the Saudis to ease the financial pressure on their
budget - by cutting their subsidies to the Moroccans. 	 In 1986
Chadli and Hassan did in fact meet on their common frontier
thanks to the efforts of King Fand.
Meanwhile Algeria participated in the Amman summit of the
Arab League, at the end of 1987, with its emphasis on cementing
an Arab consensus in the mounting confrontation with Iran - with
agreement that individual Arab states would henceforth be free to
re-open diplomatic relations with Egypt whose military
contribution is much needed in the Gulf. 	 A large number of
states, including those of the Gulf, immediately availed
themselves of the opportunity. Algeria has taken no steps as yet
to alter its diplomatic arrangements with Cairo although
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relations between Mubarak and Chadli have been cordial.
Meanwhile Libya has followed Algeria in distancing itself from
Iran, calling for a cease-fire and warning the Iranians of
possible reprisals should they persist in the war.
	
Syria,
however, despite some gestures in the direction of Arab unity,
has stuck to its alliance with the regime in Teheran, well aware
of the growing influence of Teheran in Beirut where Syria has
again had a military presence since 1986.
The Algerian government has made considerable capital out of
its ambivalent situation, as an Arab state that has consistently
tried to support Arab positions, and as a revolutionary state
committed to genuine independence and self-determination for all
peoples, Arab and non-Arab alike.
	 Her connections in Teheran
since 1979 have since won her the sympathy and good-will of
regimes far removed, ideologically, from herself.
	 Who in 1978
could have anticipated the extent of the rapprochement between
once radical Algeria and the administrations of President Reagan
in Washington, and Prime Minister Chirac in Paris?
	 But
politicians in the West are subject to re-election and voters in
France, Britain and the United states are likely to reward
governments that can protect their citizens from arbitrary arrest
and detention in Middle Eastern capitals - and to censure those
that can not.
Algeria has not changed its formal position on the need for
Arab unity.	 The National Charter of 1976 saw Algeria as an
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integral part of the Arab world.
	 "Algeria would work for the
achievement of Arab unity which it believes can be realised."27
It regretted "the present Arab predicament which is characterised
by misunderstanding and disunity" and which was responsible for
the failure of the Arab states "to halt the onslaughts of
imperialism".	 President Chadli, in his report to the fifth
congress of the FLA, in December 1983, defined the situation in
similar terms.
Algeria sees the divisions in the Arab world as a victory
for imperialism whose aim has always been to keep the
region in a state of subjugation.
	
An Arab consensus
would seriously threaten imperialist interests in a vital
area of the world, endowed with the natural resources
essential to our present epoch...The inability of the
Arab world to speak with one voice has encouraged
imperialism to infiltrate our ranks, and has also
permitted the Zionists to expand in new directions,
doubling the number of their settlements, annexing
Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, and embarking finally on
the invasion of Lebanon - all of which pose a continuing
threat to the Palestinian national movement and to the
front-line Arab states.29
The difference, of course, is that Algeria under Chadli has
not only shifted its position markedly, in the direction of the
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moderate Arab consensus, but has also tilted visibly in the
direction of the western powers and, most notably, America and
France. Increasingly since 1973 Algerian policy has been framed
with a view to her state and national interest. The concern with
Arab solidarity is genuine, if only because without it Algeria,
like her Maghreb partners, would be condemned to remain largely
on the periphery of international relations. Her participation
in the Arab cause is the price to be paid for a real and
continuing, if necessarily limited influence in affairs far
beyond the range of her immediate capabilities.
Located at the heart of the Maghreb it is natural that
Algeria should be concerned with solidarity although her approach
has, from the start, acknowledged the reality, in the Maghreb as
elsewhere, of territorial, state-based nationalisms, becoming
more and more deeply entrenched. Algerian and Maghrebin leaders,
perhaps even more than their counterparts elsewhere in the Arab
world, have often been impatient with the more confused,
sentimental and demagogic expressions of pan-Arab ideologues.
Arab unity is nothing if not based on strong, secure states
supplemented by a network of regional linkages organised around
common interests and agreed objectives.
	 Algeria continues to
favour economic cooperation as a first and obvious instalment on
any future regional community, but its leaders also appreciate
that economic cooperation is unlikely in the absence of certain
shared values and political objectives.
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During the 1980s Algerian leaders would seem to have
modified Algerian foreign policy to bring it more into line with
political and economic reality. The change had already begun by
1973, if not earlier, but the new political configuration in the
Middle East, resulting from Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in 1977,
and from the Iranian revolution in 1979, coupled with the
economic problems confronting the oil-producing states after 1981
(and more particularly after the cut in Saudi oil prices, in
1986) have prompted an even more sweeping re-alignment of
Algerian priori ties following the death of Houari Boumedienne.
The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, and its consequences for
inter-Arab relations and the PLO, together with the escalation of
the Gulf war about the same time have all had the effect of
accelerating the changes in Algerian policy.
One can appreciate the desire of the new President, Chadli
Benjedid, to distinguish himself from his predecessor, who to the
end had retained his commitment to 'revolution' and his distrust
of 'imperialism' in its various guises, along with something of
the charisma of a 'founding father'. Above all Boumedienne was
identified with the construction of the state and with the
technocratic impulse of the elites who graduated after
independence, who were impatient for economic growth but rejected
capitalist values in favour of state enterprise and an ideology
that came increasingly to approximate state socialism along East
European lines.	 Towards the end of his life Boumedienne was
himself beginning to express considerable dissatisfaction with
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the record of the Algerian economy. It remained for Chadli,
however, to take that economy in hand and subject it to the same
critical scrutiny that he would also apply to much that passed
for 'radical orthodoxy' in Algeria's relations with the external
world. Algeria remains non-aligned, but now in the sense of
trying to deal with the two super-powers on a more or less equal
footing where before Algeria had been identified, like Egypt
before it, with the East European states.
Symptomatic of the new policy was the favourable reception
given the American Vice-President, George Bush, in Algiers in
October 1983, as was Chadli's visit to the United States and
Washington on April 17-22, 1985 - the first ever by an Algerian
President.	 Chadli had taken that opportunity to re-affirm his
government's support for the resolutions of the Arab summit at
Fez in September 1982.
	
But he also warned his audience to be
wary of what he described as "partial solutions" and reminded
them that, for Algeria and the Arab peoples,
	 the Camp David
accords had dealt only with "partial problems" and had ignored
"the fundamental question which still remains to be settled and
persists as a source of constant tension" - that "essential
problem" was "the future of the Palestinian people".
Where Boumedienne had not failed to criticise the Soviet
position on Middle Eastern affairs, Chadli has also kept his
distance from the West, insisting on Algerian and Arab
priorities.	 And if his policy has had a much larger economic
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content that surely reflects the changed international situation
in the 1980s, and the new balance (or imbalance) in North-South
affairs - as much as it reflects Chadli's own conviction that
sound and efficient economic management is the surest path to
economic growth, political stability and international influence.
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CHAPTER NINE : TUNISIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST 
For a political settlement in the Middle East 
Tunisia has long
	 been considered a 'loner' in the Arab
world, largely because of Bouguiba's pragmatic and well-
publicised views on the most sensitive aspects of the Middle East
'problem'. His modernist, almost secular approach to Islam has
not recommended him to other, more conservative or 'traditional'
Arab states, particularly those of the Gulf who have dominated
the Islamic Conference Organisation (ICO) since its inception in
1969.	 While Bourguiba had little sympathy with the pan-Arab
doctrines associated with Gamel Abdul Nasser of Egypt (later the
United Arab Republic) and the Baathist regimes of Syria and Iraq,
in the 1950s and 1960s, he was no more at ease with the
traditional Islamic doctrines of the rival ICO Bourguiba was
rather the product of French liberal/constitutionalist and
secular/rational thought,
	 coupled with the administrative
pragmatism and something of the autocratic style of the Ottoman
Empire, long represented in Tunis by the authority of the Bey.
Although himself a leading exponent of Tunisian nationalism, with
a strong base in the Neo-Destour Party, itself derived in 1934
from the more traditional Destour Party of the 1920s Bourguiba
had little patience with the more strident forms of Arab
nationalism to be encountered in Syria and Egypt in the 1950s and
no great sympathy for the religious sensibilities of many Middle
Eastern rulers - and of the great majority of their subjects.
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Despite (perhaps largely because of) its comparatively high
levels of (western) education and social formation, Tunisia was
equally at a disadvantage in the Arab politics of 1956-67, when
pan-Arabism was the vogue, as well as in 1969 when it was
displaced by the more conservative sentiments of the Islamic
Conference Organisation. 	 While Tunisia could feel more
comfortable with the new, more moderate emphasis on territorial
states and their different interests and character, there could
be little rapport with the attempt to install a new religious
(and political) orthodoxy at the centre of Arab affairs, based on
a particularly narrow and puritanical (Wahabi) variant of Islam.
Moreover, Tunisia did not become an oil producer until 1969 and
oil accounted for only about 40% of Tunisia's export earnings in
1979. The country played no part therefore in the deliberations
of OPEC, which was closely linked with the fortunes of Arab
states and their leaders during the 1970s and 1980s. 	 Shortly
after winning its battle for admission to membership in the
Organisation of Arab Oil Producing States (OAPEC) in 1982,
Tunisia would petition to withdraw from the organisation. It was
Egypt's suspension from the Arab League in 1979, following the
Baghdad summit of that year. that at last enabled Tunisia to
Insert itself in Arab affairs. In that year the headquarters of
the Arab League was transferred from Cairo to Tunis.
From 1973 onwards the Arab world had been moving inexorably
towards Bourguiba's own once controversial views on Palestine,
with its acceptance of the fact of Jewish settlement and the
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reality of Israel coupled with its demands for a separate Arab
Palestine - which would entail Arab recognition of Israel within
pre-determined frontiers. Bourguiba had tried through the 1960s
to persuade other Arab leaders to accept an Israeli state based
on the 1947 United Nations Partition Plan. By 1973 moderate Arab
leaders were themselves moving towards the idea of two states
with Israel withdrawing to her pre-1967 borders as prescribed in
UN Resolution 232. After the Egyptian peace treaty with Israel,
in 1979, it was difficult to see how the Arab states could long
continue their collective refusal to acknowledge the reality of
the state of Israel. Meanwhile, once the reluctance of Saudi
Arabia to impose sanctions on Egypt was overcome by the other
states attending the Baghdad summit, the Arab League was
compelled to find a new headquarters.	 By reason of its small
size, its moderation, and its good relations with the key western
states (as well as with Egypt), Tunisia was given preference over
other larger or more militant states.
	 At the same time the
government in Tunis revealed its own interest in integrating
itself more fully into the Arab world now that other Arab leaders
had belatedly come round to Bourguiba's views on Palestine and
had had the courage to say so. 	 The very reasons that had
previously disqualified Tunisia from playing a more active role
in Arab politics - were now beginning to be perceived as positive
advantages.
Indeed, the Middle East Plan presented to the Fez Arab summit
of September 1982, by Crown Prince Fand of Saudi Arabia, seemed
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to have been largely inspired by Habib Bourguiba's earlier
proposals and was, therefore, something in the nature of a
triumph for the Tunisian attitude. The later transfer of the PLO
headquarters to Tunisia, after the Organisation's forcible
removal from Lebanon in 1982, reinforced still further the now
strategic position occupied by Tunisia within the councils of the
Arab states. Tunisia now enjoyed a form of diplomatic immunity -
an additional safeguard if not a guarantee against attacks by its
neighbour, Libya.	 Which did not, however, prevent the Israelis
mounting an aerial assault against the PLO headquarters close to
Tunis on October 1, 1985, described as reprisals for 'terrorist'
actions undertaken elsewhere by Palestinian factions. There was
Irony in the attack by the Israelis against the one Arab leader
who had consistently demanded recognition of Israel - long before
Sadat had given the idea wider circulation in the Middle East.
Irony, too, in fact that Tunisia's promotion to a more 'central'
position in Arab affairs, which owed so much to Bourguiba's
realpolitik, should have coincided with the physical decline and
eventual replacement,in 1987, of the country's historic leader.
A rational approach in confrontation with Arab sentimentalism
Tunisia's relations with the Arab states to the East,
dominated by Egypt, have traditionally been hostile. During his
stay in Cairo, after World War II, Bourguiba soon became aware of
the very big differences separating the Arab East (Machrek) from
the Maghreb, with its experience of French colonisation and its
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closer ties with Western Europe. 	 In the year of Tunisian home
rule, 1955, the open hostility between Cairo and Tunis was
expressed through Nasser's support for the militant Yousefist
movement which had set itself up in opposition to Bourguiba. Ben
Youssef, a radical pan-Arabist, was the secretary-general of the
Neo-Destour.	 Rather than accept independence for Tunisia he
wanted to carry on the nationalist campaign against the French
until Algeria also became independent. 	 After independence, in
1956, Tunisia in turn boycotted the Arab League, which it viewed
as a pliant tool of Nasserist diplomacy. The Tunisians could not
accept domination by any one state of a League which aimed at
mutual defence and the strengthening of ties among the member
states. of the League by any one state.
Meanwhile the good relations between Bourguiba and successive
French governments of the Fourth Republic, that somehow survived
until February 1958 and the bombing by the French air force of
the frontier town of Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef, were seen as an affront
by the Egyptians, particularly in view of the French military
campaign against the Algerian nationalists and the Franco-British
collaboration with Israel in the Suez expedition.
	 And in 1958
Tunisia accused Egypt of plotting against the Tunisian regime
which led to a break in diplomatic relations between the two
states.	 While Tunisia had generously placed its territory and
facilities at the disposal of the Algerian nationalists and the
Liberation Army, at the risk of French displeasure and threats of
retaliation, Bourguiba worked consistently to reduce Algerian
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dependence on Cairo and on Egyptian diplomatic and military
assistance.
Reconciliation with Egypt was delayed until 1961, when
Bourguiba found that he required Nasser's support to ensure a
place at the Non-Aligned Conference being hosted by Yugoslavia in
Belgrade.	 Algerian independence in 1962 removed yet another
source of contention between the states and, in December 1963,
Bourguiba was able to celebrate the departure of the last French
troops from Tunisia with Nasser at his side. Relations quickly
deteriorated again, however, when Bourguiba, on a visit to a
Palestinian camp at Jericho, in 1965, advocated a peaceful
settlement of the Middle East conflict. 	 Seventeen years after
the creation of Israel, as Nasser and the other Arab leaders were
being drawn into preparations for a further military
confrontation,	 Bourguiba did not hesitate to recommend
implementation of the 1947 United Nations partition plan for
Palestine.	 In a speech in Beirut, on March 11, 1965, he also
denounced the "all or nothing" approach of the Arabs, warning
that the rejection of compromise was only likely to prolong the
present unsatisfactory situation for another seventeen years.'
Other Arab leaders were scandalised while the United Arab
Republic (by then reduced to Egypt) once more broke off
diplomatic relations with Tunisia.
One outcome of the new split between Nasser and Bourguiba
was that Tunisia was the only Arab state not to attend the Arab
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League summit in Casablanca in September 1965.	 It also helps
explain why Bourguiba gave limited support to King Faisal of
Saudi Arabia when he attempted in the late 1960s to organise an
Islamic summit as a rival organisation. When Faisal toured the
Islamic world (and America) in 1965 and 1966 he was welcomed in
Rabat and Tunis despite the differences between Saudi theocracy
and Bourguiba's commitment to secularism. In 1966 Bourguiba
agreed to accept and enter into the scheme advanced by Saudi
Arabia and other conservative Arab states for an Islamic
Conference - that would, hopefully, circumscribe the influence of
Nasser and the more militant pan-Arab leaders, now contesting
Saudi influence by participating in the Yemen war and opposing
the British-sponsored South Arabian Federation of sheikhs in Aden
(later South Yemen).
Tunisia could hardly play a leading role in an organisation
based primarily on Islam and including states as distant as
Indonesia and Malaysia, but Bourguiba had already shown his
willingness to support other movements - notably the Monrovia
conference and its successor, the Organisation of African Unity,
formed in 1963. These were designed specifically to re-group the
moderate states in opposition to militant radical leaders, like
Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Nasser of Egypt, who appeared to
reject the territorial status quo in favour of pan-African or
pan-Arab 'solutions'. Not surprisingly, the radical Arab states,
including Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Algeria, condemned the Saudi
project as American-inspired.
	 Isolated within the Arab world,
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Bourguiba turned increasingly towards Africa where, with the
Senegalese President, Leopold Senghor, he became a leading
spokesman for the francophone project, which was an important
ingredient in General de Gaulle's new foreign policy.
Bourguiba returned to Arab politics under the shock of the
overwhelming Arab defeat in the 1967 war with Israel. The crisis
spelt the end of pan-Arabism in its more romantic version -
although the earlier predicament of the Egyptians in Yemen and
the rapid deterioration in the Egyptian domestic economy had done
little to sustain the illusions of the radicals. 	 Bourguiba
emerged from the crisis with his confidence in his own
convictions	 greatly	 strengthened.	 Tunisia	 had	 sent
reinforcements to the Arab front but which had then to be
recalled even before they arrived at their destination - because
the war had ended. Bourguiba also attended the Arab summit later
that year in Khartoum which accepted the reality of a Middle East
divided into separate Arab states which, notwithstanding their
essential unity, were grouped into three main geo-political
regions - North Africa (including Egypt), the Peninsula, and the
Fertile Crescent. Even at Khartoum, however, Bourguiba could not
restrain his maverick temperament - impatient as ever at the
mistakes and missed opportunities of the past to say nothing of
the reluctance of those present to accept and learn to live with
the present. Which, of course, meant the reality of Israel, with
its military strength and its international support, and the
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obvious military deficiencies and strategic weakness of the Arab
camp.
With the 1967 war behind them and the cease-fire a reality,
diplomatic relations were resumed between Tunis and Cairo. The
initial intransigence of the Arab leaders, which Nasser deplored
as much as Bourguiba, had given Israel a major propaganda
advantage, allowing it to portray itself as eager for a
negotiated settlement while Arab states persisted in repudiating
negotiation on the one hand, while trying to enlist international
support and sympathy on the other. Bourguiba was perhaps better
placed than most Arab leaders to understand western and American
sentiments in particular, just as he was among the first to
welcome American intervention in the peace process and the so-
called Rogers Plan for a cease-fire - accepted by Egypt and
Jordan in 1970 despite the misgivings of other Arab leaders
including President Boumedienne of Algeria. Although Nasser had
considerably modified his views after, if not already before the
1967 war, his death in 1970 removed an obstacle to the
improvement of Tunisia's relations with the Arab states to the
East. Nevertheless Bourguiba's views on the Middle East remained
unpopular in the Arab world until 1973, by which time even PLO
leaders were openly advocating something approaching Bourguiba's
'two-state' structure for Palestine.
For Bourguiba the Palestinians were at the heart of the
Middle East problem but, in the context of Tunisian policy, that
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statement was not just a platitude, worn out by constant
repetition. Palestinian rights could, however, best be defended
by negotiation and not by confrontation.
	 Bourguiba was as
convinced as Kadhafi that the countries most directly involved in
the Middle East conflict, Egypt, Syria and Jordan, were committed
mainly to the defence of their own particular interests - since
1967 the recovery of their own occupied territories.
	 unlike
Kadhafi, however, Bourguiba advocated dialogue and greater mutual
understanding between Palestinians and Israelis as the only basis
for a lasting settlement in the Middle East.
	 Unlike Morocco
Tunisia itself did not offer an example of fellowship and
successful reconciliation between Jew and Arab.
	 Indeed, there
had been a massive exodus of Jews from Tunisia, a reaction not to
official pressure but to widespread popular hostility based on
claims that Tunisian Jews had long collaborated with the French
and had continued to support France even after independence,
e.g., in the international crisis over the naval base of Bizerta
in Tunisia in 1961.
Before the creation of Israel in 1948 there had been 120,000
Jews in Tunisia although their numbers were reduced to 86,000 by
1956, the year of Tunisian independence. At the time of Bizerta
15,000 Jews fled the country accused of having assisted the
French.	 During and after the 1967 war it was the turn of the
British and Americans to incur the displeasure of the populace
but again Jewish shops and synagogues were the principal target
of popular anger.	 During the war of October 1973 Bourguiba
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expressly called on Tunisians to leave the Jewish community, down
to 7,000, unharmed. 2 By the early nineteen-eighties the Jews in
Tunisia w-ere said to number less than 5,000. Where King Hassan
of Morocco has pointed to the intellectual advance of the Jews
and the inter-dependence of the Jewish and Arab communities in
the Middle East - Jewish brains and Arab wealth - Bourguiba has
long emphasised the technological gap between Israel and the
surrounding Arab states.
Above all the struggle between the Arabs and the Zionists
reflects their scientific and technological inequality.
Israel's power lies in its mastery of modern science and
technology.3
Which has not dissuaded Bourguiba from pursuing his efforts in
the direction of a peaceful, negotiated solution to the
Palestinian problem.
Bourguiba has projected an image of himself as the embodiment
and symbol of 'realism' in the Arab world. 	 Apparently
intractable problems can be overcome, step-by-step, by a policy
of compromise - moving onwards, slowly, but on a firm basis of
earlier agreements and the good will and cooperation without
which any solution would, indeed, be far-fetched. The style has
been described (often only to be dismissed) as 'bourguibism'. In
1973, before the October war, Bourguiba was thus the first and
most obvious - if not the most representative - Arab Head of
-270-
State to be in line to meet Israeli officials.
	 No other Arab
leader had called so long and consistently for a dialogue with
Israel.
	 In 1973 Bourguiba announced his willingness to meet an
Israeli representative if such a meeting could further the
prospects for peace in the Middle East.
	 Arguing that "it was
essential to have recourse to dialogue and reason", he underlined
that "it would be easier to arrange a meeting in Rome, Athens,
Malta or elsewhere, because meeting in Israel would be dangerous
for me."* He then disclosed that President Sadat would be
prepared to recognise Israel provided it first renounced its
military conquests.
Israeli officials, and notably the Prime Minister, Golda
Neir, and her Foreign Minister, Abba Eban, declared they were
ready for such a meeting. The latter disclosed to the Knesset
that Israel was in fact awaiting information regarding a possible
meeting with President Bourguiba.
	 For his part Bourguiba was
careful to insist that there could not be a meeting unless Israel
first accepted the partition plan put forwsard by the United
Nations in 1947 as the basis for any dialogue.
	 "The Iraelis
should keep what was bestowed on them by the United Nations in
1947 and should leave the territories which were occupied by
force."	 If the only reason for retaining such territories was
the desire for security, then he could tell them "they would
never be secure while they continue to occupy Arab territories".
Only the Arab states could offer Israel real security, along with
a meaningful peace and a cooperation beneficial to both sides.
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Then came the critical point of the argument.
	
"But the Arabs
will never make peace if the Palestinians do not agree.
	 So a
Palestinian state must be created."6
Should his initiative not succeed this time, Bourguiba
assured the Israelis, they would regret it just as the Arabs now
regretted their earlier failure to pursue a negotiated
settlement. "The Arabs blamed me in 1965 because I told them the
truth and yet today they praise me." 6 But even Bourguiba was not
going to risk a meeting with Israeli representatives without some
kind of Arab sanction. Before making contact therefore he would
summon an Arab summit. 	 "If a single Arab state is opposed, I
will withdraw my proposal." 7
 And if that seemed to weight the
chances heavily against success he recalled that
Even Nasser, on the eve of his death, showed himself
willing to recognise Israel provided it evacuated Sinai
and respected the rights of the Palestinians.9
Tunisian diplomacy was accordingly centred around the
Bourguiba plan, of June 1973, which enunciated as conditions for
peace in the Middle East : (1) the right of the Palestinians not
to be dispossessed of their homeland; and (2) the right of the
Israelis to enjoy the fruit of their labours in complete security
and without fear of extermination. Bourguiba obviously enjoyed a
large	 degree of latitude in international Arab circles,
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presumably because his views threatened no one but himself and
may even have reinforced a hostile consensus, because of the
support he enjoyed in the Anglo-Saxon world (Canada and Britain
as well as the United States) in addition to his ties with
France, because his moderate views on other issues were
appreciated by the more conservative Arab leaders, and, not
least, because of his personal popularity at home - where,
however, on the question of Israel most of the population was
probably closer to Arab sentiment generally than to the views of
their own historic leader.
At this critical juncture Bourguiba was particularly careful
to maintain a rough balance of views within his administration.
From 1970-74 the Prime Minister, Bahi Ladgham, was a moderate
close to the President's views but aware, too, of the need to
maintain a consensus inside Tunisia if the government was to
continue to function effectively. By way of contrast the Foreign
Minister, Mohammed Masmoud, was a radical pan-Arabist, determined
to play a crucial and militant role in Arab affairs. After 1973
the balance shifted further in the direction of moderation and
support for the President's policies with the removal in January
1974 of the Foreign Minister held responsible, as we have seen,
for the treaty of 'union' with Libya.
1973-87 : the triumph of Bourguibism
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Tunisia was able during the war of October 1973 to resume its
place within the Arab community and without its loyalty being
called in question.
	
By announcing on October 7 that Tunisia
would commit troops to the front and calling on others to join
him, Bourguiba could be said to have given a lesson in solidarity
to Saudi Arabia, which was not involved militarilyand, above all,
to Jordan which did afterwards despatch a contingent to the Golan
front.	 Tunisia, like Algeria, had broken diplomatic relations
with Jordan in July, 1971, after her Prime Minister's efforts to
mediate in the conflict between King Hussein and the Palestinians
had failed to prevent a renewed outbreak of fighting. They were
restored on October 14, 1973, twenty-four hours after a similar
gesture by Algeria. While Tunisia's contribution to the war was
modest, in keeping with its means, it was nevertheless very
effective and included an infantry regiment of more than a
thousand men seconded to the Egyptian front. They were exhorted
to cooperate with the units of other Arab countries and it is
even possible that the Algerian air force helped transport them
to Egypt. Two medical teams were sent to Syria and another to
Egypt while medicines were donated to the Palestinian Red
Crescent.9
After the war, where the Arab leadership regained something
of the honour and respect that had been lost in 1967, Bourguiba
continued to urge his colleagues to press for peace with Israel.
"If the Israelis begin to see reason and show their readiness to
take account of the rights of the Arabs, we should not turn our
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backs." 1 ° In Bourguiba's own administration, however, there were
critics of the cease-fire and opponents of American intervention
who preferred to ignore or discount the success of the Israeli
counter-offensive. They included Masmoudi, the Foreign Minister,
who insisted that the outcome, "fabricated in certain capitals
and on the initiative of certain big powers" had "surprised
everybody"." Bourguiba himself continued to insist "without the
Palestinians nothing is possible". 	 The Jewish people, with its
own long history of suffering and persecution, dispersion and
recovery, should have been well placed " to understand and
sympathise with the unhappy predicament of the Palestinians".'2
There was a Gaullist undertone, too,	 in Bourguiba's
insistence that "Palestine was a historic reality, whereas Jordan
is only the name of a river." The implication was clear both
before but more particularly after the 1973 war. Tunisia could
not accept King Hussein's claims to speak or act on behalf of the
Palestinian people. The Kingdom of Trans-Jordan was a creation
of the British who, to suit their own interests had quite simply
"amputated the desert region of Palestine" to create a fief for
their client, Hussein's grandfather, the Emir Abdullah. By way of
contrast "Palestine is a historic reality : from the time of the
Pharaohs there has been a Palestine".' 3	Even Britain's
forthcoming entry to the Common Market - thanks to President
Pompidou - could not erase the memory of Franco-British rivalry
in the old Syrian province. 	 Accordingly, at the Algiers Arab
summit of November 1973, Bourguiba was ready to dismiss Jordanian
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ambitions to recover the West Bank and even Gaza and to re-attach
them to Amman.
	 The solution was not through Jordan and the
creation of a new federal entity, even more artificial than the
last, but through acceptance of the United Nations plan for
partition in 1947 with two states existing side by side, learning
to respect each other's integrity. But in the aftermath of the
war this may have been asking too much of the other Arab leaders
attending the summit and Bourguiba's speech was received with a
glacial silence, suggesting that the Tunisian leader had once
more acted precipitately threatening the brief consensus that he
himself had helped create in October 1973.
Which did not prevent Bourguiba returning to the same theme a
year later, in September 1974, when the outlook already seemed
more favourable to his views. Bourguiba was then able to insist
that
The Palestinians were coming around to his point of view,
also the Syrians.	 And as far as the Israelis were
concerned the lesson for them was that they could have
either territory or security but not both together. Back
in 1947 they had received over half of Palestine.
	 In
another ten to twenty years they would have to confront
an Arab population that would be larger, more advanced
and, thanks to oil, would command much greater resources
than was now the case.
	 In those more favourable
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circumstances the Arabs might not be prepared to concede
so much to the Israelis."
The first problem was to convince the other Arab leaders,
including Yasser Arafat and his more militant rivals in the PLO,
of the desirability of recognising the state of Israel within its
pre-1967 frontiers.
	 The other question, that persuading the
Israelis to withdraw from Jerusalem and to abandon their more
recent settlements on the West Bank and in Gaza, was postponed
for later consideration.
	
In January 1975 Bourguiba criticised
Arafat's suggestion, at the United Nations the previous year, for
the creation of a secular Palestinian state. ' s That would imply
the disappearance of the present Israeli state which was unlikely
to win widespread acceptance outside the Arab League. It hardly
constituted "a winning card" for the Palestinian revolution. At
the same time the Tunisian President gave strong support to Egypt
and Sadat who had just successfully negotiated with the Israelis
the second phase of the disengagement of their forces from the
Sinai.
President Anwar Sadat's peace initiative began with his
historic visit to Jerusalem in 1977, followed by the Camp David
talks in America in 1978 and the signing of a peace treaty with
Israel in 1979.
	 The Arab states and the PLO were, by then,
caught up in the 'peace process' and had little room for
manoeuvre.
	 Sadat had seized the initiative and the size and
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military strength of Egypt, coupled with her central role in the
Arab League and in the Middle East generally, left her allies and
opponents alike surprised, disconcerted and at the mercy of
events - and, in the case of Lebanon, the PLO and the
Palestinians,	 increasingly at the mercy of the Israelis.
American influence with Sadat and with the Saudis did not,
unfortunately, give them effective leverage over Israeli foreign
and defence policies. In that respect Washington was the victim
of its prior commitments, to say nothing of congressional and
public opinion. Increasingly Arab opinion was polarised between
those who hoped to be able to extend the peace process beyond the
Sinai, so as to negotiate settlements of the other outstanding
questions - notably Palestine and Syria - and the more radical
states who disputed the wisdom of any negotiations with Israel or
any international settlement that was reached without Soviet
participation. Those most disappointed with Sadat joined in the
Steadfastness and Confrontation Front, created in Tripoli, Libya,
in December 1977 and included Algeria, Libya, Syria, South Yemen
(People's Democratic Republic of Yemen), and the PLO
Tunisia refused to participate in the new Front arguing that
such a venture would only deepen existing Arab divisions when
circumstances clearly called for dialogue and conciliation.
Shrewdly the Tunisian authorities announced their support for any
Arab conference at any time provided it was attended by all the
Arab states. Bourguiba, who had shown so little concern for Arab
consensus in the past, now showed a special concern to revive a
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consensus that, in fact, had lasted for only a few months at the
end of 1973. Before long, in August 1978, Tunisia declared its
own opposition to Sadat's initiative on the grounds - according
to the Foreign Minister (later secretary general of the ICO),
Habib Chatti - that "it was a regrettable illustration of the
fait accompli (with which Bourguiba should himself have been only
too familiar), that it "was contrary to Arab strategy and called
in question the principles of Arab policy", and that it
threatened to disrupt the common Arab front "at the very moment
when cohesion is needed most". ' G In May 1979, two months after
the ultimatum issued by the Baghdad summit, Tunisia finally broke
with Egypt in company with eleven other Arab states.The long
history of animosity between Egypt and Tunisia was thus revived
with Tunisia this time able to lay a convincing claim to Arab
orthodoxy - just as earlier, in 1971, and again in 1973 Tunisia
had turned the tables on Egypt's former partner, Jordan, with its
defence of the Palestinians and its participation in the October
war.
Tunisia was thus well placed to succeed Egypt as the new
headquarters of the Arab League after the latter's suspension in
1979.	 The great majority of Arab states were still firmly
committed to seeking a comprehensive solution to Middle Eastern
problems by means of negotiation and diplomacy rather than by
'steadfastness' or 'confrontation'. The mood, set by the earlier
Rabat summit in 1974. was still 'realistic' and 'pragmatic'.
Meanwhile a former Tunisian diplomat, Chadli Klibi, then serving
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as Information Minister, was chosen as the new general secretary
of the League, after the resignation of the Egyptian, Mahmoud
Riyad. His nomination to the post was unanimous and followed an
extraordinary meeting of Arab foreign ministers on June 27, 1979.
The Tunisian Prime Minister, Hedi Nouira, justified the
appointment on the grounds of efficiency and ease of
communication, disclaiming any wish to 'pack' the League with
Tunisian personnel."
The choice of Tunisia as the site of the League headquarters
undoubtedly reflects the growing rapport between Tunisia and the
other Arab states. This is itself a consequence of the growing
moderation among Arab leaders after 1967 and, more particularly,
after 1973;	 a consequence, too, of the belated recognition of
Israeli strength and Arab weakness; and it follows from the re-
appraisal by the Arab states of the global balance of power
which, in the Middle East at least, continues to favour the
United States, despite the fall of the Shah in Iran, while the
Soviet position has been badly compromised by its precipitate
action in Afghanistan in 1979.
	 While Arab opinion has been
moving steadily towards Tunisian views, it must also be pointed
out that President Bourguiba was showing much greater sensitivity
after 1970 to Arab sensibilities, indicative perhaps of his fears
from the revolution in neighbouring Libya, in 1969. 	 There is
evidence that Bourguiba was under considerable pressure, both
from Libya and from within his own administration, to agree a
fusion with Kadhafi in 1974. And there can be little doubt that
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Bourguiba himself was strongly opposed to such a move, if only
because of his own long and intimate association with Tunisian
nationalism.
However, the prospect of support from other prominent
Arab states and their leaders, must have been attractive to
Bourguiba - at a time when the changing situation in France, the
eviction of the Gaullists from the Presidency, and France's own
growing dependence on oil from Iraq and Libya, paid for largely
by arms and other purchases by the same two Arab states.
	 Any
aggression against Tunisian territory after 1979 could be
presented as an aggression against the Arab League and Arab
states as a whole. The transfer of the headquarters of the PLO
to Tunis, after 1982 and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon,
elevated Tunis to the unaccustomed status of a leading Arab
capital. It was congenial, moreover, to Yasser Arafat who, since
1974, had been committed to a negotiation solution for the
Palestinian problem and who now, on the North African coast, and
in close proximity to his Algerian allies, attempted to mend his
bridges with King Hussein of Jordan as well as paying an
unexpected and highly controversial visit to President Mubarak of
Egypt, who had succeeded Sadat in 1981.
International and regional developments in the early 1980s
continued therefore to favour Tunisian diplomacy and its
integration with what remained of the Arab world. 	 The
administration had good relations with the new French President,
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Francois Mitterrand, and together both were active, and
successful in working to improve relations with neighbouring
Algeria - under the more pragmatic and moderate leadership of
Chadli Benjedid.	 If this then prompted a brief but threatening
alliance between Morocco and Libya in 1984, that came to an end
two years later and following the American air strike against
Libya. While American action may have been counter-productive in
so far as it weakened any internal opposition and enabled Kadhafi
to re-shuffle the military high command - and to move it out of
the capital and into a more remote area - it did put an end to
Kadhafi's threats against his neighbours, above all Tunisia, at
least for a time.
	 Meanwhile Algerian policy seemed to be
inspired, increasingly, by a pragmatism in the Middle East and a
preference for liberal economic policies at home, that could have
been inspired by the Tunisian example.
The height of Tunisian influence in the Middle East was
probably reached at the adjourned Arab summit in Fez, Morocco, in
November 1981, which was then re-convened in September 1982, also
at Fez. The proposals presented by Crown Prince Fand of Saudi
Arabia had first received the consent of the Saudi royal house
and of members of the newly-constituted Gulf Cooperation Council.
But the proposals were really based on the theses formulated by
Bourguiba in 1965 and first presented in published form on
controversial visit to Jericho. These contained rather more than
the germ of the later Fand Plan, which was itself an attempt to
present an Arab alternative to the so-called Reagan Plan,
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formulated in some haste in 1982 in the aftermath of the Israeli
Invasion of Lebanon.
	 The Fand Plan involved a negotiated
settlement of the Palestinian question, with implicit recognition
of the Israeli presence in the Middle East, within secure
frontiers, in return for Israeli acceptance of the creation of an
Independent Palestinian state.
	 The UN Security Council would
ensure the application of the plan and would act in the last
resort to guarantee the security of the states within the region.
While the Saudis were anxious to ensure unanimity among the
Arab states in support of the Plan, the results fell somewhat
short of their expectations. Yasser Arafat could not altogether
rely on the support of the dissident factions of the PLO, or even
on his own lieutenants within Fatah.
	 Kadhafi withheld his
agreement while President Assad of Syria appeared first to
support the plan and then to withdraw (or heavily qualify) that
support.
	 Even the adjournment until September 1982 failed to
secure the Saudi objective which was unanimity, despite the
active diplomacy of the Moroccan host, King Hassan. On the other
hand only Kadhati and South Yemen rejected it outright.
	 It is
symptomatic of the state of Arab politics in the eighties that no
further summit was attempted until 1987 when the Arab leaders
assembled again in Amman to consider the threat in the Gulf from
Iran. Nevertheless the Fand Plan was the closest the Arab leaders
would come to the formulation of a consensus on the Middle East.
And that consensus recalled the much earlier proposals of Habib
Bourguiba.
-283-
On other issues, too, Tunisia has tried to conform to what it
perceives to be the Arab consensus. From its beginning in 1980
Tunisia has tried to maintain a low profile towards the Iran-Iraq
war.	 However, as the Saudis and some of the Gulf states moved
closer to Iraq, while the Arab states led by Jordan and Saudi
Arabia looked increasingly to Egypt and Hosni Mubarak to
reinforce their military front against Iran, Tunisia took a more
prominent and more militant line against the regime in Teheran.
In March 1987 the government in Tunis broke off diplomatic
relations with Teheran accusing the Iranian Embassy in Tunis of
sponsoring agitation by religious 'fundamentalists' and of
recruiting Tunisian 'extremists' for subversive undertakings
against the government.	 On Iran, then, the Tunisian position
differs from that of the Algerians, while moving closer to Rabat
which has consistently opposed, and been opposed by, the
Ayatollahs in Iran.	 But the real irony, as we have suggested,
was that the final acceptance of Bourguiba's theses on the Middle
East, which focussed on a negotiated settlement of the
Palestinian question, coincided with the eclipse and final
removal of the founder-president himself. In the second half of
the 1980s the political struggle in Tunisia was at its peak as
Bourguiba resisted pressures from many, at hone and abroad, who
hoped to influence or even secure the appointment of their
nominee as constitutional succesor. By the end of 1987, which
also saw the reunion of the Arab leaders in Amman, in the first
summit since 1982, Bourguiba had been forcibly retired.
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CHAPTER TEN : MOROCCO AND THE MIDDLE EAST 
FROM THE GOLAN HEIGHTS TO CAMP DAVID 
A foreign policy for domestic consumption 
In terns of structure and ideology the Moroccan regime has
more in common with the conservative monarchies of Jordan, the
states of the Arabian Peninsula, and the Iran of the Pahlavis,
than with its immediate North African neighbours. Between such
'natural' allies, however, lie the more radical, republican
regimes entrenched in Egypt, Syria and Iraq, and later Algeria
and Libya.	 Moroccan foreign policy had therefore to come to
terms with a militant Arab radicalism whose insistence on direct
confrontation with Israel created problems, both domestic and
external, for the less 'progressive' states.
	 It had also to
respond to the new balance of power in the region following
Algerian independence in 1962. This favoured Algeria, by reason
of its size and geographical situation, its infrastructure, and
the availability of oil and gas. Since gaining independence from
the French, in 1956, Morocco had agitated for the modification of
existing frontiers in North and West Africa. The objective was
to recover something of the Sultan's former jurisdiction, in pre-
colonial times, which had extended to areas now incorporated in
neighbouring states.
	 De-colonisation had served only to
confirm the existing boundaries, which rejected 'historical' and
'traditional'
	 considerations
	 in favour of administrative
convenience and consistency with colonial practice.
	 Meanwhile
Rabat was under pressure from the new leadership in Algiers which
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now proclaimed its own 'revolutionary' values - while resisting
Moroccan attempts to overturn the territorial status quo.
Like other new states Morocco consciously sought to fashion a
foreign policy that would enable the state to respond effectively
to the new situation that it faced, exploiting the opportunities
that arose while trying to neutralise the threats. To a large
extent, however,
	 the policy evolved in response to isolated
problems and to specific incidents. In Morocco, as elsewhere in
the Maghreb, domestic considerations had priority in the
elaboration of foreign policy whose first and principal objective
was, in any case, to secure the regime. The function of foreign
policy was therefore to uphold the dynasty at home and to serve
Its interests abroad, to that end asserting traditional claims
and exploiting religious,
	 ideological and even personal
affinities.
	 Initially, the role of the dynasty in securing the
country's independence from the French, which had involved a
period of exile for Hassan's father, Mohammed V, had contributed
greatly to the regime's popularity. But the more enduring basis
of the regime's legitimacy lay in its religious and traditional
character, with the monarch claiming descent from the Prophet.
Search for a role in Arab affairs 
The 'patrimonial' style of administration and the personal
character of government helped establish a clientelistic
relationship between the centre and the periphery, that also cut
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across emerging class and status differentials.
	 By means of
foreign policy the same government then sought to establish
similar ties of a political, economic and military character with
other 'kindred' states.
	 While Morocco was the recipient of
special 'favours' from its American, European, and Middle Eastern
patrons, so too Rabat sought to bring other African states within
its orbit. At the centre of the system there was the dynasty and
a distinctive kind of Moroccan nationalism committed less to the
defence of a territorial entity than to the realisation of
dynastic pretensions - a policy of irredentism, mainly at the
expense of other, neighbouring states.
	 All else, including the
experiment with 'controlled' modernisation and a liberal economic
policy,	 were subordinate to the defence of the realm and the
pursuit of its interests.
The second objective of Moroccan foreign policy was to
overcome the country's geo-political isolation so that it might
integrate itself more fully into the political life of the Middle
East and Africa.
	 The aim was to circumvent the physical and
political barriers that otherwise threatened both the development
of the economy and the realisation of Morocco's wider regional
and global interests. Morocco looked over the Mediterranean to
Western Europe and the markets of the European Community; across
the Atlantic to the United States with its strategic interests in
the Mediterranean and the Levant and its preference for stable,
conservative clients. On the other side of the Sahara there were
the recently constituted black African states, closely dependent
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on French economic and military assistance, and presenting both a
challenge and an opportunity to policy makers in Rabat.	 Some,
like Mauritania in the 1960s, were viewed as territorial
dependencies, to be integrated or re-integrated into the
Slarinan kingdom at the first opportunity and without too much
regard to the territorial status quo. Other African states like
Senegal and Ivory Coast (and later Mauritania) were seen rather
as allies to be mobilised in defence of the ideological status
auo and against the challenge from more militant, perhaps
'marxist' states.
	
From the outset there was thus a certain
ambiguity about
	
Moroccan foreign policy, which was basically
conservative but, where dynastic claims were at stake, or when
the dynasty was at risk from domestic pressures, was ready to
adopt a more militant and aggressive posture and even to seek out
radical allies.
To the East there was Algeria and Libya from whom Morocco
could expect little in terms of sympathy and less by way of
support, given its territorial claims on the first and its
ideological antipathy to the second, particularly after Kadhafi
overturned King Idris in Libya, in 1969. Only Tunisia could be
said to have shared a good number of the concerns and objectives
of Moroccan foreign policy - but not their ambition to 'revise'
the inherited, colonial frontiers.	 But the small size of
Tunisia, its partial integration with the economy of eastern
Algeria, and the idiosyncratic views of President Bourguiba on
Middle Eastern questions, where he was often at variance with
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conservative as well as radical Arab leaders, seemed to exclude a
checkerboard-style alliance - save in the most exceptional
circumstances.	 The dominant strand in Moroccan policy is
therefore conservative - a defence of the ideological status quo,
a rejection of radical, particularly marxist doctrines, an
attachment to the western camp - whether to France, America or
the European Community as such - and a determined opposition to
anything that might facilitate Soviet or Communist penetration.
In the context of Arab politics this translates into
opposition to pan-Arabism - except for a brief 'flirtation' in
the 1950s with Nasser (and Kwame Nkrumah) when Morocco wanted
support for its role in the Algerian war, as well as for its
campaign to annexe the adjacent territory of Mauritania. It also
explains Morocco's predictable backing for the Saudi-sponsored
Islamic Conference Organisation, set up in 1969 to rival the
secular, and pan-Arab pretensions of their Egyptian, Syrian and
Iraq opponents.	 After 1973 Morocco would become even more
directly aligned with Saudi Arabia and the conservative regimes
of the Gulf, as well as being close to President Sadat of Egypt
and to the American leaders.	 Hassan's consistent defence of a
negotiated settlement in the Middle East and his adoption of
conservative, if cautious positions within the Arab League won
for the Moroccans a prominent, even pivotal role after 1973 in
the controversial 'peace process', alongside Egypt and Saudi
Arabia.	 Moreover, Saudi support for Morocco and the rapport
between their two monarchs was not unconnected with the choice of
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Rabat in 1974, and of Fez in 1981/1982, as the venue for key
meetings of the Arab Foreign Ministers and Heads of State. There
was also the generous financial as well as di plomatic su pport the
Moroccans received from the Saudi government following their
military interventions in Zaire as well as in the Western Sahara
- at a time when the Saudis were troubled by developments in
South Yemen and the Horn of Africa and the prospect of communist
'expansion' here and elsewhere in Africa.
But there i s a l so evidence of Moroccan support for more
militant even radical positions.
	
The object here has usually
been (1) to counter or deflect strong domestic pressures on the
dynasty, from the opposition parties, from within the military or
from other key constituencies, or else (2) to maximise external
support by other states for dynastic claims that are likely to
threaten	 entrenched	 conservative	 interests	 and	 provoke
considerable opposition abroad.	 Both factors contributed to
Moroccan membership of the short-lived Casablanca group, formed
in 1960 and linking Black and Arab African states - Ghana,
Guinea, Mali, Morocco and Egypt - in their support of Algerian
independence and their opposition to colonial and neo-colonial
'dependency'.
	 The 'bloc', led by Ghana and Kwame Nkrumah, was
particularly critical of the retention of colonial frontiers in
Africa after independence and the colonial,
	
pro-western
orientation of many of the new African leaders. Ghana, Egypt and
Morocco also had large territorial claims against neighbouring
states. On Middle Eastern issues, too, Morocco under Hassan has
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more often been associated with militant Arab sentiment than, for
example, Tunisia under Bourguiba.
	 Nor were Morocco's relations
with Egypt punctuated by the same sharp discontinuities as
characterised Tunisian-Egyptian relations in the same period.
The exception was in 1963 when Hassan himself attacked Nasser for
openly aligning his country with Algeria during the short 'war of
the sands'.	 While Hassan undoubtedly felt a much greater
affinity with Sadat than with
	 Nasser and his populist style
and radical views, there was no break in Moroccan-Egyptian
relations until 1979 - and on that occasion the severance was
regretted by both leaders.
Intermittent but well publicised support by Morocco for the
Palestinian cause and, above all, her active participation in the
1973 war on the Golan front were calculated gestures designed to
attract international attention, which helped to earn respect for
the Moroccan leadership, even among the more 'progressive'
states.	 More important Moroccan participation in the war of
October 1973 and her close identification, then and later, with
the Arab cause enabled Hassan to re-assert his authority over the
military at home - involved in several abortive coup attempts in
1971/1972.	 And more recent events suggest that Hassan still
retains the capacity to surprise allies and opponents alike. His
public and controversial reconciliation with Kadhafi, in 1983,
after nearly fifteen years of confrontation, and the 'union'
between their states that followed in 1984, displeased the
Americans and alarmedthe French.
	 Within two years of this
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alliance with Kadhafi, leader of the Tripoli group and the
Rejectionist Front, Hassan would again surprise observers by his
invitation to the Israeli Prime Minister, Shimon Peres, to visit
Rabat for confidential discussions.
It is not that Hassan has a split personality, or that
Moroccan policy exhibits a dual character, or is characterised by
instability and inconsistency. On the contrary, Morocco's more
'radical' or 'progressive' gestures can invariably be explained
in terms of domestic priorities : above all defence of the realm
and an awareness of the sources, both immediate and historic, of
its legitimacy.	 As in Jordan and Saudi Arabia (and in Egypt
under Farouk and his father) the monarch cannot afford to detach
himself or his state from the Arab cause, or from the Palestinian
question which retains the capacity to arouse and direct public
opinion throughout the Middle East.
	 This is particularly the
case with the aarifian sovereign whose claims to legitimacy
derive from religious (Islamic) precedent. Thus King Hassan II,
like King Faisal of Saudi Arabia waa able to blame radical
Ba'athism and secular Nasseriem for the defeat of 1967 while
'extremists' were held responsible for most of the Arab
misadventures.	 Hassan had a very simple explanation for the
outcome of the 'six day war' : the "Arabs had turned their back
on God and God had turned away from them".
	 Or, more
specifically, "the defeat of the Arabs was a consequence of the
ideologies that divided them and their reliance on the Soviet
Union".'
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Other gestures, including the decision to commit troops to
serve alongside the Syrians in the defence of the Golan Heights,
shortly before the 1973 war, have been 'explained' in terms of
the domestic pressures on the regime, notably the two failed coup
attempts of 1971 and 1972 - the second being attributed to the
redoubtable Interior Minister, General Mohammed Oufkir, widely
held to have been implicated in the disappearance and death of
Mehdi Ben Barka near Paris in 1965.
	 The regime (i.e., dynasty)
had to recover its popularity and to regain control over a
fractious military. The least reliable officers could be sent to
the front on active service along with any frustrated
professionals who wanted action and an opportunity for promotion.
Again, the more militant African initiatives undertaken by the
regime, notably the pursuit of its claims on Mauritania in the
1960s and, above all, the Green March into the former Spanish
Sahara in 1975, are likewise linked with domestic problems which,
in the peculiar circumstances of Morocco, have also been dynastic
problems. They reflect the attempts by the regime, under intense
local pressure, to strengthen its legitimacy and retrieve its
popular base.
More generally Morocco, with its high military profile in
Africa and its aggressive pursuit of territorial claims against
its neighbours, has pursued a diplomatic offensive calculated to
maximise domestic support while minimising the risks of
international isolation. Where Morocco in the 1960s had offended
conservative opinion in France and the more moderate African
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leaders by her designs on Mauritania, Rabat tried to compensate
by (briefly) courting the more radical Arab and African leaders.
The failure of her expansionist policies in North Africa,
however, soon prompted a shift of emphasis away from Africa and
towards the Middle East.
	 Even in 1972-73, when Hassan was
Chairman of the 0.A.U., Africa remained a relatively low priority
for Moroccan foreign policy. It was only in the mid-1970s, with
the emergence in Africa of a new generation of socialist states,
and the threat from the new oil wealth of Algeria and Libya, that
Morocco returned again to African issues, staking out its prior
claim to the Spanish Sahara, its mineral wealth and its
fisheries.	 And as Algeria, Libya and some of the more
'progressive' of the African states registered their opposition
to the Moroccan claim, the government turned for support to the
conservative majority of the Arab League - who were opposed to
further fragmentation in the Middle East, particularly where the
proposed new state was likely to be radical in orientation and
aligned with the socialist camp.Even Libya voiced its opposition
to 'balkanisation'.
Finding an unsympathetic response in the Arab League, Algeria
turned instead to the OAU and the United Nations - where the
success of its diplomatic efforts left Morocco increasingly
isolated and vulnerable, and with no alternative in the end but
to withdraw from the first and to ignore the resolutions of the
second. In his determination to avoid isolation and to fund his
military campaign in the Sahara Hassan is the more anxious,
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therefore, to retain the backing of the Arab League, the one body
to have consistently supported him on the issue of Western
Sahara. Which is why, despite the similarity of their views on
the Middle East and its problems, Hassan cannot afford the more
quixotic gestures of Bourguiba. More than Bourguiba, Hassan has
to consider opinion back home as well as the sensitivities of
Arab opinion, conservative and radical alike, reflected in the
deliberations of the Arab League and other Arab councils. Even
his most daring initiatives are carefully prepared and their
timing and presentation are calculated so as to maximise support
from as many quarters as possible : the intention being to retain
existing conservative support in the Arab League, the OAU and
among the western states while trying to keep open his lines to
the Soviet Union and to other leaders whose support, political as
well as economic, could conceivably be useful in the future.
Militancy in7the October war 
While Morocco has long favoured a political settlement of the
Middle East problems, it nevertheless participated actively in
the war of October 1973. As a result of that involvement, which
received widespread publicity throughout the Middle East, Morocco
became prominent for the first time in the politics of the region
as a whole, and was no longer seen simply as an actor in the
North African arena.	 Lacking oil and mineral wealth, however,
Morocco could not hope to achieve the same degree of autonomy or
the influence of Algeria or even Libya.
	 It would remain the
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client of other Middle East 'powers', like Saudi Arabia, or of
France or the United states. By skilful diplomacy King Hassan II
could re-dress the balance to some extent, penetrating the inner
circle of Arab rulers in the role of arbiter.
His talents in this capacity were particularly appreciated in
the aftermath of the 1973 war, as King Faisal of Saudi Arabia
sought to maintain the momentum of the 'peace process' while
preserving an increasingly delicate Arab consensus regarding its
direction and its objectives.
	 As the Saudis struggled to
maintain their close and privileged relationship with Sadat's
Egypt and Assad's Syria, they found an indispensable ally in the
Moroccan monarch whose troops had been despatched to both fronts
in 1973 and had distinguished themselves in the fighting on the
Golan Heights, And as Hassan began to focus increasingly on the
Spanish Saharan territory immediately to the South of Morocco,
and to revive dynastic claims to sovereignty in the area, the
financial support of the Saudis and the approval of the Arab
League became increasingly useful.
Moroccan participation in the 1973 war is open to many
interpretations.
	 Like President Sadat of Egypt, Hassan would
have viewed the conflict not so much as a renewal of the
confrontation politics of the previous decade, but more as a
means of upsetting the territorial status quo imposed by the
Israelis following their sweeping victory in 1967. 	 Where the
often repeated threat of war had failed to alert the Israelis and
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their American patrons to the instability inherent in the present
arrangements, Egypt and Syria had been compelled in 1973 to
deploy their troops in an offensive operation that was initially
as successful as it was unexpected.
	
The exact numbers of
Moroccan troops involved in the 1973 campaign are not available.
Estimates vary from 5,500 to 7,000 soldiers. 2 According to one
source two units of the tank brigade had been sent to the Golan
front in Syria as early as May, five months before the war began.
They were equipped with Russian-designed 154 tanks and numbered
around 1500-3000 soldiers, under the command of General Abdeslam
Sefrioui. 3 A second expeditionary force was despatched to Egypt
after the war began. composed of four units of the tank brigade
and some 2,000-5,300 soldiers under Colonel Hassan Hatim, the
brigade commander.
	 They were accompanied by an Air Force
squadron.4
One view is that the operation was mounted not in a display
of revolutionary fervour but rather to strengthen the position of
the throne in Morocco, whose legitimacy derives from Hassan's
claims to be descended from the Prophet.
	 Elbaki Hermessi has
argued that practices such as fund-raising during religious
rituals and the despatch of army contingents to the front were
destined, like the later appeals for a people's march to 're-
occupy' the Western Sahara, to help legitimate the monarchy.s
Reviewing a contingent of the expeditionary corps en route to
Syria, in advance of the war in May 1973, Hassan reminded the
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troops ot the holy nature of their mission, which recalled
Mohammed's earlier defence of the Faith.
Today we are called on to make sacrifices to liberate
Jerusalem and to retrieve the dignity of all Moslems...we
are participating, together with our Arab brothers, in
this struggle for emancipation which is for the glory of
Islam and the triumph of its holy values.6
And to reinforce the religious symbolism, flags were distributed
by the sovereign bearing the legend : "For the defence of the
Arab nation". Hassan also revealed that other contingents would
follow and the despatch of a second to the Egyptian front was
announced on October 6, 1973.
Others have seen the gesture more as a response to the two
abortive coup attempts directed against the throne, in July 1971
and August 1972.
	 These furnished clear evidence of widespread
unrest among the officers of the army and air force.
	 The
transfer of the first contingent of the Royal Armed Forces (FAR)
to Syria, in May 1973, suggests that Hassan was preoccupied above
all with the internal unrest in the military but also with the
rejection by the opposition parties of the proposed political
concessions and their refusal to participate in the proposed
government of national unity on the terms outlined by the
monarch. There was the temptation to despatch the least reliable
units to the Syrian front where Israeli raids had been frequent
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and casualties were likely to be high. The gesture would serve
as a warning to the more fractious of the military as well as
providing opportunities to the more professional elements to
distinguish themselves militarily and, once more, in loyal
service to the throne. Hassan himself insisted that the decision
to send troops to Syria was in direct response to the appeal for
military support made by the Syrian Foreign Minister, Abdulhalim
Khaddam, on a tour of the Maghrebin states in January 1973.
Hassan's favourable reply, on February 22, was as prompt as it
was unexpected
	 There was no question about the loyalty of the
army to the throne.
The Royal Armed Forces remain loyal to their pledge to
defend God, Fatherland and the King. They now have the
opportunity to join in a struggle for liberty, dignity
and glory, in support of Islam and the Word of God.7
Hassan also invited the super-powers, and China, to impose a
lasting peace in the region, based on justice, and which would
"guarantee to the Arabs their dignity and to the Palestinians the
recovery of their territory and their homeland".
	 Direct
participation by Moroccan forces on the Syrian front was
undoubtedly a bold diplomatic initiative for which the other
Maghrebin states were unprepared and which therefore enabled
Hassan to pose, before the world, as the militant champion of
Islam and the Arab nation.
	 Morocco was clearly staking out a
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claim to greater prominence in the affairs of the region while
Hassan, himself, sought to improve his diplomatic profile and to
introduce himself into the inner circle of Arab leaders who were
trying, essentially by diplomatic means, to re-assert Arab
interests following the humiliation of the Six Day war and the
eclipse of radical pan-Arabism. Aware that the emergence of oil
politics in 1973 threatened Morocco's new, enhanced status in the
councils of the Arab states, to say nothing of its exclusion from
such key bodies as OPEC and OAPEC, Hassan was anxious to exploit
his own unique position as an Arab leader on good terms at once
with the Palestinians and with the Israelis.
	 As memories of
October 1973 faded, and with it the renown achieved by the
Moroccan forces in Syria, Hassan turned his attention to the
'peace process' which offered significant new opportunities for
Moroccan diplomacy, linking Rabat even more closely with her
conservative allies in the Arab League and with her Western
patrons, notably the United States.
Morocco's new and enhanced status in the Middle East,
following the 1973 war, was soon reflected in the choice of Rabat
as the venue for the important Arab League summit in 1974, after
Algiers had acted as host for the immediate post-war summit in
November 1973.	 Hassan had described that conference as
signalling the "Arab renaissance"
	
"the revival of a
civilisation and the renewal of its history".
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But can a people be content with the reliving the glories
of the past?	 Peoples die not of poverty but of
humiliation...We have been united as one man despite the
differences that separate us and despite our different
political views...and soon we will pray together in
Jerusalem.a
While such militant sentiments accorded well with the spirit of
the Algiers summit and underlined the Moroccan role in the
October war, it was rather as an 'honest broker' and diplomat
that Hassan approached the 1974 summit in Rabat. With the peace
process well under way the question of Palestinian representation
became crucial. Where King Hussein of Jordan and the PLO under
Yasser Arafat both contested the right to act as spokesman for
the Palestinians living under Israeli occupation in the West Bank
and Gaza, it was the PLO that was finally designated the "sole
legitimate representative" at the Rabat conference.
Camp David and the Moroccan Jewish community 
The choice of Morocco to host the Rabat summit was deliberate
and reflected the country's pivotal role particularly in any
future dialogue involving Israelis, Arabs and the Palestinian
question.	 Although relatively poor in income and resources,
Morocco had consistently supported the PLO since its inception in
1964, levying a special tax for that purpose. 	 But Morocco has
also - secretly - played host to a succession of Israeli
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political figures, beginning with Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister
in 1976, followed by Moshe Dayan, the Foreign Minister in 1977,
who made contact in Morocco with the Egyptian Deputy Prime
Minister, Hassan Tuhami, to make preparations for Sadat's visit
to Jerusalem later that year. In 1978 it was the turn of Shimon
Peres, then leader of the Labour opposition, who would return in
July 1986, this time as Israel's Prime Minister in the coalition
government. While Morocco cannot entertain open diplomatic
relations with Israel until a general peace agreement is first
achieved, Hassan is known to favour a two-state approach to the
Palestinian problem and eventual Arab-Israeli cooperation.
This is the less surprising in that Morocco is unique among
Arab countries in so far as it retains a flourishing and
respected, though much depleted Jewish community numbering around
20,000.	 Moreover, they are in close and virtually unrestricted
contact with Israel where the Moroccan Jews exercise considerable
influence and are now the largest single ethnic group, estimated
in 1978 at around 400,000. 	 In that sense Hassan's support for
the 'peace process' after 1973, together with his encouragement
of Sadat's visit to Jerusalem and his more cautious support for
his subsequent participation in the Camp David talks, represent a
continuation of his own tolerant attitude to the local Jewish
community - which he inherited from his father. For their part
the Moroccan Jews had come to appreciate the treatment they
received under Islam, after independence, which contrasted
favourably with the behaviour of the earlier French (and
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Christian) rulers, notably under Vichy. Moroccan Jews are proud
to recall that King Mohammed V - then the Sultan Ben Arafa - had
refused point blank to implement the anti-semitic decrees
transmitted from Vichy, which ordered the persecution of the
Moroccan Jews. A number of european Jews were even able to take
refuge in Morocco, a fact which impressed itself not only on the
young Hassan but also on the world in general.	 By 1948 the
Jewish community in Morocco numbered a quarter million, although
the creation that year of the new state of Israel and the appeals
for immigration launched by Zionist agencies contributed
substantially to their rapid decline thereafter.
Immediately after Morocco's independence, in 1956, King
Mohammed V appointed Dr. Leon Benzeguen, a Jew, as Minister of
Post and Telegraphs (PTT), a portfolio he retained in the
subsequent government.	 It was a tribute, however, to his
standing in the wider society and not a conscious effort to
provide representation for a particular constituency. 	 And in
1965 the chef de cabinet of the Minister of Defence was also a
Jew : further evidence of the degree of religious tolerance
within Morocco after independence. 9 It is true, however, that
the emergence of Arab nationalism, as reflected in the press of
the Istiqlal Party, helped foster a feeling of insecurity within
the Moroccan Jewish community, particularly when coupled with
Morocco's entrance into the Arab League, in 1957, and the arrival
in power of Istiqlal.
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Yet, as late as November 1976, the Moroccan Prime Minister,
Ahmed Osman, indicated publicly that those Jews who had
emigrated, particularly to Israel, were free to return to Morocco
at any time. would be made welcome and would continue to enjoy
the same rights as Moslims. 1 ° And on July 10, 1984, King Hassan
II conferred the Order of the Wissam Al Arch on David Ammer, the
President of the Council of Jewish communities in Morocco, on the
occasion of his fifty-fifth birthday. 	 Ammar is among the
wealthiest members of the business community in Morocco, with a
spread of economic interests. The previous May he had organised
a Jewish Congress in Rabat with the participation of an Israeli
delegation that included some thirteen officials, some eight of
them members of the Knesset.	 Among those invited was the
President of the World Jewish Congress, Edgar Bronfman. 	 The
Moroccan Minister of the Interior, Dris Bassri, was present at
the inauguration of the conference while the Crown Prince,
Mohammed, presided over the closing dinner." In September 1984
the first Jewish deputy was elected to the Moroccan parliament on
the platform of the Constitutional Union (UC).
In 1977 Morocco also provided facilities for senior Egyptian
and Israeli officials concerned with the preparations for Sadat's
forthcoming visit to Jerusalem.	 Hassan himself was afterwards
invited to visit Israel. He defended his actions against those
of his Arab critics, notably Syria, who levelled accusations of
'treason' against the Moroccan leader. Such countries did not
understand that
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what we are undertaking here will in fact advance the
Arab cause.
	 Their leaders know very well that Morocco
has always complied with its undertakings and will always
stand beside its brothers in defence of their sacred
rights. 12
Because of Morocco's participation in the 1973 war, on the Golan
and the Sinai fronts, Hassan can afford to go further than other
Arab leaders in his pursuit of a negotiated Middle Eastern
settlement.
	 As an official commented to a visiting French
journalist : as the one Arab country outside the 'ReJectionist
Front' to have suffered casualties in 1973 in both Sinai and the
Golan, Morocco has earned the right to participate fully in the
discussion of Middle Eastern affairs.
	 It is well placed to
mediate between Arab countries themselves and between Arab states
and Israel and
nothing will prevent Morocco from having contacts with
Israel or even from inviting such contacts - in the
interests of peace. Morocco does not favour a separate
peace between Egypt and Israel.	 It does, however,
continue to accept the three conclusions of the 1974
Rabat Arab Summit conference : no separate peace; the
PLO is the sole representative of the Palestinian people;
and Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories.''
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Moroccan support for a peaceful, negotiated settlement of
Middle Eastern problems provides the incentive for continuing
talks and consultations with Jewish leaders and Israeli
officials.	 In October 1985, Raphael Edery, a member of the
Israeli Knesset and himself of Moroccan origin, apealed to King
Hassan II, urging him to take the initiative in fostering direct
negotiations, on Moroccan soil, between Israel and a joint
Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to be led by King Hussein - but
excluding the PLO. That did not, however, reflect the letter or
even the spirit of the Rabat summit. In October 1976 the Israeli
Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, paid a secret visit to Morocco
when he met King Hassan for discussions, and contacts between the
two continued after Yenachem Begin had replaced him as head of a
Likud administration in 1977,
	 In February 1977, Nahum Goldman,
then President of the World Jewish Congress, was received by
Hassan and, shortly afterwards, Shaoul Ben Shimon, leader of the
powerful Israeli trade union organisation, Histadruth, visited
Morocco to meet with the local Jewish communities.
Hassan had then taken the opportunity to outline his view
that all Arabs were now ready to recognise Israel.
I do not know a single responsible Arab leader who does
not want once and for all to close the Israeli file.
They are ready to recognise Israel provided she returns
to its pre-1967 frontiers.
	 Israel must be prepared to
bargain (trade) for peace."'
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He had spoken of the inherent genius of the Israeli people and
the desirability of channelling their energies into peaceful
cooperation rather than into war and confrontation.
Just think what the Arab world, endowed as it is with
considerable financial and economic resources, could
accomplish by way of transforming the entire region, if
matched by Israel's innovative genius.16
There could be no doubt that Morocco was ready and willing to
recognise the legitimacy of the Israeli state provided it, in
turn, was prepared to meet the Arab conditions for such
recognition.
	 And it was in Morocco that the first steps were
taken towards Sadat's historic visit to Jerusalem and here, too,
that Camp David and the peace process can be said to have
started.
With Menachem Begin in power, Moshe Dayan, Israeli Foreign
Minister, received an invitation from King Hassan II, which
resulted in a first visit to Morocco on September 4, 1977, which
would soon be followed by others. During their meeting the King
apparently promised to try and arrange a meeting between Dayan
and a representative of the Egyptian government to consider peace
talks.
	 An agreement on such talks soon followed in Cairo, the
Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister, Hassan Tuhami, being delegated to
meet with Dayan.
	 That meeting took place in Morocco on 16
September 1977. Presenting Hassan with a Canaanite sword and a
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bronze arrowhead, both from the second millenium B.C., Dayan
commented
Before the invention of the Phantom and the MIG empires
were conquered with weapons like these, and it was
with such armaments that the Israelites subdued the petty
kingdoms of Canaan in the late thirteenth and early
twelfth centuries B.C. - some forty years after their
exodus from Egypt.'6
Thanking him, Hassan replied that such weapons were "a reminder
of past wars. The time has now come to make peace". For his
part the Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister emphasised the boldness
of his government's present move, which was known only to himself
and Sadat, but which entailed the most serious risks.
In the course of the secret discussions between the two
sides, Hassan intervened to re-assure the Israelis about Sadat's
intentions.
From what I know of Sadat's thinking, after talks with
him, I am prepared to give my word of honour that Sadat
will meet with Begin and will shake hands with him
provided Begin can give a personal undertaking that the
bi-lateral talks will. proceed on the basis of an
understanding that Israel will withdraw from the
[occupied] territories."
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The outcome of the talks in Morocco was Sadat's controversial
visit to Jerusalem where he addressed the Knesset on November 20,
1977.	 Before Sadat left for Israel King Hassan had telephoned
him personally to convey his "high esteem" for Sadat and his
"keen desire" that the initiative "undertaken with great courage"
might be "crowned with success - for the good and the interest of
Egypt, of the confrontation states, and of the entire Arab
nation".	 Always cautious, however, Hassan also SEEMS to have
emphasised his "complete certainty" that Sadat would not make
concessions at the expense of the Arab nation and its interests,
"including those of the Palestinian people".1°
Since 1975 Morocco had been in conflict with Algeria and the
Algerian-sponsored Polisario movement, over Rabat's territorial
claims on the Western Sahara. Hassan was therefore sensitive to
criticisms like that of the Algerian news agency (APS) which
insisted the King was "responsible for the policy of surrender
(capitulation) and for the division it had created in the Arab
world. The same agency recalled the speech of the Israeli Prime
Minister, Menachem Begin, to the Knesset on the occasion of
Sadat's visit, in which he had congratulated King Hassan for
having encouraged Sadat to go to Israel. Morocco's support for
the Egyptian initiative was made even more public in an interview
given by the Foreign Minister, Mohammed Boucetta, to the
correspondent of the French newspaper, Le Monde. He had insisted
that Morocco's support for Sadat's initiative was in complete
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agreement with the three main conclusions of the 1974 Rabat Arab
Summit.
All Arab territories occupied by Israel in 1967,
including Jerusalem, must be evacuated; the Palestinian
problem must be resolved by the establishment of a state;
and there must be a comprehensive settlement of the
Middle East problem which would exclude any notion of a
separate agreement. 19
Sadat's visit to Morocco in February 1978 provided further
confirmation that the two leaders were working together on their
'peace strategy' for the Middle East.	 The United States also
conveyed its appreciation of Hassan's efforts by despatching
shipments of arms to Morocco to help deter the Algerian-backed
Polisario. The New York Times remarked that
In order to compensate King Hassan II for his support for
President Sadat, the Carter administration proposed to
sell anti-guerrilla war planes and armed helicopters to
Morocco.°
Following the Israeli raid on Lebanon, in March 1978, itself a
response to a Palestinian commando operation inside Israel, King
Hassan sent a message to the Israeli Prime Minister via the U.N.
General Secretary, in which he expressed his 'concern' and called
for an end to the aggression and for the withdrawal of Israeli
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forces engaged in Lebanon - as it threatened the prospects for
peace in the region. There was a warning that, despite Moroccan
support for the recent peace initiatives, the government might be
forced to revise its policy in the light of such incidents.2'
The Arab states were indeed to be disappointed by the results
of Sadat's initiative, whose
treaty signed in 1979 between
phased withdrawal of Israeli
only outcome was a separate peace
Israel and Egypt, providing for the
forces from Sinai.	 At the first
in November 1978, the Arab
his failure to
Baghdad Summit of the Arab League,
states conclusively rejected Sadat's policy and
pursue a comprehensive Middle Eastern settlement covering the
other issues raised in 1974 at Rabat. There was growing support
for the view that Sadat had been a pawn in the American-Israeli
power game to dominate the Middle East and secure their own
presence to the exclusion of other interested parties, including
the Syrians, the Palestinians and the Soviet Union. Where the
first Baghdad Summit had issued a warning to Sadat against
concluding a separate treaty with Israel, the second Baghdad
Summit, in March 1979, proceeded - albeit reluctantly on the part
of the Saudis, the Moroccans and their conservative allies - to
suspend diplomatic relations with Egypt.
Egypt seemed by 1979 to have opted out of the Arab-Israeli
conflict leaving the Israelis a more or less free hand on their
northern border with Lebanon and Syria. 	 It was at the second
Baghdad Summit that the Arab states considered transferring the
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headquarters of the Arab League away from Cairo.
	 Despite the
Moroccan presence at the summit and the decision to suspend
relations with Egypt, King Hassan himself refused to condemn
Sadat and seems, personally, to have thought him justified in
concluding a separate deal. In May 1979, in a speech which
directly contradicts an earlier statement by the country's
Foreign Minister, Mohammed Boucetta, Hassan commented that
President Sadat thought it right to take a certain number
of initiatives which were within his competence. As long
as he continues to act for Egypt, it is not for me to
tell him that he has exceeded his rights. Had I, too,
been pre-occupied for as many years with the same
problems I might have reacted as he did.	 I do not
know, 22
Sadat, lor his part, made no attempt to conceal his support
for the Moroccan monarch when, at a press conference on September
1, 1979, he indicated his readiness to help Morocco, militarily,
in its war in the Western Sahara. "If Hassan II were to ask for
Egyptian help I would seek the approval of the People's Assembly
and that of the National Democratic Party." 23
 Hassan, himself,
had not yet abandoned all hope of a political settlement of the
outstanding issues in the Middle East. In September 1980 he
advised representatives of the press that the PLO was ready to
recognise Israel provided Israel would recognise the PLO as a
political entity with the right to a homeland.
	 Hassan had
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strongly supported the offer by the PLO to act as intermediaries
in seeking the release of the American hostages, seized in 1979
by the new revolutionary authorities in Iran. He had recommended
the proposal in a note to Ayatollah Khomeiny, pointing out that
"should it succeed, the PLO and Arafat would have to be received
in Washington as accredited intermediaries." 2A There is little
doubt that behind Hassan's proposal was the hope of pre-empting
Algeria's own mediation efforts and a possible rapprochement
between President Chadli, the new Algerian President, and the
United States.
Bostility to the Iranian revolution 
Hassan, however, had little or no influence with the
authorities in Teheran, if only because he had earlier agreed,
together with Sadat, to receive the former Shah of Iran after his
overthrow. --'Relations between Hassan and the Shah had, in any
case, been close before the revolution when both had been major
recipients of American military and other aid. Then there was
the report that Hassan saw an American military intervention in
Iran as the most likely outcome of the protracted American-
Iranian crisis.	 In the event Hassan's initiative failed while
the Iranian Foreign Ministry recalled its diplomatic personnel
from Morocco on December 20, 1979 - citing the King's openly
hostile attitude towards the Iranian reovlution. By way of
retaliation, Teheran gave official recognition to the Saharawi
Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) in Western Sahara in February
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1980. A year later it was announced that Iran had recalled its
envoys from Jordan and Morocco (and severed diplomatic ties)
because of their governments' support for the Iraqi regime which
had meanwhile embarked on an invasion of Iran - ostensibly with a
view to securing a revision of their common frontier in the
Shatt-el-Arab.
At the beginning of that conflict, in 1980, Hassan had
declared himself "concerned and heartbroken". But on September
24, 1980, Rabat announced its complete support for Iraq - which
also supplied Morocco with most of its oil. Three days later the
leading Moroccan parties, the Rassemblenent Rational des
Indêpendants (RAI), the Istiglal Party, and the Socialist USFP
all announced their support for Iraq in its conflict with Iran
Meanwhile, the Foreign Minister, Mohammed Boucetta, in a speech
calling for an end to hostilities, insisted that
we have supported the historic rights of Iraq because we
consider that no agreement can last or guarantee
stability that
	
is not even-handed and based on the
principle of equity.'
He maintained that Khomeiny, who had passed much of his exile in
Iraq, should himself have denounced the earlier agreements.
These, particularly the 1975 agreement effected in Algiers, had
been imposed on a reluctant Iraq by the government of the Shah -
and without proper consideration of the merits of the Iraqi case.
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Iraqi islands and territory that were the subject of dispute
today had simply been annexed by Iran under the terns of the 1975
treaty.	 Where Morocco had tried, unsuccessfully, to undermine
Algerian attempts to mediate in the dispute between Teheran and
Washington, Rabat was now concerned to emphasise Algeria's
complicity in the elaboration of the terms of the 1975 treaty
between Iran and Iraq.	 Which provides further confirmation of
Zartman's hypothesis that the quarrels within the Maghreb are the
source of most foreign policy initiatives taken by Tripoli,
Tunis, Algiers and Rabat.
Moroccan support for Iraq in its conflict with Iran can be
seen as a quid pro quo in return for Iraq's decision to support
Morocco's policy in Western Sahara,	 Indeed, Iraq had agreed to
supply Morocco with oil at a discount price of $3 a barre127.
The differences with Teheran have their origins in the close
rapport that existed between the Shah and King Hassan and the
threat that the Iranian revolution represented to the
conservative monarchies and sultanates of the Gulf and elsewhere
in the Arab world.	 An American newspaper report described a
dinner given in honour of the visiting Richard Nixon, former
American President, by the United States ambassador to Morocco,
Joseph V. Reed, in March 1982, which was attended by the twenty-
three year old son of the late Shah, seated next to Nixon. He
was described as living in Morocco at the time and as being a
regular visitor to the American Embassy. 2° Despite the break in
diplomatic relations between Morocco and Iran the Iranians were
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nevertheless present at the summit of the Islamic Conference
Organisation held in Casablanca, in January 1984.
Morocco's initiatives towards peace with Israel had the
support of the conservative Arab states, and especially that of
King Hussein of Jordan who, from the end of the 1967 war until
the arrival of the Likud government in power in 1977, was
reported to have had around five hundred hours of secret meetings
with Israeli leaders, most of them representing the Israeli
Labour Party, including the party leader, Shimon Peres.29
Morocco was chosen as the venue of the Fez Arab Summit in
November 1981 at which Crown Prince Fand of Saudi Arabia was to
present a new set of Arab proposals for a peace settlement in the
Middle East. Hassan was unable, however, to secure consensus on
the proposals and the summit was therefore adjourned after only a
few hours discussion.	 It was reconvened a year later in very
different circumstances, following the Israeli invasion of
Lebanon.	 The summit appointed Hassan chairman of a 'team' to
explain the Fand Plan to other states and it was in that capacity
that theKing, on October 26, 1982, expounded the Plan to the
United Nations General Assembly, commenting on its realistic
nature and its positive approach. He described it as the first
serious Arab effort for peace in the Middle East. 30
In fact the appearance of new divisions among the Arab states and
within the PLO itself rendered the proceedings at Fez rather
pointless and no new summit was convened until 19g7. The main
topic then was no longer Palestine or the recovery of Arab
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territory from Israel, but the Iran-Iraq war in which the
Maghrebin interest was, at best, only marginal.
Moroccan diplomacy continued therefore to focus on the
conflict in the Western Sahara.
	 Other initiatives aimed to
maximise external support or to neutralise the opposition, in
this case no longer domestic but foreign - and led by the
Algerians. Where the unexpected rapprochement between Libya and
Morocco and the treaty of union concluded in 1984 made little
sense in terms of ideology or of Arab politics in general, it was
a response to re-alignments within the Maghreb and to growing
fears of diplomatic isolation on the part of the two states - the
one involved militarily in Chad and in confrontation with
American and western policy, the other involved militarily in the
Western Sahara and receiving American and western assistance.
While the conservative Arab states were prepared to show sympathy
for the predicament of the Moroccans - and even hoped for some
moderation in Libyan policies as a result - Washington lost no
time in expressing its own distaste for the 'union', to the
extent of cutting military assistance while moving closer to
Algeria.	 President Chadli visited the United States in April
1985.
After the military action by the United States against Libya,
in 1986, Hassan felt a pressing need to restore American
confidence in himself and his polcies and to ensure a
continuation of American aid. He therefore invited the Israeli
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Prime Minister, Shimon Peres, to Morocco in July 1986, proving
once again that on Middle Eastern issues his country remains a
useful as well as a reliable ally - more reliable, for example,
than Algeria even under its new moderate President - and an ally
whose policies do not depart, in any important respect, from
those of the United States. And this from an Arab leader who was
also	 President	 of	 the	 Saudi-funded	 Islamic	 Conference
Organisation, of the Al Quds (Jerusalem) Liberation Committee,
and of the Arab League. The result was a break with Libya and
the end of their 'union', while Hassan hastened to resign from
the presidency of the Arab League.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN : LIBYA AND THE MIDDLE EAST 
LIAIERICLIDLIGIOF NO COMPROMISE 
Arab unity as an instrument of policy 
Zartnan has emphasised the relevance of 'nation-building' and
differentiation as ingredients in foreign policy-making by the
Maghreb states,	 particularly	 in the years just after
independence.	 Within the region there develops a kind of
'adversary politics' based on differentiation, and the desire to
create a distinctive	 sense of identity among peoples and groups
whose links with the state (and one another) are often tenuous
and whose loyalty to that state remains, at best, conditional. A
foreign policy is not just a symbol of independence but is also a
weapon of domestic policy as well as a source of external
leverage. Pressure for union or unity remains a weapon in the
hands of Maghrebin leaders attempting to embarrass their
opponents or to steal an advantage over their rivals. Some are
better placed than others to employ that weapon. 	 Geographical
factors have strongly favoured Algeria over its immediate
neighbours - if only because of its central situation.
At the eastern end of North Africa the weight of advantage is
overwhelmingly with Egypt, because of its population, its level
of industrialisation, the strength and stability of its state
and, above all, its commanding position at the point of
intersection of the three main zones of Arab settlement : North
Africa, the Fertile Crescent, and the Peninsula. Where Kadhafi
-319-
has been intent, since his seizure of power in Libya, in 1969, on
playing a prominent, even a predominant role in Middle Eastern
affairs, his attention has therefore focussed primarily on the
East and Egypt, rather than being directed westwards towards the
Maghreb.	 Using his country's main asset, oil, to acquire
regional influence and international leverage, he has attempted a
reverse take-over : seeking to attach the Egyptian state to the
Arab cause of unity - that he claims to have inherited from
Nasser after his death in 1970.
	 If, on the one hand, Egypt
shelters
	 Kadhafi from an Israeli land offensive, on the other
hand it also serves as a barrier to the Libyan leader's regional
(and global) ambitions.
Kadhafi's neo-Nasserism and Sadat's Egypt 
Kadhafi came to power determined to reverse the decline of
pan-Arabism and aspiring to play a pivotal role in Arab affairs.
As self-proclaimed heir to the Nasserist tradition of Arab union
the young and inexperienced Kadhafi was soon outmanoeuvred by
Anwar es-Sadat. The latter, while ready to avail himself and his
impoverished country of the bounty freely disbursed by Tripoli,
had no intention of standing down as President in favour of an
upstart pretender with large ambitions but generally without the
means or the opportunity to realise them.
	 While Kadhafi's
pronounced Arab, Islamic and socialist views may have served to
differentiate (and isolate) Libya from her immediate neighbours
and from the rest of the Middle East, they also provided Sadat
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with a useful weapon against the Nasserists at home, while
providing extra leverage over the conservative Arab governments
of the Gulf.
Before 1967 Egypt had provided a defensive perimeter against
Israel for the states of the Peninsula, from 1989 Egypt would
serve instead as a barrier to Libyan expansion eastwards. Sadat
rather than Kadhafi would seize and hold the political initiative
in the 1970s.	 The Egyptian leader had grasped the basic fact
that, after the defeat of 1967, it was pointless to try to revive
earlier hopes of Arab unity and a single nation. Kadhafi's coup,
inspired by Nasser and his militant legacy of the 1950s, failed
to adapt to the changing situation in Egypt and the Middle East.
The point of the 1972 war against Israel was not to revive the
politics of confrontation but to provide an opportunity (and
international support) for those, like Sadat, who were committed
to a new policy of accommodation. As we have seen Kadhafi does
not appear even to have been given advance notice of the war.
By 1973 Kadhafi was unable to realise his aspirations for
union with Egypt and for leadership of the Arab cause, Even the
hopes he may have entertained for union with Sudan, which had
experienced a 'progressive' coup in 1968,	 were quickly
disappointed. Jaafar Numeiry had taken power with the intention
of modelling himself on Nasser and forming an Egytian-Sudanese
federation.	 After 1971, however, Numeiry had taken the
opportunity of a failed left-wing and pro-communist coup, to
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dissociate himself from the far left, and from pan-Arabism. By
1979 Kadhafi had lost his last reliable ally in East Africa with
the overthrow and removal of Idi Amin in Uganda. The 'union' of
1981 with the Marxist regime
	
of Mengistu Haile Mariam, in
Ethiopia, and with the Democratic People's Republic of South
Yemen (PDRY), although welcomed by the Soviet Union and deplored
by Saudi Arabia and Washington, offered few if any opportunities
for effective joint action. The Ethiopians were not Arab - nor
was the leadership predominantly Islamic. And the government of
Ethiopia, like that of South Yemen, was preoccupied with its own
very considerable domestic problems.
With the increasing isolation of Libya in the Middle East,
after 1973, Kadhafi turned instead to his western and southern
neighbours - to the states of the Maghreb and those of the Sahel.
But the states of the Maghreb were already well established and
their leadership was more or less entrenched before Kadhafi came
to power.	 Nor was Libya particularly well qualified to assume
the leadership of the three states previously administered by
France. In the Sahel, the Libyan appeal was religious, economic
and political in character rather than racial. Here Kadhafi was
able to exploit the revival of Islam, as well as the devastating
impact of a prolonged and extensive drought, and the heavy
cutbacks in French military and economic assistance to the former
colonies.	 There was resistance, however, from the other
Maghrebin states - notably Algeria and Morocco.
	 Moreover, the
French, responding to Libyan 'provocation', and fearing the
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emergence of a new radical bloc in Africa, strengthened their
own military dispositions.
In the 1980s Kadhafi suffered a series of reverses in West
and North Africa that were comparable with his earlier setbacks
in the Middle East. The policy of "union" was no more successful
after 1973, in North Africa, in the case of Tunisia, Algeria and
Morocco, than it had been before 1973 - with Egypt and the Sudan.
The growing sense of isolation was confirmed by a series of
humiliations, as the Maghrebin states, like Egypt before them,
concluded 'marriages of convenience' with Libya	 only to
repudiate them once they had served their limited purpose. The
record elsewhere in the Sahel and black Africa were scarcely more
encouraging, beginning with Kadhafi's failure to secure the
chairmanship of the OAU, in 1982, and ending with the rout of
Libyan forces in Chad in 1987.
Where Libya is now an established actor in the Maghrebin sub-
system, her foreign policy continues to be defined by a rivalry
with Egypt that is hardly central to Maghrebin politics. Kadhafi
turned westwards only after his approaches to Egypt had been
repeatedly and definitively rejected.
	 Egypt required financial
and diplomatic support on a scale that, apart from the United
States, only Saudi Arabia and Kuwait could supply. Effectively
excluded from the arena of his choice, Libya then sought entry to
the Maghreb and the African states of the Sahel. But this was on
terms that the other states and their leaders could not, for the
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most part, endorse.	 A policy of unity with Egypt had nearly
ended in war.	 Unity with the Sahel could not survive the lost
war in Chad.	 Unity with the Maghrebin states produced a
succession of dishonoured treaties to say nothing of the failure
of those states and their leaders to make any effective gesture
of solidarity towards Kadhafi, following the American raid on
Tripoli in 1086.
Libya's pursuit of Arab unity has been a continuing source of
division within the Arab camp where the predominant outlook has
been conservative since 1973 if not since 1967.	 Kadhafi's
increasinz intransigence and his espousal of radical solutions to
Middle Eastern problems has helped polarise the Arab world, while
confirming his own country's deepening isolation. 	 From 1974
Libya was a member of the 'Rejectionist Front' which opposed any
move towards a peaceful, negotiated settlement with Israel.
Libya was also a founding member of the 'Steadfastness Front',
formed in December 1977 to insist on the severance of relations
with Egypt following Sadat's initiative for a separate peace.
There, too, the Libyan leader was forced to yield ground at the
last Arab summit in Amman, in 1987, when member states were
authorised, although not recommended, to resume normal diplomatic
relations with Cairo.	 Libya could, however, derive some small
satisfaction from the fact that Egypt continues to be excluded
from the Arab League.
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There has been polarisation, too, in the Palestinian camp as
a direct result of Libyan intervention. The effect has been to
encourage the more intransigent factions in their opposition to
the Chairman, Yasser Arafat, and in their rejection of a
negotiated settlement that would recognise Israel within her pre-
1967 borders.	 Libyan foreign policy continues to react to
Egyptian initiatives in a way that recalls the long-standing
rivalry between China and the Soviet Union. 	 It was President
Chadli of Algeria who finally organised a 'session of national
unity' in Algiers, in April 1987, attended by most of the rival
factions, either as participants or as observers.	 Kadhafi,
himself, had no option but to agree to meet Arafat after the
conference to signal to Saudi Arabia and other leading Arab
states his desire - after American action in 1986 - to 'come in
out of the cold'. Indeed, after the April conference Kadhafi
announced that the PLO office in Tripoli would be allowed to re-
open, having been closed for over three years.
Where Tunis continues to house the headquarters of the Arab
League and the PLO, where Algiers has taken the initiative in
bringing together the various factions of the PLO, and is
actively working for a settlement of the Gulf war, and where
Rabat has once again tried to press forward with Arab-Israeli
dialogue - Tripoli favours policies that divide rather than unite
Arab states and persists with approaches that Nasser himself had
begun to question as early as 1961 - after the collapse of the
union with Syria, and well before the debacle of 1967. The roots
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of Libyan policy lie in Kadhafi's obsession after 1969 with a
dream of Arab union : a dream that was already discredited by
1967, and and was formally repudiated - as an immediate and
practical goal - by the Arab summit held in Khartoum.
	 The
failure of his strategy of union with Egypt - as well as with
Syria, Iraq and Sudan - seems largely to have prompted his
subsequent interest in the Maghreb - while the natural suspicions
of the Maghrebin leaders may have helped deflect his interests
further south to the Sahel. Rejection by Egypt, defeat in Chad
and declining oil revenues have greatly reduced the scope for
Libyan foreign policy. Formerly condemned to a subordinate role
on the margins of the Machrek, Libya seems condemned now to an
even more subordinate role at the periphery of the Maghreb.
The intervention that brought Kadhafi to power, on September
1, 1969, was not a classic coup d'etat.	 For Kadhafi and his
twelve fellow officers this was only the beginning of a far more
ambitious project elaborated some years previously.
	 No sooner
had they entered secondary school at Sabha than they came under
the influence of another schoolboy, Muammar Kadhafi.
	 Even at
this early stage Kadhafi was encouraging them to enlist and join
the officer corps after graduation, with a view to toppling the
conservative regime of King Idris and bringing Libya into the
United Arab Republic, alongside Egypt and Syria. In 1969 Kadhafi
remained determined to revive the cause of Arab unity, despite
the military defeat of 1967 and the eclipse of Nasserism. It was
but a short step from the conquest of power in Libya to the
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fulfilment of a childhood ambition : a fusion of Egypt and Libya
as a first symbolic step towards complete Arab unity.
Kadhafi's generation in Libya was that of the Saut Al Arab
(The Arab Voice), derived from the Egyptian radio station of that
name, whose propaganda in favour : 	 of pan-Arabism greatly
influenced the Arab world and the Arab youth in particular. 	 If
Kadhafi saw Nasser as his political mentor he and his Libyan
military colleagues did have some reservations about the secular
emphasis of the Egyptian revolution. 	 By neglecting the
importance of Islam, particularly among the rural masses, they
had conceded support to to more traditional Arab forces. and
leaders like King Feisal of Saudi Arabia and King Idris of Libya,
who could turn the issue to their advantage, using it as a weapon
against Nasser, himself, and more generally against Arab
socialism.
	 Moreover, Libyan nationalism had little attraction
for those who made the revolution with Kadhafi in 1969. Unlike
Egypt Libya had no long history of statehood and independence and
regionalism remained, at least until 1969, a major factor in
Libyan politics.
	 The goal of Arab unity and the pursuit of a
single Arab nation enabled those officers who were more
politically aware to circumvent the all too obvious divisions
within the country and to draw together in a common cause.
After the 1969 coup the Foreign Ministry was re-named the
Ministry of Unity. Its policy was based, as the title suggests,
on Arab unity and the approaching confrontation with Israel.
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Which did not prevent Kadhafi from implicitly recognising Arab
rivalries and divisions and exploiting them when it served his
purpose.	 The significance of Islam for Kadhafi was its ability
to transcend such divisions thereby enhancing Arab unity. 	 The
Prophet Mohammed had once been able to unite warring tribes and
families under the banner of Islam. Now it was for Egypt, as the
largest, most powerful Arab state, to assume the leadership of
the Arab states in their contest with Israel and Zionism.
Because of her size, human resources and geographical situation
Egypt was the obvious choice. History for Kadhafi is the product
of two important factors, religion and nationalism, and the
interaction between them.	 Where a common religion enabled the
Arab peoples to transcend their many differences, for Kadhafi
Arab nationalism, i.e., the sense of belonging to a single nation
with a common destiny, would enable Christian Arabs to stand
alongside Berbers, Kurds, and members of other faiths, in the
struggle against colonialism and underdevelopment.
What was at issue after the death of Nasser, in 1970, was the
question of Arab leadership and the role of Egypt in the common
struggle of the Arab states and peoples. Kadhafi had no doubt
that Nasser himself had entrusted him with the spiritual mission
to which he had long dedicated his life as well as the resources
of his country.	 Nasser had once remarked to Kadhafi : "You
remind me of my youth"; and, visiting Libya in January 1970, he
had announced : "My brother, Muammar, is the guardian of Arab
nationalism, of the Arab revolution, and of Arab unity."' After
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Nasser's death Kadhafi professed to look on Egypt as a country
endowed with human resources but without a leader, while Libya,
with its scant population and oil wealth, had a leader in search
of a country.
	 Kadhafi's ambition was therefore to unite Egypt
with Libya and thereby open the path whereby he might assume the
leadership of the Arab world.	 Without such unity the Arab
peoples could know neither genuine freedom nor a real socialism.
The year of Nasser's death was also the year of Black
September, when the Jordanian army, loyal to King Hussein,
confronted and finally defeated the forces of the Palestinian
Liberation Army, after a fierce civil war, expelling them from
Jordanian territory.	 From the outset of his rule Kadhafi had
therefore to take sides in a conflict that set Arab against Arab.
The Libyan leader was openly critical of the Jordanian attempt to
restrict	 the	 activities	 of	 the	 Palestine	 resistance,
notwithstanding the threat they posed to what remained of
Hussein's kingdom after 1967. Which did not prevent Kadhafi from
despatching his deputy, Abdul Salam Jalloud, to Amman to try to
mediate in the conflict and bring it to an early and satisfactory
conclusion.	 When arbitration failed Kadhafi, supporting the
Palestinians, went so far as to halt his country's economic aid
to Jordan, finally breaking off diplomatic relations with that
country in late 1970.
Kadhafi continued his support for 'progressive' Arab forces
by backing two attempted coups in Morocco against King Hassan II,
-329-
the first in July 1971, the second in August 1972.
	 Nor did
relations with Jordan improve until April 1976. In November 1972
King Hussein claimed to have evidence that a coup against his
regime was being planned by Palestinian guerrillas acting in
complicity with Colonel Kadhafi. 2
 But Kadhafi could react with
equal determination to what he perceived as threats to Arab unity
from the secular forces of the Left. He re-affirmed his support
for Jaafer Nunniry in the Sudan in July 1971, following the
announcement of an abortive coup supported by the Sudanese
Communist Party. Leaders of the coup fleeing Sudan were forced to
land in Libya and were then returned to the Sudan, to be executed
by Numeiry. Kadhafi was later to regret this gesture of support
after Numeiry turned his back on his original supporters and
looked instead to the West and to conservative forces both in the
Arab world and inside Sudan.
Despite the defection of Numeiry, whose government was
besieged by communists, as well as by the Mandist opposition, and
by black secessionists in the South, Kadhafi was able in 1971 to
declare a federation of Arab republics, to comprise Egypt, Syria
and Libya. However, where Libya favoured complete union, Egypt
and Syria insisted on federation as a first stage towards that
final goal.	 In 1972 Kadhafi then pressed Sadat for further
steps in the direction of Arab unity.
	 Sadat had yet to
consolidate his domestic position after Nasser's death, and was
dependent on Libyan generosity to help maintain Egypt's economy
in a precarious state of balance. 	 He appeared to accept
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Kadhafi's case for union while it was the turn of the Syrian
President, Hafez al Assad, to resist and finally reject the
Libyan proposals for integration.
	 Sadat for his part seems to
have been playing for time, making concessions to Libya that he
would later withdraw, while preparing his country for a war
against Israel.
After the Israelis had shot down a Libyan civilian airliner,
flying over occupied Sinai on February 21, 1973, there was an
outburst of anti-Egyptian sentiment in Libya as a result of
Egypt's alleged failure to protect the airliner. Such riots were
quickly condemned by Libyan radio which insisted that "accusing
and condemning certain of our brothers is tantamount to support
for and collaboration with Israel".
	 According to Sadat's own
account, Kadhafi then asked the Egyptian leader to supply Libya
with two submarines to provide additional "protection" against
further Israeli action.
	 After Sadat had hastened to comply,
Kadhafi proceeded to order one of the submarines to torpedo the
British liner, Queen Elizabeth II, cruising towards Israel in Nay
1973 with a complement of Jewish tourists on their way to
celebrate Israel's twenty-fifth anniversary. When the submarine
commander reported back to his Egyptian superiors for advice he
was instructed to take no such action and to return his vessel to
an Egyptian port. 4
 Again there was no open criticism in Libya of
Egyptian inaction.	 Unity with Egypt presumably remained the
first priority.
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To expedite matters Kadhafi visited Egypt twice, once in June
1973 for a meeting with Sadat and with Egyptian intellectuals,
and again the following August, while Sadat was in Saudi Arabia.
Between these two visits there came the 'Green March' of Libyans
into Egypt, designed to apply further pressure to the Egyptian
leader, already busy with preparations for the October war with
Israel.	 The Egyptian authorities promptly arrested some forty
thousand enthusiasts close to the border with Libya, hoping to
avoid a repetition of earlier incidents when students had
demonstrated in Cairo against Sadat's 'moderate' policies.Sadat
did agree to meet with a delegation from the marchers and to
receive a petition, written in blood, asking him to announce the
abolition of the 'artificial border' between the two countries.
The six-point petition also called for a single Head of State and
an integrated ruling party. Shari'a law would apply throughout
the new state where there would be "no place for waverers,
cowards, capitalists, or bourgeois who did not subscribe to the
principles of the Arab revolution".- The petition also insisted
on respect for "the principles of the late Egyptian President,
Nasser".
Confronted with the reality of the Libyan revolution and
Kadhafi's insistence on strict observance of the Islamic codes,
the Egyptian elites hastened to confirm their support for Sadat
and their rejection of the merger with Libya. Kadhafi himself
seems to have perceived the risks to his own Islamic revolution
that would follow from a closer union with the predominantly
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urban and secular middle classes of Egypt. There was no attempt
to repeat the 'Green March' or to export cultural revolution to
Egypt.	 Instead, on the twenty-first anniversary of the 'free
officers' coup that removed King Farouk of Egypt, on July 23,
1973, Kadhafi 're-assumed' the functions of leader of the Libyan
state, having relinquished them a week earlier in the interests
of the 'Libyan-Egyptian union'. He would retain those functions
until such time as the Egyptian government was replaced along
with its corrupt and bureaucratic administration which could not
sustain a war against Israel.'- Only then would a merger become
possible.
Kadhafi was not even consulted in advance of the war of
October 1973.	 Nor could he claim to have played a substantial
role in the conduct of the war, despite his pretensions to Arab
leadership.	 And the result of the war, with its initial
successes for the Arabs, was further to isolate Libya in the Arab
world. Sadat emerged from the war greatly strengthened both at
home and in the community of Arab states. There developed an
Arab consensus for the first time - from which Kadhafi was
excluded. Algeria had made a substantial contribution in men and
materials to the war effort.	 Morocco had sent troops to the
Syrian and Egyptian fronts.
	 King Faisal of Saudi Arabia had
helped finance the preparations for the war and was responsible
for the selective boycott of western oil consumers. Immediately
after the war was over Kadhafi went on to the offensive, opposing
the cease-fire and any settlement short of the "destruction" of
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Israel.	 Where the Soviet Union had denied the Arab states the
modern, offensive armaments they required to defeat the Israelis,
the Americans had joined with the Soviets to impose a cease-fire
calculated to serve their interests rather than those of their
Arab clients.
In June 1974 Libya revealed details of its contribution to
the October war, amounting in all to some $968 million. 7 Seventy
MIG 21 aircraft were said to have been placed at Egypt's
disposal, together with three hundred modern tanks, forty-seven
armoured troop carriers and many other vehicles. Once a cease-
fire was announced, however, Libya halted all aid to Egypt. Of
the four million tons of oil promised by Libya, only 800,000 tons
were received by Egypt - and the 750,000 tons of butane gas
likewise failed to arrive. 	 Supplies had to be secured from
Algeria instead, while Algeria also doubled its contribution of
oil to Egypt from one million to two million tons.' The policy
of reconciliation and peace subsequently followed by Sadat after
the October war reinforced Kadhafi's already critical attitude
towards Egypt. Sadat's Egypt was henceforth the principal target
of Libyan attacks. Kadhafi was provoked and outraged by Sadat's
more moderate outlook on issues ranging from accommodation with
the western world to a willingness to accept the fact of an
Israeli presence in the Middle East.
Where the Libyan monarchy had revealed no ambitions beyond
its frontiers and had followed a policy of accommodation with the
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west the Libyan revolution and the advent of Kadhafi had
transformed the country's foreign policy. Moreover, the monarchy
had failed to enlarge its domestic options even under the impact
of buoyant oil revenues in the 1960s, neglecting this last
opportunity to build a broader political base of support.
Kadhafi's regime not only addressed a much wider Arab audience
but was also able to exploit the new possibilities arising from
oil wealth to win support in the international and regional as
well as domestic spheres.	 Despite these advantages the Libyan
revolution has been disappointed in the poor response to its
leader's message. Frustrated in his hopes for union with Egypt,
Kadhafi embarked on steps to subvert the regime in Cairo.	 In
1974-6 he repeatedly called on the Egyptian military to intervene
against their President. He also courted the student movements
and the more radical Islamic elements, close to 'fundamentalism',
who were fiercely opposed to any policy of rapprochement with
et-
Israel. The most serious_attemptLon Sadat's life took place at
the Cairo Military Academy, in April 1974, claimed twenty victims
and was the work of a religious fanatic trained in Libya.'
Unsuccessful in its object it led to a break in relations between
the two governments.
Hostility to moderate Arab regimes 
In an interview, in 1976, Kadhafi admitted that regimes did
not interest him any more.
	 "I address myself to the Arab
masses." 1 ° One does not have to seek far to find the reason.
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Relations with Sudan were also hostile at this time, when Libyan
'mercenaries' were held responsible for an attempted coup in
Khartoum in July 1976. The outcome was a 'holy alliance' between
Egypt, Sudan and Saudi Arabia, with the avowed objective of
countering Kadhafi's subversive activities. By July 1977 Libyan
'provocations' were such that, after a series of bombings in
Cairo, the Egyptian and Libyan armies fought an engagement along
their northern frontier. Egypt, with moral support from Sudan
and Saudi Arabia, launched a large punitive raid against Libya,
hoping to provoke unrest in Libya and to de-stabilise the Kadhafi
regime, and at the sane time to mobilise patriotic opinion in
Egypt behind Sadat. A cease-fire was achieved by the combined
efforts of Algeria's President, Houari Boumedienne, and the
Chairman of the PLO, Yasser Arafat. 	 Libya had suffered most
casualties and its forces had the worst of the engagement.
There now ensued a fundamental change in the direction of
Libyan foreign policy. Egypt had become a non-permeable barrier
: a state whose frontiers could not be penetrated by the Libyans.
Kadhafi was effectively cut off from the Machrek with which he
had always identified and where he had hoped to play a decisive
role appearing as a new political prophet. In response Libya
began to move away from its position of strict non-alignment.
Although a staunch enemy of Communism - unpopular in Moscow after
his treatment of Numeiry's left-wing military opponents in 1971 -
Kadhafi nevertheless moved closer to the Soviet Union at the very
time when Sadat's policy was drifting towards the West in general
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and. the United States in particular. Sadat's visit to Jerusalem
in November 1977 must have swept away any remaining hopes on
Kadhafi's part for unity with Egypt and a major role at the
centre of Middle Eastern politics. 	 There was a wave of anti-
Sadat demonstrations and attacks on the Egyptian Embassy in
Tripoli. culminating in the suspension of diplomatic relations
with Egypt scheduled to coincide with Sadat's arrival in Israel.
Meanwhile Libya called for the expulsion of Egypt from the Arab
League and for the establishment of an Arab 'Rejectionist Front'
to continue the struggle for liberation.
Egypt had now moved from being the object of Kadhafi's most
ardent attentions, to being the main target of his abuse. There
were attacks on what he termed the "Pharaonic, Hebrew, American
alliance" and allusions to the possibility of Sadat being himself
a Jew.'' And on the tenth anniversary of the Libyan revolution (
September 1, 1979) Kadhafi denounced the Camp David agreements as
"a monument to defeatism". 	 Sadat was portrayed as "a false
prophet" and Kadhafi insisted that one day "the Zionist
colonialists would leave Palestine just as the French
colonialists had left Algeria and the Italians had departed from
Libya". 12
 For Kadhafi the 'reactionary' Arab regimes are now the
main obstacle confronting Arab unity.
	 Once such regimes are
removed the artificial frontiers would dissolve and a single Arab
nation would confront the world, having recovered both her
dignity and her strength. 	 This then is Kadhafi's new crusade.
His response to the American military build-up in the Gulf region
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during summer 1980, and the Carter administration's quest_	 for
facilities for a Rapid Deployment Force, was to launch an appeal
for 'jihad' or holy war. to cleanse and defend the holy shrines
from the enemies of Islam.
While the holy land itself was being profaned by the American
presence and the introduction of American AVACs (Airborn Warning
and Control System) aircraft, Kadhafi advised Moslems against the
annual pilgrimage.	 During the pilgrimage season of 1980 he
asserted
Yesterday we called on Moslems to liberate Jerusalem from
the Jewish occupation; today it is Christians who are
occupying Mecca, Medina, and the Arafat mountains."
This "occupation" of the holy land was a "prelude" to the
occupation of the entire Arab world by Christians and Jews. The
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which sees itself as the Guardian of the
Moslem holy shrines, was sufficiently provoked by Kadhafi's
utterances to break off diplomatic relations with Tripoli in
October 1980.	 Its government already felt itself to be
threatened by the new revolutionary administration in Iran, that
followed the overthrow of the Shah in 1979 and by the
confrontation between Iraq and Iran which threatened the peace
and stability of the Gulf region as a whole.
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That same month Kadhafi sent a message to the Heads of State
in the Gulf warning that Libya was ready to lead the Arab states
in the fight against America. 	 But this apparently entailed
support fcr Persian-speaking Iran against Arab-speaking Iraq! It
was clear that Kadhafi's reaction against Egypt and its American
patron now involved him in a breaoh with Arab unity as together
with Syria, he supported Iran in its confrontation with Iraq.
It is the duty of those loyal to Islam to ally with the
Moslems of Iran in their present confrontation, instead
of fighting them for the American cause... America is
taking advantage of the Iraq-Iran war to introduce into
the Arabian Peninsula advanced aircraft whose role is
spying and surveillance.14
However, following the Israeli raid on the Iraqi nuclear plant
under construction (by the French) at Tamuz, on June 7, 1981,
Colonel Kadhafi charged Yasser Arafat with a delicate diplomatic
mission - to secure a rapprochement between Libya and the
moderate Arab states including Saudi Arabia as well as Jordan and
Morocco.	 All three had been strongly criticised by Kadhafi in
the past as "stooges" of the United states. while Jordan had more
recently supported Iraq in its war against Iran and Morocco was
campaigning actively against the Saharawis in the Western Sahara.
Now Kadhafi was anxious to secure the support of 'moderate',
pro-western Arab governments, evidently fearing a similar attempt
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against his own nuclear facilities.
	 Had not the Libyan leader
often proclaimed his ambition to make his country the first Arab
nuclear power? ' s Was not the Libyan presence in Chad connected
with reports of large nuclear deposits inside the Aouzou Strip?
Moreover, by all accounts Libya appeared even more vulnerable to
a surprise air strike than Iraq. 	 And the Iraqi military,
although much larger and better equipped than Libya's, and in a
state of war-time alert, had been unable to defend such an
obvious and vulnerable target. Saudi Arabia and Libya annoucned,
on December 31, 1981, that they were resuming diplomatic
relations after a break of fourteen months - but as late as
January 1983 Saudi officials revealed that their Ambassador to
Libya had yet to resume his functions. Meanwhile Kadhafi was on
probation as the Saudi government sought further assurances of
his future good conduct.
Indeed, if one is to believe Eadat's personal account,
Kadhafi's growing sense of isolation pushed him in the direction
of a reconciliation with Sadat himself.
	 Despite Egypt's
expulsion from the Arab League in 1979, after Sadat had signed
the separate peace treaty with Israel, many Arab states did
maintain diplomatic and other contacts with Cairo. According to
Sadat, however
Kadhafi's cousin came to see me on my birthday at my home
village.
	 He offered me reconciliation with Kadhafi on
one condition : that it should be secret.
	 I replied by
-340-
saying
	
"You do not respect the deals you make in
public, so how can I respect a secret one?...I am sure
Kadhafi would deny it."16
At the core of Kadhafi's Arab nationalism is the concern with
unity and the conviction that the Palestinian question can serve
as a catalyst in the creation of a single Arab nation. 	 Faithful
to the pan-Arabism of the fifties and early sixties Kadhafi
remains convinced that the future of Palestine lies not in the
creation of a micro-state somewhere in the West Bank but
	
as an
Integral part of the new Arab nation. It is not the Jews who are
the real enemy, but Zionism and its western supporters. Because
of their hatred for Islam and their greed the imperialist powers
have, in his view, created Zionist Israel with a view to blocking
Arab union and exploiting Arab resources.	 By the same token
Kadhafi accuses the moderate Arab regimes of 'reaction' and being
'traitors' to the Arab cause : by their collaboration with the
imperialist powers, they necessarily collaborate with Zionism.
It is the role of Islam and of pan-Arabism to diminish western,
communist andother foreign influences beginning with Zionism,
the outstanding example of a foreign presence at the heart of the
Arab world.	 And because Israel is the primary enemy of the
Arabs, Kadhafi logically backs the extremist wing of the
Palestinian movement, as well as African states willing to sever
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diplomatic ties with Israel, and dissident groups wishins, to
overthrow more moderate Arab and African leaders.
Since coming to power, in 1969, Kadhafi has consistently
advocated war as the only and the most appropriate means to
resolve the Arab-Israeli dispute. In the first half of the 1970s
the Libyan government enthusiastically supported the use of
'terrorism' against Israel, when the moderates among the Arab
states and within the PLO were drawing very different lessons
from the war of October 1973. The position of the PLO itself was
strengthened while the oil embargo had proved to be a much more
effective weapon against the Vest than the earlier experience
with terrorism.	 Kadhafi, however,	 has always maintained ties
with the Palestinian 'Rejectionist Front'.	 And in contrast to
Sadat, who viewed the October war as the one to end all wars and
open the path to diplomacy and negotiations, Kadhafi continued to
oppose UN Resolution 242 of November 1967, and to support the
idea of an Arab Palestine which would incorporate only those
indigenous Jews who had lived there under the British mandate.
All other Jews who had migrated to the 'occupied' territory,
after 1948, would be returned to their country of origin.
Kadhafi has consistently rejected proposals for the creation of a
Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip just as he
has resisted proposals for the formation of a mini-state in the
Western Sahara.	 The first priority is for unity not division
within the Arab nation.
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Kadhafi saw the October war as one fought chiefly for
Egyptian and other narrow 'state' interests and not for the
Palestinian cause which he insisted would be betrayed once the
Arab states had regained their occupied territories. It was for
that reason that Libya, together with Iraq, declined to attend
the Algiers Arab summit of November 1973.
	
In Beirut the Libyan
Prime Minister, Abdul Salam Jallud, said that his country was
boycotting the summit because Egypt had already decided to make
peace.
We contacted Egyptian leaders and we realised they are
determined to seek a settlement. The summit is therefore
useless because, when the kings and heads of state
gather, peaceful resolutions will have reached a point of
no return.	 We would have nothing to do but bless all
that and that is just what we refuse to do."
Indeed, unlike the Khartoum summit of August 1967 where the Arab
consensus had rejected the idea of a negotiated peace, the
Algiers summit had given Egypt and Syria a free hand to attend
the Geneva peace conference of December 1973. Sadat might even
have been grateful for the absence of Libya and Iraq - which made
his task all the easier.
In February 1974, when Fatah, Saiqa and the Democratic Front
for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), the last two of which
have Syrian connections, concurred on the principle of
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establishing Palestinian sovereignty in any part of the West Bank
and Gaza relinquished by Israel, the radical Arab states and the
more radical Palestinian factions, including the People's Front
for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), adamantly opposed the
idea of a political solution which they assumed would necessarily
lead to separate and exclusive compromises with Israel. Thus, in
October 1974, Iraq, South Yemen, Libya, and several Palestinian
factions formed the Rejectionist Front (Jabhat al Raid), with the
object of countering the peaceful intentions of the moderate
Arabs and Palestinians.
In 1975 Libya also became involved in the internal conflicts
in Lebanon. In January it offered to fortify the southern part
of the country against Israeli attacks.	 Kadhafi's subsequent
support for the Palestinians and the Lebanese factions of the
left provoked attacks on the residence of the Libyan ambassador
in Beirut, and an official complaint by President Suleiman
Frangieh to Kadhafi, in June, about Libyan interference in the
domestic affairs of the Lebanon. lt In 1976, when the PLO entered
Into a formal alliance with the Lebanese National Movement and in
opposition to the Christians, Libya extended its backing to this
alliance.	 Meanwhile, the Libyan Prime Minister, Major Abdul
Salam Jallud, embarked on a tour of the Middle East, including
Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, presumably with a dual mission : to
prevent any reconciliation between Egypt and Syria and to promote
one between Syria and the Lebanese Leftist-Palestinian alliance.
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When Syria moved troops into the Lebanon, in June 1976, Libya
feared they might be deployed against Tripoli's allies. Besides
trying to protect the Palestinians, Kadhafi also wanted to block
intervention by non-Arab states, and to avoid the partitition of
Lebanon which could only serve the opponents of the Arab cause in
Palestine and elsewhere. Kadhafi claimed to have no objection to
a genuine union between Syria and Lebanon but insisted that
supression of the Palestinians or their left- wing allies would
be tantamount to treason. ' s Libya continued with its attempts at
mediation, entrusted to Major Jallud, to effect a cease-fire
between the Lebanese rightists and the Palestinian leftist
alliance. Libya also persisted with its efforts to induce Syria
to withdraw her troops from Lebanon but, on both counts, Libyan
diplomacy was unsuccessful.
When Libya sent troops to join the Arab peace-keeping force,
set up largely at the instigation of Saudi Arabia, their
neutrality was challenged by the Lebanese rightist leaders who
claimed that the Libyans were fighting for the opposition. 	 In
October 1976 Libyan-Syrian relations were severed when Syria
launched new offensives against the Palestinians and the Lebanese
leftists. Libya then recalled the head of the Libyan relations
office in Damascus and threatened a complete break in diplomatic
relations.	 Kadhafi's policy in Lebanon reflected the complex
issues at stake.	 He was sympathetic with those who wished to
change the status quo, in a situation that appeared to give the
advantage to the Christians over the Moslems and to favour the
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interests of the rich over those of the poor. He was also aware
of the ideological conflict between pan-Arabism and parochial
nationalism. Which was why he encouraged the Moslem PLO alliance
to continue the struggle to which he gave material support. And
which also explains his anger at the Syrian attack on the
Palestinians and their Lebanese allies. But President Assad of
Syria also had reason to suspect Kadhafi's motives. Pan-Arabism
offered at best an insecure base for a continuance of Alawite
(minority Shi'a) rule in Syria. 	 Indeed there was some evidence
of Libyan money going to the Syrian Sunni Moslems, who were long-
standing opponents of Assad's regime and claimed to represent a
majority of the Syrian population.2°
From June 13-16, 1979, there was an extraordinary conference
in Tripoli of members of the Libyan Revolutionary Command
together with the leaders of all the Palestinian factions other
than the two pro-Iraqi groups, the Arab Liberation Front CALF)
and the Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF).
	 Opening the
conference the Libyan Prime Minister, Major Jallud, reminded
delegates that "after the downfall of Egypt, the Libyan
Jamahiriya became a confrontation country against the Zionist
enemy". 2 	The General Secretary of the pro-Syrian PFLP-General
Command added
We must coordinate the actions of the Libyan and
Palesinian revolutions, in anticipation of a possible
assault on the Jamahiriya, and with a view to confronting
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those who wish to end the Palestinian presence in south
Lebanon.tt
Libya promised to meet the needs of the Palestinian resistance
but asked for greater unity and cohesion on the part of the
resistance leadership.
By now, however, Kadhafi could find little to choose between
Arafat, Chairman of the PLO, and Sadat. And there would be no
rapprochement between the two before 1981 - which was the year of
the Israeli attacks on the Iraqi nuclear reactor and against
Beirut and Palestinian positions in southern Lebanon.	 At that
time, as mentioned earlier, Kadhafi was ready to entrust Arafat
with a mission to effect some reconciliation between Libya on the
one hand and Saudi Arabia and Morocco on the other. Relations
with Arafat soon deteriorated, however, and in 1982, as the
Palestinians were besieged in Beirut by the Israeli army, Kadhafi
publicly urged Arafat to die rather than accept disgrace. "Your
suicide will immortalise the cause of Palestine for future
generations... the path to victory [lies through] the conscious
choice of death." 23 Later, in October 1983, when PLO loyalists
were again besieged, this time in the Lebanese port of Tripoli -
by dissident Fatah leaders supported by Syria - Arafat supporters
in Libya were ordered to leave within forty-eight hours.24
Kadhafi's attention remains focussed on the need to assure
"justice for the Palestinians" and to acquire a credible
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political, diplomatic and military capability for Libya. Libya's
major contribution to the Palestinian cause has been to counter
Israeli influence in black Africa, especially by offering aid and
assistance to states and leaders prepared to sever diplomatic
relations with Israel. There was disillusionment there too,
however. and on both sides, as African states complained of lack
of financial assistance from the Arabs, and of support for their
campaign against South Africa, while Arab leaders bemoaned the
greed and opportunism of African governments.
	 In the Middle
East, itself, Kadhafi's main contribution has been his rejection
of a negotiated settlement with Israel and his support first for
the Rejectionist Front, after the Rabat summit in 1974, and later
for the Steadfastness Front, after Sadat's separate peace
initiative.	 But the volatility of Libyan foreign policy under
Kadhafi has prevented the development of close and stable
relations with other Arab states, while relations with most of
the major powers, including the Soviet Union, have also been
turbulent.
The Iranian revolution and the Iran-Iraq war 
Like Algeria, Libya welcomed the fall of the Shah and the
success of the Iranian revolution, viewing it as a major defeat
for imperialism in the Middle East and as a formidable
contribution to the Arab cause, although coming from a non-Arab
source. Kadhafi's hostility to the Shah had grown since Iran's
seizure of the Tunb islands in the Persian Gulf in 1971. He had
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then seen the Shah as "a big enemy of the Arab people". Libya
also disproved the Algiers Agreement of March 1975, between Iran
and Iraq, particularly Iraq's readiness to abandon its claim to
the Khuzestan oil-producing province of Iran which has a
substantial Arab population.
	 Libya was also disturbed by the
Shah's role in helping the Sultan of Oman, Qaboos Bin Said,
suppress the rebellion in Dhofar province which Libya was
supporting.
	 Libya repeatedly warned Qaboos, in 1975, to expel
the Iranian troops or face Libyan intervention. And in June 1975
Libya again	 threatened to intervene unless all foreign troops
were withdrawn	 from Oman.	 Jallud issued a statement urging
"Britain, America and Iran to withdraw Iranian, Jordanian and
American forces immediately".
The new Islamic regime in Teheran therefore augured well for
Kadhafi. Where the Shah had continued to supply Israel with oil
ignoring the sanctions imposed by OAPEC - to which Iran did not
in any case belong - the new government promised more militant
action against Israel and in support of the Palestinians.
Khomeini's attacks on corrupt and reactionary Arab governments
matched the criticisms earlier made by Kadhafi himself.
	 On
February 18, 1979, the Iranian government severed its diplomatic
relations with Israel and, on the same day, the PLO leader,
Yasser Arafat, received a triumphant reception in Teheran. The
next day he was able to open an office in the premises of the
Israeli trade mission.
	 Within a fortnight Iran had severed
diplomatic ties with South Africa, confirming the previou-s
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decision not to send further supplies of oil to the white
minority regime, 1'6 Relations with Egypt were severed on April
30, after a message from Kadhafi to Khomeini, while relations
with Libya were quickly restored after an interval of seven
years.	 The Iranians were even prepared to ignore earlier
allegations that Kadhafi had been responsible for the
disappearance, in August 1978, of the Shi'ite spiritual (and
political) leader, Musa Sadr, whose activities in Lebanon had
been a cause of some concern to Kadhafi.
Meanwhile the Iranian leadership began to emphasise the
Islamic dimension of the Palestinian problem, in anticipation of
the approaching contest with Saddam Hussein of Iraq and the
Baathist regime in Baghdad. Teheran was anxious that this should
not be seen as an Arab/Iranian conflict. Thus, in May 1979, the
Iranian Director of Radio and Television stated that his country
viewed Islam as the only force capable of defeating Zionism.
We must abandon the notion of a conflict between Arabs
and Israilis replacing it by the notion of a conflict
between Moslems and Zionism.	 That is what really
matters! 27
For Kadhafi the Iranian revolution represents a modification of
the status quo in the region, following the expulsion of the
Americans and the decision by Khomeini to align with the Arabs in
their conflict with Israel.
	 And it was this that dictated
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Libya's decision to support Iran after the Iraqi invasion of
1980. The Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein, was accused of trying
to undermine the Iranian revolution - literally "stabbing it in
the back".	 In October 1980 the Iraqi government accused Libya
and Syria of delivering arms to Iran and withdrew its diplomatic
personnel from both Arab states.2°
After the failure of Jallud's mission to Baghdad, in mid
1981, in search of reconciliation, there were reports of
increased arms sales from Libya to Iran. These pointed to large
deliveries of arms, including 190 Soviet T54, T55 and T62 tanks
shipped from Libya to the naval base of Bandar Abbas. Meanwhile
personnel to man the first tanks had completed their training in
Libya and returned to Iran in June 1981. 11 Libya continued to
support Iran against its former ally in the ReJectionist Front
although Libyan policy was modified after the American attack on
Tripoli and Benghazi in 1986. 	 In the absence of tangible
evidence of Arab solidarity with the regime in Tripoli, Kadhafi
was anxious to improve relations with the other Arab states,
notably Saudi Arabia,	 Shortly before the fifth summit of the
Islamic Conference Organisation, in Kuwait, in January 1987,
Kadhafi called for a cease-fire in the Gulf war and the insertion
of a peace-keeping force with contingents from Nigeria and other
non-aligned states. In April of that year he attacked Iran for
its intransigence in the pursuit of war rather than peace. There
were even reports of contacts between Kadhafi and Saddam Hussein
of Iraq about the normalisation of relations between their two
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states,
	 Iraq had broken off relations in Jun 19.85 to protest
against Libya's alliance with Iran. 	 While repeating his advice
to Teheran to agree to a cease-fire with the government in
Baghdad, Kadhafi nevertheless refused to attend the Arab summit
in Amman, Jordan, in November 1987. He was aware that a majority
of states were now prepared to resume diplomatic relations with
Egypt and insisted, therefore, that the summit would only serve
American interests.
Libya's support for the Iranian revolution did not ease the
Libyan position in Lebanon.	 There Kadhafi had long supported
radical Palestinian groups against both the right-wing, phalange-
dominated status quo, and against the more orthodox PLO and the
Moslem militias.	 But the Lebanese Shi'a population, who have
recently emerged as the largest single group in Lebanon and as a
new force in national politics, also have a long-standing dispute
with Kadhafi over the disappearance of their former political and
spiritual leader, the Imam Musa Sadr, while he was on a visit to
Libya in August 1978. Doubtless it was the 'parochial' character
of the movement led by Musa Sadr and Kadhafi's concern with pan-
Arab unity which prompted the abduction of the popular,
charismatic Lebanese Shi'ite leader. Thereafter Libya became the
target for Shi'ite militants in Lebanon, whose activities
included the hijacking in June 1983 of a Libyan Boeing 707 en
route from Athens to Tripoli. The aircraft was forced to land at
Larnaca Airport, Cyprus, where the hijackers were persuaded to
release the thirty-two passengers and crew and to surrender to
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the Cypriot authorities.
	 The following August they were
sentenced to seven years imprisonment. 3°
After maintaining a long silence about Musa Sadr's abduction,
Kadhafi eventually responded to the Cyprus incident with an
impassioned outburst during the ninth ordinary session of the
General People's Congress (GPC) in Libya in February 1984.
	 He
denied any role in the death of the Imam but at the same time
accused him of being an agent of the Shah of Iran, and, by
implication, working for Israel and imperialism and against Arab
and Moslem unity in the Lebanon.
But I am insistent on saying it so that Libya is no
longer accused of [complicity in] Sadr's disappearance.
Thousands of Sadrs have died in Lebanon and in the Arab
world.	 Why then should we cry only for Musa Sadr, the
agent of the Shah?-31
In reply to this outburst the Libyan Chargé d'Affaires in Beirut,
Mohammed Feitouri, who was also the highest ranking Libyan
diplomat in Lebanon, was abducted in July 1984 by militants of
the Sadr Brigade. Another Libyan diplomat had been held by the
same organisation for forty-eight hours, the previous month,
until he was freed by forces loyal to Nabih Berri, the new
Shi'ite leader and head of the Anal militia.
onclusions 
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There appear to have been few if any attempts to coordinate
the Middle Eastern policies of the Maghrebin states. Each of the
four claimed to be concerned for the welfare and the future of
the Palestinians but the content and style of their policies has
been far from uniform.	 Tunisia's moderate approach and its
appeal for a solution to the problems of the Middle East on the
basis of international law and jurisprudence has been balanced by
Libya's uncompromising intransigence, projected by its constant
calls for armed struggle and the elimination of the Israeli
state, and its support for 'terrorist' measures in defiance of
the rule of law. And while Algeria has consistently pressed for
an Arab solidarity in an effort to reach an honourable settlement
of the problem, Morocco, despite a pretence of militancy, has
frequently practised a policy of accommodation with Israel - as
well as being a major influence behind Sadat's initiative for
peace and his visits to Jerusalem in 1977 and to Camp David in
1978.
On the issue of the Iran-Iraq war the Maghreb seems to have
been polarised, with Libya and Algeria initially aligned with
Iran, while Tunisia and Morocco supported Iraq and denounced Iran
whom they accused of meddling in their internal affairs. 	 In
return for their solidarity with the Arab states of the Gulf, the
Arab League has extended its support to Morocco in its
confrontation with Algeria and Libya over the Western Sahara.
Algeria's recent attempts at rapprochement with Morocco and her
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attempts to mediate in the Iran-Iraq conflict do, however, seem
to have produced some relaxation in the attitude of the Arab
states.
It is Zartman's contention that the foreign policies of the
Maghrebin states are dictated by the state of inter-Maghrebin
relations. There is a large measure of truth in this,
particularly in the first years of independence, and it is still
the case that Algeria's actions in the Middle East must take
account of any Moroccan initiative, while wider alliances are
concluded primarily with a view to undermining the opposition of
neighbouring	 states	 and promoting essentially parochial
interests.	 It would be wrong, however, to interpret Morocco's
contribution to the peace process and to rapprochement with
Israel solely, or even largely in terms of her rivalry with
Algeria and their continuing dispute over the Western Sahara. It
would be wrong, too, to interpret Algerian support for the Arab
cause in the wars of 1967 and 1973 as though it were dictated by
Maghrebin rivalries rather than by a sense of solidarity with the
Arab cause.
In analysing the foreign policy of any state, one has first
to disentangle the various issues and strands of policy which,
over time, and under pressure of a continuous sequence of events,
have become enmeshed.	 For the observer, therefore, there is
always the temptation to oversimplify and to engage in
'reductionism'. Foreign policy nevertheless remains the product
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of complex forces, often contradictory interests and overlapping
concerns, while it is also the case that issues and disputes
closer to home, however parochial, are likely to take precedence
over other questions	 irrespective of their intrinsic
significance.
Our analysis does, however, suggest that the Middle Eastern
policies of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia are to a large extent
dictated by events within the Maghreb itself, even when they are
obviously responding to developments elsewhere in the world. In
that sense Libya remains an anomaly. Although it has been part
of the Maghreb scene, at least since the Hassi Massaoud agreement
with Algeria in December 1975,	 it is clear that Libyan
initiatives and Libya's foreign policy as a whole, continues to
be a response, not to events in the Maghreb, but to the current
state of relations with Egypt.	 Where Arab unity is usually a
means to other ends in the case of the Maghrebin states, in Libya
since 1969 it has largely dictated Kadhafi's foreign policy.
Unity, first with Egypt and then with other Arab states, is the
goal. All else in Libyan policy is subordinate to that goal.
Even Kadhafi, however, has had to respond to events and to
accommodate more urgent pressures. The disparity between Libyan
aspirations for unity on the one hand, and her almost complete
isolation by the mid eighties on the other, was only too apparent
following the American raid in 1986, the unsympathetic response
of the other Arab states, and the final collapse of the Libyan
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position in Chad at the end of 1987. For the foreseeable future
Libya is likely to remain an actor in the politics of the Mackrek
and of the Maghreb; it is unlikely, however, that it will become
a "power" in either context.	 Libya's revenues have been (and
are still ) substantial, but its population smaller even than
Tunisia's while its economic base is extremely narrow and
therefore particularly vulnerable to global market forces. Its
military potential is considerable in relation to the forces that
the sub-Saharan states can muster. But it is more than balanced
by Algerian forces and effectively contained by Egyptian strength
while France and the United States retain a visible presence in
the region.
PART FOUR
THE MAGHREB AND AFRICA
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THE MAGHREB AND AFRICA 
Introduction 
Despite their geographical proximity, their common Islamic
and Arab-Berber cultural identity, and a similar colonial past,
the	 North African countries today present a broadly
differentiated spectrum of social classes and interests, with
considerable variation in their domestic policies as well as in
their external alliancPs. 	 Other than Algeria, the remaining
Maghrebin countries gained their sovereignty before the wave of
independence that swept Africa in the early nineteen-sixties.
Thus both Tunisia and Morocco achieved statehood and a separate
international identity in 1956, while Libya received independence
as early as 1951.
Where the foreign policies of other African states are
largely conditioned by domestic issues, notably political
stability and internal unity, and are directed mainly to the
black continent, the North African states are relatively
privileged in so far as stability has not been a constant
preoccupation while their favourable location, natural resources,
and levels of social development can support more ambitious and
wider-ranging foreign policies. 	 The Maghrebin states are not
only a part of the black continent but also 'belong' to the
Middle East to which they are linked by 'language' as well as by
religion and 'culture'; 	 they also share a common Mediterranean
history with the Southern European and Levantine states.
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If there was less emphasis on the African 'connection' for
much of the 1960s, the events of 1973 produced a conspicuous
rapprochement between Arabs and Africans, following the Arab-
Israeli war of October.
	 Immediately after the war the Maghreb
states, led by Algeria and Libya, invested time and resources
trying to persuade the African states to sever diplomatic
relations with Israel and drawing a parallel between the
situation in South and Southern Africa and that in the Middle
East. Subsequently, the Algiers Arab summit of November 1973 set
out the basis for future Arab-African cooperation and prepared
the way for the Afro-Arab 'dialogue' and for the first Afro-Arab
summit in Cairo, in 1977. 	 By then, however, the Maghrebin
efforts, pioneered by Algeria and Libya, had been largely
overtaken - overwhelmed rather - by a diplomatic offensive
sponsored by Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states.
This was mainly directed at the African states south of the
Sahara, had little to do with African support for the Arab cause
and betrayed no enthusiasm for revolution in Southern Africa or
for rapid social change elsewhere. On the contrary, the Saudis
professed to be anxious on account of growing Soviet penetration
in the Horn of Africa and the adjacent Red Sea.
	 Like their
American allies they were alarmed at the scale of Soviet and
Cuban support for the Marxist military regime that had seized
power in Ethiopia in 1974. Contrary to the consensus among the
black African states which favours respect for existing
boundaries - the Saudis later backed the Somali invasion of
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Ethiopia in 1977-78. Saudi Arabia's aims in Africa were to block
further Soviet expansion and to halt the activities of radical
states like Algeria and Libya. 	 Huge amounts of financial
assistance were on offer to convince African governments that
only the Gulf states had sufficient resources to permit a
meaningful 'dialogue'.
The political situation in Africa in the 1970s came in some
ways to resemble that of the early sixties, with the emergence
of new Marxist regimes in Mozambique and Angola and the return of
ideological alignments following the collapse of Portuguese rule
in April 1974.	 The civil war that accompanied Angolan
independence in 1975 served to polarize the other African states
with the reappearance of the moderate-radical divide.
	 The
revolution in Ethiopia in 1974, the subsequent war with Somalia
in 1977-8, and the rivalry between Algeria and Morocco over the
future of the former Spanish Sahara reinforced the impression of
polarization - as did the conflict in Shaba province of Zaire in
1977 and again in 1978 where Moroccan troops were soon active in
support of the conservative, pro-Western government of Mobutu
Sese Seko against dissident elements infiltrating from Marxist
Angola.
Although not involved militarily - other than in Western
Sahara - Algeria continued to support 'progressive' or 'radical'
governments elsewhere in Africa, including the MPLA in Angola.
While Libya and Tunisia were less conspicuous in the divisions
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over Angola and Zaire, they ranged themselves behind Algeria and
Morocco respectively.	 Tunisia condemned the presence of Cuban
troops and the supply of Soviet weapons to Africa - Algeria and
Libya were the two largest purchasers of Soviet arms - and
appealed for an American presence to restore some kind of
'balance'.
The year 1973 was critical in other respects for the
Maghrebin states and their interaction. It saw the first moves
in the contest to remove and afterwards replace the Spanish in
the Western Sahara, taking advantage of General Francisco
Franco's imminent death - he died on November 20, 1975. 	 And at
the other end of the Maghreb it also marked the advent of
Libya's direct intervention in Chad with the occupation of the
disputed Aouzou Strip. The result was a further deterioration in
the situation within that troubled country, which had experienced
uninterrupted
	 civil	 war and	 foreign	 involvement	 since
independence a decade earlier. While Kadhafi may have hoped to
extract from northern Chad the uranium cake that he required to
satisfy his nuclear ambitions, it was also Libya's declared
intention to challenge and eventually replace French influence
throughout the Sahel.
These issues would paralyse the OAU in the 1980s, undermining
the little consensus that had survived the crises and divisions
of the 1970s. The summit, due to be held in 1982 in the Libyan
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capital, would be cancelled for lack of a quorum, reflecting the
strength and persistence of the ideological divide within the
African organisation. Libya's interventions elsewhere in Africa
were, like the Saudi involvement in the war in the Horn,
obviously contrary to the principles of the OAU, notably its
recognition of colonial boundaries and its defence of the
sovereignty and independence of existing states. 	 In the end
Libyan actions provoked a hostile coalition that came to include
states on both sides of the ideological divide - although it has
to be admitted that Kadhafi's policy in Chad was in some sense
only a continuation of earlier Senoussi policies designed to stem
French penetration in the region and to replace their political
and cultural influence.
While Tunisia has neither the means nor the ambition to be a
'power' in Africa or in the Maghreb, that has not been the case
with Libya, Algeria and Morocco.	 There has been continuing
rivalry between the last two, each a candidate for regional
leadership and their competition has prompted the need for allies
and for alliances, not only in the Middle East but also south of
the Sahara. As antagonists in the Maghreb, Algeria and Morocco
have had to do battle elsewhere with a view to neutralising the
other's strengths and exacerbating his weaknesses. While Algeria
embarked after 1973 on an ambitious programme of Arab-African
cooperation and South-South trade as well as North-South
dialogue, it has since had to withstand a diplomatic offensive by
the Saudis and the Gulf states, aimed at restricting its
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influence with the black African states.
	 Meanwhile Libya and
Morocco have each pursued expansionist policies in the Sahara
itself and beyond which, to the extent that they were successful,
would have contained Algerian influence in the region while
posing a direct challenge to Algeria's role as the leading power
In the Maghreb itself.
The year 1973 was in many respects critical for the Maghreb
as well as for Africa as a whole, with the appearance of new
issues that before long would threaten existing structures and
procedures, and would challenge the fragile consensus reached ten
years before at the constituent congress of the OAU However,
developments in 1987 held out the promise of an end to the more
Intense and bitter conflicts involving the leading Maghrebin
states. There were signs of a rapprochement between Morocco and
Algeria, raising hopes of a negotiated settlement to the long-
standing problem of the Western Sahara. The year also witnessed
the crushing defeat of the Libyan army and its allies in Chad
after a series of military engagements in March.
	 Chad has
thereby won at least a temporary respite from the chronic battles
that have divided it since independence.
	 Moreover, within the
OAU there seems to be a real and growing desire to set aside the
differences and divisions of the past decade and once again to
take up the economic issues that are so crucial to the future
development of the continent. Here the differences, if no less
obvious, are not so intensely felt : nor are they as likely to be
exploited by outside powers.
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With regard to Maghrebin foreign policies it is clear that
Zartman is correct and that the conflictual and competitive
relations that characterise the Maghrebin states are also
reflected in their relations with sub-Saharan Africa, just as
they are reflected in their relations with the Middle Eastern
states. Their policies in Africa are largely contradictory while
their rivalry, here as elsewhere, is a further obstacle to unity
and integration within North Africa itself. Before colonial rule
and the erection of artificial barriers to trade and migration,
the Sahara was no obstacle to Afro-Arab cooperation. 	 Since
independence there have been attempts by Sahel states like
Mauritania and Sudan to bridge the old divisions and to
facilitate interaction.	 The main obstacles to closer Arab-
African cooperation are two-fold : there is the racial issue -
Arab rule being equated with white rule - and there is also the
residue of colonial history which favours the European rather
than the Arab connection.
This preference for the West over the Middle East stems not
nnly from a rational calculation of national interest, but also
from an understandable prejudice against the Arab merchants once
involved - albeit with African connivance - in the slave trade.
There remains the view that "yesterday they sold us, today they
want to buy us with the income from their oil".
	
With the
exception of Libya, the Maghreb countries nevertheless seek to
overcome the religious and linguistic barriers that separate Arab
from black Africa, employing a secular approach that emphasises
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common material interests and overlapping political concerns.
But racial and cultural ties are largely missing. To that extent
it would seem that a country like Nigeria is better placed to
provide leadership for black African states - on account of its
large and heterogeneous population,	 its central location
overlapping the three main cultural zones of West Africa, rain
forest, savannah and sahel - to say nothing of its long and often
painful experience of religious and ethnic diversity.
Algeria and Morocco and, more recently, Libya have grasped
the significance of Nigeria as focal point for influences from
West, Central and Southern Africa and as a state that is in tune
with 'moderate' African thinking while seeking to remain
genuinely non-aligned.
	 Where Algeria was aggressive in its
defence of Nigerian unity throughout the civil war, Morocco
attempted, briefly and unsuccessfully, to enlist Nigerian support
for its territorial claims in the Westerm Sahara. Libya also -
unsuccessfully - solicited Nigerian support for a cease-fire in
Chad that would enshrine partition between North and South.
Nigeria was no more sympathetic to Libyan intervention here than
it was to Moroccan intervention in the Western Sahara.
	 In any
case Kadhafi had long been suspect in the eyes of the Nigerian
leadership.	 However,	 while Nigeria called for the removal of
all foreign troops from Chad, her own difficulties with Hissene
Habre, in the pursuance of her peace-keeping role, occasionally
made for a temporary rapport with Libya.
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CHAPTER TWELVE : ALGERIA AND AFRICA 
AFRICAN SOLIDARITY FOR A THIRD WORLD SOLIDARITY 
A militant African policy 
Algeria's African policy was defined at a regional level by
the continuing rivalry with Morocco and Libya, each of which had
ambitions in the Sahara, in Western Sahara and Chad respectively,
and each of which disputed territory claimed by Algeria. At a
continental level Algerian policy was directed to the goal of
Afro-Arab understanding and solidarity, as Algeria worked to win
African support for the Arab cause and South-South cooperation,
and in an endeavour to exclude Israeli influence from the black
continent. In the international sphere Algeria played a leading
role in the quest for a New International Economic Order to be
based on African non-alignment and on solidarity between black
Africa and the Third World as a whole, facilitating a major
revision of existing North-South arrangements in favour of the
latter.	 And finally, because of its ambitious strategy for
economic development, Algeria hopes to extent its own influence
southwards, with the objective of securing new markets for its
surplus industrial production; first, however, it has had to
resolve outstanding border issues.
After 1958 and the establishment of a provisional government
in exile - the GPRA - Algeria was at the heart of African
preoccupations. The Algerian problem featured on the agenda of
various international bodies, while active support for Algerian
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independence and opposition to its forcible integration with
France constituted one of the principal lines of political
cleavage among the newly independent African states, The radical
states of the Casablance group, including Ghana and Morocco, were
supportive, while the Monrovia groups, including the great
majority of the francophone states were more reserved in their
attitude to the French, content to demand a cease-fire and
negotiations that would stop somewhat short of independence.
Thus, most of the independent francophone states represented at
the 1960 session of the UN General Assembly opposed the demand by
the Algerian Liberation Front for a referendum on self-
determination to be held under UN auspices.	 Several African
countries,	 , however, notably Ghana and Guinea, did recognise
the GPRA, enabling it to open formal diplomatic relations and
establish a physical presence in black Africa.
Algeria's independence in 1962 was therefore greeted in
Africa with a sense of relief mixed with a certain feeling of
self-satisfaction at the triumph of African will over colonial
might, The FLN could rightly boast that the armed struggle in
Algeria had accelerated the pace of de-colonisation in Africa as
a whole, and particularly in the former French territories of
West and Central Africa.
	 Hence the title of the FLN weekly
journal, Revolution Africaine, recalling the prediction of Frantz
Fanon that revolution in Algeria would serve as the catalyst for
revolution in Africa as a whole. Under President Ahmed Ben Bella
the Algerian leadership was ambitious to provide for Africa the
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kind of leadership that President Nasser of Egypt furnished for
the Arab states of the Middle East. 	 In the early 1960s,
therefore, Africa emerged as a 'vital space' for Algerian foreign
policy, offering apparently unlimited scope for the new state's
diplomatic ambitions.
Independence brought new difficulties, however, in the shape
of border disputes with neighbouring governments which
intensified existing differences, constitutional and otherwise.
Which increased the determination of the Algerian leadership to
win support in Africa to bolster its position within the Maghreb,
while using Algeria's new standing in Africa to advance its
claims as a prominent contender for power within the Middle East.
The decision by the African leaders in 1963 to form an
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was supported by all the
Maghrebin states attending the first conference. 	 The Charter,
however, gave especial prominence to two principles that were
central to Algerian (as well as to African) concerns : respect
for the existing states and frontiers - if not always for
existing regimes; and support for liberation in those regions
and territories where colonial (white) rule was still entrenched.
While Algeria could readily identify with such principles, and
continues to do so, the same cannot be said of Morocco or, since
1969, of Libya.
Again Ben Bella was ahead of his Maghrebin neighbours in
emphasising that
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Algeria believes that its Maghrebin and Arab vocations
should be viewed in an African context. Apart from the
more obvious points I, myself, have some difficulty
understanding the meaning of 'Arabism'. 	 And, in the
final analysis, just what is the Maghreb? It is only a
small North-Western slice of the Great African continent.
There can be no Maghrebin action, no Arab action outside
the vast framework of African struggle and African
aspirations. Africa is the central objective, the polar
star, the cornerstone of the struggle against a
colonialism whose aim, today as yesterday, remains the
balkanisation of our continent.2
And this at a time when Tunisia was pursuing a policy of
francophone cooperation or Francophonle, while Morocco was
increasingly isolated, even within francophone Africa, by its
continued attempts to deny independence to Mauritania and then to
incorporate the new state within the frontiers of the Greater
Morocco.
Moreover, while Algeria's relations with the Maghreb and with
the Arab world were constrained by the rivalries and alliances,
frictions and disputes familiar among existing states and within
any established system, her relations with Africa were
sufficiently recent, and at the same time sufficiently flexible
and at a sufficient distance to minimise possible causes of
friction and to permit a more relaxed and satisfactory form of
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cooperation across a wide spectrum of activities.
	 The grounds
for cooperation are of course different in the case of the
Maghreb and the Arab states on the one hand, and Africa on the
other. The first two involve a range of subjective and emotional
elements comprising a community of religion, 'language' and
'culture', while African unity is perceived more in a political
and secular sense and in terms of anti-colonial solidarity and
the struggle against dependence and exploitation.
Ben Bella's term as President (1962-65) coincided with an
upsurge of revolutionary excitement reflected in an African
policy dominated by anti-colonial sentiment. His bid for African
leadership rested on his country's recent history of successful
struggle against a major colonial power and on his subsequent
support for liberation elsewhere in the continent.	 And there
were few other leaders in Africa at that time who could match his
militancy or his flamboyant but attractive style. 	 Nasser
furnished him with an ideal and a model, but it was an Arab ideal
and an Arab model that had to be adapted to African needs and
conditions - a task that Nasser had once attempted, in the
company of Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, but had found uncongenial.
Where other Arab leaders would largely dissociate themselves from
the African cause - at least until the 1970s - Ben Bella was
already offering to provide 10,000 Algerian volunteers 3 for a
combined African army to help liberate the Portuguese territories
and other parts of 'occupied' Africa. Algiers offered to house
two of the leaders of the Angolan resistance, first Roberto
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Holden of the Government in Exile (GRAB), then Agustino Neto,
president of the )LA - and at a time when Algiers was also
offering accommodation to the Palestine Liberation Organisation,
despite Nasser's misgivings.
With the removal of Ben Bella in 1965, following a military
coup by the army commander, Colonal Houari Boumedienne, Algeria's
reputation suffered a setback in the Third World as a whole, as
the intervention came on the eve of a major international Non-
Aligned Conference, heralded as 'Bandung II' and scheduled for
June 19. The conference was first postponed and then cancelled
after a number of states had withdrawn, including the Popular
Republic of China.	 The preparations had occupied Algerian
diplomats for the past three years as the government strove to
maintain good relations with both China and the Soviet Union,
while trying to avoid a major split among the recently united
African states - over the continuing crisis in the Congo. Where
the conference was designed to help legitimise the government at
home and to confirm its international status abroad, the actions
of the military set a term to Ben Bella's ambitions and at the
same time ended Algeria's pretensions to a leading role in Africa
or, indeed, in the Third World.
In a continent where military intervention was yet to become
commonplace, the coup in Algeria - against a leader who was
widely popular with Africans and Arabs alike - resulted in a
diplomatic freeze that would continue until 1967. In contrast to
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Ben Bella, Boumedienne began by giving priority to domestic over
international questions and by emphasising the Arab rather than
the African character of Algerian policy. For example, Algeria
ceased to be prominent in the agitation over Rhodesian UDI,
thereby losing ground in Africa to other militant and non-aligned
states, notably Ghana (until 1966) and Tanzania. Relations with
Britain had been severed in 1965 and Boumedienne continued that
policy but in a "low profile".0n the other hand, the disastrous
Arab-Israeli confrontation of 1967 provided Algeria and its new
leader with a much needed opportunity to resume the diplomatic
offensive, this time in the context not of Africa but of the
Middle East.
The African connection was revived, however, in September
1968, when Algiers was host to the Fifth summit of the OAU The
summit was dominated by the Nigerian civil war as the majority of
the African states, supported by Algeria, sought the exclusion of
foreign forces and an early end to the fighting - but not at the
expense of Nigeria's territorial unity. A year later Algiers was
also the venue for the first Pan-African Cultural Festival,
convened under the auspices of the OAU . The two events in 1968-69
were crucial in effecting a reconciliation between the
Boumedienne government and the majority of African states.
Whether under Ben Bella or Boumedienne there was no question,
however, about Algeria's ideological preferences or about her
commitment to OAU principles, namely respect for the integrity of
sovereign states within their existing frontiers.
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Respect for sovereign states did not, however, always imply
support for existing regimes.	 Where the issue was one of
secession, as in Katanga and later Biafra, Algeria gave
unequivocal support to the central government - the more readily,
perhaps, because in each case secession was supported by
conservative and/or colonial (usually French) interests and was
perceived as a challenge to African independence.
	 In Chad, on
the other hand, Frolinat benefited from Algerian support in its
long struggle against a central government maintained in power
largely by French military forces. But there the issue was not
secession but the conquest of power and this time it was the
central government in N'Diamina (Fort Lamy) that was identified
with the former colonial power. In Angola, on the other hand, the
Marxist-led MPLA was actively supported by Algeria in its
struggle first against the Portuguese (until independence in
November 1975) and then, during the civil war that raged
immediately before and after independence, against its two, pro-
western rivals, the FNLA and UNITA. Although opposed to secession
and to active, armed intervention in the affairs of other African
states, Algeria was nevertheless ready to support armed
resistance to regimes that were closely identified with colonial
interests and thus served to perpetuate Africa's internal
divisions and its external dependency.
From the outset Algeria has maintained an office to organise
and conduct relations with the African liberation movements, led
by an FLN activist, Jelloul Malaika, but maintaining close links
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with the presidency. 	 By 1982, however, some of its functions
were transferred to one of the two subordinate committees
operating within the External Relations Commission of the FLIT,
Algeria has also joined in the world-wide condemnation of the
minority racial regimes in South Africa, Namibia and Rhodesia,
lending its support to armed resistance movements wherever they
were active. Faced with competing resistance movements Algeria
has consistently preferred those that were most active and most
intransigent in their opposition to white rule. In Namibia, for
example, it is SWAPO (South West African People's Organisation)
that has received Algerian support at the expense of SWAIM (South
West African National Union), the latter being perceived as less
representative and also less combative. In South Africa Algeria
has supported the ANC (African National Congress) in preference
to the more exclusive, albeit initially more militant PAC (Pan-
African Congress), and the ANC is permitted to maintain a
permanent delegation in Algiers. 	 In contrast to many of the
francophone states - and several that are English-speaking -
Algeria has consistently supported the imposition of sanctions
against the South African regime.
Ideological preference has also largely dictated the Algerian
position in inter-African conflicts with support for 'radical'
and 'secular' regimes.	 In contrast to Libya, for example,
Algeria backed Tanzania in its conflict with Uganda in 1979.And
the sane ideological considerations may also explain Algeria's
change of position in the long conflict between Ethiopia and the
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Eritrea Liberation Movement (ELM) As long as the Emperor Haile
Selassie was in power the ELM benefited from Algeria's more or
less declared support, a distinction being drawn between self-
determination for Eritrea, forcibly incorporated in Ethiopia in
1951 and secessionist movements elsewhere in Africa. After the
change of regime in Addis Ababa, however, in 1974, Algeria drew
closer to the new Marxist military rulers and began to distance
itself from the ELM	 The shift might, of course, have been
explained in terms of the confusion and atomisation that has been
such a feature of the ELM, particularly in the mid 1970s.
In some cases ideology does seem to have taken second place
to more pragmatic considerations and raison d'etat. Which may be
presumably why Algeria has also withheld its endorsement from the
Marxist wing of the rival Eritrean organisation, the Eritrean
Liberation Front. At the same time Algeria has consistently
refused to support the claims of Somalia, even under a Marxist
regime after 1968, to the Ogaden province of Ethiopia. Here, as
elsewhere, Algeria seems to have been influenced by the African
consensus : that territorial revision in the Horn of Africa
carried a real risk that border conflicts would become
widespread, threatening the security of existing states, Algeria
included. There is a large element of self-interest here. Many
of Algeria's neighbours consider that they were unfairly
discriminated against in the demarcation of Algeria's frontiers,
carried out by the French at a time when they expected to occupy
Algeria for the indefinite future. 	 Which may be why Algeria
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refused to receive the representatives of the ELF at the Algiers
summit of the Non-Aligned Movement in September 1973.
For an Afro-Arab solidarity 
Even before the Arab-Israeli war of October 1973 Algeria was
pursuing the goal of Afro-Arab solidarity, working within the
framework of the OAU to try to neutralise Israeli influence in
black Africa.	 Drawing a parallel between the forces supporting
Zionism and those behind Apartheid in South Africa, Houari
Boumedienne appealed to African leaders, at the OAU summit in
Addis Ababa, in May 1973, to sever their diplomatic relations
with Israel as a "concrete manifestation of African unity",
warning them against applying a "double standard" in their
attitude towards colonialism.
Africa cannot adopt one attitude to colonialism in South
Africa and a completely different one towards Zionist
colonialism in Northern Africa.4
The Middle Eastern conflict was not just one opposing Israel and
the Arab states, but rather a contest between an occupying power
and a disinherited people, dispossessed of their land and
divorced from their livelihood. 	 It was a struggle against a
colonial power that practised both racial and religious
discrimination. Boumedienne called for African solidarity in the
fight against the "two plagues" threatening the continent.
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The struggle against colonialism and racial
discrimination cannot, in any way, be dissociated from
the struggle against Zionism and domination.s
Algeria's diplomatic efforts, together with those of Libya,
resulted in a growing number of African states breaking off
relations with Israel, in the latter part of 1973 and in
anticipation of reciprocal Arab intervention in support of
African independence and economic development. Togo, for
example, severed ties on September 21, and Zaire, part of whose
military had been trained by the Israelis, cut its ties on
October 4. The October war accelerated the movement, opening the
way for what would become known as Afro-Arab dialogue. The
eighth extraordinary session of the OAU Council of Ministers, met
in Addis Ababa, November 19-22, at the request of Algeria,
Tanzania, Zaire and Zambia. After reviewing the prospects for
Afro-Arab solidarity in the economic sphere it carried a
resolution inviting all member-states to use their influence to
obtain international support for an all-out economic boycott of
Israel, Portugal, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia - with
particular attention to terminating the supply of oil.6
Afro-Arab solidarity was taken a step further at the sixth
summit of the Arab League in Algiers, in November 1973, when
President Mobutu of Zaire, previously known for his symnpathetic
attitude towards Israel,
	 made a symbolic appearance at the
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summit where he was greeted effusively by President Boumedienne.
It was at this summit, too, that Boumedienne was able to announce
the admission of Mauritania to the Arab League. 	 The Algerian
president delivered an enthusiastic speech in praise of Afro-Arab
cooperation.
In Africa we have seen something that many in the past
had refused to credit.	 The African continent is now
pledged to solidarity : a solidarity expressed through a
severing of diplomatic relations with Zionism, as well as
through support for Justice and for the African states
which continue to be victims of flagrant and repeated
acts of aggression...Which is why we are convinced that
it is time to consolidate those organic links by Joint
political initiatives and by stepping up cooperation , in
different fields. From this historic moment onwards we
will do everything in our power to further political and
technical cooperation between member states of the O.A.U.
and the Arab League.7
Largely on the initiative of Algeria a number of bodies were
set up after the 1973 summit of the Arab League with a view to
pursuing dialogue and cooperation. They included the Arab Bank
for the Economic development of Africa (ABEDA); the Special Arab
Fund for Africa (FASA); the Arab Fund of Technical Assistance for
Arab and African Countries (FAATAA).
	 The ABEDA did not begin
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giving aid until November 1975 although, by June 1976, some
twenty-two African projects were being financed by the bank
absorbing half of its paid-up capital. ° Loans were advanced at
concessionary rates and for periods of between fifteen and
twenty-five years. The 1973 Arab summit also agreed to step up
the Arab diplomatic presence in Africa; to sever all diplomatic,
economic, cultural and other ties with South Africa, Rhodesia and
Portugal; to discontinue supplies of Arab oil to such countries;
to strengthen and extend economic and cultural cooperation with
the African countries; to extend immediate assistance to those
African states afflicted by drought and other natural disasters;
and to provide material support for African liberation movements.
Algerian resources were, however, limited, while other Arab
states, much better placed financially to offer assistance to
Africa, were reluctant to support an initiative that they feared
would discriminate in favour of more radical regimes - while
enhancing Algeria's own prestige in Africa and the Middle East as
well as in the Maghreb itself. Aware of its large population and
limited resources, the Algerian government called increasingly
for global solutions to what was perceived as a global economic
crisis. Only international cooperation could begin to tackle the
real problems at the heart of the crisis, namely unfair terms of
trade and artificially low prices for the raw materials and cash
crops supplied to the industrial world by the countries of the
Third World.
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Far from alleviating the problems confronting the Third
World, lower oil prices would mainly benefit the already
privileged North at the expense of producer countries in the
South.	 The answer was not cheaper oil, which would only
Impoverish much of the Middle East, but higher prices for
African, Caribbean and Pacific produce, to enable them not only
to maintain their oil imports, but also to earn a surplus that
would finance industrialisation.	 The message of Afro-Arab
solidarity was quickly transposed therefore into an appeal by
Boumedienne, at the international level, for Third World
cooperation and North-South dialogue, and for a concerted effort
to bring about a global redistribution of income, through new
patterns of investment and trade.
But no amount of rhetoric could conceal the fact that the oil
producers of the Gulf and the Peninsula, with large oil reserves,
low cost production and a small population, were much better
placed than Algeria to bear the financial responsibility for
Afro-Arab cooperation.	 They were reluctant, however, to allow
Algeria and other radical states to take the credit for schemes
that they themselves were financing.	 And they were obviously
well placed to be able to determine the amount of their aid and
the purpose for which it was allocated, as well as to select the
recipients.	 They preferred a more selective, discriminatory
approach to the question of Afro-Arab solidarity, with a
preference for Moslem countries in Africa or for those who shared
their own political conceptions.
	 Which is why most of the aid
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from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf has been directed to countries
like Senegal,	 Niger,	 Mauritania,
	 Burundi and the Sudan.
Nevertheless Saudi Arabia was rightly credited by the African
leaders with the success of the first Arab-African summit, held
in Cairo on March 7-9, 1977. Where the African leaders had set
an optimistic target of $2 billion as the amount of assistance
they required, King Faisal of Saudi Arabia finally saved the
conference by himself agreeing to contribute $1 billion for the
African states. Other Gulf states followed the Saudi lead until
some $1.5 billion was finally subscribed.9
Unable to compete on equal terms with offers such as these,
the Algerian government opted instead for a more pragmatic Arab-
African cooperation free from the more obvious ideological
constraints,	 religious	 or	 otherwise.	 Hence	 President
Boumedienne's astute sponsorship of the North-South dialogue with
its secular emphasis and its non-discriminatory approach to the
Third World. Algeria was attempting to create a model for Third
World development based on its own struggle for independence from
the French and its own efforts to secure control, through
nationalisation, of its own resources. 	 Economic as well as
political sovereignty seemed a necessary condition for any
autonomous development.	 But to be assured of success such a
struggle must have the support of other developing countries
whose governments would come to see the advantages of South-South
cooperation, where practicable, over North-South dependence.
This then was the Algerian message during the 1970s.
-38 1-
Divisions in the Arab world, particularly after Sadat's visit
to Jerusalem in 1977, created new problems for Afro-Arab dialogue
- which was not assisted by Libya's interventions in the affairs
of African states.	 There was growing resentment among the
African states at being treated as a mere appendage of the Arab
world or worse, becoming involved in inter-Arab disputes. After
Sadat had signed a separate peace treaty with Israel in 1979 a
number of African states began to question the desirability of
maintaining a cold war with Israel.
	 At the OAU summit in
Monrovia, in 1979, many African states refrained from condemning
the Camp David agreements while a few even showed their readiness
to respond to Israel's renewed diplomatic offensive in black
Africa. Egypt was the leading Arab state and the only Arab state
in Africa whose territories had been occupied by Israel, and if
Sadat had come to terms with Israel why should the African states
withhold their support from such a positive development?
After 1975 Algeria's African policy was dominated by the
Western Sahara conflict and the mounting rivalry between Algeria
and Morocco for leadership of the Magrheb. A victory for Morocco
in the Western Sahara would, according to Algiers, enable Morocco
to extend its influence in sub-Saharan Africa. 	 The challenge
from Morocco would no longer be confined to North Africa but
would extend through the continent. 	 The Moroccan military
interventions in Zaire in 1977 and 1978 pointed to wider
ambitions on the part of Rabat.	 Aware that the majority of
states in the Arab League were inclined to look favourably on
-382-
Moroccan claims to the disputed territory, Algeria maintained
that the OAU was the only body authorised to adjudicate the
dispute.	 The principles of the OAU Charter upheld the existing
frontiers and the right of the colonial peoples to self-
determination. Morocco seemed to be contesting those principles
to which Algeria had, for the most part, consistently subscribed.
The Algerian diplomatic offensive began in 1978 with the decision
to give Africa a disproportionate share of the country's
diplomatic posts abroad. 	 In 1979 the number of posts in Africa
was increased to twenty - leaving aside Sudan, Somalia and
Mauritania which were integrated in the Arab world.''
By 1982, five of the twelve directors in the Minstry of
Foreign Affairs had served as ambassadors in Africa. The
secretary general, the administrative head of the Ministry, had
been ambassador in Cameroon, while the new African director had
been ambassador to the People's Republic of the Congo. Algeria
by then had some thirty ambassadors covering forty-two African
countries." Algeria's own industrial strategy pre-supposed the
extension of her influence southwards into black Africa which
alone could provide the necessary markets for her products. 	 As
early as 1960 Frantz Fanon, on a visit to Angola, had underlined
Algeria's African ambitions.
Having carried AlgeriA to the four corners of Africa, we
shall return with all of Africa towards Algeria, towards
the North, towards Algiers, that continental city. What
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should I like to see?	 Great lines of communication,
great channels of nevigation across the Sahara. Demolish
the desert, deny it, rally Africa and create the
continent!..Reach out for the absurd and the impossible
and whatever goes against the grain, and launch an entire
continent in an assault on the last ramparts of colonial
power.,2
Two decades later Algerian foreign policy remained attached
to this vision with its flattering view of Algeria as the
intermediary between Africa and Europe - a view also shared by a
number of countries favourably positioned, in close proximity to
the Mediterranean and adjoining the Sahara. The French, too, had
once had similar ambitions for their Algerian departments which
were described by General de Gaulle as "the door opening out on
the Third World". 1 °	 Meanwhile in 1971	 Boumedienne seemed
motivated by considerations not that different from those
expressed by Fanon a decade earlier - although his approach was
certainly more practical.	 In that year the President launched
his project for a highway linking Algeria to its southern
neighbours.	 To be named the Trans-Sahara Highway (or Road of
African Unity) its construction was entrusted to the Armee
Nationale Populaire (ANP). And when complete it will extend for
some 2,000 kilometres linking Algeria to Niger and Mali in the
Sahel.	 A Trans-Saharan Liaison Committee was established to
ensure	 the	 necessary	 coordination	 and	 consisting	 of
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representatives of Tunisia, Algeria, Niger and Mali. Morocco and
Libya each had rival plans for sub-Saharan routes linking their
states with black Africa and neither therefore participated in
the Algerian proposal.
The connection with Niger is valuable because of the latter's
uranium deposits and other strategic resources, in which Libya
had shown considerable interest as early as 1973-4. Moreover, it
would bring Algeria closer to Nigeria whose population was
approaching a hundred million and offered the largest single
market in the entire continent.	 Algeria was also anxious to
develop air and maritime communications with the other African
states, by means of Air Algerie in addition to the proposed road
across the Sahara which could be utilised by the Algerian Societd.
Nationale des Transports Routiers (SNTR).	 By opening up the
Saharan region Algeria also hoped to encourage trade and
development in an otherwise landlocked area, with linkages
perhaps to the Economic Community of West African states (ECOWAS)
then being proposed jointly by Nigeria and Togo.	 Perhaps most
important of all the new channels of communication would help
contain the threat of Libyan and Moroccan expansion, both
military and commercial.
Nor was the highway Algeria's only route southwards into
black Africa.	 Since the 1960s Algerian administrations had
courted the government of independent Mauritania hoping on the
one hand to block Morocco's expansion to the South, while on the
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other seeking to attach Mauritania to itself and also to the Arab
cause and the idea of Maghrebin unity.	 Mauritania was one of
several 'hinge' states to be found in the Sahel zone stretching
right across Africa, whose vocation it was to bring together
'black' and 'white' or 'Arab' Africa. 	 Prior to 1975 and the
eruption of the Western Sahara dispute, Algeria and Mauritania
had enjoyed an exemplary and close relationship, based among
other things, on their mutual suspicion of Moroccan irredentism.
President Mokhtar Quid Daddah of Mauritania was a frequent guest
in Algiers and his country was often spoken of as but "another
province" of Algeria. Ould Daddah on one occasion seems to have
taken the initiative in proposing to Boumedienne union of the two
states in the form of a federation. 14	Boumedienne worked
energetically to have Mauritania accepted as a member of the Arab
League in November 1973, earning the following tribute from Ould
Daddah.
Mauritania will spare no effort to serve the Arab cause
and to work for a better understanding between the Arab
and African worlds, themselves complementary. Mauritania
will do everything in its power in both Africa and the
Arab world to forge a new movement for Arab-African
solidarity and to create a new front for the liberation
of Africa and the Palestinian people. 's
-386-
Algerian-Mauritanian cooperation had led in 1974 to the
creation of the Conpagnie Mauritanienne de la Peche (CALMAP), as
well as the	 Compagnie Mauritanienne de la Navigation
Maritime(COMAUNAM). The same year also saw the formation in the
West African state of Benin of another joint navigation company
(CODANAM) as well as other Algerian investments in that
francophone state, In 1975 a joint fishing company was set up in
newly independent Guinea Bissau (GUIALP) while the Algerian gas
and electricity authority was entrusted with an electrification
project. In Mali, too, the Algerians helped with the creation of
the Societe Africaine de Transport (SAT),
lite establishment of such joint companies and participation in
public works projects was usually accompanied by some form of
Algerian aid, a grant or a loan or, more often, technical
assistance (e.g., with the training of qualified staff),
	 Prior
to 1982 there were cooperation agreements with some thirty
African countries while Algeria was involved in a score of joint
companies with other African governments. Algerian participation
in projects extended as far south as Madagascar on the east coast
and to Angola on the west. 	 There were also extensive cultural
ties, dating for the most part from the first Pan-African
Cultural Festival, held in Algeria in 1969. They are mostly with
francophone countries and provide, among other things, grants for
African students who wish to complete their studies in Algerian
universities.	 There is also the technical aid and assistance
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described above and covering a variety of programmes and
undertakings.
Algeria has continued its active pursuit of regional and
continental cooperation during the 1980s,
	 In March/April 1981
President Benjedid Chadli undertook a long journey across Africa,
visiting eleven states in all - Mali, Niger, Nigeria, the Congo,
Madagascar, the Seychelles, as well as the five Front-Line States
(Angola, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Mozambique, Tanzania), In addition to
soliciting support for Algeria in her dispute with Morocco over
the Spanish Sahara, Chadli also expressed his interest in genuine
non-alignment;	 in strengthening the authority of the OAU,
particularly in light of the contest in Chad;
	 in the struggle
against apartheid, the pursuit of Namibia's independence, the
elimination of foreign bases from Africa, the establishment of a
zone of peace in the Indian Ocean and the development of South-
South cooperation. 	 The itinerary itself and the questions
developed show a somewhat more pragmatic emphasis than under
previous Algerian administrations. 	 There remains the stress on
liberation and non-alignment, but the states visited include a
cross-section of moderate as well as of more radical governments.
Indeed there has been a growing emphasis since the 1970s on
improving diplomatic links with the moderate states, perhaps
reflecting the movement by the Soviet Union in the same direction
beginning with the Nigerian civil war in the late 1960s - perhaps
a response to Algeria's own closer relations with Nigeria as a
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result of its support for General Yakubu Gowon and the Federal
Government during the civil war.
	 Perhaps also reflecting the
substitution of economic for strictly ideological priorities in
the appeals for North-South dialogue (in cooperation with France
and other sympathetic industrial powers) and for South-South
cooperation.	 In May 1981, following Chadli's earlier tour, the
Algerian Foreign Minister, Mohamed Sedik Ben Yahia, visited Ivory
Coast and Senegal, the leading francophone and conservative
states of West Africa.	 Ben Yahia declared that the era of
difficult relations between Algeria on the one hand and Ivory
Coast and Senegal on the other was now over, and he stressed the
need for greater cooperation between Algeria and these leading
francophone states on the basis of mutual respect and African
solidarity. 16 As a result of this more open diplomacy Algeria
was able to persuade a number of African states to recognise the
Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR).
Algeria has been sensitive to the criticisms voiced by
moderate black leaders in Africa to the effect that the recent
divisions within the DAD have largely been the product of
quarrels between Arab members of the organisation - to the
detriment of the black African states and their common interests
(largely economic)." The point was made by President Houphouet-
Boigny of Ivory Coast and, earlier, in June 1984, President
Mobutu of Zaire had proposed despatching the problems of Chad and
the Western Sahara to the Arab League and creating a new
organisation of black, sub-Saharan African states to discuss
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matters oi mutual interest - to the exclusion of the North
African states. ' s	 Algeria has been working to convince such
moderate states That dialogue is now possible, and indeed highly
desirable, irrespective of any ideological differences.	 Their
common objective must be the economic development of the
continent and to that end three separate agreements were signed
between Algeria and the Ivory coast to create an institutional
framework for future cooperation. 	 It is probable that this new
step in Algeria's African policy owes much to the improvement in
relations with France since 1981 and to the preferential
agreement reached with successive French governments for the
export of Algeria's gas. 	 The agreements with Ivory Coast
concerned cultural, scientific and technical, as well as economic
cooperation.	 The resulting joint commission will meet every
other year in order to permit continuing consultations on a
permanent basis.
Despite these efforts on the part of the Algerian government
it has to be conceded that trade between Algeria and the rest of
the African continent remains very limited indeed : amounting to
no more than 0.7% of her exports and 1.7% of her imports. 19 And
there is little that Algeria can now offer Africa other than the
products of her few industries and, of course, crude or refined
oil - at prices set by the other OPEC states.	 The diplomatic
efforts can only be understood in the context of the current
dispute with Morocco in the Western Sahara and with a view to the
future industrial expansion of Algeria and the desirability of
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working to overcome the very considerable barriers that stand in
the way of future trade and commerce.
	 To that end Chadli has
been active in trying to settle outstanding border issues with
countries like Niger and Mali who, in 1983, concluded treaties
with Algeria defining their common borders.
	 Mauritania, too,
after adhering to the Algerian-Tunisian Treaty of Friendship,in
December 1983, concluded an agreement with Algeria two years
later approving their common frontier.
	 No doubt a contributing
factor here were fears in Mauritania arising from Moroccan policy
in the Western Sahara, as well as from Libyan attempts to de-
stabilise Haidallah's regime after his recognition of the SADR in
February 1984.	 This had amounted to a rejection of Kadhafi's
plan for a Mauritanian-Saharawi federation.
Algeria has conducted a long and active campaign against big
power intervention in African affairs and to try to ensure that
African	 states would themselves cooperate to ensure the
continued political and economic independence of the continent.
Algerian governments have been critical in the past of French
military intervention in Africa and of organisations like OCAM or
the West and Central African Monetary Unions that were
exclusively francophone in character and maintained close
political as well as economic ties with France.	 Algeria has
resisted association with the European Community, unlike Tunisia
and Morocco, and has also remained outside the various forms of
Franco-African cooperation. 	 These had seemed too closely
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identified with neo-colonialism which Algeria has consistently
condemned.
With the arrival of the Socialist in power in Paris in 1981,
however, coinciding with the new administration of President
Chadli in Algiers, there was a distinct thaw and, before long a
marked improvement in French-Algerian relations. 	 Algeria is
anxious and ready to explore new possibilities for cooperation
with France with a view to transforming their economic relations
in the direction previously suggested by the North-South
dialogue. The object is for the two states to work together, each
respecting the sovereignty and independence of the other, to try
to overcome the many obstacles to economic development in Africa
- notably debt and low commodity prices.
As a first step the Chirac government in 1988 approved the
signature of a new contract between the Algerian government and
Gaz de France guaranteeing a continuation of existing
arrangements whereby Algeria receives a substantial premium (over
the prevailing world and european prices) for supplying gas to
the French public utility. The agreement followed
	 protracted
negotiations extending over twelve months and was concluded
despite the opposition of Gaz de France. The contract owed much
to President Chadli's successful intervention with the Iranian
government to secure the release of French citizens held captive
in the Lebanon - and in time for the French presidential election
of 1988. It remains to be seen whether that kind of cooperation,
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for which Algeria is now well placed, can in fact be extended to
other African (or Western) states.
CHAPTER THIRTEEN : MOROCCO AND AFRICA 
IN THE SERVICE OF MODERATE CAUSES 
A conservative bias 
Events in Morocco prior to independence in 1956 favoured the
dominance of conservative over progressive or radical forces.
The nationalist Istiqlal Party was itself divided between
traditionalists and modernists.	 A tense political climate was
engendered by the exile of the Sultan, Mohammed Ben Youssef
(later King Mohammed V), in 1953, on the initiative of the French
Resident and at the prompting of a highly reactionary and
insubordinate French administration.	 This arbitrary and
'unauthorised' action by the French had the unexpected, if quite
predictable effect of making the hereditary Sultan, now in exile,
the uncontested leader of the growing nationalist movement,
The outbreak of rebellion the following year in Algeria
alerted the French government to the need for a more enlightened
policy in Morocco and a tighter rein on the local administration.
It also convinced the conservative landlords and the Moroccan
bourgeoisie that an early compromise with the French was
desirable if they were to avoid a similar revolution before long
In Morocco itself.	 By now the more progressive and secular
Istiglal leaders were themselves either in exile or in prison and
were therefore unable to provide effective leadership for the new
(if headless) movement which looked instead to the more
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traditional elements, namely those close to the throne and to the
landowning class.
By 1955 the French government, under Radical leadership, was
finally convinced that only the return of the Sultan would
appease the nationalist agitation in Morocco and prevent the
rebellion in Algeria from spreading to the two neighbouring
protectorates. Ben Arafa, the 'pretender' to the Moroccan throne
since 1953, was promptly deposed by those who had set him up in
the first place, while the government in Paris concluded that
self-government (later independence) for Morocco and Tunisia was
a small price to pay for a continued French presence in Algeria.
The Sultan was duly re-instated in November 1955.
From the time of independence, therefore, there was a strong
conservative bias inherent in the Moroccan state and in the
ruling institutions.
	 This bias was later reflected in the
country's domestic as well as in its foreign policies, and
influenced the Moroccan positions within both the Arab and the
African political communities. Moroccan independence, coming in
1956 and as a result of political compromise rather than armed
struggle, did not evoke the same sympathy in Africa as the
contemporaneous	 rebellion	 in	 Algeria.	 While	 several
traditionalist leaders of Istiqlal had been exiled in Africa and
were conscious of the similarity between their own struggle for
independence and African aspirations for similar emancipation, no
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enduring bonds were forged.'
	
The cultural and political
differences could not easily be bridged.
The more 'progressive' and secular among the IstiVal leaders
had encountered future African leaders in the course of their
studies in French universities, but the contacts had remained
superficial as the Africans were more concerned with issues like
securing equal treatment and overcoming discrimination rather
than with independence as such.	 For the first years of
independence, therefore, the Moroccan elites evinced little
interest in developments within black Africa. In any case it was
the King and not the party leaders who (then as later) defined
policy, both foreign and domestic.
A taste of radicalism
PLc independent Africa became polarised in the 196ns betwen
the conservative,	 mostly francophone states, and the radicals
which included Egypt (for a time), together with Ghana, Guinea
and Mali, the obvious place for Morocco was within the moderate
camp, led by Felix Houphouet-Boigny and Leopold Sedar Senghor,
leaders respectively of Ivory Coast and Senegal.	 This equation
was, however, to be upset by Moroccan opposition to the
forthcoming independence of Mauritania. The leadership in Rabat
was split between those who favoured annexation and another group
urging
	
self-determination.	 The	 first	 comprised	 the
traditionalist leadership of IstiVal, led by Allal Al Fassi, who
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as early as April 1956 had maintained that only the restoration
of Greater Morocco could assure the revival of the Moroccan
nation. Mauritania f for Al Fassi, although colonised by France in
the nineteenth century, was an "integral part of Morocco"" while
Rabat also had historical claims over other territories in the
Sahara and the Sahel.
	 Visiting Cairo in 1956 Al Fassi had also
established contact with a Mauritanian leader, HormaOuld Babana,
whose party, An Nanda (Renaissance Party), favoured the Moroccan
connection.
The left tendency within the Istiqlal Party, led by Mehdi
Ben Barka, favoured a more democratic solution to the Mauritanian
question insisting, upon his return from America in 1957, that
"it was more important to be concerned with solving human and
economic problems instead of insisting on the demarcation of
frontiers". : '	 King Mohammed V himself favoured annexing
Mauritania, while his heir, later King Hassan II, proposed a
referendum that would permit the Mauritanians to choose their own
destiny.	 General	 de Gaulle's support	 for Mauritanian
independence, influenced as it was by the consensus among the
black African states close to France, was strongly resented in
Morocco, not least by the monarch who had long been on close and
friendly terms with the French President.	 Rabat nevertheless
rejected the French decision and ignored the views of the great
majority of francophone states in West Africa. Morocco persisted
with its claims on Mauritania alleging, however, that French
imperialism and colonial intransigence were at the heart of the
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inter-African dispute - and that, left to themselves, the
Mauritanians would naturally have chosen to be integrated with
their northern neighbour.
From this new anti-colonial perspective (rather than the
earlier traditionalist one) Morocco's obvious partners were not
the conservative African states, who favoured independence within
existing frontiers, but the radical, 'revolutionary' ones who
insisted on African unity and the re-casting of the inherited
colonial borders. Morocco therefore participated in the founding
conference of the radical African group of states held,
appropriately, in Casablanca in January 1961.
	
This radical
alignment did not survive long, however. 	 In February 1961
Mohammed V died, to be succeeded by Hassan II who was much less
concerned about Mauritania. 	 Instead there was the prospect
before long of Algerian independence and the opportunity to re-
negotiate the frontier rather arbitrarily drawn by the French.
At the very least the issue would provide an opportunity to test
the strength and cohesion of the new Algerian leadership with its
'socialist' ideology and its 'revolutionary' pretensions. 	 While
Morocco attended the constituent assembly of the OAU in Addis
Ababa in 1963, it joined Somalia in refusing to subscribe to the
organisation's view demanding respect for existing, inherited
frontiers.
Return to moderatlan 
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The subsequent military confrontation between Morocco and
Algeria,	 in October 1963,	 did something to clarify the
ideological confusion in as much as the other members of the
Casablanca group felt closer to Algeria than to Morocco,
provoking Morocco's departure 	 from the group and its
disintegration.	 Morocco's brief alignment with the radical
states was prompted more by opportunism than by ideological
conviction. After 1963 Rabat re-directed its policies once more
towards the moderate states with their francophone majority.
Senegal and Ivory Coast were soon among its closest allies. Even
then the contacts were mainly political rather than cultural or
economic.	 Although Morocco signed a cultural agreement with
Senegal, in July 1963, any exchanges remained exceedingly modest.
In the course of the seventies there was an overall decline in
the numbers of Senegalese students studying in Morocco, who
dropped from 2,000 in 1973-4 to only thirty-two in 1978-9.4
Apart from the economic difficulties in Senegal after 1973, this
may also have reflected the preference of the Senegalese
government that its elites should be formed in a non-Arab
environment.
By way of contrast, commercial exchanges between Morocco and
Ivory Coast have been growing rapidly. Already in 1966 some 41%
of Moroccan imports from Africa were drawn from the Ivory Coast,
while 31.8% of Morocco's exports to Africa were directed towards
the Ivory Coast. Such commercial exchanges, however impressive,
conceal the fact that, in 1972 at least, the value of Ivory
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Coast's exports to Morocco was six times the value of her imports
from Morocco." Ties with Ivory Coast and its President, Felix
Houphouet-Boigny, were further strengthened in September 1973
when the two states signed an agreement of friendship and
solidarity as they abolished entry visas between their respective
countries.	 The support of the francophone states and the
principle of rotation were largely responsible for the election
of King Hassan II as Chairman of the OAU in 1972, after the
summit held in Rabat. Hassan's preoccupation with his domestic
opposition and the first of two abortive military coups in 1971,
followed a year later by the second, discouraged Hassan from
participating actively in continental African affairs - and an
opportunity was lost for bridge-building between Rabat and the
black African capitals.
Since 1975 Morocco's African policy has largely been dictated
by her territorial claims on the former Spanish Sahara.
	 The
African states have shown no more sympathy with the Moroccan
position on Western Sahara than they displayed for her earlier
ambitions in the case of Mauritania. This time, however, Morocco
managed initially to attach Mauritania to her cause by proposing
an arbitrary (and unfavourable) partition of the Western Sahara
between their two states.	 It was this early success that seems
to have taken the Algerian president by surprise, provoking a
backlash in the direction of both Morocco and Mauritania, with
Algerian recognition of and support for Polisario. 	 Another
difference with Moroccan policy over Mauritania in the 1960s was
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the extent to which Hassan was able to mobilise domestic opinion
in support of his policy in Western Sahara. 	 There were no
dissentient voices before or after the Green March. The internal
opposition and the parties, from Istiqlal on the Right to the
Socialists on the Left, were united in their support for the
King's crusade with its traditional and religious connotations.
The issue at last gave Hassan the opportunity to outflank his
opponents, in the parties as well as in the army, and to win a
popular mandate and secure a broad political base for the throne.
For most Moroccans the Western Sahara was a problem only in
so far as Algeria wished to pursue its now traditional
confrontation with its rival in the Maghreb. Where Algeria had
earlier refused a reasonable offer to re-negotiate its border
with Morocco, and had then invited Morocco and Mauritania to
negotiate a common position on the future of the Western Sahara,
President Boumedienne was now determined to exclude Morocco from
a territory that, for the Moroccans,
	 had long and close
historical ties with Morocco and the Alawite throne.
	
In the
Western Sahara Morocco's undoubted military success has been
largely offset by Algeria's efforts on the African diplomatic
scene. By 1987 some sixty-eight states, including thirty-two in
Africa, had recognised the SADR Nor was Morocco in any position
to implement anything resembling the celebrated Hallstein
Doctrine, as Morocco has little economic power compared with that
enjoyed in the fifties by the Federal Republic of Germany.
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Hassan did try to enlist his francophone African allies to
counter Algeria's diplomatic and Polisario's military efforts.
Thus, when the Mauritanian regime seemed on the point of
collapsing under constant pressure from (and repeated attacks by)
Polisario, President Senghor of Senegal issued a warning that any
change of leadership in Mauritania and any concessions to
Polisario would lead Senegal to support self-determination for
Mauritania's black population. 6	 The warning was repeated
immediately after the coup d'thtat in Mauritania in July 1978.
And at the Khartoum summit of the OAU, in July 1978, Senghor
again insisted that self-determination for the Saharawis of the
Western Sahara was inconceivable without self-determination for
the black population of southern Mauritania.'
	 Senghor also
claimed that Polisario had been responsible for the massacre of
thousands of Mauritanian blacks and that a Polisario government
would be racist and anti-black. 	 And again at the O.A.U. summit
in Freetown, in July 1980, he maintained that 2-3,000 blacks had
been killed by Polisario.'
Senghor's tactics were directed at the black African leaders
with a view to mobilising them against acceptance and recognition
of a 'Western Sahara State'. The intention was clearly to
strengthen Hassan's position where it was weakest : inside the
OAU .	Polisario sought to counter such propaganda by using
Algerian television to show South African weapons captured from
Moroccan troops.	 Morocco's diplomatic weakness among the
African states was clear from the general lack of enthusiasm in
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the OAU for the Moroccan position in the decade and a half since
the Western Sahara question was first raised.	 Her principal
allies have been Senegal, Gabon, Ivory Coast and Zaire. 	 Hence
Morocco's preference for the Arab League rather than the OAU as
the relevant body to arbitrate in the conflict - which goes
counter to Algeria's support for the OAU. Hassan has also sought
to enlist additional support by presenting the Western Sahara
within the wider framework of the east-West conflict.
Dancing for the West 
Morocco has insisted that the supply of Soviet weapons to
Polisario, via Algiers and Tripoli, represents a new, more
aggressive Soviet strategy in Africa.	 And when Morocco twice
sent troops to the assistance of President Mobutu of Zaire,
during the Shaba conflict of 1977-78, Rabat hoped to convince the
West and Washington in particular that she was defending the
values of the 'free world' both here as well as in North Africa
and in black Africa as a whole. In fact Morocco's action was the
result of a concerted strategy with France designed to break out
of its diplomatic isolation; to threaten and, if possible, de-
stabilise the radical regimes of Angola and Algeria; and, most
important, to secure Western support and aid for Morocco to
finance the costs of her military occupation of the Sahara. The
despatch of Moroccan troops to Zaire was an attempt to define
Morocco's role and place within the international power game.
And in an Africa increasingly polarised once again between
moderate and radical groupings, Hassan's preference was clearly
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for alignment with forces that were conspicuously anti-
revolutionary.	 Morocco's intervention in Zaire had been
prompted, in Hassan's view, by fear that a revolution in Zaire,
provoked by intervention from Angola and supported by Cuban and
Russian advisers, might bring Marxist rule to a country whose
size and situation made it a key strategic target.
Algeria,	 on the other hand, was confronting Morocco,
indirectly, througn its support for the MPLA in Angola. 	 There
were even reports from Zaire that Algerian pilots had fought with
the MPLA in its post-independence contest with the FNLA and UNITA
- although this was never confirmed. The Algerians did, however,
allow Soviet equipment to pass through their territory on its way
to Angola.'°
	
And as if to underline the Algerian stand, an
Algerian medical mission was despatched to Luanda, Angola, in
February 1977, while the Angolan Prime Minister visited Algiers
the following	 March."	 Logically, Morocco's support for the
central government in Zaire was coupled with its backing for the
pro-Western rebels in Angola. Morocco has been a main source of
weapons for UNITA along with South Africa which likewise supports
UNITA in an effort to de-stabilise the MPLA government in Angola
and to contain the SWAPO guerrillas operating out of Angola and
into Namibia.	 Polisario has alleged that South Africa also
cooperates in training Moroccan military personnel inside Morocco
Itself. In support of the allegation they claim to have captured
from the Moroccans some thirty brand new South African Panhard
armoured cars, ' 3	 It is because of Morocco's far-flung military
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interventions inside Africa that she has appeared to the rest of
Africa as "the gendarme of the West".
When the Angolan President, Agostino Neto, sent the Moroccan
king a message warning him of the consequences of despatching
troops to Zaire, the Moroccans hastened to point out that they,
at least, were acting within an African framework and had not had
recourse to military personnel from the Caribbean.'4
	
In the
first Shaba war, March-May 1977, France and Morocco had rushed an
expeditionary corps and the necessary arms and equipment to Zaire
where Mobutu's troops were apparently besieged by forces
infiltrating from across the border with Angola. 	 The Moroccan
troops helped turn the tide in favour of the central government -
to the relief of moderate African leaders who feared the
consequences elsewhere of a successful invasion of Zaire. There
were few states in Africa that were not threatened in some way by
dissident forces who had taken refuge across the border.
	 Such
dissidents required only arms, training and encouragement to turn
them into a credible military threat to governments whose own
armies were weakened by corruption, indiscipline, personal
jealousies, and ethnic and other divisions.
The Moroccan Foreign Minister was quick to defend his
country's decision to send troops to Zaire in 1977. 	 He issued
the following statement to the Foreign Minister of Togo, who was
presiding at	 the twenty-eighth session of the OAU Council of
Ministers ;
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The government of the Kingdom of Morocco is convinced
that peace in Africa is one and indivisible.	 It
responded to the appeal by the President of the Republic
of Zaire by placing a contingent of the Moroccan armed
forces at his disposal with the object of defending the
national unity and territorial integrity of the country.
In so doing it sought to deal with the problem within a
strictly African framework.'E'
In the second Shaba war, May-June 1978, Hassan II sent some
1,500 Moroccan troops to replace the Belgian and French
paratroopers who had been flown in earlier to maintain peace in
the region of Kolwezi and around Lumumbashi. 	 A dozen American
C141 aircraft were used to transport the Moroccan soldiers who
were joined by contingents from Togo, Ivory Coast, Senegal and
the Central African Empire (now once again a Republic), all
operating in the guise of an African intervention force. 	 The
new Moroccan Foreign Minister, Mohammed Boucetta, maintained that
Morocco, despite sending troops to Zaire, was still non-aligned
in the fullest sense of the word, which was why Morocco had also
signed important agreements with the Soviet Union with a bearing
on the country's future development. Hassan, himself, was
unrepentant at the end of the operation in June 1978. 	 Morocco
would undertake similar operations whenever and wherever they
were required.
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Morocco does not intervene in the internal affairs of
Zaire and it does not support a regime as such. But it
will, with all the means at its disposal, oppose de-
stabilisation attempts monitored from outside.17
Which presumably explains Hassan's meetings with President
Mobutu, at the end of the first Shaba war, in 1977, and again in
May 1978, while the second Shaba war was still under way.
It appears that today Zaire is Morocco's one remaining ally
in Africa. It was the only country to walk out of the OAU summit
in Addis Ababa in November 1984, in support of Morocco and in
protest at the decision to seat the delegation from the SADR- And
in July 1985 Zaire indicated that it would not participate in the
forthcoming summit of the OAU because the Saharawi Arab
Democratic Republic remained a member. On this occasion the
Foreign Minister of Zaire, Mokolo Wampombo, recalled that Morocco
had supported President Mobutu in 1977-78 and that her gestures
then were "actions that Zaire cannot forget".'2'
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LINKING AFRICA TO THE WEST 
The link between Europe and Africa 
Foreign policy in Tunisia has always remained the preserve
of President Habib Bourguiba, and all Foreign Ministers, with the
exception, perhaps, of Mohamed Masmoudi, being simple executants.
What Bourguiba wants from Africa is stability and moderation,
adherence to the principles of the OAU Charter, and continuing
and close links with the Western powers, notably the United
States and France, which alone in his view can provide the
investm2nt required for the economic development of his and other
African states.	 From his vantage point the problems of other
African states are similar to those of his own country, and lie
mainly in the need for economic and social development within the
continent.	 Such development can only come, however, from the
'free world', which is the source of the most advanced
technology. Tunisia's small size and population and its limited
resources are both a consequence of its relative weakness and
lack of influence as well as contributing to that weakness. 	 At
best Tunisian foreign policy, in Africa as elsewhere, leads a
shadowy existence, as the country's leaders manoeuvre within
extremely narrow limits fixed largely by geography, colonial
history, and the absence of substantial mineral resources.
The country's comparatively high levels of social development
and educational attainment have guaranteed high and responsible
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posts in international	 organisations to	 its many and
distinguished graduates. 	 The very disadvantages of the country,
in terms of conventional power politics, have also brought
compensations in so far as Tunis serves as the location for a
number of prestigious international bodies.
	 But assets of this
nature are dependent on international good-will and therefore
presuppose a low rather than a high profile in terms of foreign
policy, and a conciliatory rather than an aggressive or abrasive
approach.	 If Tunisia Has always adhered closely to the western
camp it has tried to avoid being directly identified with
confrontational policies and has also been active in the non-
aligned movement.	 Only in the context of the Middle East have
Tunisia's policies ever seemed 'radical' - because there, too,
Bourguiba pursued the goal of a political rather than a military
settlement. Some of his early difficulties with the independent
Algerian government also stemmed from his support, in the last
years of the war with France, for political negotiation between
France and the FLN instead of prolonged armed conflict. But then
Tunisia suffered heavily from the Algerian war and its large
commitment to the FLN - as well as from French reprisals and
other kinds of sanctions imposed by Paris.
While the economic ties between Tunisia and Algeria have
grown since independence, Bourguiba has had no close or obvious
ally in North Africa, other than Morocco. 	 By the same token,
however, Bourguiba has been reluctant to allow his state to be
associated with the expansionist policies of Rabat. Although the
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rivalry between Algeria and Morocco, that has continued since
1963, does create a role for Tunisian diplomacy, it also
detracts from the prospects of Maghrebin cooperation which should
otherwise be the basis of Tunisian policy in North Africa.
Bourguiba sees Tunisia as the link between Europe, with its
advanced technology and administrative competence, and black
Africa with its under-development and inadequate social
structures.	 In 1960 Tunisia did not hesitate to reproach Guinea
for having rejected the French Community in favour of an uneasy
independence requiring the search for new (and in Bourguiba's
view often unsatisfactory) allies with little understanding of
Africa's real requirements and even less to contribute to its
economic growth and social development.	 A year later, however,
at the time of Tunisia's brief confrontation with France over the
evacuation of the French base at Bizerta, it was the turn of
Bourguiba to complain of the "drama" of those countries whose
fate it was was to be linked with France I - while the member
countries of the French community demonstrated their solidarity
with the former 'motherland'.
In these trying circumstances Tunisia's participation in the
summit of the Non-Aligned Movement in Belgrade, a few months
later, suggested that it might be seeking to diversify its
partners - in ideological terms.	 That did not happen, however,
as during the Bizerta conflict Tunisia turned instead towards the
United States waiting in vain for military aid from Washington
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that failed to arrive.	 Thereafter Tunisia has aligned in
political and military terms with America and France, very
occasionally trying to play one off against the other, but
generally dependent on both to ensure the country's economic
growth and to secure its survival vulnerable as it is sandwiched
between Algeria on the one hand and Libya on the other. 	 The
scope for manoeuvre, never large, became even more constricted
after the overthrow of the conservative monarchy in Libya in 1969
and its replacement by the revolutionary and Islamic republic of
Colonel Kadhafi.	 There were compensations, however. 	 At the
height of its economic confrontation with Algeria, at the end of
the 1960s and the early 1970s, France could not afford to fail
Tunisia - her own economic problems notwithstanding. 	 And the
arrival of Kadhafi did give Tunisia a new strategic importance
both to the Americans and to Algeria.
Francophonie : the path to Africa 
But Tunisia's links with black Africa are largely through the
francophone states and are the product of their close and mutual
relationship with France, reflecting Tunisia's image of itself as
the 'link' or 'hinge' between Europe and Africa - an image it
shared with Senegal under Senghor. The relationship began during
the Algerian war with Tunisia's whole-hearted identification with
the rebellion. After 1958 and the arrival in power of General de
Gaulle Bourguiba did, however, grasp the change that had taken
place in France and in French sentiment towards the war.
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Thereafter he worked, increasingly in conjunction with France's
other moderate allies in Africa, notably Senghor, towards a
negotiated political settlement between the F.L.N. and the
French.
	 That would be the basis of future difficulties with
Algeria (and of more immediate problems with France), but it did
serve to draw Tunisia closer to the francophone states of West
Africa which would acquire their own independence even before
Algeria.
Tunisia was also associated in 1960 with the same francophone
leaders of West Africa, particularly Senghor, as they sought to
influence the French in favour of independence for Mauritania.
Thus Tunisia recognised Mauritania's independence, in 1960, and
fought for its admission to the United Nations - against the
wishes of the Moroccans who were then associated, briefly, with
the more radical African states. 	 In October 1964 an attempt at
mediation by Tunisia and Senegal - between President Ould Daddah
of Mauritania and King Hassan II of Morocco - was a failure.
Bourguiba nevertheless continued to work with the moderate
francophone leaders of West and Central Africa, perhaps
recognising the central importance that the French attached to
their former African colonies. 	 His incursions into Middle
Eastern politics had not been auspicious, particularly after his
speech at Jericho in 1965 where he implicitly advocated
recognition of Israel. Bourguiba may have hoped to recover from
this diplomatic setback by embarking from mid-November until mid-
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December on a tour of francophone African states that included
Mauritania, Liberia, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger and Senegal.
Another, perhaps more important reason for the African tour,
was Bourguiba's anxiety to improve his country's relations with
France and with President de Gaulle in particular - after the
earlier difficulties over the nationalisation of French estates
in Tunisia and the evacuation of the Bizerta naval base. Algeria
under President Ben Bella had enjoyed good (and profitable)
relations with France after its independence - whereas relations
were strained between France and the two more moderate Maghrebin
states, Tunisia and Morocco. In 1965 General de Gaulle was still
smarting from the Ben Barka scandal which threatened to
complicate his re-election as President at the end of the year.
With Franco-Moroccan relations almost non-existent, the time may
have seemed propitious in Tunis to attempt to re-launch the old
friendship between de Gaulle and Bourguiba.	 At the end of his
African tour Bourguiba took the opportunity in Senegal to join
with Senghor in proposing the creation of an international
francophone community - a project presumably calculated to
flatter de Gaulle, to produce a thaw in Franco-Tunisian
relations, and to give Tunisian diplomacy once again some margin
for manoeuvre.
The francophone states of Africa, with the exception of
Guinea, had retained close ties with the metropole long after
independence - and for the most part the relationship continues,
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albeit in an attenuated form, today.
	
Economic, cultural,
commercial and military agreements have been a feature of
France's relations with her former colonies. 	 As an Arab state
that had demanded and received independence as early as 1956,
Tunisia could hardly entertain such notions of strict dependence.
Indeed, as a Maghrebin state aware of the views of its large
neighbour, Tunisia was careful to emphasise the economic rather
than the cultural or political basis of francophonie - whereas
Senghor placed greater weight on the last two factors. 	 Tunisia
meanwhile was cultivating the recent Canadian interest in Africa
and may have seen Tunis and Dakar as the twin poles of a new
French commonwealth.	 Bourguiba was also a very pragmatic
politician and may among other things have been exploring the
prospects for economic support from all possible quarters.
In his speech in Dakar in November 1965 Bourguiba had given
voice to his own moderate, democratic socialist views while
criticising	 the
	
'progressive'	 African	 leaders	 and,	 by
implication, President Nasser of Egypt.
We do not favour closer relations among African states by
encouraging acts of subversion. 	 We cannot serve peace
and at the same time indulge our appetite for hegemony.
It is no kindness to the oppressed to hold out prospects
of a liberation that is not within their reach. 	 It is
our manner, as Tunisians, to face up to realities...Does
this mean that we lack revolutionary spirit?
	
But our
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objectives are revolutionary...development, the raising
of living standards...those are the goals we want to
achieve and without a revolution. 	 What kind of a
revolution is it that only destroys without ever
building? But to reach our objectives we need time and
planning.2
There seem little doubt that Bourguiba 	 also sought refuge
in francophonie out of a sense of frustration with his fellow
Arab leaders, giving rise to the conviction that the Arab League
was incapable of taking realistic decisions about the problems
confronting it. In any case the cultural divide between the Arab
core and the Maghrebin fringe would not easily be bridged.
Geographical groupings, like francophonie, based on 'cultural
affinities' and grouping leaders with shared backgrounds were
more likely to lead to fruitful cooperation and to have a
positive effect in terms of promoting peace, stability and
development. In Africa at least Bourguiba was convinced that the
francophone community was already a reality. It was not only the
presence of a common tongue, French, but the fact that the
African elites also "spoke the same language" : i.e., shared a
community of discourse, of symbols, ideals, goals, a readiness to
accept the independence of other states and a willingness to work
with them.
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Francophonie did not, however, appeal greatly to Tunisia's
Maghrebin partners.	 President Boumedienne of Algeria dismissed
with something approaching contempt any suggestion of his
country's participation in the new grouping with its preference
for the European over the Middle Eastern connection and the low
priority it attached to economic independence. 	 Morocco was
still smarting from a series of rebuffs administered by France,
beginning with the independence of Mauritania and, more recently,
the backlash from the murder in Paris in 1965 of the Moroccan
socialist leader, Mehdi Ben Barka.	 In any case Morocco did not
suffer from the same cultural inhibitions that made it so
difficult for Bourguiba to come to terms with his Middle Eastern
counterparts. Nor did Morocco enjoy the confidence of the black
African states to the South to anything like the same extent as
Tunisia.	 Bourguiba's democratic socialist views had an echo in
the liberal attitude of Senghor,	 while his realpolitik
corresponded closely to that of Houphouet-Boigny. 	 Tunisia
threatened no one but did offer a model of development with some
relevance to other states poor in natural resources and forced to
trade on unequal terms in a world dominated by the industrial
powers.
From the Tunisian point of view the most tangible outcome of
francophonie - besides the gatherings that took place each year
from the end of the 1960s - was the establishment of close and
enduring links between Tunisia and Senegal. 	 In 1966 Tunisia
succeeded in its request that French should be accepted by the
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United Nations as an official language for all proceedings.
Interestingly, Algeria approved the initiative while Morocco
insisted that proceedings in UNESCO should be conducted in Arabic
as well.	 President Pompidou, perhaps because of his special
interest in education (his father had been a lycee teacher)
showed rather more interest than de Gaulle in establishing a
permanent francophone grouping.
But it was under his successor, in June 1974, that a chair of
Francophone Studies was created at the Sorbonne, to be entrusted
to a Tunisian, Ahmed Abdesselam, Meanwhile Senghor's success in
getting his party (later the Parti Sociallste Senegalais, or PSS)
affiliated with the Socialist International, in 1976, encouraged
Bourguiba to seek the same status for his own Parti Socialiste
Destourien (PSD). Although supported by Senghor the application
was finally rejected as a result of the opposition of the rival
Nouvement d'Unite Fopulaire (MUP), led by Bourguiba's former
Economics Minister and old antagonist, Ahmed Ben Salah, whose own
movement, formed in 1973, had already received observer status
within the Socialist International. Which did not stop Bourguiba
and Senghor from promoting an African branch of the Socialist
International, which did not include the MUP.
In the struggle for African independence Tunisia had always
backed moderate leaders and movements who would preserve and
encourage western ties after independence. 	 As early as 1960
Tunisian troops had participated in the United Nations force
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deployed to keep order in the former Belgian Congo (later Zaire).
Their intervention had helped to establish a pro-western
government in Leopoldville (now Kinshasa) under President Joseph
Kasavubu, who had meanwhile dismissed his radical Prime Minister,
Patrice Lumumba - later to be assassinated by troops loyal to
General Mobutu, then Army Chief of Staff.	 On this as on other
issues the Tunisian position coincided fairly closely with that
of the United States and France, although France was then more
inclined than Tunisia (and a majority of the francophone African
states) to support Katangan secession.
Distaste for Communism and Apartheid 
In the 1970s there were further opportunities for cooperation
between Tunisia and Senegal with American and/or French
encouragement.
	 In the Angolan civil war of 1975 both states
supported Roberto Holden and the FYLA which had been the only
Angolan movement accorded an office in Tunis in 1970.
	 Both
Tunisia and Senegal also approved French intervention in Shaba
(former Katanga) province of Zaire in 1977. At the height of the
Shaba affair the Tunisian press not only condemned the Cuban
military presence in southern Africa and the use of Soviet arms,
but also underlined the need for an American presence as a
counterweight to the Soviet intervention.' 	 And when Senegal
accorded facilities to the French for air attacks against
Polisario, in 1977, Tunisia made no protest.	 Indeed, Bourguiba
refused to condemn French actions against the Saharawis despite
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requests from Boumedienne, which did not improve Algerian-
Tunisian relations.	 These, as we have seen, were already poor
following Bourguiba's active encouragement in 1974-5 of a
rapprochement between	 Morocco and Mauritania with a view to
partitioning the Western Sahara.
Bourguiba's distaste for communism in general and the Soviet
Union in particular made him suspicious of radical governments in
Africa fearing that the Soviets would use them to extend their
influence in the continent.
	
A serious rift developed in 1975
with the Marxist regime in Ethiopia over Tunisia's support for
the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF).	 Ethiopia even broke off
relations after Tunisia tried to have an Eritrean admitted as an
observer at the OAU summit in July 1975. 4 And at the 1976 OAU
summit in Mauritius the Tunisian Foreign Minister, Habib Chatti,
implicitly attacked Angola by insisting
Africa must preserve its distinctive personality and
pursue its own path to ensure that it remains master of
its destinies. We must resist those outside powers who
continue to assail us.'
He would return to the same issue a year later at the Libreville
(Gabon) summit
Africa presents the unfortunate image of a continent
subject to rivalries and divisions...at a time when the
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major powers are working hard to maintain and develop
detente and cooperation. It is sad therefore to see
Africa going in the opposite direction - one which can
only lead to confrontation and de-stabilisation.6
Tunisia's rejection of a Soviet presence in Africa goes back
at least to 1965 when it claimed the Mediterranean as a "lake of
peace", thereby implicitly calling for the withdrawal of the
Soviet fleet. Its opposition to Communist penetratrion and its
warm support for Western involvement is consistent only in so far
as Bourguiba clearly views the West as a force for order and
development and sees Africa as in some sense bound to the West
through its ties first with France (and Britain) and later
through the United States, The Soviet Union, on the other hand,
is seen as an interloper, whether in historical or cultural
terms, whose only interest in Africa (as in the Middle East) is
military and not economic, and is therefore linked with violence
and de-stabilisation. If that was also the view of francophone
leaders like Houphouet-Boigny, Senghor and Mobutu, it was
certainly not a view that was universally held in Africa, even
among the more moderate, conservative leaders. But it does
explain why Tunisia was unable to project a more favourable image
inside the Non-Aligned Movement - particularly with Fidel Castro
as Chairman in 1979-80, and why Tunis, despite its favourable
location for international meetings and organisations, is yet to
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become the Geneva of North Africa. And this despite Bourguiba's
pre-occupation with persuasion and moderation.
Where other Arab states, notably Libya and Saudi Arabia, have
sought to exploit the presence of Islam in Africa, to further
their own influence, such channels are closed to Tunisia,
particularly under Bourguiba.	 Since independence Tunisia has
been conspicuous in the Moslem world in the government's pursuit
of, and encouragement for
	
secularisation in every sphere of
life. It is the most notable example of the policy since Mostafa
Kenal's Turkey.
	
Although a member of the Islamic Conference
Organisation - more for political and ideological rather than for
religious reasons - Tunisia has never sought to encourage Islamic
militancy in Africa, least of all in Tunisia itself.	 Hence the
recent	 concern	 at	 the	 alleged	 activities	 of	 Iranian
fundamentalists in Tunis, although the main opposition to the
government continues to come not from Islamic organisations but
from the unions in the capital and the left of centre political
movements.
While Bourguiba's approach may not recommend Tunisia to the
Iranian fundamentalists or the Saudi Vahabbi, it does help remove
an important cultural barrier between the political elites in
North Africa on the one hand and : 	 those governing in Africa
South of the Sahara on the other : religion remains an obstacle
for the other Maghrebin leaders who seek support in black Africa
among Christian as well as Moslem leaders and among their
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constituents.
	
It has been a problem for the Moroccans, and for
Houari Boumedienne despite the secular nature of the Algerian
administration and its preoccupation with economic rather than
religious questions.	 It is not such a problem for Kadhafi
because his appeal is directed largely at Moslem leaders in
predominantly Moslem countries, mainly within the Sahel. 	 Some
three decades after independence the western values of the
Tunisian leadership are still for the most part those of the
black African governments.	 Tunisia also appointed the first
woman to serve as ambassador in Africa : Faika Farouk, who
represented her country in Senegal. 	 This was seen as an appeal
by Bourguiba for the emancipation of African women, at a time
when the feminist movement was having a noticeable impact within
Africa.
Tunisia, in its approach to the black African states also has
the advantage that it has no obvious "axe to grind".
	 With the
exception of the Bizerta episode in 1961, and possibly the more
recent threats from across the border in Libya, Tunisia is
involved in no dispute of its own for which it wants African
support. It is also distinguished from its Maghrebin neighbours
in lacking the military means by which to intervene elsewhere in
Africa.	 Tunisia also had little to contribute to the Afro-Arab
dialogue that followed the October 1973 war in the Middle East,
lacking the means.	 In that sense, however, her position is
closer to the great majority of African states, dependent mainly
on cash crops and minerals. Where the black African states are
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largely integrated into West European markets, Bourguiba has
always insisted that economic development can only come in close
cooperation with the West and not in opposition to it.	 As a
pragmatist Bourguiba had little patience, in any case, with the
rhetoric that characterised much that passed in the 1970s for
"North-South Dialogue".
Having come late to oil production, and even then only in a
small way, Tunisia had no large surplus with which to purchase
allies in Africa. Whereas Senghor sought to broaden his concept
of Eur-Afrique to include the Middle East, and Mauritania sought
and was given admission to the Arab League as a result of
Algerian sponsorship, Bourguiba concentrated instead on the one
resource for which Tunisia is really distinguished - its
administrators and technocrats.
	
The President of the most
important Arab/African institution, the Arab Bank for Economic
Development in Africa (BADEA) is the Tunisian economist, Chadli
Ayari , formerly Minister for the Economy. 7 Even with its very
limited means Tunisia manages to make its presence felt in Africa
by contributing skilled and experienced personnel to various bl-
and multi-lateral organisations. 	 According to one source, by
1973 Tunisia had 1052 cooparants working, mainly as teachers, in
black Africa. °1 Addressing the OAU summit, in 1977, Habib Chatty,
then the Foreign Minister, was able to point to
Afro-Arab cooperation as an important step realised by
Third World countries in their effort to contribute to
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the installation of a a new international order. 	 It
makes for a more diversified and at the same time for a
much closer form of South/South cooperation.9
Tunisia, like its neighbours, Algeria and Libya, views Afro-
Arab solidarity as a means of expressing common interests and
engaging in a common struggle.	 For Tunisia, however, the
struggle is one against poverty and illiteracy and against those
outside powers who seek to exploit the backwardness and weakness
of the African states to further their own global ambitions. The
fact that Algeria and Libya were, for much of the seventies, the
two largest African purchasers of Soviet arms, helps to explain
Tunisia's determination to maintain and develop its own contacts
with Western Europe and America, as well as with the 'moderate'
African states to the South. The tight constraints under which
Tunisian policy operates abroad, especially in Africa, require
diplomatic language of an exceptional subtlety - quite unlike
Bourguiba's attempts to confront the key issues of the Middle
East : head on! The ambiguous flavour of much Tunisian policy in
Africa is to some extent conveyed by the following extract from
the Tunisian press.
Africa and the Arab world use the language of reason and
firmness and not the language of violence and hatred.
Both have worked to bar the path to colonialism and
racism by having recourse to appropriate methods of
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struggle against essentially anachronistic systems of
domination and supremacy.	 This new strength points
inexorably to the end of a certain type of domination
destined sooner or later to disappear.1°
Indeed, on two questions of central concern to	 Africans,
i.e., apartheid in South Africa and Israel's attitude to the
Palestinians, Tunisia has always adopted a radical attitude.
Tunisia condemned the South African raid on the African National
Congress (ANC) offices in Maputo, in October 1983, and declared
its complete solidarity with Mozambique. 	 Tunisia's Foreign
Minister called the raid a "barbaric act committed in defiance of
international law"."	 And when President Mobutu of Zaire
approved the resumption of diplomatic relations with Israel, in
May 1982, Tunisia, like Algeria, recalled its ambassador from
Kinshasa	 - as a first step.	 Morocco and Iraq, on the other
hand, resolved only to try to persuade President Mobutu to change
his mind. The presence in Tunis of the headquarters of the Arab
League as well as those of the PLO does impose a particular
responsibility on the Tunisian government - certainly on issues
affecting the future of the Middle East and especially the plight
of the Palestinians.
On the other hand Tunisia continues to adhere to a moderate
position on most other issues of interest to Africa.	 Unlike
Morocco, Tunisia regularly attends the Franco-African summits -
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although admittedly only as an observer, Algeria, however, has
consistently refused to participate in meetings that it insists
are orchestrated by France.	 Tunisia also maintains its close
contacts with Senegal and Ivory Coast and it was in conjunction
with the former that the Inter-African Socialist Organisation
(IAS) was set up in Tunis in 1981 and held its first ordinary
congress in Morocco in May of that year. 	 Its president is the
former Senegalese leader, Leopold Sedar Senghor. In this as in
other matters of common interest 	 Tunisia has always worked
closely with moderate African states in the search for practical
solutions.	 Thus President Abdou Diouf of Senegal, on an
official visit to Tunisia in May 1984 stressed the need for
both countries to consult more often to try to find African
solutions for African problems, particularly in the related areas
of peace and security. 12
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CHAPTER FIFTEEN : LIBYA AND AFRICA 
ADVENTURES FOR THE ARAB CAUSE 
Kadhafi : the rejected suitor 
Libya's interest	 in sub-Saharan Africa goes back to the
nineteenth century when the Senoussiva, a religious confraternity
founded by Mohammed Al Senoussi, sought to extend its
implantation across the Sahara and into the Sahel. Al Senoussi
despatched missionaries towards Lake Chad, and the regions of
Oueddei and Dafour,	 After his death the work was continued by
his two sons, Al Mandi and Sharif who formed zawias (lodges) in
all these regions. The Senoussi resisted French colonial
penetration in the Sahara and West Africa and were responsible
for the massacre	 of the Flatters'	 Mission and the
assassination of Pere de Foucauld,' it is this Senoussi heritage
which Muammar Kadhafi later sought to appropriate after the
revolution of 1969 in Libya and the overthrow of the monarchy.
And there are a number of parallels with present-day Libyan
foreign policy - as well as some obvious differences.	 The
religious and political legacy of the Senoussi provides an
enduring symbol of unity in a country otherwise sparsely
populated and divided into at least three main regions. There is
the tendency too to subordinate everything to the realisation of
a single over-riding goal, that of unity, which does not permit
of any compromise. Where before it was the French who were the
outsiders and the principal obstacle to Arab unity, now it is
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Israel, supported of course by the West and international
Zionism.
Arab unity and the vision of a pan-African Islamic
confederation are the twin goals of Kadhafi's foreign policy.
Disappointed in the first by 1973 Kadhafi turned increasingly to
the second.	 Hence Libya's growing involvement in Africa,
particularly in Chad, which began in the early seventies and
culminated in a full-scale military invasion in 1980, followed by
another in 1983.	 The aim was not only to compensate for set-
backs elsewhere, notably his bid for unity with Egypt 1970-3, but
also to put an end to 'Zionist' penetration of Africa, to exclude
Israeli influence, to strengthen the cause of Islam, and
eventually to outflank the secular and conservative Egyptian
state. By confronting Israel directly, wherever her influence is
to be found, and by challenging her allies in the West, Kadhafi
believes that he will re-create the Arab nation and revive the
flourishing culture of the past.
More immediate factors were also at work in the case of Chad.
There had been civil war and an extensive French military
presence in that state almost from its inception in the sixties.
And the Arab groupings of the North had problems in uniting to
confront the Christian and animist minority of the South that
nevertheless dominated government, the administration and the
economy - with the backing of the French.
	 There was also the
determination to resist the West and, in particular, the French
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wherever there was a chance of popular support.
	 Finally, on a
more mundane, material level, Northern Chad and neighbouring
Niger were known (or in the case of Chad were believed) to
possess extensive deposits of uranium.
	 With his aspirations to
lead a nuclear power, Kadhafi needed access to large quantities
of uranium;	 if at the same time he could deny uranium to the
West and France, so much the better.
Despite	 its	 small	 population,
	 Libya's	 oil	 wealth,
particularly after 1973, meant that Kadhafi, unlike Bourguiba,
had a range of foreign policy options to choose from. He could
try to purchase political allies and ideological support in
Africa by means of lavish economic aid and assistance.
Alternatively, he could provide negative 'aid', by arming and
financing dissident groups who could be induced to participate in
his grand design for the Sahel and for the Arab world as a whole.
Or again, Libya could expend its wealth acquiring a vast armoury
and building an army capable of intervention elsewhere in Africa
and the Middle East.	 Here the small size of the Libyan
population would seem to dictate the employment of large numbers
of 'mercenaries' recruited from elsewhere in Africa. The Islamic
character of most of the Sahel would greatly assist in the
process of recruitment as well as in the attainment of Kadhafi's
objective	 a "Greater Islamic State"." 	 Kadhafi's message,
however, was unlikely to appeal to the existing political class
whose attachment was, for the most part, to the former colonial
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power and who, in any case, were likely to resist Kadhafi's
attempts to by-pass them and appeal directly to the masses.
We have seen that the death of Nasser in 1970 was followed by
a divorce between Sadat and Kadhafi, as the plan for Libyan-
Egyptian union was scrapped while Libya was isolated during the
war of October 1973. Libyan policy then changed its direction if
not its object as Kadhafi pursued the theme of Arab and Islamic
unity in the Maghreb and the Sahel rather than the MachreKibyan
foreign policy had then to adjust to this about-face without,
however, disclaiming its Arab convictions and its goal which was
confrontation with Israel, not in Africa but in the Middle East.
In the words of the Libyan Foreign Minister, in an interview with
Jeune Afrique in 1973
In essence the Arab nation has become African...70% of
the Arab people lives in Africa; 60% of Arab land is in
Africa; the seven Arab countries in Africa also have the
largest populations; and the most important of the Arab
economic and cultural centres are also in Africa;
moreover the Arab language, which is one of the rare
African languages that can be written down, is spoken by
some 90 million Arabs in Africa.-':
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The battlegrilund is aTica 
Libya, like Tunisia before it, came to Africa on the rebound
- after the collapse of the unity negotiations with Egypt in
1973. If Arab unity remained the goal the young officers who had
seized power with Kadhafi in 1969 would have to make a detour of
several thousand kilometres through the Sahel before they could
outflank Egypt and confront both Sadat and Israel. Africa moved
from a very low to a very high priority in 1973. 	 Where the
regime of King Idris had only had seven embassies south of the
Sahara, under Kadhafi that number was increased in a matter of
months to over thirty, to say nothing of the forty joint
government companies, the ten Libyan financed banks,and the
seventeen Islamic centres that were all inaugurated before the
end of 1974. 4 But the diplomatic and commercial offensives would
have to be supplemented by other, military pressures, as in
Uganda and Chad, or even by promoting popular insurgency against
the most reactionary and intransigent of the African regimes.
Religion was also a formidable weapon in Kadhafi's well-
stocked armoury.	 Islam was presented by Kadhafi as an
ideological bulwark against imperialism and its own brand of
militant Christianity.	 By contesting Christianity in Africa one
was also undermining Western influence throughout the continent.
Meanwhile the presence of Islam in Africa and its considerable
popular appeal would prove the strongest link in Afro-Arab
solidarity, guaranteeing victory over even the combined forces of
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Judaism and Christianity.	 At the seventh pan-African Youth
Conference in Benghazi (Libya), in March 1974, Kadhafi strongly
denounced Christianity and its subservience to imperialism. 	 He
also attacked the Pope and the Catholic priests who wanted to
impose their domination upon the African people. In South Africa
Christianity had even been used as a weapon to destroy the black
man in Africa.5
In a speech in Bangui (Central African Republic), where he
was the guest of President (later Emperor) Jean-Bedel Bokassa, in
October 1976, Kadhafi spoke once more about the association of
Christianity with imperialism in Africa and the need for a
cultural revolution to impose the values of Islam which was more
in tune with African goals.	 A year earlier Bokassa, until then
a Catholic, had been converted to Islam changing his name to
Salah Ed Din Ahmed Bokassa and urging all Africans at the same
time to become Moslems. 	 His own conversion, one of several in
the course of his life, owed not a little to the prospect of Arab
money.	 In September 1976 Bokassa decorated Kadhafi with the
Grand Order of Bokassa referring to him - with considerable self-
effacement - as "Africa's leading hero and soldier". 7 And in an
interview with the Lebanese newspaper, Al Safir, in August 1980,
Kadhafi insisted that the Arab Christians must also convert to
Islam, for they concealed "a European spirit in an Arab
body... [and] one cannot be a Christian and an Arab at the same
time."'
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Islam,	 for Kadhafi,	 is a progressive religion which
encourages science, social justice and respect for all peoples.
In a speech on December 1, 1978, Kadhafi took it on himself to
modify the Moslem calendar so that in Libya, days, months and
years would in future be calculated from the date of the
Prophet's death and no longer from the date of the Haj ire
commemorating his departure from Mecca to Medina,' Kadhafi has
sponsored the construction of mosques and Islamic centres in
Africa, including the Grand Mosque of Niamey (Niger). And Islam
was also a central element in Libya's intervention in Uganda
throughout the seventies, in support of President Idi Amin. But
as well as support for Islam and opposition to Christianity the
major object of Kadhafi's African policy, as indeed of all his
policies, has been confrontation with Israel and, in the African
context, the expulsion of Israeli influence from the continent.
Accordingly, when the government of Ngarta (Francois)
Tombalbaye in Chad broke off diplomatic relations with Israel, in
November 1972, the way was opened for strengthening relations
with Libya and the conclusion of a Treaty of Friendship and
Cooperation which the two leaders approved a month later, in
December. As other African states followed suit Kadhafi was able
to conclude similar treaties with Niger, the Central African
Republic, Uganda and the Congo. Guinea had severed its relations
in 1967, before Kadhafi's coup.	 There was considerable
resentment in the Israeli press at the scale and success of the
Libyan campaign. According to Haaretz of December 8, 1972 :
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Not only has Libya succeeded in severing relations
between Israel and a number of African capitals, but it
has also undermined the prevailing view in Africa that
Jerusalem can find a solution to every crisis.
	
The
Africans are not accustomed to seeing Israel suffer
reverses.'°
Indeed, Kadhafi regarded Israel's growing isolation in
Africa, and the desertion of many of its former friends, as his
greatest contribution so far to the Palestinian cause. Thanks to
Libyan efforts he maintained that "the Zionist state" had been
"reduced to the level of Taiwan"," He even called for a boycott
of the forthcoming OAU summit in Addis Ababa - a celebration in
1973 of ten years of African unity - on the grounds that Israel
was permitted to maintain an embassy in the Ethiopian capital.
Only the immediate transfer of the OAU headquarters and the
adoption of a common approach to Israel could ensure a Libyan
presence on the occasion of the anniversary. 	 Cairo, it was
suggested, as the largest city in Africa would be a more
appropriate site for the OAU headquarters.
It was Kadhafi's determination to remove all trace of Israeli
influence that led to confrontation with Fidel Castro of Cuba, at
the summit of the Non-Aligned Movement in Algiers, in September
1973.	 As Cuba (like the Soviet Union) still maintained
diplomatic relations with Israel, Kadhafi denounced Castro at the
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conference as being neither socialist nor non-aligned, but a
communist (i.e., a puppet of the Soviet Union). However, at the
end of the conference, when Castro announced his decision to
sever ties with Israel, the two leaders embraced publicly.
Pressure on African states to cut their ties with Israel, coming
from Kadhafi and other Arab leaders, has not always been welcomed
- particularly in view of the substantial economic aid that
Israel had previously supplied to the African continent. They
were unlikely to identify with sentiments such as the following
expressed by the Libyan leader in a speech to the General
People's Congress in Tripoli in January 1982.
Those in Palestine who now constitute the armed state of
Israel are not the kind of Jews we can describe as Arab
cousins, the Oriental Jews who have lived in the Arab
East since time immemorial. Not at all! Those [in power
in	 Israel]	 are	 Europeans,	 criminals,	 foreigners,
mercenaries and warriors, who came and set up a criminal
society that poses a grave threat to peace here and in
the world as a whole. Those countries that have agreed
to arm and support such people will one day pay a heavy
price - after the Israelis have provoked a Third World
War.'
Meanwhile Libya's diplomatic influence in Africa certainly
owes much to the financial aid it is able to provide to
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prospective allies.
	
Libya is the only African country with a
large financial surplus - thanks to its small population, its
inability to utilise more than a fraction of its wealth at home,
and oil revenues that remained high until the mid-eighties.
States like Nigeria and Algeria also have a regular income from
oil but this (and more) is soon absorbed by development
programmes and by rising expectations on the part of a growing
population.	 Libya has sought to employ economic incentives to
ensure support for her programme across a wide range of African
states and governments, usually through bi- rather than multi-
lateral arrangements.
Leaving aside the states that belong to the Arab League, the
main beneficiaries of Libyan aid, from 1973 until 1977, have been
: Chad ($19m); Uganda ($18m), Guinea ($11m), Gabon ($10m), and
Mali ($5m)'": .	 Contrary to a widely held view - and contrary to
Saudi Arabian and OAPEC practice - Libyan assistance is not
primarily directed towards predominantly Islamic states. 	 The
presence of an important Moslem community is obviously one
criterion for Libyan aid.	 But Libya has also worked towards a
rapprochement with 'progressive' African states with a Christian
majority. With the collapse of Portuguese rule in Africa in 1974
and the emergence the following year of a number of Marxist
regimes, Libyan aid has increasingly gone to governments whose
outlook is similar, from a political and ideological point of
view, to that of Kadhafi, and which are anti-Western and anti-
imperialist.	 Thus Angola and Uganda, despite their Christian
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majorities, benefited from Libyan financial assistance - to the
tune of $150m and $180m respectively, during the 1970s14.
Other countries are viewed by Libya as being within its
'natural' sphere of influence, notably Chad and Niger who each
received $70m and $100m respectively from Libya in the 1970s."-'
Libya also subsidises some of the main agencies of Afro-Arab
cooperation, including the Arab bank for Economic Development
(BADEA).	 In the case of BADEA, Libya subscribed $40m of a total
paid-up capital of $231m.	 This did not quite match Saudi
Arabia's $50m, but it exceeded Iraq's $30m, and was double
Algeria's $20m."7.
	Kadhafi, however, absented himself from the
Afro-Arab summit in Cairo in March 1977, while the Libyan press
criticised the decision to hold the summit in the Egyptian
capital. 17 His opponents accused him of playing the game of the
Israelis and the South Africans who (unlike Kadhafi) had
condemned the idea of the summit. 	 Kadhafi's absence doubtless
reflected his conviction that the summit would be dominated by
the conservative Arab coalition headed by Saudi Arabia and the
Gulf states on the one hand, and by Egypt and Sadat on the other.
His fears were confirmed.	 The summit did, however, attract
delegates from some sixty Arab and African countries; important
decisions were taken and a fund of over $1.5b was subscribed to
meet African developmental needs.
Libyan oil policy was directed first towards securing the
highest price and the maximum profit on a commodity that is in
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limited supply	 whose reserves are finite, and where mounting
demand from the industrial nations threatened in the seventies to
exceed available supplies. The second question involved the use
of the oil as a 'weapon' by which producing countries might by
coordinated action effect changes in the behaviour and policies
of the consuming states - notably with regard to the Middle East
and the problem of Israel and the Palestinians. On the question
of pricing policy Kadhafi in 1974 had proposed, at the Islamic
Conference meeting in Lahore, to agree a preferential oil price
for the oil-dependent African states.	 Although rejected by the
other OPEC members, Kadhafi's suggestion did correspond to the
wishes of many African states for whom Afro-Arab solidarity meant
concessionary oil prices. '° Had the Libyan proposal been adopted
it is possible that Afro-Arab cooperation might not have provoked
the kind of mutual recrimination so much in evidence at the
latest meeting of the Islamic Conference Organisation, in Kuwait,
early in 1987. It was clear to the African states, however, that
Libyan influence within OPEC and among the key oil producing
states was very limited. Regarding the oil weapon we have seen
that the embargo on oil supplies to certain western countries, as
a result of the October 1973 war, was lifted after a brief
experiment and despite the objections of the Libyans.
There is little doubt that ideology rather than philanthropy
was the motive behind Libyan development aid to Africa. There
had been some aid offered before 1973, but the bulk of Libyan
commitments were entered into after 1973 as Kadhafi turned his
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attention from Egypt and the Middle East towards the sub-Saharan
states.	 The failure of Arab solidarity had much to do with
Libya's new interest in Afro-Arab solidarity. 	 Tripoli has
certainly sponsored a number of development projects in Africa,
but the main emphasis has been on social investments such as the
construction of hospitals, and cultural cooperation including the
building of mosques and Islamic centres. 	 Yet another aspect of
Libya's policy in Africa relates to military involvement (in Chad
and Uganda) and support for insurgency.
Vision of an Isiamic_state in the Sahel 
Kadhafi has issued repeated appeals to the Touareg to
'return' to	 Libya and 'rejoin' their 'motherland'.
	 The
intention has been to embarrass the governments of Mali, Niger
and Algeria whose territorial integrity would be threatened
should the Touareg comply with Kadhafi's directive.
	 Kadhafi's
aim was to secure recruits for his 'Islamic Legion' by insisting
that the Touareg were Libyan 'Arabs' exploited and oppressed by
their present political masters. In September 1979, on the tenth
anniversary of Kadhafi's accession to power, the Islamic Legion
paraded in Tripoli, its troops being acclaimed as the future
"Liberators" of the Third World.	 Nor did Kadhafi hesitate to
attack the authorities in Mali and Niger, accusing them of
persecuting elements of their population.
	
The nomads were
reminded that the borders of Libya remained open to them as "free
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Sons of the Arab nation who suffer repression and extermination
in the camps set up in Mali and Niger".°
As the Touareg are of Berber stock and have nothing in common
with the Arabs, neither race nor language. 2 '	 Kadhafi's appeals
therefore aroused derision rather than anger in Niamey and
Bamako.	 Nevertheless, in November 1980 the President of Niger,
Colonel Seyni Kountche, warned that
Every country has its domestic quarrels and its ethnic
particularisms. A certain Libyan called Kadhafi wants to
exploit such particularisms to foment subversion in our
country.22
Kountche's predecessor, Hamani Diori, had been overthrown by
Kountche, in 1974, after Diori was suspected (by the army and the
French) of conspiring to sell his country's uranium to Libya at
prices well above those sanctioned by the French government and
the mining consortium.
At the end of 1980 the press in Niger, controlled by the
government, was quick to reject any designs Kadhafi might have on
Niger's vast uranium deposits.
Where Niger has always been ready to cooperate in a loyal
and sincere way with Libya, we are not another Chad."
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Which prompted Kadhafi's retort to the effect that
The Touareg are Libyans because originally they came from
Libya.	 We do not encourage them to revolt against the
authorities in the countries where they live, but we do
invite them to return to their country because we have
the means to receive and assimilate them..24
Tripoli has sought to extend its 'protection' to the so-called
'white' minorities in those Sahel states with black governments.
These include the Touareg of Mali and Niger and the Toubous of
Niger and Chad.	 Libya can easily acquire influence over such
peoples thanks to the economic incentives it can offer and which
other governments in the region cannot hope to match.	 By the
eighties it was reported that Libya was recruiting for its
Islamic Legion from as far afield as Mauritania, Senegal, Ghana
and Nigeria (disputed by the Nigerian authorities), Mali, Upper
Volta, Niger and Chad.
	
There were also volunteers from the
Maghreb, particularly Tunisians. In one way or another Libya has
also been involved, more or less directly, in the politics of
many of the West African states, including Nigeria, with its
large and highly politicised Moslem population, and even Ghana
which is predominantly Christian. For a time Libya sponsored a
leading opponent of the government of Abdou Diouf in Senegal as
well as financing opposition to the regime in Mali - following
its reintegration into the francophone community in the late
seventies.
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At about the same time the Libyan government began to
encourage a new, younger and more militant generation of military
leaders, who took advantage of the deteriorating economic
conditions and an ageing and increasingly corrupt leadership to
seize power for themselves. They included Master-Sergeant Samuel
KanyonDoe, in Liberia (1980), Flight-Lieutenant 'Jerry' Rawlings
in Ghana (1979 and again in 1981). and the late Colonel Thomas
Sankara in Upper Volta (i.e., Burkina Faso - in 1983).
	 As the
interventions were clearly subversive of the old order and
initially failed to secure the support of the relevant European
power - America in the case of Liberia, Britain in Ghana, and
France in Upper Volta) - the usual pattern was for the coup
leader to seek Libyan political and financial support and then to
use that as a lever to extract a more favourable settlement from
the Western governments.
Liberia is now more closely and tightly integrated than ever
with the IMF, the World Bank, and the American government. Ghana
under Rawlings is regarded by the IMF, if not by its own people,
as a showpiece for Western fiscal orthodoxy. Sankara has been
overthrown and killed in Burkina Faso and it is too soon to be
able to comment on his successor. 	 It is difficult, however, to
avoid the conclusion that outside Chad and possibly Niger, and
despite the resources that Libya has squandered in West Africa
and the Sahel, the political returns have been minimal. In Niger
incipient Libyan involvement was quickly blocked by the French
who had the backing of the local military. And in Chad the
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outcome of nearly a decade of direct Libyan military intervention
has been division, defeat and a humiliation in Africa not long
after the American attack on the Libyan capital and Kadhafi's own
official residence.	 Elsewhere in Africa the picture has been
much the same : as African states have come to terms with the
international monetary organisations, in an effort to meet
interest payments on a mounting debt, they have shown less
interest in the milleniary visions of a Libyan ruler whose
fortunes, both literally and metaphorically, appear to be on the
decline, and who has himself drawn closer in recent months to
leaders and states that are well connected in Washington.
Relations with Niger 
Relations between Libya and Niger under Hamani Diori were
exceptionally cordial and seem to have been a kind of 'model for
relations between Tripoli and other states within the region.
Although a disciple at first of Houphouet-Boigny, leader of the
Ivory Coast and founder of the Entente group of states which
included Niger, Diori had registered his independence as early as
the civil war in Nigeria when he maintained cordial relations
with the Federal Government and criticised the French Government
and Houphouet-Boigny for their support for Biafra. 	 He later
sought to develop good relations with the Canadian Federal
Government in Ottawa at a time when French policy inclined
instead towards Quebec.	 As early as 1966 Libya had established
an embassy in Niger but it was 1971 before Diori visited Libya,
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looking for Libyan support for Niger's development.	 That same
year saw the commencement of extensive uranium mining in Niger,
near Arlit, as well as the o pening in Tripoli of an embassy
representing Niger.
On January 2, 1973 Niger severed diplomatic ties with Israel,
a gesture quickly approved by the Libyans. Libya and Niger drew
even closer with Kadhafi's visit to Niamey in March 1974. A
mutual defence agreement seems to have been signed while Kadhafi
pledged to provide educational and cultural aid to Niger and to
build a radio station, the "Voice of Islam", which would
propagate Islam in Africa.' s
 Diori's resolutely pro-Arab policy
identified Niger as an obvious candidate for Libyan assistance,
coupled with its Islamic population, its vast uranium deposits
and growing antagonism with the French government whose
determination to exercise complete control over uranium
extraction and marketing ensured a lower price than could
otherwise be obtained, e.g., from Libya.	 Diori's overthrow
following a military coup in April 1974 has been attributed at
least partially to the new and closer relationship with Libya,
although there were mounting domestic problems as well after
several years of severe drought throughout the Sahel.
The military in Niger might also have seen the defence
agreement with Libya as indicating a lack of confidence in the
army on the part of the civilian leadership.	 But it seems
significant that the new military government maintained its ties
-444-
with Libya, and sought as quickly as possible to restore cordial
relations with Nigeria and its other partners in the West African
Economic Community (ECOWAS). Even more to the point, in May 1974
Kadhafi paid an official visit to Niger, where he was welcomed by
the local press in the name of "Islamic fraternity"..-'6 There was
reference, too, to the "similar and even identical positions of
the two countries", vis-a-vis the international situation in
general and the "two dominant global ideologies" in particular.
Nevertheless relations between Niger and Libya did deteriorate
rapidly after 1974, perhaps reflecting the growing differences
between Paris and Tripoli, over Chad and the Western Sahara, and
above all the question of access to Niger's uranium deposits, as
Libya began making large territorial claims in Niger - after its
claims in Chad.
Several cooperation agreements between Niger and Libya were
Eaelved between 1974 and 1976 and in March 1976 there wae a
further coup attempt in Niamey, against the military government
of President Seyni Kountche.	 This time the government in Niger
made no secret of its suspicion of Libyan complicity : instead of
breaking off relations with Tripoli, however, Kountche sought to
pursue the country's earlier line of independence from France by
seeking a rapprochement with Algeria.	 Algeria was militantly
nationalist and anti-colonialist, was powerful enough to contain
any Libyan threat to Niger, and, just as important, could be
trusted to respect the frontiers of the existing states. Coupled
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with Nigerian support Kountche was convinced he could contain the
spread of Libyan influence.
President Boumedienne invited Niger and Libya to a mini-
summit at Wargla in southern Algeria, in April 1976, to discuss
and hopefully resolve outstanding differences. Far from complying
the Libyans produced new official maps of the region, in
September 1976, laying claim to an additional 52,000 square miles
of territory in Algeria, Chad and Niger. 27	Kadhafi was also
thought to be supporting a rebellion of the Touareg in northern
Mali, where uranium deposits had likewise been uncovered.
Official figures from Niger revealed that in the first half of
1981 Libya bought 1,212 tons of locally mined uranium, three
times the quantity purchased in 1980. Even the 1980 figure was
large for a country whose normal requirements were much more
limited.	 Indeed. Niger's deliveries to Libya in the first six
months of 1981 were half the quantity sold to France. But they
established Libya as Niger's second customer, ahead of Japan (816
tons) and Spain (300 tons).2e
Libya's territorial claims in Niger remained dormant until
1981, thanks largely to Algerian efforts in support of existing
frontiers. There is, however, a parallel with the situation that
later turned to Libyan intervention and conflict in Chad. 	 On
January 13, 1981 the Niger government expelled Libya's diplomatic
staff. 2 '1' This followed the attempted 'fusion' between Libya and
Chad and the conversion of the Libyan embassy in Niamey into a
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"people's bureau" without first consulting the Niger government.
Libyan intervention in N'Djamina in 1981 was seen as a threat to
Niger which was then producing ten per cent. of the world's
uranium.	 Meanwhile Algeria was distancing itself from Libya at
this time, and moving closer to Niger in the process. Confronted
by Libyan demands, Algeria and Niger quickly reached agreement on
their joint boundaries. While Kountche was attending the Franco-
African summit in Vittel, France, in October 1983, there was an
attempted coup mounted in Niamey - apparently involving security
forces close to the President. The coup was soon put down amidst
allegations of further Libyan involvement..3°
Involvement in Chad 
Chad, like Uganda before it, was a major setback for Libyan
foreign policy in Africa. 	 A large, landlocked country, with
nearly two	 hundred different	 ethnic	 groups,	 Chad was
predominantly Moslem although, for the first fifteen years after
independence, government was in the hands of the largely
Christian Sara tribe, in the South, and the President, Francois
Tombalbaye. Rebellion erupted in the centre of the country, in
1965 and the following year the Chadian National Liberation Front
(FROLINAT) was set up in Sudan, formed by Ibrahim Abatcha, with
assistance from Algeria, Sudan and Libya. The Libyan connection
thus preceded Kadhafi's arrival in power. When Numeiri of Sudan
opted out of the conflict, in a bid to appease his Christian
minority, Kadhafi stepped up his own intervention. 1968 saw the
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insurrection of the Toubou in the north based on the Borkou
Ennedi Tebesti (BET).	 Tombalbaye rejected Libyan offers of
mediation, calling instead for French intervention. 	 The region
was	 'pacified'
	
by General	 Edouard Cortadellas and his
paratroopers in 1970-2.
Libya was less concerned about French intervention at this
stage than with the more sensitive question of Chadian-Israeli
cooperation, which went beyond economic matters to encompass
military cooperation - and bases that were at the disposal of the
rebellion in southern Sudan.	 In August 1971 the government of
Chad accused Libya of interfering in its domestic affairs and
severed diplomatic relations with Tripoli.	 In September the
Libyan government reacted, according recognition to Frolinat
which then opened an office in Tripoli. 1	Chad broke off its
diplomatic relations with Israel in November 1972, just as
Tombalbaye was taking a more critical and independent line with
the French - together with the neighbouring francophone
governments of Cameroon and Niger. There was a thaw in relations
between Chad and Libya as diplomatic staff were exchanged once
again. Relations likewise improved between Chad and Sudan.
In the summer of 1973, however, Libya occupied the Aouzou
strip in northern Chad, basing its claim on the French-Italian
treaty of June 1935, which the French had never ratified.
Libya's assertion of its rights in northern Chad seem to have
gone uncontested in Chad itself, perhaps another indication of
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the southern bias in N'Djamina (and the French preference for the
Sara and the comparatively prosperous agriculture of the
south). J2	The only opposition to the Libyans came from the
Forces Armees du Nord (FAN) led by Hissene Habre. 	 Until 1975
politics in Chad remained polarised around the North/South or
Christian/Moslem axis.	 The state itself continued to be
monopolised by the Sara with the systematic exclusion of
northerners from political as well as military and economic
power.
	 While this greatly strengthened the unity and
determination of the Sara,	 it also contributed to the
fragmentation that was such a feature of FROLINAT and its
interventions. There were at least three rebel armies - the true
figure was closer to twelve - claiming revolutionary legitimacy
in Chad by 1975.
The Second Army of Hissene Habre and Goukouni Oueddei had
been created in 1972;	 in addition there were the Forces
Populaires de Liberation (FPL) of Abba Siddick, and the Eastern
Army (AE) of Mohammed Baghlan,	 The Libyan occupation of the
Aouzou Strip, in 1973, antagonised Frolinat and turned Habre into
an opponent of the regime in Tripoli.	 Kadhafi then sought to
exploit the divisions within the front as well as the ambivalence
of French policy concerning the Strip and French hostility to
Habre after several French had been captured and held by forces
loyal to him.
	 Kadhafi sought to exploit the rivalries within
Frolinat, supporting Oueddei who was closer to Libya, in
opposition to Habre who preferred to keep his distance. 	 There
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was a major schism between the two in 1976 which split the Second
Army. Habre defected to organise the Forces Armees du Nord (FAN)
while Oueddei emerged as leader of the Forces Armees Populaires
(FAP).
With the help of the French, Habre then approached President
Felix Maloum who had earlier staged a successful coup against
Tombalbaye.	 Habre then became Prime Minister while Maloum
remained as President.
	 But at the beginning of 1979 these two
leaders quarrelled.	 Nigeria intervened to try and effect a
reconciliation in Chad that would help exclude Libyan influence.
Oueddei agreed to distance himself from Libya in August 1979 and
to enter a Government of National Unity (GUNT) in N'Djamena.
Oueddei was able to take advantage of the rivalry between Habre
and Maloum to impose himself as president and to arbitrate among
all the contending factions. He detached himself from Libya and
denounced its occupation of the Aouzou Strip. Libya then accused
Goukouni of receiving arms from Jerusalem and Cairo, while
Kadhafi turned to other factional leaders including Abba Siddick,
Mohammed Abba of theFront de Liberation Populaire, Ahmat Acyl
from the Armee Vol can, and even Lieutenant-Colonel Wadel
Abdelkader Kamougue, effective master of the south.
The Libyan objective was doubtless to bar the route to
national reconciliation, as favoured by Nigeria and the majority
of African states, members of the OAU. Tripoli hoped instead to
take advantage of the continuing confusion within Chad to
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multiply its own interventions and extend and deepen its
penetration.	 Perceiving that the antagonists in Chad were
lukewarm about implementing the Kano resolutions, under which
Nigeria and Libya would act jointly to underwrite the
reconciliation in Chad.	 Oueddei accused Lagos of trying to
ignore and stifle the government in N'Djamena. Frolinat was then
confronted in the capital by the Bbuvement Fopulaire pour la
Liberation de Tchad (MPLT), financed, according to some sources,
by the	 Nigerian government. 4	 This apparently latent
confrontation was the Nigerian response to Oueddei's renewed
flirtation with Libya.	 In November 1980 it was even reported
that Nigeria was considering an announcement declaring the Libyan
ambassador in Lagos persona non grata. 36	 He was said to be
recruiting mercenaries from Nigeria to fight for Goukouni in the
civil war now raging inside Chad. Though Nigeria refrained from
breaking diplomatic relations with Libya, it nevertheless
expelled the personnel of the "people's bureau" that had been set
up inside the Libyan embassy in Lagos.
When fighting erupted in March 1980 among the various
factions of the GUNT, the contest was essentially between Habre's
FAN and the forces loyal to the GUNT, which included
Goukouni'sPAP, Kamougue's Fares Armees Tcbadiennes (FAT), and
Acyl Ahmat's Front d'Action Commune (FAC).	 The intensity of
Habre's campaign coupled with the French decision to withdraw
their forces from Chad, left Goukouni with little option but to
request Libyan intervention. 	 Kadhafi's seized the opportunity
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that his opponents had afforded him. In December 1980 he
/ despatched a large military force to Chad, comprising the
Islamic	 Legion	 with
	 over	 5,000	 infantry	 supported by
sophisticated Soviet weapons. 3 ('-' Unable to resist Habre then fled
to Cameroon.	 A month after Libyan troops had entered Chad,
Kadhafi announced that Libya would merge with its southern
neighbour.	 any states in Africa were critical of the Libyan
gesture, seeing the Libyan presence more as an annexation than as
a merger.	 In November 1981 Libya made the surprise announcement
that she was withdrawing her forces from Chad - after strong
pressure from African capitals and a campaign that seemed to be
concerted between Lagos and Paris.
In December an OAU peacekeeping force was hastily improvised
under Nigerian leadership but with contributions from only three
of the six African states that had originally agreed to
participate in the venture. The force had no clear instructions
beforehand, with the Nigerians determined to avoid a military
confrontation with any of the contending factions. 	 Before long
they found themselves under fire while Lagos failed to receive
the financial backing it had been promised for the force - either
from the OAU or from the French.	 Zaire and Senegal who also
contributed to the OAU force of 3,500 troops had rather different
conceptions from Nigeria about their role and referred all
decisions about their deployment for the advice of their
respective governments. 37 Oueddei interpreted 'peacekeeping' to
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mean that the inter-African force would assist him to defeat
Habre' s FAN.
However, General Ejiga, Nigerian commander of the force, saw
it as occupying a neutral position, creating a buffer zone
between the opposing forces. 	 Habre was able to put together a
successful military coalition which, in view of the Nigerian
attitude, resulted in Goukouni's downfall.	 There followed yet
another Libyan intervention from the north in support of
Goukouni, accompanied by a new French intervention, this time on
behalf of Hissene Habre and his victorious coalition. Where the
French had long considered Chad to be an integral part of their
African domain, and the Libyans, under Kadhafi, had just as
strongly rejected any French presence in Africa, the campaign in
Chad, in 1982-3, threatened for a time to turn to all-out war.
Francois Mitterrand, the new Socialist president of France
was anxious, however, to dissociate his administration from the
earlier image of France - under the Fifth Republic - as the
gendarme of Africa.
	 A politician, with considerable previous
experience of black Africa, Mitterrand was wary of those in
Washington and elsewhere who sought to draw France into a direct
confrontation with Libya.	 This time French intervention was
designed not to support one or other faction, but instead to
separate the warring leaders, providing a respite during which a
peaceful settlement might be negotiated.
	
Fighting a rear-guard
action on the economic front in France itself, Mitterrand's
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government had no wish to become embroiled in what threatened to
become a long and expensive war with the risk of super-power
involvement.	 Already Washington had supplied Habre with arms
while he had been regrouping his forces in Sudan, in preparation
for his return to power, and while France was still courting
Oueddei's government in N'Djamena and working behind the scenes
to secure the withdrawal of the Libyan forces. 	 The French
politely warned the Americans that France could not accept the
view of the Chadian conflict as one between East and West.
Claude Cheysson, then French Foreign Minister, spoke of it as
primarily a "war of chiefs".9
Chad offered Kadhafi an obvious base from which to pursue
his vision of an "Islamic Empire in the Sahara", stretching from
Mauritania to Sudan.	 Being desperately poor, most of the
countries in the region were also politically vulnerable. Which
may be why Kadhafi appeared to accept Mitterrand's offer for a
joint but phased withdrawal of French and Libyan troops from
Chad, only to renege on the agreement, if such was indeed the
agreement, after the French had hastened to comply. 	 French
withdrawal did, however, encourage those in Chad who wished to
seize this, perhaps the last opportunity for a settlement
excluding all direct foreign intervention. 	 In Tripoli there
appears to have been a strong difference of opinion between
Goukouni and Kadhafi, reflected in Chad by the defection of much
of Goukouni's support to the government forces now led by Habre.
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The outcome, in March 1987, was the unexpected defeat of the
Libyan army at Oudi Doum, with 2,500-3,000 soldiers killed and
hundreds of prisoners taken captive. 4°	 For the first time
Goukouni's followers had fought alongside the government forces,
Kadhafi's prestige in Africa has suffered a severe blow from
which it may not recover. The remnants of the Libyan army, back
in Libya, may be a de-stabilising factor.	 The war itself is
reported to have been unpopular with the Libyan officers and men.
Kadhafi for his part is likely to take the opportunity to try to
strengthen his control over the military, by changes of personnel
at all levels, as well as by measures of de-centralisation,
designed to give additional protection against any possible
military intervention.
'Islamic' solidarity - with Uganda! 
Elsewhere the experience of Libyan intervention has been
scarcely more succesful although the motive has usually been
similar : to eliminate Israeli and Zionist influence from Africa
and to encourage the spread of Islam. Since independence Israel
has sought to improve relations with black Africa, not only to
secure diplomatic support but, more important, to position itself
for intervention in the Arab states - to exploit any sign of
weakness or division in the other camp. 	 In Sudan, for example,
Israel helped train the southern African dissidents, gathered
together in the 1960s in the Anya Bya movement. Further south
Israel has also shown a continuing interest in Uganda which, to
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some extent, also controls the Nile waters, vital for Egypt and
its economy.
	 When President Milton Obote was overthrown as
President of Uganda, in 1971, there were 150-200 Israeli experts
- half of them military - inside Uganda.
	
Israel was also
undertaking construction of six air bases and the training of
Ugandan paratroopers.' 	 There were those who suspected the
Israelis of complicity in the coup that enabled Idi Amin to
replace Obote while the latter was attending the Commonwealth
Conference in Singapore.
It came as something of a shock, therefore, when, on March
30, 1972,
	
Amin announced his country's break with Israel.
Already Libya's influence was being felt in Uganda. In September
there appeared the first signs that Kampala was moving towards
the Arab viewpoint. In the United Nations Uganda voted a motion
calling on Israel to withdraw from the territories occupied in
1967.	 That same month some 400 Libyan troops landed at Entebbe
airport near Kampala. 	 Intended to provide a loyal, private
bodyguard for Amin, the troops were met and welcomed by the
President himself. 42
 In January 1973 Amin made the pilgrimage to
the holy land and, on his return from Mecca, Amin stopped off in
Tripoli where he conferred with Kadhafi.
	 A Joint communique
proclaimed Islam as "the language of revolution".
	 Libya
undertook to build and finance a programme of educational and
religious building in Uganda as well as signing agreements for
economic cooperation.	 Bilateral relations were further
strengthened the following month as Libya offered to provide a
-456-
$10 million loan which had first been promised and then refused
by Great Britain.4'11
Uganda was the first African state eligible for Libyan aid,
for the simple reason that it was also the first sub-Saharan
state to have severed diplomatic ties with Israel.
	 It was also
the first to have expelled Israeli military staff, in March 1973.
Successes of that order won considerable respect for Kadhafi and
his policies among many of his Arab partners. Amin, on the other
hand, was able to exploit the situation to win considerable
leverage over his patron. To get Libyan support for his scheme
to invade Tanzania, Amin had only to cite the presence in Dar-es-
Salaam of Milton Obote, plotting his return to power with
Tanzanian complicity - and Israeli support!	 The Libyans were
convinced that the removal of Amin would mean the return in force
to Kampala of their Israeli foes.	 In February 1977, when there
were "threats" of an invasion from Tanzania, Kampala was able to
announce that Libya had placed all its armed forces at the
disposal of the Ugandan govenrment.
Two months before the Ugandan attack on Tanzania, in November
1978, Id! Amin and his Defence Minister were both in Tripoli.
After the outbreak of hostilities Libya called for moderation on
the part of Tanzania and Uganda. Uganda, part of whose army was
trained by the Palestinians, claimed to be ready to comply with
the Libyan appeal : Tanzania, understandably, refused."
	 In
March 1979 Amin called for a war against the Tanzanian
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"aggressor" and his entourage of mercenaries and Ugandan
traitors, supported by a coalition of imperialists, zionists and
racists.
	
He also confirmed that Palestinians were actively
engaged in the conflict, fighting alongside his own troops 	 By
then the Ugandan army was being driven back across the frontier
by the Tanzanian milit 'ary offensive. 	 Shortly afterwards the
Tanzanian president, Julius Nyerere, rejected an ultimatum from
the Libyans to withdraw his troops from Ugandan territory,
notwithstanding a Libyan threat to commit forces of its own to
the defence of the Ugandan regime. More than 3,000 Libyan troops
do, indeed, seem to have been seconded to the defence of the
government in Kampala, while the Libyan media deplored the
"terrible massacre of Ugandan Moslems by invading forces from
Tanzania".
Despite Libyan intervention, the Ugandan opposition, which
comprised some eighteen different movements, organised into the
National Front for the Liberation of Uganda (NFLU), entered and
occupied Kampala with the help of the Tanzanians on April 11,
1979. Amin fled the country, finally seeking sanctuary in Saudi
Arabia.	 Libya had suffered 400 troops killed and another 200
taken captive in the course of the brief campaign. 46 They had
gone to Kampala on a mission of "Islamic solidarity", despite the
large Christian majority in Uganda where the Moslem population
had never exceeded ten per cent, at most, and despite Amin's
fearsome reputation both at home and abroad.
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Libya and the Horn of Africa 
The conflict in the Horn of Africa has traditionally involved
long-standing Somali claims to the Ogaden province of Ethiopia,
as well as claims, later withdrawn, to much of Kenya's most
northerly province.	 It has also involved the parallel struggle
for autonomy or independence from Ethiopia on the part of various
factions, Christian and Marxist in Eritrea, 	 From the outset
there was a strong East-West dimension, with American support for
the Emperor Haile Selassie in Addis Ababa, and Chinese, later
Soviet support for the regimes, civilian and military, in
Mogadishiu.	 The Somalis had failed in their first military
confrontation with Ethiopia in 1964, when they had received
little encouragement from the Soviets and had incurred the united
wrath of the African states for trying to change existing
frontiers by force.
They would try a second time, in 1977-78, following the
revolution in Ethiopia in 1974 which saw the overthrow of Haile
Selassie and the installation of the military dergue.	 Under
attack over civil rights from President Carter, and, much more
serious, facing	 an invasion from Somalia, the new regime in
Addis Ababa moved further to the left, removing the Americans and
inviting Soviet and Cuban intervention to defend what by now was
describing itself as a Marxist, rather than a socialist regime.
The Russians, for their part, were happy to exchange their
influence in Somalia for a much larger, potentially stronger
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ally, occupying a strategic location in North-East Africa with
access to the Red Sea.
Libya's rapprochement with the Soviet Union after 1973
coincided with Egypt's integration after 1972 in the Western camp
and Sadat's expulsion of the Soviet technicians and military
advisers.	 Prior to the revolution in Ethiopia, in 1974, Libya
under Kadhafi had supported the territorial claims of Somalia and
her rejection of the inherited colonial frontiers.	 Somalia's
Moslem majority and her membership of the Arab League - although
she was not an Arab country - qualified her for Libyan support.
Like Algeria, however, Libya moved into the other camp following
the revolution in Ethiopia and the arrival in power of Colonel
Mengistu Haile Mariam.	 The change in Tripoli was influenced by
the new Soviet preference for Ethiopia, coupled, above all, with
the fact that 'moderate' Arab states, led by Egypt, Saudi Arabia,
Morocco and the Sudan. were now providing support for Somalia.The
fact that Somalia belonged to the Arab League while the
leadership in Ethiopia was neither Arab nor Moslem does not seem
to have troubled Kadhafi (or Algeria).
And by 1977 Kadhafi had made yet another switch - from
supporting the mainly Moslem guerrilla movement in Eritrea
against Haile Selassie, to supporting the Marxist regime of Haile
Mariam against the Eritrean Marxists. Once again the readiness
of 'moderate' Arab states like Saudi Arabia to back the Eritrean
movements was apparently sufficient cause for Libya to support
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the anti-imperialist regime now entrenched in Addis Ababa.
	 In
July 1977 Egypt, Sudan and Saudi Arabia had concluded a 'holy
alliance' with the aim of containing communist 'subversion'
whether from South Yemen, Ethiopia or from Libya. They planned
to transform the Red Sea into an "Arab lake of peace". The fear
of Soviet penetration of Africa and the Middle East and the
desire for American support were also factors in the Arab
equation.	 In Tripoli, however, the threat came from outside,
directed by the United States and its European and Arab
accomplices.
	 The aim was to de-stabilise all 'progressive'
African regimes.	 Hence Libya's support for Ethiopia against
Somalia after 1974;	 it was even reported that Libya had given
Moscow $300 million to supply Mengistu's regime with MIG 21
fighter aircraft and some 110 T34 and T54 tanks,
Having defeated the Somali invasion with Cuban and Soviet
assistance, the regime in Ethiopia then invoked Russian aid in a
major offensive against the Eritrean liberation movements around
Asmara. The Cubans seem to have declined their support for a war
against a genuinely Marxist movement, while even the Libyans were
uncertain whether to condone the destruction of a movement that
was not only Marxist but also included a commitment to pan-
Arabism among its objectives. Military failure in Eritrea might,
however, provoke the downfall of the government in Addis Ababa,
Unable or unwilling to choose Tripoli finally opted for a
negotiated, political solution to the conflict - not unlike the
Cuban position.	 Yet its repeated calls for negotiation did not
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halt the Soviet military engagement in Eritrea; nor did it lead
to a re-consideration of the Libyan-Ethiopian alliance.
	
In the
interests	 of	 anti-imperialist	 solidarity,	 Libya supports
'revolutionary' Ethiopia against the claims of Somalia, after
having earlier supported Marxist Somalia against pro-Western
Ethiopia.	 However, in the interests of Arab-Islamic
solidarity, it called for a negotiated settlement of the
Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict (1976-78) after having supported the
Eritrean guerrillas agains Addis Ababa (1969-75).
Support for Soviet strategy and Soviet interests was never
the over-riding or even the principal preoccupation on the part
of Kadhafi.	 Instead it was the defence of 'progressive' regimes
in Africa that would then become reliable partners in the
struggle against Israel, and to defeat zionism and its
imperialist allies.	 The Libyans have never stopped criticising
Soviet opposition to religion and communist support for secular
atheism among the peoples of the Soviet Union who include a very
substantial Moslem component.	 Nor can the Libyans ignore the
fact that the Soviet Union voted for the creation of Israel in
the United Nations - alongside the United States. Indeed the
continuing emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel is one of the
ambitions of the present Israeli leaders. The Soviets have also
refused to accept the more extreme Palestinian position, which
would entail the disappearance of the Jewish state in the Middle
East. That certainly was not the tenor of the Brezhnev proposals
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advanced in 1978.
	
Moreover, Moscow supported Arafat against
Assad and Kadhafi in 1983.
Nevertheless, it is a major objective of Kadhafi's African
policy to exclude western as well as Israeli influence from
Africa - and, most notably, the tenacious grip of the French over
their former territories in West and Central Africa. 	 It was in
Chad that the Libyans hoped first to confront and then defeat the
French, repeating their success among the adjacent states of the
Sahel.	 In his Africa Day address on May 25, 1981 Kadhafi
denounced those African states that were French-speaking and
"completely subservient to France". It would make more sense in
such cases to transfer Libya's diplomatic missions to France
itself. 48	Accordingly, in June 1980 the Libyan government
announced the closure of its embassy in Senegal, while its
diplomatic staff were recalled from Gabon in August 1981.
Senegal responded by breaking off diplomatic relations with Libya
on July 1, 1980. Two weeks later President Senghor accused
Kadhafi of training and arming mercenaries in an attempt to de-
stabilise the Sahelian region. There were even allegations that
Kadhafi was mobilising Senegalese dissidents under Ahmed Khalifa
Niasse - who had taken refuge in Libya and had called for the
installation of an Islamic republic in Senegal.'"
The same year Kadhafi was suspected of playing a part in the
so-called Maitatsine riots that rocked the northern Nigerian city
of Kano shortly after the return of civilian government and the
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withdrawal of the military. The Nigerian Foreign Minister warned
I sincerely hope that they- the Libyans - will keep out
of this country... But if they continue [to intervene] we
will have to consider taking drastic measures. s°
Several other African states followed Senegal's example in
severing diplomatic ties with Libya in 1980-81, including
Gambia,Gabon and Ghana - all alleging that Libya had interfered
in their domestic affairs.	 Indeed, repeated intervention by
Libya in the states of the Sahel, and its exploitation of their
persistent social and economic problems, has had the effect of
uniting their governments - the majority at least - in efforts to
isolate and contain Kadhafi.
At the 1981 OAU summit, in Nairobi, several African states
were reluctant to have Tripoli as the venue for the next OAU
summit.	 In fact the 1982 summit had to be abandoned after two
successive attempts to convene in Tripoli. On the first occasion
various states refused to attend because the Saharawi Arab
Democratic Republic (SADR) had been admitted to full membership of
the organisation.	 At the second attempt they again refused to
attend because Kadhafi refused to receive Hissene Habre as the
legitimate representative of Chad. Many African states saw Chad
as the springboard for Libyan attempts at de-stabilisation
elsewhere in the Sahel and, beyond that, in West, Central and
-464-
Eastern Africa.	 Fears such as these have led the Ivorian
President, Houphouet-Boigny, to attribute a prolonged teachers'
strike in April 1983 to the machinations of an unnamed foreign
power - presumably Libya.	 At that time Kadhafi was visiting
Benin, a francophone state and a member of the Ivorian Entente -
but with a 'Marxist' military government. In Benin he succeeded
in infuriating Houphouet-Boigny by declaring : "we must continue
to incite the African peoples to revolution and to encourage the
army to seize power." In Abidjan he was described by the media
as an "Arab-African Hitler". s '	 The pro-Libyan coup that took
place in Upper Volta four months later, in August 1983, clearly
served to confirm African fears about Kadhafi.
Conclusions 
Libya's foreign policy in sub-Saharan Africa has a symbolic
character that is inspired by Kadhafi's dream of a united Arab
nation that would one day assume the leadership of the Third
World. Libya's interest in Africa south of the Sahara grew after
the failure of Libya's foreign policy both in the Middle East and
in the Maghreb. Substantial oil revenues have given credibility
to Libya's ambitions in Africa which are backed up by generous
offers of financial assistance on the one hand as well as by
threats of military involvement and de-stabilisation on the
other.	 But visions of Arab unity in Africa have proved as
difficult to realise as earlier dreams of unity with Egypt and
the other Arab states of the Middle East. Another dimension of
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Libyan policy in sub-Saharan Africa is its support for Islam and
its efforts to replace Western values with Moslem ones. In line
with much earlier policies of Senoussiya expansionism it seeks to
dominate the Sahara in ideological terms. Accordingly, Kadhafi's
Libya follows the 'natural' line of expansion which was that of
the Senoussiya, towards Chad, southern Algeria and northern
Niger.	 Again the symbolic nature of Libyan policy is obvious,
although mixed, as always with a measure of pragmatism and more
than a suspicion of opportunism.
But it is Kadhafi's Middle Eastern designs and his desire to
acquire a nuclear capability, on behalf of the Arab world, that
have pushed him in the direction of territorial expansion and
into neighbouring states with large known (or reputed) reserves
of uranium - just as the desire to acquire nuclear technology has
pushed him into even closer alliance with the Soviet Union. But
again it is the symbolic character of Libyan policy that is most
striking. Libya has little to recommend it as a credible nuclear
power - unlike Israel it does not have the technological base or
the	 necessary	 levels	 of	 scientific	 skill	 or military
organisation. For Kadhafi the possession of a nuclear capability
would serve largely symbolic purposes - as a token of Arab
renewal and a force for Arab unity.	 As well as being an
instrument of coercion and blackmail, a nuclear device also helps
define the extent of a state's 'power' as well as its prestige in
the modern world. To Kadhafi there is no question but that the
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restoration of Arab 'greatness' requires the acquisition of
nuclear capability.
After 1973 the Maghrebin states pursued more active foreign
policies in Africa. 	 The reason was the Arab-Israeli war of
October 1973, which provided motives and incentives forArabs and
Africans to come together to harmonise their foreign policies
with regard to the external world and in the context of Middle
Eastern issues and the North-South debate.
	 In the Maghreb,
Algeria and Libya made considerable efforts to convince African
states of the necessity for a united Arab-African front so as to
make common cause against the "common" enemy : represented by
apartheid on the one hand and by zionism on the other.
	 It was
argued that by combining their efforts the Arab and African
states could help defeat injustice and regain their sense of
dignity. These efforts resulted in the so-called Afro-Arab
Dialogue where Arab finance and African diplomacy were supposed
to complement one another and to contribute to the success of
their respective causes.
The conservative Arab states of the Gulf, led by Saudi
Arabia, were determined, however, to show themselves as the
effective masters of the new situation.	 It was their financial
contributions rather than those of the Maghrebin states that
would determine the success or otherwise of Afro-Arab dialogue -
at least so far as the African recipients of aid were concerned.
The radical Arab states like Algeria and Libya were excluded from
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any major role in the Arab-African rapprochement, which was to
the advantage of the moderate Maghrebin states, namely Morocco
and Tunisia, who lacked the income of their "oil-rich" neighbours
but had no wish to be overtaken either in the Maghreb itself, or
anywhere else in Africa.
In the medium and longer term, however, the divisions within
the Arab world have served only to weaken Arab-African
cooperation as African states have resisted attempts to enlist
their support in inter-Arab conflicts that are remote from their
immediate concerns. It is argued that such disputes have served
only to threaten and undermine the fragile consensus on which
African unity and the OAU are based. Meanwhile the conflict over
the Western Sahara split the Maghreb into two distinct camps with
Algeria "supported" by Libya on the one hand, and Morocco
receiving "moral" backing from Tunisia on the other. Morocco's
military successes on the battlefield were matched by Algeria's
diplomatic efforts on the African scene. These regional rivalries
then spilt over into other areas of Africa where conflict was
increasingly assuming an ideological character, beginning with
Angolan independence and the civil war that accompanied it in
1975 and soon spreading to the Western Sahara, then to the Horn
of Africa and, after the troubles in Shaba province of Zaire,
finally focussing on the civil war in Chad. From the outset,
Algeria's covert support for the MPLA and the central government
in Angola was countered by Morocco's more direct and explicit
support for Zaire and the Angolan opposition.
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The Maghrebin states, with the exception of Libya, have
approached their potential African allies from the vantage point
of a limited coincidence of interests rather than that of an all-
embracing sense of community and shared values. But the crucial
factor dictating Maghrebin involvement in Africa has been the
struggle for regional leadership within the Maghreb itself and
the attempt to enlist African support on behalf of the two
leading North African states, Algeria and Morocco. The Algerian
approach has been largely secular focussing mainly on economic
issues with the emphasis on national control of resources, on
overcoming dependency and cooperating in the creation of a new
international economic order. 	 At the same time Algeria views
Africa as a large and convenient market - once existing barriers
to trade are overcome - for the country's expanding industrial
production, as well as an obvious source of raw materials. The
Moroccan interest in Africa is political and strategic rather
than economic. Radical states like Algeria and Libya are
perceived as a serious threat to the established social and
political order.	 The Moroccan role in Africa is therefore to
strengthen and defend the moderate African regimes - although
occasionally (and briefly) Morocco has made common cause with
radical states, notably Ghana in the sixties and Libya in the
1980s, in pursuit of territorial claims dictated by the logic of
Maghrebin politics.
Tunisia, which has few means with which to influence events
in Africa, prefers to see the continent tied to the western world
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whose continuing support and cooperation, both military and
economic, is felt to be a condition for African emancipation, and
for the independence and development of the new states.	 Libya,
on the other hand, has pursued long term symbolic goals as well
as short term territorial gains in Africa.	 The attachment to
Arab unity and Islamic hegemony has been accompanied by wide-
ranging interventions in African and Arab states alike, usually
involving financial or military support or, conversely, de-
stabilisation culminating sometimes in physical intervention.
African ends are subordinated to (radical) Arab goals and
leadership, although the targets of Libyan policy are often the
"corrupt", conservative regimes in Africa and the Middle East,
which have made common cause with imperialism and zionism at the
expense of the masses and Arab-African unity. 	 In that context
Islam is presented as a revolutionary doctrine that is alone
capable of mobilising those same masses against foreign
penetration and economic exploitation.
Libyan policy under Kadhafi has, however, been perceived as
ambitious, subversive and, indeed, counter-productive by most
other African states, conservative and radical alike, as well as
by states and powers outside Africa.
	 While North African
Interest in the sub-Saharan states has largely been dictated by
rivalries within the Maghreb itself, the divisions among the Arab
states have been just as pronounced as the divisions among the
old colonial powers. As a result Afro-Arab dialogue had already
lost much of its attractiveness for both sides even before the
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end, of the 1970s and the start of the next decade that would
witness a sharp drop in oil prices and the emergence of the debt
crisis,
PART FIVE
THE MAGHREB-WESTERN EUROPE AND THE
SUPER POWERS 
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THE MAGHREB. WESTERN EUROPE AND THE SUPER-POWERS 
Introduction 
The year 1973 marked a watershed in Arab-European relations
generally and in Maghrebin-European relations in particular. It
was the year of Euro-Arab Dialogue (EAD) following the Arab-
Israeli war of October. 	 But for the war, the oil boycott, and
the new pricing arrangements for oil, there would not have been a
dialogue, Because of their geographical proximity to Europe and
their historical ties, particularly with France, the Maghreb
countries played a prominent role in the Dialogue. Even before
the October war, at the summit of the Non-Aligned Movement in
Algiers, in September 1973, Houari Boumedienne had raised the
question of a rapprochement with Europe "to put an end to the
bipolarisation of the world". Afro-Arab cooperation and a joint
dialogue with Europe were seen as useful steps towards that goal.
European technology, Arab oil and finance, and African raw
materials formed the basis for an alliance that even the super-
powers would have to reckon with.
From the vantage point of Western Europe and the member-
countries of the European Community (EC) the oil boycott, imposed
by OAPEC in the context of the 1973 war, raised a number of vital
issues : the formation of an oil-producers cartel was no longer a
remote and unlikely prospect; Europe was particularly vulnerable
to such a boycott given its high consumption of imported oil and
its heavy dependence on Middle Eastern producers; and globally
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the European states were unable to speak with a single voice and
were, in any case, overshadowed by the super-powers, particularly
the United States. The 'Mine' therefore issued a declaration on
November 6, 1973, which proclaimed the support of the EC for
Security Council resolutions 242 and 336, calling for Israeli
withdrawal from the territories occupied since 1967 and
acknowledging the right of all Middle Eastern states to secure
existence within recognised and approved frontiers.	 There was
recognition, too, of the	 need for a "just peace" based on
acceptance of the "legitimate rights of the Palestinians".
This important statement, now regarded as Western Europe's
first original contribution to the Middle Eastern debate, was
followed a few days later by the Arab League summit in Algiers
which issued an appeal for the development of trust and mutually
beneficial cooperation across the Mediterranean and between
European and Arab states - states which shared a long history as
well as cultural affinities and a number of vital interests that
remained common to both. Such were the origins of Euro-Arab
Dialogue in 1973.	 In December discussions were held in
Copenhagen between European representatives and four Arab
ministers (from Alge,ria, Tunisia, Sudan and the UAE) mandated by
the Algiers Arab summit, The European states had to balance off
their heavy dependence on Arab oil, which accounted for well over
half their total imports, against American warnings that any
Dialogue at this level should not extend to questions of politics
or oil. The dialogue nevertheless became institutionalised with
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the creation of a General Commission that met for the first time
in Luxembourg, in May 1974. There were further meetings in Tunis
(1977), Brussels (end of 1977), Copenhagen (March 1978) and
Damascus (December 1978). Meanwhile EC exports to the Arab world
more than doubled, rising from 6.6% of all exports in 1972 to 15%
in 1979.2
The European reaction to Camp David in 1978 was supportive, at
least in public, although there was considerable scepticism
regarding the possibi.lity of a Palestinian settlement emerging
within such a restricted diplomatic framework, 	 The Foreign
Ministers of the EC, in a statement of September 19,
congratulated President Carter on his efforts and achievements to
date, but insisted that peace would be achieved only when the
various parties concerned had taken account of a "Palestinian
homeland". 2 In 1979 there was increased pressure on Europe both
from the French government inside the EC and from the Arab states
outside, who called for a European diplomatic posture on the
Middle East that would be independent of the United States and
would better protect European interests in the Arab World. The
outcome was the Venice declaration in June 1980 which launched a
European initiative for a settlement of the outstanding issues in
the Middle East.	 The declaration did not go so far as to
recognise the PLO but did ask that the PLO should be associated
with any future negotiations.
	
It also rejected any unilateral
initiative aimed at a change in the status of Jerusalem.
Otherwise the West European states confirmed the right of all
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states within the Middle East to a secure and peaceful existence
within recognised frontiers, and repeated its earlier appeal for
a just settlement in the Middle East recognising, among other
things, the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.4
Caution rather than imagination were the hallmarks of the
Venice declaration, whose overriding concern it was to reassure
Washington while seeking to placate the Arab states with a number
of pious statements that, in the context of European-American
relations, carried little or no weight with the super-powers.
This evident lack of resolve on the part of the Europeans,
coupled with the new Republican administration in Washington,
doubtless encouraged Israel to invade the Lebanon in 1982. There
was an attempt to revive the European peace initiative in March
1984 - long after the failure of the Brezhnev Plan in 1978, the
Reagan Plan of September 1981 and the Fand Plan of 1981/1982.
There was a declaration by EC members calling on Israel to end
its occupation of Arab territories and to halt the creation of
new settlements in the West Bank, the Golan, and Gaza. Without
American backing, however, the member-states of the EC had little
leverage over Israel even had they been agreed - which they were
not - about measures to give effect to their resolutions.
The Maghrebin states were well placed, geographically and
otherwise, to play a key role in any Euro-Arab Dialogue. Long
and close association with France and other EC countries had made
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them familiar with the problems arising from transfer of
technology and unequal exchange. Where, in the past, Algeria had
been ready to play the American card against the French in order
to achieve independence, they now sought to strengthen Euro-Arab
Dialogue in the hope of distancing Western Europe (or individual
European states) from the United States, emphasising their
different and often conflicting interests, while underlining the
underlying sympathies and the interdependence that marked
Europe's relations with the Arab states.	 Algeria was already
looking for improved relations with France, under President
Giscard d'Estaing after 1974, in the context of the North-South
Dialogue, and after 1981 under the socialist President, Francois
Mitterrand, who held out promise of a new era of Franco-Algerian
solidarity and cooperation, beginning with a long-term contract
for imported Algerian gas on terns that were highly favourable to
Algeria.
For the Algerians, cooperation with France and Europe would
help reduce American influence in the Middle East, and within the
Arab world would strengthen the states of the Maghreb (notably
Algeria) at the expense of those in the Gulf who claimed to have
the confidence of Washington. The oil embargo imposed by OAPEC
on October 17, 1973, was designed to gain leverage over the West
and thereby to increase the pressure on Israel to negotiate. For
Algeria, however, it also served other purposes. 	 Primarily it
was a means of boosting oil revenues to finance domestic
development and a series of major economic projects. If Algeria
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called for tougher measures against the United States, the
Netherlands, Portugal and South Africa, and was "softer" on the
other EC countries, this largely reflected her own trading
patterns. Oil supplies to America were then only 5% of total oil
exports from Algeria. Nor could America retaliate diplomatically
or otherwise against Algeria as all relations had been severed
after 1967.
Oil is not, however, the only commodity traded across the
Mediterranean. The countries of the EC, particularly France, also
provide a valuable outlet for surplus Maghrebin labour,
especially unskilled labour from Algeria and Morocco. They are
also an important source of manufactured goods as well as
providing technical and financial assistance. The Maghreb, for
its part, supplies much of the EC's energy and commodity
requirements, creating a large degree of complementarity between
the North and South "banks" of the Mediterranean.	 Indeed,
Maghrebin trade with the EC far exceeds the levels of trade
within North Africa itself - one of the major problems
confronting more ambitious plans for Maghrebin unity and
cooperation. Dialogue with the EC is also favoured by the North
African states in so far as it is a trading community rather than
a military alliance and does not therefore threaten their
independent, non-aligned status.
	
In that respect it is
preferable to alliance with either of the super-powers and
integration in their respectivtmilitary blocs.
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Under the terms of the EC's Mediterranean policy, the
community began in 1973 to negotiate an agreement of association
with Algeria as well as renewal of existing agreements of
association with Tunisia an Morocco.	 The negotiations broke
down, however, over the problems posed by Tunisia's tinned
sardines, by Morocco's citrus fruits, and by Algerian wine.
Agreement on the new trading arrangements, and provisions for aid
and cooperation, was not reached, therefore, until 1976. 	 In
April of that year Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia all signed
association agreements with the EC (then the EEC)- which
emphasised the growing inter-dependence of the nations on both
sides of the Mediterranean, and twenty years after Tunisian and
Moroccan independence. North Africa serves increasingly as a
convenient market for West European manufactured goods and as a
recipient of European technology, while Western Europe absorbs
much of North Africa's agricultural surplus, her unskilled labour
and her raw materials.
In the case of Tunisia and Morocco the new agreements of
association gave preferential access for Tunisian products like
olive oil and wine which would now be admitted to the Community
markets at special low tariffs. Industrial products would have
free access with quotas for more sensitive items whose import
would threaten established local manufactures.	 Tariffs on
Moroccan citrus fruits and wine were set 80% below the fixed
Community rate, while concessions were also available for tinned
sardines and olive oil and, in the industrial sector, there is
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exemption for all Moroccan products derived from cork. Algeria
had no previous agreement with the EC and, conscious of its
leading position in the Third World and its reputation as a
radical state, the Algerians made the negotiations both difficult
and protracted. The agreements concluded by Tunisia and Morocco
were strongly attacked by Algiers who claimed they had obtained
only "derisory" advantages and were simply bolstering European
protectionism.	 The agreement of association finally reached
between the EC and Algeria was broadly similar, however, to those
already signed with her two North African neighbours. There was
complete exemption from tariffs for Algeria's industrial products
with partial exceptions for cork and for products derived from
refined petroleums
Tunisia and Morocco protested nevertheless at what seemed to
them unfair discrimination in favour of Algeria and against their
own established economic interests. 	 Algeria, they maintained,
had negotiated easier access for its oranges and quality wines
than they had received for the same products. To which the EC
replied that other concessions had been made to the Tunisians and
Moroccans, achieving an overall balance between the three
Maghrebin states. s	 The 1976 agreements were of unlimited
duration and, unlike previous agreements, did not entail the
granting of "reverse preference" to the states of the EC. 	 In
fact the concession dates back to 1973/4 and the re-negotiation
in Brussels of the Lome Agreeents. Under Nigerian leadership the
African, Caribbean and Pacific states had pressed strongly for
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concessions on "reverse preferences" as well as on a number of
other issues including fixed 'floor' prices for a specified
number of commodities essential to the economic survival of many
of the poorest Third World states. As in other areas of policy
the African and other Third World states were beginning to look
within themselves for leadership in international negotiations -
and away from the Arab states.
Nevertheless, Algeria attached particular importance to the
principle of "non-reciprocity", for which it had campaigned
actively through the seventies in the context of the North-South
dialogue.	 Along with lower tariffs on industrial products and
guaranteed quotas and minimum prices for raw material exports, it
had long been seen by Third World states as an important step
towards a New International Economic Order. The 1976 agreement
of association was renewed by Algeria in June 1987. There was a
matching financial protocol with a renewable five-year duration
for which the EC has allocated the sum of FF 1.7 billion. Europe
is Algeria's major market for hydro-carbons as well as being the
leading supplier of goods to Algeria, while the balance of trade
in 1986 was $2 billion in Algeria's favour.7
Algerian policy in the period under review was largely based
on extracting from Brussels and the European capitals the best
possible terms for Algerian trade while pursuing its goal of
rapid industrialisation in an attempt to transform the country's
status within the international capitalist system. The approach
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can best be described - to adopt the language of I.W. Zartnan -
as that of "licking them",	 Tunisia and Morocco are similarly
concerned with their domestic development and securing better
terns of trade with the EC.	 Their elites, however, are more
conservative and more closely integrated with the ruling circles
in Western Europe. The main goal of association with the EC is
therefore to foster the preservation of existing economic (and
therefore political) structures : the approach is one of "joining
them",Fx
The Mediteranean basin forms a single ecological unit and
patterns of agricultural production are therefore similar
everywhere. The Maghreb states, being on the other side of the
Mediterranean are not, however, eligible for membership of the
European Community.	 Their status is governed by a special
Declaration of Intent, part of the Annexe to the Rome Treaty,
which only permits them to conclude "conventions for economic
association" with the EC. The prospect therefore of Spanish and
Portuguese entry to the EC as full members seemed to threaten the
interests of Tunisia and Morocco in particular, which produced a
range of similar agricultural products and whose status within
the Community would remain inferior to that of the newcomers.
The impact would be proportionately greater in the case of
Morocco where agriculture plays a predominant role in the economy
and where some three-fifths of the population are engaged in
farming.	 Aware of this challenge Morocco announced its
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intention, in 1984, to apply for full membership of the
Community.	 King Hassan II repeated the request while visiting
Britain in July 1987.
	 As the statutes of the EC preclude non-
European states from full membership it is probable that the
request was a symbolic affirmation of Morocco's desire to retain
a close relationship with the EC despite its new composition.
Today Morocco and Tunisia face something of a dilemma in their
relations with the European Community. 	 Unless they diversify
their economies quickly, and re-structure production to ensure
greater efficiency and even lower costs, they are likely to
suffer considerably in the near future from competition from
Greece, Spain and Portugal. 	 Algeria and Libya, on the other
hand, are mainly exporters of hydro-carbons for which there is a
fairly buoyant market in western Europe (albeit at lower prices
since 1981). Even the new members of the Commnity are importers
of oil and gas.
Another issue helping to shape relations between the Maghreb
and the EEC has been the presence of a considerable number of
Maghrebin migrant workers within the Community, particularly in
France.	 The number is now estimated at around 1,200,000 and
their accommodation and treatment in the host country has long
been a source of continuing complaint on the part of their home
government. In 1983 the French Socialist government recognised
their right to equal status with domestic workers - which itself
marked a considerable advance. 	 The Community has itself
acknowledged the existence of the problem. Apart from numerous
-482-
cases of racism,	 particularly in France, 	 the Maghrebin
governments are also concerned about the opportunities for
migrant workers to acquire skills that are in short supply back
home and would contribute substantially to economic development
in North Africa.	 As unskilled labour they are seen to be in
competition with French workers and are highly vulnerable in an
economy experiencing high and rising levels of unemployment.
Their remittances are valuable to the Maghrebin economies while
their presence abroad helps to keep unemployment down in Algeria
and Morocco.	 Nevertheless the North African govenments
acknowledge that this is at best a short-term expedient -
although it has been continuing now since before the last war.
Re-training within the Community would be a valuable contribution
to Maghrebin development as well as a form of indirect
educational subsidy.
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CHAPTER SIXTEEN : ALGERIA AND EUROPE 
'NATURAL' PARTNERS 
France : Algeria's road to Europe
Algeria has long	 been aware of the relevance of Western
Europe for her economic development as well as for her security.
It was this that prompted the government to try to win observer
status at the 1975 Helsinki Conference on European Cooperation
and Security. Although the attempt was unsuccessful, Algeria was
permitted to submit its views to the conference and, in its
submissions, Algeria took the opportunity to underline the
connection between European and Mediterranean security.
Algeria's original association with the European Community
was indirect, based on its special relationship with France. When
the special relationship ended Algeria immediately began
negotiating a direct association with the EC whose members,
particularly France, continue to acount for a significant
proportion of Algeria's trade. 	 Because of the long colonial
experience and the resulting historical and cultural ties,
Franco-Algerian relations are more prominent than relations with
other European countries. Since the time of General de Gaulle,
France has seen Algeria as its "window" on the Third World;
Algeria for its part has looked to France to defend its interests
inside Western Europe. 	 Boumedienne was not the first to have
acknowledged that "Paris and Algiers are condemned to live
together", despite their political differences over a wide range
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of issues, including the Western Sahara and the status of migrant
workers in France.	 Meanwhile the French have attempted to
maintain a presence within the Algerian economy and to retain
their influence with a country that was once regarded as part and
parcel of the metropole.
Conflicts and reconciliations have been a feature of Franco-
Algerian relations since independence in 1962. There has been
some convergence in foreign policy as a result of de Gaulle's
insistence on French independence vis-a-vis the global powers,
his withdrawal from NATO in 1966, and his determination to pursue
a policy oriented towards Africa, the Arab states and the Third
World.	 Successive French presidents after de Gaulle have
likewise adhered to an independent line of foreign policy,
sympathetic to Third World aspirations.	 President Pompidou
registered his opposition to Henry Kissinger's scheme for the
creation of an International Agency for Energy; 	 Giscard
d'Estaing cooperated with the African and Arab states to organise
a global debate on North/South issues in 1974-76 and to encourage
three-way cooperation between Europe, Africa and the Arab world;
at the Cancun talks in Mexico in 1981, Francois Mitterrand
supported	 Algeria's	 proposal	 for	 global	 negotiations
notwithstanding the hostility of the American President;
Mitterrand also worked to increase French support for the Third
World, trying to extend aid to states outside the traditional
'inner circle' in West Africa.
	
All such initiatives were well
received in Algiers.
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By 1973 Algeria's relations with France seemed to have
survived the nationalisations of 1971 and to be on the mend. In
the summer	 Abdelaziz Bouteflika became the first Algerian
Foreign Minister to visit France since independence in 1962. The
visit succeeded for a time in healing the rift that had developed
as a result of the earlier expropriation of French companies and
investments - without compensation. 	 The treatment of Algerian
migrant workers in France did, however, introduce a discordant
note - and eleven Algerians were killed during September 1973 as
a result of racial violence. That month the Algerian government
suspended further immigration to France while the presence in
France nf over 800,000 Algerians raises questions of security
that have weighed heavily on policy-makers in both capitals. In
his two visits to France in January 1974 Bouteflika received
assurances from President Georges Pompidou about the security of
Algerian workers living in France. The French Foreign Minister,
Michel Jobert, then travelled to Algiers in March. Other visits
followed in rapid succession culminating in the first visit by a
French president to independent Algeria in April 1975.9
President Giscard d'Estaing came to office in 1974
determined to improve relations with Algeria, to set aside the
quarrels of the past, and to secure France's energy requirements
by promoting mutually profitable trade and investment. 	 In
Algiers the French and Algerian presidents discussed the Paris
energy conference and the need to widen its scope."'Giscard
promised to improve the condition of Algerian workers resident in
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France and to try to meet Algeria's need for a wider range of
skills.	 There was agreement to proceed with a $2 billion gas
pipeline that would supply Algerian gas to the French and
European markets." It was not long, however, before many of the
old problems re-emerged : racism, clashes over the pricing of
Algerian commodities, notably oil and gas, and, by 1975, the
Western Sahara issue began to cast a long shadow over Franco-
Algerian relations.
Algeria's will for de-colonisation of relations 
Initially France maintained a neutral posture over the
Western Sahara conflict. Early in 1976, however, French policy
tilted towards Morocco as France agreed, in January, to sell 21
Mirage Fl fighter aircraft to Morocco - at a time when Morocco
and Algeria were engaging in open confrontation. The Algerians
regarded the French initiative as a hostile gesture. 	 Giscard
maintained that good relations with Morocco should not imply any
deterioration in relations with Algeria.' 1 He did, however,
indicate his support for the partition of the Western Sahara
between Morocco and Mauritania, which he justified on the grounds
that the small population of Saharawis could not support the
large, complex apparatus of a modern state. To allay Algerian
fears he was prepared, however, to sell arms to Algeria as well
as to Morocco. He also offered French mediation should both sides
request it. But relations between Paris and Algiers suffered a
further eclipse, in May 1976, 	 when Polisario guerrillas
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kidnapped six French nationals working in Mauritania, seizing two
others in October.
The French held Algeria responsible and threatened military
intervention to free the hostages. At the request of the
Mauritanian government French Jaguar aircraft were sent to strafe
and attack Polisario bases. The hostage affair still rankled in
December 1977 when the French legislature vetoed an important
agreement between Algeria and the European Community.
	 Still
denying any responsibility, Algeria then arranged for
negotiations between the French and Polisario, and these talks
and the intercession of the U.N. Secretary General, Kurt
Waldheim, led to the release of the hostages that same month.
French-Algerian disagreements over the Western Sahara did offer
Algiers the opportunity to seek out alternative trading partners,
thereby asserting her independence while strengthening her
bargaining power. By 1976 the United States had superseded
France as Algeria's major trading partner. In 1977 the important
division of the Algerian Foreign Ministry with responsibility for
'France' was absorbed into the division dealing with 'North
America' and 'Europe of the Nine'. The advent of President
Carter in Washington and his policies favouring civil rights and
a 'regional' rather than a 'global' response to Third World
problems,	 undoubtedly contributed to the new Algerian
orientation. Henceforth American penetration of Algeria began to
seem irreversible.
	 In 1976 the French Chamber of Commerce and
Industry in Algeria had warned that "France is about to lose
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once and for all its economic and cultural predominance within
Algeria" .13
Algeria's determination to promote trade with America rather
than with France was underlined by the appointment, in June 1977,
of Abdelaziz Maoui, as Ambassador to Washington - a post left
vacant although diplomatic relations with the United states,
broken off in 1967, had been resumed as long ago as 1974. The
appointment of a new ambassador to Washington coincided with a
re-shuffle of Boumedienne's government and the deliberate choice
of technocrats with a view to "gaining the battle of production
and management". The interests being reflected in Algiers were
those of the large state industries created in the late 60s and
early 70s, companies like SONATRACH with responsibility for the
extraction and marketing of oil and gas. The new generation of
Algerian officials and management, like their counterparts in
Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa at this time, were impressed by
the advances of American technology and the efficiency of
American management - to say nothing of the respect and prestige
that they enjoyed with government and administration alike.
Meanwhile the economic downturn in France, following the
energy crisis, had aggravated racial tensions to the point where
the government was considering the phased repatriation of
Algerian migrant workers.	 In December 1978 Paris rejected a
request from Algiers that expiring visas for migrant workers
should be renewed for an additional ten year period. Instead the
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French proposed a one year extension and further talks between
the two governments.	 Under pressure the Algerian authorities
agreed to the repatriation of some 30,000 workers annually but a
thaw in relations led to a new agreement in Paris, in September
1980, effectively ruling out repatriation as a solution to the
outstanding difficulties."	 Relations continued to improve
across the Mediterranean, particularly after the election of
Francois Mitterrand in 1981, the first socialist and left-wing
President of the Fifth Republic.	 While France's rather
ambivalent attitude to the Western Sahara dispute remained a
stumbling block, the new government in Paris was obviously keen
to dissociate itself from earlier right-wing policies in Africa
including support for conservative-oriented regimes and a
predilection for military intervention.
There had been a new government in Algeria, too, since 1979,
and the president, Benjedid Chadli, was anxious from the start to
work for better relations with his French counterpart.
We have never been against the French people. Today we
have turned the corner after one hundred and thirty years
of colonialism and eight years of war. Now is the time to
re-examine relations between our two countries.'s
Trade between Algeria and France flourished once more in the
eighties. thanks in no small measure to a very favourable
agreement with the French for the export of Algerian gas at
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prices well above the going rate in Europe and the rest of the
world. Other agreements followed covering different sectors of
the economy.
Algeria's gas policy and Europe 
By 1982 France had recovered its position as Algeria's major
trading partner to the relief of those in Paris for whom Algeria
could never be anything but French. In November 1981 Mitterrand
had already visited Algeria and in December 1982 it was the turn
of President Chadli to repay the courtesy, stopping over for four
hours in Paris after an official visit to Belgium. His choice of
Belgium in preference to France was taken by French officials as
an indication of the delicate state of Franco-Algerian relations.
The French recovery in Algeria also owed much to a bitter dispute
with the El Paso company of Houston, Texas, after Algeria had
demanded a new contract and a sharp price increase for its
liquified natural gas - $6 per million BTUs instead of $1.95.16
In 1980 both El Paso and the American government rejected the
Algerian request, fearing that it would set a precedent and
encourage other larger suppliers, notably Mexico and Canada, to
follow suit. Negotiations were broken off in February 1981, but
not before Algeria claimed to have lost $1 billion in revenue as
a result of its decision to suspend sales of its gas to the
United States.
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Algeria had then to seek new customers in Europe where its
gas would have to compete with cheaper Soviet supplies reaching
the Vest via a new overland pipe-line. 	 Where Algeria was
receiving $3,75 per million BTUs from the French, the Belgians in
April 1981 agreed a price of $4.80 for long term supplies from
Algeria- 17	This was a significant break-through for the
Algerians in their long wrangle to secure higher prices for
natural gas and to index gas prices to those for crude oil. It
helps explain Chadli's first visit to Belgium in 1982, in
preference to Paris.
	 By 1982 Algeria had finally succeeded in
extracting from Belgium, France and Italy an additional premium
of around 20% above market rates for its natural gas.
	
The
Algerian authorities were anxious to diversify their exports in
view of the low reserves of oil; by way of contrast Algeria holds
the fourth largest reserves of natural gas in the world.
Moreover, a considerable amount of capital had been invested in
new plant designed to liquify the natural gas which could then be
transported anywhere in the world.
At the beginning of February 1982 France signed one of the
largest ever contracts for the supply of natural gas from
Algeria.	 The deal came only a few days after the French had
agreed to take a similar quantity of gas each year from the
Soviet Union and the price to be paid Algeria was 20% above
market rates. Following protests by Gaz de France the government
agreed to pay thirteen per cent. of the price direct to the
Algerian suppliers.'
	 The decision effectively to subsidise the
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purchase of Algerian LNG was then complemented by three sectoral
agreements covering French participation in Algerian projects
covering housing, transport, infrastructure and agriculture,
which brought substantial orders for French companies by way of
compensation.
In September 1982 there was yet another agreement, this time
between Algeria and Italy, covering the supply of natural gas
through the Trans-Mediterranean pipe-line - over a year after the
completion of the pipe-line. 	 The deep differences between the
two governments over the price to be paid for the gas go some way
to explain why a $1.3 billion facility had remained unused for
those twelve months.	 Algeria, for its part, was determined to
extract everything it could for what amounted to a wasting asset.
The main Italian customer, the state oil company, ENI, had agreed
to review the original contract, signed in 1977, but refused to
pay more than $3.90 per million BTUs until the Italian
government, following the French example, offered a subsidy
raising the price to $4.41. The price was indexed to a basket of
crude oil prices and the agreement, though covering the supply of
gas for twenty-five years, was subject to review every three
years. 19 France and Italy had, in effect, paid a political price
to ensure supplies of the gas on which they were relying to meet
future energy demands and to achieve a desired balance among
different types of fuel.
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Algeria. for its part, rewarded French, Belgian and Italian
companies with contracts enabling them to participate in the
execution of Algerian development projects. Thus, in September
1982, the Belgian company, Cobelgaz, won a turnkey contract, woth
$100 million, to construct a pipe-line from Hassi R'Mel oil field
to the port of Arzew, Algeria's major oil and gas base. 2° In
November 1982 the Algerian and French governments signed a major
transport agreement that was expected. to bring French companies
contracts worth 11.3 billion.
	 French companies had, in
particular, been retained to build an underground transport
system for Algiers. Another agreement by Italy for the purchase
of Algerian gas opened the door to an estimated $1.5 billion
worth of Italian exports to Algeria.2'
By way of contrast, Spain's position as a supplier to the
Algerian market was weakened by a protracted dispute between the
Algerian state-owned oil company, SONATRACH, and the Spanish
state gas company, ENGAS. It was alleged that ENGAS had failed
to honour the terms of a contract to import LNG from Algeria.
Deliveries were suspended in 1981 after the twenty-five year
contract had run only six years and after El/GAS had taken, on
average, only one-third of the agreed quantity of gas.	 In
retaliation Algeria had suspended several key contracts awarded
to Spanish companies.	 In 1985 the Spanish share of Algerian
imports fell to 1.4% compared with 7.5% in 1982. This dispute
was, however, settled as a result of an agreement concluded in
Algiers, in February 1985, in the presence of the foreign
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ministers of the two states. ENGAS agreed to pay $500 million in
compensation and to accept a price increase on the resumption of
deliveries.	 SONATRACH agreed for its part to permit ENGAS to
vary the quantities of LNG to be taken pending the extension of
the Spanish domestic grid and, as a result,	 an increase in
domestic demand. The prospects of further economic cooperation
were enhanced by the visit of the Spanish Prime Minister, Felipe
Gonzalez, to Algeria in March 1985, followed by that of Chadli to
Spain the following July.
Algeria has generally favoured relations with European states
but relations with Spain deteriorated sharply in 1975 after the
government in Madrid had signed a tripartite agreement with
Morocco and Mauritania allowing them to partition and occupy the
Western (former Spanish) Sahara. 	 Algeria had responded by
offering material and moral support to the Saharawi nationalist
movement, represented by the Polisario Front. 	 Furthermore,
Algeria extended its support to the Canary Islands' Independence
Movement (MPAIAC). 22	The Spanish government recalled its
ambassador from Algiers, in December 1977 after a statement in
the Algerian press describing the Canary Isands as the "last
Spanish colony in Africa" and implicitly criticising Spain for
allowing the French to use a base in the islands from which
aircraft could then proceed to Dakar and carry out attacks
against Polisario.
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The Spanish protested at Algerian interference in what they
described as their "domestic affairs", namely the Canary Islands.
A visit to Algiers by the Spanish socialist leader, Felipe
Gonzalez, seems to have improved relations.	 Algeria ceased to
allow broadcasts by the MPAIAC directed at the Canary Islands,
while the Spanish ambassador returned to Algeria in February
1978. 23 Algiers then took the opportunity to protest about the
freedom that the Spanish authorities accorded to Algerian
opposition leaders, including the former President, Ahmed Ben
Bella, and his supporters. Algeria then offered sanctuary to the
Basque leader, Txoimin. A tense situation developed between the
two countries until a meeting in December 1986 in Algeria between
prominent officials of the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE) and the
FLN. This led to a deal whereby both governments seem to have
agreed to discourage dissident leaders from one country operating
inside the other.
Algerian relations with West Germany became close during
1974, largely as a result of the sympathy of the West German
Chancellor, Willy Brandt, with the plight of Third World
countries, and his support for Boumedienne's appeal to the United
Nations, in April 1974, for a New International Economic Order.
Brandt, leader of the West German Social Democratic Party, was
received by Boumedienne in Algiers shortly after the Algerian
leader had addressed the UN Special Session.
	
Boumedienne was
reported to have told Brandt :
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It is true that it is hard to change the present system
but first we must recognise that it is unjust. 	 It was
created without our consent or participation and we would
like to have the opportunity to examine it with you and,
if necessary, re-negotiate everything, the means, the
methods, the system itself.24
Expanding economic relations between Algeria and West Germany
were reflected in the visit to Germany by the Algerian Industry
Minister, Abdesslam Belaid, in May/June 1974.	 The Algerian
delegation was a large one and included the directors of the
major state enterprises.	 In the eighties Vest Germany has
retained its position as the second largest supplier of the
Algerian market, although its share of that market slipped from
13,9% in 1982 to 11.2% in 1985.2s
Sweden, particularly under the socialist leader, Olof Palme,
was likewise viewed by Algeria as a country that values its
Independence and in its foreign policy accords a high priority to
Third World issues. Palma visited Algeria in November 1974 where
he signed a comprehensive agreement on economic, scientific and
technical cooperation. In 1981 Scania of Sweden won a £25
million order for 457 inter-city buses from the state bus
company, SNTV.	 Deliveries of the vehicles would begin in June
1981 and be completed by February 1982. 2 	 In March 1983 the
Swedish construction group, Shanska Cementgiuteriet, won a
turnkey order valued at £73 million for the construction of
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twelve pre-fabricated boarding schools, to be completed by the
end of 1984.27
Relations with non-socialist governments in Europe have
usually been cordial but not as close as with socialist-led
administrations.	 Algerian relations with Switzerland were long
overshadowed by a conflict over moneys said to have been
deposited in a Swiss-based bank by the late Mohammed Khider,
former FLN Treasurer during the Algerian war. In 1973 the Civil
Court in Geneva had ruled that the sum of fifty million Swiss
Francs that once belonged to the FLN and was then transferred to
an Arab bank in Geneva, should be handed over to the Algerian
government.	 After six years of litigation the Swiss Supreme
Court ruled unanimously, in July 1974, that Algeria had no claim
to the money which, according to the Arab Bank, had been paid
into Khider's personal account. 29 A lawyer retained by the Arab
bank maintained that Khider and not the FLN was the rightful
owner of the money - which had been collected for the most part
from Algerian workers in France and other supporters of the war
for independence.	 Insult was added to injury when the Supreme
Court further ruled that the Algerian government was liable for
costs. 29
Anglo-Algerian relations have remained luke-warm and British
companies have been slow to move into the Algerian market. This
may have reflected advice from British diplomats in the seventies
who warned investors to stay away from Algeria on the grounds
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that its economy was heading for disaster. 	 In the eighties
relations began to improve somewhat as Algeria began to examine
alternative sources of arms in an attempt to diversify its
purchases away from the Soviet Union and later America. In 1982
Tarmac International won a £46 million contract to build four
hospitals in the Mascara region of Algeria, while in 1983 British
companies received contracts totalling £26 million. '° By 1986,
however, the United Kingdom's share of Algerian imports was only
some 3%, and the commodities supplied were mostly foodstuffs,
chemicals, and iron and steel products.
During 1981 Algeria had sought a barter deal with Japan to
supply goods in return for oil. The object was to resist Saudi
pressure on OPEC members, including Algeria, to drop their crude
oil prices.	 In 1982 Japan became the fourth largest source of
Algerian imports, providing cars and heavy equipment in return
for quantities of oil and copper. Japanese companies were also
the recipients of two major contracts to be financed by soft
loans from Japan. One contract worth $54.4 million involved the
Mitsubishi Corporation and concerned the construction of gas
extraction and treatment facilities. The other, valued at $250
million, was awarded to Koble Steel for building a recovery and
processing plant for Liquified Petroleum Gas (LPG) at Bassi R'nel
in southern Algeria. 3I In addition there was the sale of some $50
million of Honda cars which were paid for by shipments of crude
oil. Because of the drop in oil prices in the eighties, however,
imports from Japan were down from 7.3% in 1982 to 6% in 1985.
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Algeria's relations with Western Europe have been dominated
largely by questions of trade as Algeria has sought to secure its
economic independence by policies of industrialisation and
product diversification.	 The Algerian authorities have also
taken effective steps to try to improve the terms of trade in
line with their support for a revision of existing North/South
relations and the elimination of dependency and "unequal
exchange".	 With a large and rapidly expanding domestic
population, Algeria, although an important oil producer, does not
have a large surplus income to invest. It is far more vulnerable
to market and price fluctuations for its oil and gas exports than
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, for example, or even Libya. Nor does it
have large reserves of oil on which it can draw for its future
development needs. Under Boumedienne Algeria therefore embarked
on an ambitious programme of industrialisation, financed by
exports of hydrocarbons, and to the neglect of her agriculture.
It was essential, therefore, that Algeria should extract the best
possible price for her limited exports, whether crude oil or
natural gas.
Hence the paradox that Algeria,	 with its socialist
principles, has been heavily involved in commercial-type
negotiations	 with capitalist	 states and large western
corporations. Its adoption of capitalist tactics to enhance its
own revenues has enabled it to survive some major international
setbacks, including the relative drop in real oil prices for much
of the 1970s, and the steep decline in the price first of oil,
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then of natural gas, after 1981. 	 In that sense the Algerian
tactic of trying to link the price of natural gas to that of a
basket of crude oils proved singularly counter-productive in the
mid-1980s.	 Algeria had then to try to re-negotiate all the
earlier agreements with a view to maintaining the price of gas.
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CHAPTER SEVENTEEN : MOROCCO AND EUROPE 
IN SEARCH OF MARKETS AND SYMPATHY 
Morocco and Spain : unreliable alliance 
The conservative orientation of the regime in Morocco makes
it an obvious and privileged partner of the West, including both
the European Community and the United States. Its rivalry with
'radical' Algeria has been used to enlist western sympathies and
to present Morocco as a loyal and an indispensable ally in the
defence of western interests within the region and in Africa as a
whole.	 Over the Western Sahara issue Morocco was thus well
placed to be able to canvass western as well as moderate Arab and
African support for its own position. 	 It earned that sympathy
and support by its military intervention in 1977-78 in the Shaba
conflict when it contrived to save the moderate regime of Mobutu
Sese Seko against what it labelled a 'communist' conspiracy from
neighbouring Angola.
Over the years the European Community has, however, proved an
unreliable partner for Morocco. At the first hint of recession
the EC has imposed quotas which in 1977 resulted in a trade
deficit with Europe of $1 billion. In 1979 the Moroccan Commerce
and Industry Minister attacked the Common Agricultural Policy
which was subsidising high cost European producers of fruits and
vegetables that could be grown more cheaply and naturally in
Morocco. He warned that Morocco would be forced to seek other
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markets, perhaps by expanding trade with the Soviet Union and the
member-states of COMECON.
Morocco has also had problems with Spain which, in 1975, had
signed a tri-partite agreement with Morocco and Mauritania,
relinquishing its own rule over the former Spanish Sahara -
rather than risk a prolonged confrontation with Moroccan forces
at a time of political transition in Spain itself. In May 1979,
however, the Spanish Prime Minister, Adolfo Suarez, agreed to
meet Polisario leaders during a visit to Algiers after which he
told the Algerian government that the inhabitants of Western
Sahara had the right to self-determination while the
International community had the obligation to see they were able
to exercise it.'
	 It would apear that, since 1975, the Spanish
authorities had come under increasing pressure from the left,
Socialists and Communists, over their earlier support for
Morocco. This change of policy in Madrid, coupled with a dispute
between Morocco and Spain over fisheries, aggravated relations
between the two.
In February 1978 when the Cortes had ratified an earlier
fishing agreement with Morocco there had been considerable
opposition in Spain from the left which supported Polisario.
Polisario guerrillas retaliated by attacking Spanish fishing
fleets operating in waters adjacent to Western Sahara and by
capturing some of the fishermen. The ruling Spanish party, the
Central Democratic Union, then attempted to secure their release
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by sending a delegate to the Fourth Congress of Polisario, in
1979, thereby implicitly recognising the movement. Morocco then
seized several Spanish boats on the pretext they were fishing in
Moroccan waters,	 Relations improved for a time when King Juan
Carlos visited Morocco in June.	 In November 1980, however,
relations deteriorated once again after the Spanish Prim
Minister, Adolfo Suarez, visited the Spanish enclaves of Morocco-
Ceuta and Mellila which Morocco claimed as part of her national
territory.
In December Spain then concluded an agreement with Polisario
for the release of some thirty-six Spanish fishermen captured the
previous September. The agreement included a promise of Spanish
support for the principle of self-determination for the peoples
of Western Sahara.	 Polisario claimed that this new agreement
superseded that of 1975 between Spain, Morocco and Mauritania.2
Morocco reacted the following day by claiming a maritime zone
extending two hundred miles into the Atlantic as well as sections
of the Mediterranean.	 A new Spanish Prime Minister, Leopold
Calvo Sotelo, was appointed in February 1981 and at once tried to
improve relations with Morocco, starting with a new one-year
agreement on fisheries signed in Apri1.3
The election of a Socialist government in Spain under Felipe
Gonzales was not well received in Rabat, following as it did the
election of a socialist government in France in 1981.	 In
opposition the French and Spanish socialists had both shown
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support for Polisario.
	
In government the Spanish socialists
worked instead to try to improve relations with all the Maghreb
states.	 Both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister paid
separate visits to Morocco in 1983 and a four-year agreement on
fisheries was concluded in August - the first real sign of better
relations between Madrid and Rabat. 	 Spain also pledged loans
amounting to $550 million, tied partly to the purchase of Spanish
goods and services, and partly to the development of port
facilities in Agadir. 4	 The agreement was very favourable to
Morocco, being in line with its policy of developing a national
fishing industry to take advantage of the extremely rich fishing
grounds off its Atlantic coast which had been mainly exploited by
other countries, including the Soviet Union, Spain and France.
Prudence with France and the EC 
Morocco enjoyed exceptionally good relations with France
during the conservative presidency of Giscard d'Estaing. 	 The
French President was received in Rabat in May 1975, while Hassan
visited France in November 1976.	 The timing of Hassan's visit
coincided with mounting confrontation in the Western Sahara
between Morocco and the Polisario forces, supported by Algeria.
Hassan doubtless hoped to secure a strengthening of the Rabat-
Paris-Madrid axis. France remained Morocco's Principal trading
partner as well as its chief source of aid which was estimated in
1978 at $300 million - increasing to $329 million in 1979. 5 To
express his satisfaction at the state of French-Moroccan
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relations King Hassan broke with his previous practice and
attended the Fifth Franco-African summit in Paris in May 1978,
which also debated the French proposal to set up a permanent
"Intervention force".	 A week earlier Zaire had requested
military assistance from Morocco, suggesting the coordination of
French-Moroccan policies on the African scene.
	 The main
justification offered for an intervention force was its potential
as a counterweight to the Cuban presence in Africa.
After a successful attack by Polisario against the southern
Moroccan town of Tan Tan, early in 1979, Hassan II paid an
unscheduled visit to France.	 Later that year details emerged
about the extent of French military aid to Morocco.' By 1980
relations were so close that Giscard and Hassan had three
meetings and the issues discussed ranged from the Western Sahara
to the recognition of the PLO as the sole legitimate
representative of the Palestinian people. Morocco also sought to
enlist French support to try to convince Algeria of the futility
of prolonging the Saharan conflict. 	 Given such close ties
between France and Morocco in the seventies - a considerable
improvement over the Gaullist period when relations had been
extremely frosty - it was not surprising that Giscard's defeat in
1981 was badly received in Rabat. The victorious socialists had
supported Polisario when in opposition and Mitterrand was known
to favour better relations with Algeria : he hoped to succeed in
Algiers where Giscard, before him, had failed after 1974.
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Mitterrand visited Algiers as early as November 1981 while
his trip to Rabat was delayed until January 1983. The new French
president was careful, however, to avoid any serious breach with
Morocco, no doubt fearing that the Americans would take advantage
of any strains in Franco-Moroccan relations to strengthen their
own influence with Rabat. Given its location Morocco retained
considerable significance for the French even if the value of
trade with Morocco was smaller than that with Algeria.
Accordingly the French supply of arms to Morocco continued under
the socialists.
	 In January 1982 Hassan was received by
Mitterrand following two visits by the French Foreign Minister to
Morocco.	 The King's unofficial visit to Paris cleared the way
for Mitterrand's official visit of three days to Morocco in /ate
January 1983. After recalling the "special ties...forged by
history and geography" Mitterrand expressed his support for those
African states that wished to exclude the great powers from their
conflicts. Which was one reason why he favoured self-
determination for the population of the Western Sahara and
therefore a referendum.7
Mitterrand's visit did nothing to alleviate Moroccan fears
that the French socialists would inevitably side with Algeria in
the latent conflict opposing the two Maghrebin states in the
Western Sahara. Algeria, on the other hand, seems to have
suspected the French government of a change of policy leaning
more towards Morocco. On the eve of the Libya-Moroccan 'union'
agreement Mitterrand was in Morocco on a 'private' visit. The
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Moroccan-Libyan 'union' did provide a useful channel of
communication with the Libyans at a time when Paris was working
for the removal of outside forces from Chad and in favour of a
reconciliation among the various factions still in contention.
Like the Spanish, the French have tried since the eighties to
adopt a balanced approach to the Maghreb as a whole.
Predictably, however, where Mitterrand had visited Algiers before
Rabat, the new Gaullist Prime Minister, Jacques Chirac, gave
priority to Morocco while despatching his Foreign Minister to
Algiers.
Hassan has always looked to Western Europe as his country's
most obvious partner, describing his country as "Europe's
backyard". The Foreign Minister, Abdellatif Fillali, declared in
1987 that Morocco was a "part of the West". 8	 The logical
culmination of centuries of shared history and civilisation
would, from the Moroccan point of view, be full membership for
Morocco within the European community.
	 There are a million
Moroccans living within the Community, mainly in France and
Belgium, while tourism is responsible for a large annual
migration from both sides of the Mediterranean. Aware that full
membership is unlikely for the present, the Moroccans have
pressed their claim for special treatment, above and beyond the
concessions granted to other countries in the Mediterranean
basin.	 Given the accession to the EC of Spain and Portugal,
after Greece, the question of special consideration for Morocco
has taken on a new urgency.
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The accession to the Comunity of Greece, Spain and Portugal
may seem necessary for a Community trying to strengthen its
position in the Mediterranean and, to some extent, competing with
an American presence inside a region that is, however, of vital
concern to Western Europe. But the expansion of the Community is
bound to damage the trading interests of countries like Tunisia
and Morocco, and particularly the latter because of its heavy
dependence on agriculture. Morocco wants to keep its competitive
advantage especially over its principal competitor in Western
Europe, namely Spain. Morocco insists that the matter is of the
highest national importance, pointing out that in citrus
production alone the livelihood of some three million people is
at stake.
	
Two-thirds of Morocco's citrus production is sold
inside the Common Market.' To secure its previous competitive
advantage, even after Spanish entry to the EC, Morocco resorts to
political and strategic rather than economic arguments.	 The
appeal is directed to the European Heads of State rather than to
the bureaucrats in Brussels.
	
The case rests mainly on the
Kingdom's pro-western orientation, its military capability and
its political reliability.	 There is also its invaluable
strategic situation, linking the Mediterranean and the Atlantic
and commanding the entrance to the former. Factors such as these
are the basis of the Moroccan case for special treatment by the
EC.	 The viewpoint of Rabat was well expressed by a senior
Moroccan official who complained :
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We do not understand why no distinction is made between
friends like us, who share the same values as Europe, and
more distant countries...The fundamental problem is that
the European Community treats us as if we were
Syrians. "°
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CHAPTER EIGHTEEN : TUNISIA AND EUROPE 
COMMITMENT TO THE WEST 
Europe : the hope and shelter 
Tunisia has always been	 seen as a liberal, pro-western
country whose foreign policy is based on cooperation with the
western world which alone, it is held, can supply the technology
and investment needed for the country's economic development and
social emancipation.	 There is also the conviction that the
industrial states of the West, with their long history of
political and economic intervention in the Third World, and the
experience and profits derived therefrom, have a special
responsibility to assist in the development efforts of the poorer
states, through the provision of guarantee1 markets au& prices
for Third World produce. Closing the gap between rich and poor
nations would contribute to security at the global level as well
as to regional political stability. Tunisian security is seen to
be connected closely with that of Western Europe and particularly
those states bordering the Mediterranean. 	 The Tunisians have
proposed an ingenious solution to the problem of North African
migrant labour inside Europe. 	 The establishment of light
industries in the Maghrebin states, which have abundant labour
and energy sources, would assist states like Tunisia to diversify
while relieving countries like France of the problems posed by
large scale immigration at a time of economic uncertainty and
growing unemployment.
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Tunisia, like its Maghrebin neighbours, also looks to France
to represent and defend its interests within the EC.
	 While
relations with France were strained during the Algerian war and a
diplomatic chill persisted until de Gaulle's defeat and departure
in 1969, Bourguiba enjoyed a personal triumph in 1972 when he
visited France for the first time in his official capacity as
President of Tunisia. Giscard paid an official visit to Tunisia
in November 1975, after first going to Algeria and Morocco.
Giscard praised Bourguiba's leadership and moderation and
underlined the continuing friendship between their two countries.
"Tunisia and France had concluded a contract, a compact for
development, that was valid for today, for tomorrow and, as far
as anyone could envisage, for ever."'
In June 1978 it was Giscard's turn to receive the Tunisian
Prime Minister, Hedi Nouira, and both received the report of the
Grande Commission de Cooperation which pointed to the steady
improvement in economic and financial cooperation between the two
countries.	 Meanwhile France's commitment to the security of
Tunisia was demonstrated in 1980 when it hastened to secure the
Bourguiba government after the Commando attack from across the
frontier at Gafsa.	 It was not clear whether the French feared
Libyan or possible American intervention most.
	 Ministerial
visits followed and, in their wake, the French agreed to make
available FF.210 million to help alleviate the country's economic
problems and to promote development.
	
This was the largest
allocation of French aid, per capita, to any country. 	 Paris
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undertook to correct the imbalance in bilateral trade betwen
France and Tunisia while Tunis agreed to solve the problem of
French accounts frozen in that country since independence. 2 This
problem, outstanding since 1956, was in fact largely resolved by
February 1981.
A visit by the Tunisian Prime Minister to France, in February
1982, ended in an agreement whereby Peugeot would establish a
factory in Tunisia to manufacture spare parts for the home market
and for export. France also undertook to intercede on behalf of
Tunisian interests in the EC. Bourguiba, who had earlier
approached the Socialist International with a view to affiliating
his own party, took the opportunity of a socialist government in
Paris in 1981 to advance his country's special relationship with
France. Tunisia was the first Arab country to be visited by the
new Foreign Minister, Claude Cheysson, in July 1981. And it was
held out as "an example of democracy for.. .the Third World". On
this occasion France undertook to expand and intensify its
relations with Tunisia on the basis of a troe policy of
association" with the object of reaching the stage of
"integration and complementarity".
France also reaffirmed its "natural undertaking" to maintain
"military security in a region which included Tunisia". 3 The
following March Charles Hernu, the French Defence Minister,
visited Tunisia. Since January 1980, when Tunisia had increased
Its defence budget following the Gafsa attack, France had
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furnished Tunisia with the necessary radar equipment to safeguard
its airspace. And, along with the United States France was the
country's principal supplier of arms. In January 1982 the Tunisian
Prime Minister paid a visit to Paris, which was returned in
February by the French Prime Minister, Pierre Mauroy, on his
first visit to a Third World country. Mitterrand himself visited
Tunisia officially in October 1983, confirming France's place as
Tunisia's major trading partner - despite the obstacles erected
by the EC on Tunisian exports to Europe. 	 Mitterrand also spoke
of the 220,000 Tunisians resident in France and their rights to
security and well-being. The question of French assets frozen in
Tunisia for the past twenty-seven years was also finally resolved.
The deterioration of the Tunisian economy during the eighties
and mounting debts brought pressure from the IMF for cuts in
public spending as well as for the abolition of subsidies on
basic commodities like grain.	 The subsequent 'bread riots' of
January 1984, which had their counterpart in Morocco as well,
threatened a regime whose leader was clearly approaching the end
of his political life. In February the French provided aid worth
FF.560 million in cereals as well as a grant for the purchase of
agricultural products and loans to cover the deficit in the
country's balance of payments. The agreement signed on that
occasion, which	 provided for the gradual re-possession by
Tunisians of French colonial estates in the countryside, was
eventually ratified by the Tunisian government in early March
1985.	 Relations have steadily improved, particularly	 since
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agreement was reached in September 1986 allowing the transfer to
France of the assets of 11,000 French citizens who had resided in
Tunisia prior to independence, and whose assets had subsequently
been impounded. 4
 France continued to support Bourguiba until his
removal by a palace coup late in 1987. While the French did not
intervene directly to effect a smooth succession, the new
Tunisian leader, Ben Ali, has long and close relations with
France as well as enjoying the confidence of the United States
and the Algerian government - all of whom clearly had an interest
in the outcome of the power struggle in Tunis.
Tunisia's relations with other West European countries have
generally been good. Political relations with Portugal, severed
in 1963 because of that country's colonial policy, were restored
in 1974 when the Portuguese recognised the independence first of
Guinea-Bissau and later of Mozambique and Angola.	 There have
also been some problems with Italy and Spain. 	 In the case of
Spain the mnatter at issue was an adverse trade balance, while
the difficulties with Italy - a former colonial power - were more
complex. Relations between Italy and Tunisia deteriorated during
1974-77 after disputes over fishing rights, assaults on the
Tunisian community in Sicily, and the low level of Italian
imports of Tunisian oil. All of which was complicated by Italy's
membership of the EC. In May 1977 there arose a new disagreement,
again over fishing rights, but in July the two Mediterranean
countries joined Algeria in an agreement for the construction of
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a natural gas pipe-line that would link Algeria with Italy via
Tunisia.
Even then tensions persisted over fishing rights and trading
patterns. However, at the time of the grain riots, in February
1984, Italy donated 2,500 tons of wheat. 6
 And when the Italian
Premier , Eettino Craxi, visited Tunisia in December 1984, he
promised to try to ensure that Spanish and Portuguese entry to
the EC would not be allowed to damage Tunisian interests.
Tunisia has also been one of the principal recipients of West
German aid and an agreement assigning DM 150 million in credits
for development projects in Tunisia was signed in October 1978.6
Delivery of the loan was later suspended, however, on account of
violations of human rights in Tunisia, in the case of the
detained Tunisian trade unionists,
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CHAPTER NINETEEN : LIBYA AND THE WEST 
THE POLICY OF CONFRONTATION 
larope : source of Arab mishaps 
Libyan foreign policy since 1969 has been inseparable from
the issues of Arab unity and opposition to imperialism and
zionism.	 Europeans have been held responsible for most of the
ills of the Third World and, in particular, for the destruction
of Arab and African cultures and the exploitation of those who
had the misfortune to be subjects of one or other European
empire. Libya has adopted an aggressive posture towards the West
and to Western Europe. 	 Just as Kadhafi mobilised the Libyan
armed forces for the overthrow of the Libyan monarchy. he now
seeks to mobilise the African and Arab masses for the conquest
and overthrow of imperialism.
In 1973 Kadhafi published his Green Book, containing his
"Third International Theory' which aims in the first instance at
mobilising and raising the revolutionary awareness of the Libyan
people as well as imparting a more radical bias to Libyan foreign
policy.' The policy of oil nationalisation in September 1973 was
a calculated step in this direction, provoking, as expected, a
hostile reaction particularly in America.	 When the large oil
companies threatened to embargo Libyan oil, Kadhafi asked : "How
can you boycott something which everybody needs". 2
	It is
Kadhafi's purpose to provoke : whether he is calling for the
exclusion of foreign vessels from the Mediterranean so that it
-517-
may become a "lake of peace"; or whether he is demanding
reparations from Italy, Germany and Great Britain for the damage
inflicted on Libya, after 1939, by the warring European powers.
Libya had no use for Euro-Arab Dialogue after 1973 unless
the European states were prepared to subordinate their other
interests to the Arab and anti-imperialist cause. The subjects
proposed for dialogue by the Libyan ambassador to Bonn, in 1975,
included the exclusion of foreign fleets from the Mediterranean;
the de-militarization of bases in southern Europe that could be
used for offensive action in the Middle East; the participation
of East European countries in any Dialogue;
	 and a particular
emphasis on the Palestinian question. No one was surprised when
Libya withdrew from the preparatory talks on Dialogue after the
European Community had concluded an economic agreement with
Israel in May 1975.
It is Western support for Israel that has dictated Libyan
attitudes to the member-states of the EC. Support for Israel is
seen in Tripoli as part of a deliberate conspiracy aimed at
dividing and ultimately destroying the Arab world. There is a
state of continuing war between Libya and the West that may
permit certain opportunist alliances - there are, after all,
divisions in the western camp that can be exploited by Arab
states, just as the West has fomented Arab divisions to serve its
own purposes.	 It does not, however, permit of any lasting
compromise or negotiated settlement.
	 The lines are clearly
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drawn.	 Dialogue, in that context, could be tantamount to
betrayal of the Arab cause.
Within Europe, Britain has been singled out as bearing a
particular responsiblity for the creation of the state of Israel
within the Arab heartland.	 And in retaliation Kadhafi has
apparently been prepared to support the Irish Republican Army
(IRA - Provisionals) in their campaign of violence in Northern
Ireland. The connection between the IRA and Kadhafi seems to go
back to 1973 when a small ship, the Claudia, was intercepted off
the Irish coast and was found to be carrying weapons from Libya
destined for use by the IRA.' For Kadhafi, the struggle of the
IRA against British (and Protestant) rule in Northern Ireland is
that of a genuine liberation movement reacting against an
imperialist power.	 Britain was largely responsible for the
dispersion throughout the world of the Irish people in the
nineteenth century;	 Britain, too, was responsible for the
dispersion after 1948 of the Palestinians, having long connived
at Jewish immigration and the forcible re-settlement of the
original Arab inhabitants.
By supporting the IRA Kadhafi claimed to be demonstrating
his support for all liberation movements;
	 the capacity of the
Arab revolution to strike back at its opponents; and the fact
that injustice generates its own remedies. There were reports,
too, during the Falklands War, beginning in June 1982, of Libyan
support for the junta in Buenos Aires.
	
Libya and Israel were
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both suspected of selling arms to Argentina. 4 More serious was
the crisis with Britain in 1984 after shots were fired from
inside the Libyan People's Bureau at anti-Kadhafi demonstrators,
leading to the death of a policewoman. That and the subsequent
siege of the People's Bureau lent credence to the American view
of Libya as a prime source of international terrorism. 	 But it
also led to a break in diplomatic relations with Britain which,
until then, had been Libya's most important commercial and
financial outlet in Western Europe.
The United States has nevertheless had great difficulty
trying to persuade European states to join in a campaign to
isolate Libya economically and politically. Europe, with a good
appreciation of its own interests, and a more realistic
assessment of the real significance of Kadhafi and Libya's rather
limited potential for disruption, has preferred to take advantage
of Libya's dependence on western oil markets, particularly in a
time of glut.
	 The availability of alternative supplies of oil,
similar to Libya's but from more reliable sources, has given the
European states some leverage as oil prices themselves have
fallen sharply. As Libya's revenues have declined her potential
for mischief may also have decreased. After Libya's confrontation
with the United states, in April 1986, the EC removed Libya from
the list of North African countries eligible for food and other
subsidies under the EC export tender system. The country no
longer qualified therefore for the 461,000 tonnes of grain,
54,000 tonnes of skimmed milk, 14,000 tonnes of beef, and 7,000
country in the matter of winning West
rights.	 Tripoli announced that it
-520-
tonnes of butter it had received, at subsidised prices, during
the previous year.8
France : a friend and a foe 
In the case of France, Libya initially approved the
government independent foreign policy, especially its attitude
after 1967 to the Arab cause. E' Finding itself heavily dependent
after 1973 on imported oil, France worked to improve relations
with producing states like Iraq and Libya (and Algeria for a
time) in order to guarantee future oil-supplies, preferably at
concessionary rates. To help meet the increased bill the French
also pursued an aggressive policy of arms marketing, which
involved large sales of Mirage jet fighters to Libya as well as
quantities of these and other arms to other states in the Middle
East.	 In 1974, following a month-long tour of Europe, East and
statementWest, by Major Abdul Salam
singled out France as a key
European support for Arab
Jallud, an official Libyan
wished to see France leading other West European nations to
"independence" from American influence, on the Palestinian
question as well as on that of a global oil strategy.' Following
Prime Minister Chirac's visit to Libya in March 1976, France was
able in 1978 to ratify a maritime agreement providing "most
favoured nation" treatment for French and Libyan merchant
shipping in the ports of either state.
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In Africa, however, Libya disapproved of the French presence
and France's neo-imperial pretensions. 	 The two countries were
brought into latent conflict between 1978 and the mid-eighties,
first over the Western Sahara and then, more seriously, over
Chad. And when France, like Algeria, offered to send troops to
Lebanon in May 1976, at the height of the civil war in that
state, Libya strongly opposed the suggestion which Kadhafi
described as tantamount to French "aggression" against the
Lebanon. 9	 For Kadhafi the French intention was all too
transparent : to support the Christian Maronites against the
Lebanese National Movement backed by a majority of the Moslems.
But the major clash with France was over Libyan involvement in
Chad.	 By 1980 that involvement was already large and obvious.
The presence and success of Libyan troops inside Chad was seen in
Paris as a defeat for French policy, not only in Chad but in
Africa as a whole. Moreover, West African leaders who had long
supported France were now critical of French "weakness" and her
reluctance to resume her military responsibilities in this former
French state.
Libyan resentment of the West as well as geographical
circumstances also explains Libya's constant attempts to exert
pressure on Malta, with the primary object of preventing the
Maltese government from establishing close ties with NATO
countries or harbouring NATO bases. The two countries were in
dispute over their rival claims to the continental shelf. Malta
had, moreover, declined to sever diplomatic ties with Israel.
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Nevertheless, the Maltese Minister of Education was able to visit
Libya in June 1978 where he confirmed that Arabic would now be
taught in all Maltese schools and would be available as part of a
more advanced curriculum in other institutions. Kadhafi himself
visited Malta in July 1978 to discuss political and military
questions, as well as the financial consequences of Britain's
withdrawal from the Island in 1979.9
On that occasion he pledged economic and financial support
for Malta's neutrality threatened by the NATO powers, 	 He was
personally present in Malta, on March 30, 1979, for the
ceremonies marking the British military evacuation and renewed
his earlier promise of economic aid. 	 He announced that Libya
would establish several joint economic ventures that would
provide work for thousands of Maltese, while his country would
also continue to provide oil at prices below world market levels.
He then stressed that Malta's real interest lay in maintaining
the neutrality of the Mediterranean and excluding any foreign
military presence. Relations, however, deteriorated in the
eighties, given the Maltese resentment of their new 'subordinate'
status and the continuing dispute about oil exploitation rights
in the continental shelf.
	 In 1980 Kadhafi ended the supply of
oil to Malta at concessionary prices and Malta had then to seek
other suppliers and pay a higher price.
	 The Maltese Prime
Minister, the Labour leader, Dom Mintoff, then shut down the
Libyan radio station - Radio Friendship and Solidarity - while,
in July 1980, the right-wing National Front party in Malta
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denounced Kadhafi's "expansionist and annexationist" plans. They
claimed responsibi lity for the bombs that damaged the Libyan
Cultural Centre and the office of Libyan Airlines in Valletta.
And in August Malta expelled more than fifty Libyan military
advisors."'
Italy, the former colonial power, was also of considerable
importance in terms of Libya's European policy. Libya had looked
to Italy to defend its interests within the European Community.
Many Italians found lucrative jobs in Libya, while Libyan
investment helped finance a number of leading Italian companies.
In 1976 the Libyans were encouraged to invest in FIAT, the
Italian car company, when that company was experiencing financial
difficulties and Italy was itself prospecting for foreign loans.
In November 1978 the Italian Prime Minister visited Libya where
he and Kadhafi expressed satisfaction at present relations
between their two countries while both agreed on the desirability
of maintaining Malta's neutrality.
	 The previous month the
Italian state oil company, Ell, had negotiated a $ 250 million
loan over a period of five years with the Libyan Arab foreign
Bank, which had important investments in Italy - including the
recent investment in FIAT in December 1976."
After a wave of killings of Libyan exiles in Europe,
particularly in Italy and Britain in 1980, the Italian government
decided on new measures to protect Libyan expatriates. It was at
this time of mounting tension that Libya informed Italy, Britain
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and West Germany that she intended to seek reparations for the
damage inflicted on Libya by those states responsible for the
Second World War.' 2
 Meanwhile the Maltese government was anxious
to secure Italian diplomatic and economic assistance to
facilitate their own impending break with Libya.	 The Italians
themselves were not, however, ready or prepared for such a break.
The 20,000 Italians in Libya constitute the largest group of
Western residents inside the country while Libya remains an
important source of oil imports. 	 Italian governments have
therefore had to balance off interests of that kind against
strong American and NATO pressures for tougher measures against
Kadhafi.
-525-
THE MAGHREB AND THE SUPER-POWERS 
Introduction 
Where the coastal states of the Mediterranean are seen by
the super-powers as strategically very important, the Maghrebin
governments have shown, in varying degrees, their reluctance to
be involved in big power rivalry within the region.' The two
major powers have themselves held back from direct involvement in
the conflict over the Western Sahara, while the Soviet Union has
shown its reluctance to be drawn into a confrontation with the
United States over Libyan initiatives in Africa and elsewhere.
Algeria is still too concerned with its hard-won independence
to accept a subordinate status in any international alliance. As
early as 1972 Algeria revived the idea of 'the Mediterranean for
Mediterraneans'.	 In July the Foreign Minister had suggested a
conference to try to work, among other things, for the withdrawal
of foreign fleets and the dismantling of foreign bases. 22 Such a
conference was not feasible, however, since countries like Italy,
Greece and Turkey were members of the NATO alliance. 	 Like
Algeria Libya, too, claimed to be non-aligned - even criticising
the Cubans in the early 1970s for their alliance with the Soviet
Union.	 In 1979 Kadhafi recalled the departure of American,
British and Italian forces from Libya and the elimination of
their bases.	 Libyans would not accept the return of foreign
forces but would remain non-aligned "and friend and foe alike
would have to accept that fact", 3 Meanwhile Egypt's growing
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alignment with the United States in the seventies and the
emergence of President Reagan in the eighties would seem to have
pushed Kadhafi closer to the Soviet Union and the friendship
treaty of 1982 between their two states. While the Soviets may
have acquired the use of Libyan bases and facilities the
impression is that Moscow has tried to avoid closer military ties
with the charismatic but unpredictable Kadhafi.
The Sixth Fleet has long had access to Tunisian ports, but
the Americans, like the French before them, are aware that no
Tunisian government, whether under Bourguiba or his successor,
would readily give permission for the establishment of American
bases.	 After the eviction of French forces from Bizerta, in
1961, and the repatriation of the FLN to Algeria at the time of
independence in 1962, the issue remained a sensitive one and
Tunisians were determined to retain control of their national
territory.	 The same pressures were not, however, at work in
Morocco.	 In return for American support in the Western Sahara
conflict, Hassan did agree transit rights for American military
forces in February 1982 while authorising a joint military
commission with representatives of both states. By May there was
also permission for American military aircraft to operate from
Moroccan airfields, which was mainly significant in view of
American efforts to set up a Rapid Deployment Force principally
for the Gulf area.
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There is now a proposal from Morocco to allow the United
states to transfer air force bases from Spain to Morocco, which
reflects American as well as Moroccan difficulties with the
Spanish government.	 In talks at the White house, in May 1982,
President Reagan described King Hassan II, without exaggeration,
as a firm friend of the United States. 4	Moroccan officials
maintained, however, that the agreement on base facilities would
in no way affect their country's sovereignty and independence, or
its territorial integrity; nor would it endanger any other state
in the region.	 Libya nevertheless insisted in November that
joint military manoeuvres between Morocco and America threatened
peace and security in other parts of the globe.8
In the Maghreb, as elsewhere, states do not always observe
the letter or the spirit of their declarations. Morocco, which
Is armed by France and the United States, maintains close
political ties with the latter. In economic terns, however, its
trade with the United States is small in relation to the $2
billion phosphate agreement with the Soviet Union in 1978 and the
$300 million fishing agreement with the same state.
	 Algeria,
which was ideologically closer to the socialist bloc and the
Soviet Union, bought most of its arms from Moscow but trades
mainly with France and, increasingly, the United States. 	 Its
trade with the Soviet Union, other than arms, is insignificant.
The Soviet Union has more need of Moroccan fish and phosphates
than of Algerian or Libyan oil. 	 What Libya and Algeria can
provide, however, is foreign exchange to help maintain an
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equilibrium in the Soviet balance of payments. Whereas, in 1976,
America became Algeria's major trading partner, Morocco was two
years later concluding the "contract of the century" with the
Soviet Union for a large phosphate complex in the southern part
of the country. This was one of the largest Soviet investments
at that time in the Third World!
The United States, on the other hand, had an abundance of
phosphates but her industries continued to depend on imported oil
and, more particularly, on natural gas. 	 Relations with her
traditional supplier,
	 Mexico,	 were strained in the late
seventies, and President Carter was anxious to show that America
could cooperate even with 'radical' Third World states, provided,
like Algeria, they kept their distance from the Soviet Union.
Libyan military supplies have cone largely from the Soviet Union,
despite the supply of French Mirage fighter aircraft in the early
seventies. But again most Libyan trade is western- not Soviet-
oriented.	 Economic inter-dependence, geographical location and
political necessity have therefore produced some strange
bedfellows in North Africa.
	
In the Maghreb in the eighties
foreign relations were even more tortuous than usual.
Morocco is an obvious ally for the United States because of
its key strategic situation and the supportive policies of its
conservative, pro-western regime. 	 The loss of Morocco to the
Soviets would be a calamity for American foreign policy. Where
the Soviets have dominated Moroccan trade and investment
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patterns, the United States has given substantial aid and
assistance supplemented by the generosity of Saudi Arabia and
other Gulf states. Coinciding with the outbreak of the conflict
in Western Sahara, in 1975, the United States Defence Department
announced its decision to sell Morocco $154 million of military
equipment. 6 American interest in Tunisia, as a bulwark against
Libyan designs in North Africa, has had similar consequences in
terns of political and military support.	 In a visit to Tunisia,
in April 1976, the American Vice-President, Nelson Rockefeller,
expressed concern about the future intentions of Libya and
Algeria - particularly Algeria which had received large
quantities of weapons from the Soviet Union and had been visited
by General Giap of Vietnam and by Fidel Castro of Cuba. After the
Gafsa raid of January 1980, in which Libya was implicated, the
American representative in the United Nations, Donald McHenry,
visited Tunisia where he stressed
We wish to re-emphasise at this time our deep interest in
the independence and integrity of Tunisia...We would view
with concern any outside interference in Tunisia's
affairs.7
It can be argued that non-alignment as an option is becoming
increasingly difficult, if not impossible, in North Africa. The
resignation of General de Gaulle, as President of France, in 1969
and the accession of non-Gaullist presidents after 1974, removed
a major factor contributing to the credibility of a non-aligned
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policy in the Mediterranean. Even more important, the defection
of Egypt from the Soviet camp after 1972 and its subsequent
integration into the western alliance removed another essential
support for non-alignment elsewhere in North Africa. 	 The fall
of oil prices in the eighties and economic hardship and
indebtedness almost everywhere in Africa have forced states to
re-examine not only their economic policies but also to explore
the political conditions for debt relief and further credits and
investment.
The Western Sahara conflict, emerging after 1975 against this
changing political background, acted as a catalyst. The American
determination to reinforce Hassan in Morocco, the reluctance of
the Soviet Union to become directly involved or even to recognise
the provisional Saharawi state, the SADR, and the sympathy
exhibited by most of the Arab states for Morocco, left Algeria
little option but a diplomatic initiative to try to isolate
Morocco first within Africa, then within North Africa, and
finally to try to secure a return to a more even-handed approach
on the part of the United States. The American Ambassador to the
United Nations under President Carter warned that, by favouring
Morocco on the Western Sahara issue, the United States risked
losing a very promising trading relationship with Algeria;
Rather than tackling Washington directly, in the manner of
Kadhafi, the new Algerian administration of President Chadli,
sought not confrontation but rapprochement - offering Algerian
mediation with Teheran to secure the release of the American
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Embassy hostages.	 Algeria remained non-aligned, but her non-
alignment now inclined towards the West in an attempt to correct
the American tilt towards Morocco over the Western Sahara.
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CHAPTER TWENTY : ALGERIA AND THE SUPER-POWERS 
PRAGMATISM WINS OVER IDEOLOGY 
Algeria leads the battle for the Third World 
Algeria was understandably hesitant at first to seek any
accommodation with the United States. On ideological as well as
other issues Algeria saw America as a formidable opponent. The
American intervention in Vietnam and its consistent support for
Israel were viewed in the 1960s and 1970s as examples of
imperialist aggression. 	 Diplomatic relations were severed in
1967, following the Six-Day War, and American firms were among
those nationalised by the Algerian government.
	
Alter the 1973
war Algeria strongly supported the oil embargo by OAPEC against
certain Western nations, notably the United States, in view of
American support for Israel during the war.	 Algeria was also
opposed to the lifting of the embargo against America when that
was proposed by the Gulf states. The Algerian authorities then
resisted Secretary of State Kissinger's attempts to enlist the
support of consumer states in a bid to reduce the power of OPEC.
The growing dependence of the United States on imported oil from
the Middle East offered the Arab states some leverage over
American policy and a possible means of prising the United States
away from Israel.
After the 1973 war the United States nevertheless included
Algiers on the Middle Eastern itinerary of its visiting
statesmen. Kissinger visited Algiers several times in 1973-4 in
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the pursuit of his shuttle diplomacy.	 In December 1973 he was
supposed to have enquired of President Boumedienne whether
Algeria should be classified with the 'moderate' camp of Arab
states, or with hard-liners such as Iraq and Libya. Boumedienne's
reply was to the effect that Algeria was not trying to outbid
anyone. "It can only support the decisions of the Palestinians
themselves.	 To demand more than they do is demagoguery, to
demand less is treason." Boumedienne also saw President Nixon
while in the United States in April 1974, on a visit to the
United Nations. That same month Kissinger was again in Algiers
to discuss the disengagement of Syrian and Israeli forces in the
Golan Heights. Kissinger reported that Algeria "showed support
and understanding" for the American initiative.
	 He also added,
significantly, that "relations between Algeria and the United
States were undergoing extensive review.
	 [They] are improving
constantly and will continue to improve in the future".1°
While Algeria was ready to go alone with the diplomatic
process in the context of the policies agreed by the Arab states,
it rose to the defence of OPEC against criticisms from the United
States that "in raising the price of oil the producing countries
have purely and simply torpedoed the chance of development of the
Third World". Boumedienne was the first of the OPEC Arab leaders
to refute such criticisms. At the Second Islamic Conference in
Lahore, in February 1974, he declared :
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Today we hear voices explaining to the third World that
the increase in oil prices is directed against them.
Since when has the exploiter become defence counsel for
the exploited? The industrial countries must learn to
get their hands off our riches. We pay excessive prices
for imported industrial goods and technology.
	
The
contest over oil is part of a wider struggle involving
all raw materials : and underlying that struggle is the
question of relations between the industrialised and the
developing countries."
A few days before the Lahore statement, and in his capacity as
President of the Non-Aligned Movement, Boumedienne had sent a
message to the U.N. Secretary General calling for a Special
Session of the U.N. to deal with "all questions relating to every
aspect of raw materials".12
For Algeria the Arab states and OPEC were doing battle with
the industrial nations on behalf of the entire Third World and in
an effort to bring about a new and more equitable international
order. Theirs was not an Arab struggle but one on behalf of the
Third World as a whole.	 The issue was not only oil but all
commodities and raw materials.	 It was necessary therefore to
organise other commodity producers into bodies like OPEC so that
the battle for a New International Economic Order could commence.
However powerful the OPEC states alone could not take on the
consumer nations without the support of other producer states.
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Fearing American plans to weaken and undermine OPEC, Boumedienne
summoned a first OPEC summit in Algiers in 1975 to ensure a
united front by its members. He also took the opportunity of the
conference to mediate in the dispute betwen Iran and Iraq over
their common frontier on the Shatt-al-Arab.
That same month there was a meeting in France of some ten
nations whose object was to prepare for an international
conference of producer and consuming nations. On behalf of the
developed states, America pressed for an agenda that would
emphasise energy problems;	 the Third World nations, led by
Algeria, demanded a much wider, more comprehensive agenda, to
focus on problems of development. Despite the stalemate between
the two sides, the ability of the Third World states to present
and maintain a united front was regarded as a diplomatic victory
for Algeria. The stalemate was finally broken in May 1975 when
Kissinger agreed to broaden the discussion to include more
general questions about the relations between developed and
developing nations.
	 Concessions by America were answered by
concessions on the part of some of the more'moderate' (i.e.,
conservative) Third World states. As the united front among the
producer countries gave way before the show of 'reasonableness'
on the part of the consuming nations, Algerian influence also
began to wane.	 Meanwhile the emergence of the Western Sahara
issue on its own frontiers served to distract Algerian attention
away from the long and complex proceedings in Paris.
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Algeria's interests first 
Just as political relations between Algeria and the United
Stateswere becoming incrasingly problematic, their economic
relations were improving and expanding. In 1973 Algerian exports
to America were worth $ 215 million, or 11% of her total exports.
Her imports from America amounted to $ 161 million, or 7% of
total imports.	 Two years later, in 1975, Algerian exports to
America had risen to $ 2.209 billion, which was nearly 40% of the
total.	 Imports from America were $ 487 million or 9% of all
imports.	 Algeria thus had a favourable trade suplus with the
United States in 1975 of $ 1.722 billion, compared with a surplus
of only $ 54 million in 1973.' 3 By 1976 Algeria had ceased to be
economically dependent on France as the United States came to
replace France as Algeria's principal trading partner.	 This
economic rapprochement with America was accompanied by some
deviations in foreign policy, as Algeria switched to a more
moderate line in both domestic and foreign policies, breaking
with her earlier, more intransigent line.
	
The year 1977
witnessed a big increase in Algeria's trade surplus with the
United States which leapt to $ 2.538 billion.
	
The value of
Algerian exports to the United States was $ 3.065 billion while
Algerian imports from the United States did not exceed $ 527
million - a mere 8% of her total import bill. By 1978 Algeria
had a favourable trade surplus with America of $ 3.200 billion.'4
-537-
Rapid industrialisation and technological "dependence" were
the main factors behind this increasing reliance on the American
connection. By 1977 Algeria was the leading recipient of loans
and loan-guarantees from the U.S. Export-Import Bank. In other
respects, too, Algeria was looking to the United States rather
than to France. From 1973-1977 the number of Algerian students
studying in America increased from 50 to 2,000. 16 In 1977 the
Algerian government was itself composed mainly of technocrats for
whom America, rather than France or the Soviet Union, served as
the model of industrial and scientific advance. 	 Ideology would
seem to have been relegated to second place as the 'circulation
of elites' within Algeria produced a new generation of senior
administrators.	 Having grown to maturity since the war of
independence, these were likely to be more critical of orthodox
socialist prescriptions and more inclined to pragmatism in
foreign as in domestic policy.
American foreign policy had moved sharply to the right in the
late seventies, away from the earlier 'regional' perspective of
the State Department and towards a more 'global' view,
represented by the National Security Council and White house
advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski. Brzezinski's presence at the
twentieth anniversay celebrations of the Algerian Revolution, on
November 1, 1979, was all the more surprising.
	 It recalled the
earlier support that American leaders had given, in the late
fifties and early sixties, to the cause of Algerian independence
during the long war with France.	 It also suggested that the
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Carter administration was hoping to expand its influence on the
southern shores of the Mediterranean at the expense both of
France and the Soviets. While Algeria remained, with Libya, the
largest African purchaser of Soviet arms, Washington was ready to
accept the fact of Algerian independence. 	 Algeria would not,
however, replace Morocco as America's most trusted ally in North
Africa : 1979 also saw the American decision to sell arms to
Morocco, at the height of her confrontation with Algeria and
Polisario over the Western Sahara.
Until 1979 American neutrality in the Saharan conflict was
clear from its reluctance to sell offensive weapons to Morocco -
so as not to upset its economic relations with Algeria.
Washington saw the conflict as a local one that did not invite an
East-West confrontation.
	 When Polisario began to intensify its
attacks on Morocco, in late 1979, the Americans came under strong
pressure to register their support for King Hassan II, President
Carter summoned a meeting with the Secretary of state, the
Secretary of Defence and his National Security Advisor, to
consider possible overt military aid for Morocco.' s	After
Hassan's visit to Washington, in March 1980, Morocco received $
235 million of American military aid.i7 Algeria, for her part, did
not react negatively, but sought instead to use its influence
with the new, revolutionary regime in Teheran, to try to secure
the release of the American Embassy hostages - if possible, in
advance of the presidential election. 	 Algeria had initially
criticised the Iranian action as a violation of international
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norms and as a political mistake that had isolated Iran from the
rest of the world.
As one of the few countries that had retained close ties with
Iran in the early stages of the revolution, Algeria was well
placed to be able to mediate in the dispute. le By helping to
secure the release of the hostages, in 1981, and by serving as
Iran's representative in Washington, Algeria hoped to convince
the Americans that Algeria was, in fact, non-aligned, despite the
purchase of arms from the Soviet Union. The new administration
of BenJedid Chadli also hoped to establish its	 international
credentials and to publicise and promote Algeria's style of
conflict resolution - as demonstrated earlier by Boumedienne's
mediation in the Iran-Iraq border dispute. In return Algeria may
have expected a more sympathetic response by Washington to the
Algerian position on the Western Sahara - and some support in her
long and costly dispute with the EL PASO oil company.
Disappointed with the results, on both counts, Algeria concluded
that Washington would continue its support for Morocco rather
than adopt a more 'balanced' or neutral approach to Maghrebin
affairs.
The new Reagan administration soon made its position clear.
Following the American clash with Libya in the Gulf of Sirta in
December 1981, the decision to sell advanced AWACS aircraft to
Saudi Arabia, and the creation of American bases in Kenya and
Somalia as well as Egypt, the Algerians became alarmed at the
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prospect of concerted action against so-called 'revolutionary'
regimes in Africa.	 In 1982 the Moroccan government granted
military facilities to the Americans, including the use of bases
inside Morocco, shortly after the creation by America and Tunisia
of a Joint military commission.	 At the same time American
imports from Algeria were halved as oil companies stopped lifting
Algerian oil complaining of its high cost. 	 Imports from the
United States increased, however, by some 20% to reach $1
billion. They included Hercules transport aircraft and army
trucks as well as equipment for oil and gas extraction.19
More liberal economic policies on the part of the Chadli
administration in 1983 - and moves for detente with Morocco -
did, however, bring a return to closer economic ties with the
United States,	 By 1984 Algeria exported $3.8 billion in
hydrocarbons to the United States, importing $500 million of
American goods in exchange. A pro-American group emerged within
the Algerian political elite, led by the Prime Minister,
Abdelhamid Brahimi, backed by the Foreign Minister, Ahmed Taleb
Ibrahimi. 2°	 But the main impetus for a new U.S.-Algerian
rapprochment came in August 1984 as a result of the OudJa Treaty
of Union between Morocco and Libya. Washington was not slow in
registering its disapproval - as the flow of arms to Morocco
slowed to a trickle.
	 In April 1985 Chadli became the first
Algerian president to pay an official visit to Washington. The
United States responded by approving Algerian purchases of
sophisticated American military hardware.
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Thereafter Algeria has looked increasingly to the United
States rather than the Soviet Union for its major defence
purchases.	 It did not, however, succeed in its more immediate
aim of isolating Morocco from its principal source of military
and financial assistance. 	 The Libyan-Moroccan 'union' did not
bring America's "special relationship" with Morocco to an end and
the Americans, in any case, had no wish to drive Morocco into the
arms of the French. After the American attack on Libya in 2986
the Moroccans determined to bring the 'union' to an end and set
about ingratiating themselves once more with Washington. By 1985
America was Algeria's second largest trading partner after
France. While America's trade with Algeria is second only to
Saudi Arabia in the Arab and African worlds.
Algeria and the Eastern bloc 
For Algerian and other Arab leaders the war of October 1973
offered conclusive evidence that, as in 1967, the Soviet Union
was more concerned with safeguarding détente and securing parity
with the United States, than with promoting Arab and other
'local' interests.	 Even in the fifties and sixties Soviet
support for Algerian liberation had been lukewarm - and had
fluctuated depending on the state of diplomatic
	 relations
between Moscow and Paris. Like most other Arab states Algeria
had expected the Soviet Union to come to the rescue of the Arabs
during the war of June 1967, To the dismay of Algeria and other
Arab states, however, the Soviet Union was not only surprised by
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the scale of the Arab defeat, but counselled the Arab leaders to
negotiate an unconditional cease-fire. Algeria could not accept
the Soviet interpretation of détente which would effectively
perpetuate the status quo in much of the Third World.
	 It was
unreasonable and unjust that the masses should have to accept
poverty and exploitation for the indefinite future so that those
in the industrial nations could enjoy both security and higher
standards of living. Peace and security on a global level depend
on a satisfactory outcome to the North-South Dialogue and a New
International Economic Order. 	 As the Algerian National Charter
of 1976 states
It is increasingly in Africa, Asia and Latin America that
wars, plots and coups d'etat take place, instigated from
outside.	 It is there, too, that the real struggle
continues...For Algeria, therefore, peace is one and
indivisible. .21
Under President Boumedienne Algeria seems to have rejected
the Soviet thesis of a world divided into socialist and
imperialist powers, preferring the Chinese version which sees the
split as one between rich and poor. On the eve of the Algiers
summit of the Non-Aligned Movement,	 in September 1973,
Eoumedienne had reacted angrily to an attempt by Leonid Brezhnev
to ensure that the Soviet view was accepted by the conference.
Instead Algeria has preferred to stress the economic rather than
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the political content of non-alignment, where the Soviets have
sought to emphasise the second at the expense of the first. For
Algeria, ideological considerations are secondary to the over-
riding need for development and the pursuit of a more equitable
distribution of wealth on a global basis. Détente is valuable in
so far as it contributes to that goal. The banners in Algiers at
the time of the Non-Aligned conference carried the slogan "poor
of the world unite" which suggested once again a preference for
the Chinese rather than the Russian position.
Initially, however, Algeria had appeared to be linked to the
Soviet Union - although it refused to take sides in the Sino-
Soviet schism. Ben Bella who was accorded an elaborate reception
in the Soviet Union, in May 1964, did not take up an invitation
to visit Peking. Moscow reacted coldly, however, to the coup in
1965 and the substitution of Boumedienne for Ben Bella, and this,
as well as the Soviet reaction to the Arab defeat in 1967, may
have pushed Boumedienne towards a more independent line.
Nevertheless it was February 1974 before the Algerian president
made his first official visit to China where he found much
sympathy for the view that all foreign fleets should be withdrawn
from the Mediterranean.
Algeria and Libya were the main African purchasers of Soviet
arms for much of the 1970s although neither would concede
military bases on their territory. While they are closer to the
Soviet Union than any other North African state, Moscow has been
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wary of any diplomatic involvement in the Western Sahara dispute.
The Polisario forces are equipped largely with Soviet arms, and
the Soviet Union did warn the French against intervention in the
conflict. But, as well as ideological affinities with Polisario
and Algeria, Moscow had also to consider questions of trade and
the benefits the Soviet Union could derive from the purchase of
Moroccan phosphates and the negotiation of fishing rights in the
off-shore waters of the Atlantic. The fact that the Moroccans
were soon in effective occupation of most of the Western Sahara
as well as patrolling the adjacent waters, clearly influenced the
Soviet attitude. Anticipating the disappearance, one day, of the
Moroccan monarch, the Soviets also wish to maintain a presence in
a state whose strategic position in the Mediterranean is of
considerable importance.
The Soviet Union also resented the appointment of Benjedid
Chadli to succeed the late Houari Boumedienne in 1979. Aware of
Chadli's reputation as a 'liberal' Moscow would have preferred
the candidate of the left, Mohamed Salah Yahiaoui. 	 On taking
office Chadli had promised to adhere to the country's policy of
non-alignment - keeping both super-powers at an equal distance.
It is doubtful, however, if that was quite the interpretation of
non-alignment that the Soviet leaders wished to hear. Algerian
demands for the withdrawal of American, Soviet and NATO fleets
from the Mediterranean are not regarded with much sympathy by the
Soviets who would find themselves effectively confined within the
Black Sea or compelled to roam the more distant oceans. Trade
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between Algeria and the Soviet Union did increase significantly
in the seventies, mainly as a result of large Algerian purchases
of Soviet arms. But trade with the East does not begin to match
the level of trade with the Western countries. Moreover, Algeria
since 1973 has shown a distinct preference for Western,
particularly	 American	 technology	 in	 its	 pursuit	 of
diversification and rapid industrialisation.
Yet, despite Chadli's new interpretation of non-alignment, he
was cautious not to offend the Soviet Union. Algeria had not
condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.
	 And,
during Chadli's visit to the Soviet Union, in June 1981, he
reviewed Algeria-Soviet relations and important aspects of
international relations, but failed to mention Afghanistan.22
While the Soviet Union continues to provide most of Algeria's
military equipment, Britain, France and the United States are
also playing an increasingly active and prominent role. Moscow's
only close ally in North Africa now is Libya - which some would
see more as a liability than an asset. The United States, on the
other hand, can count on Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco, while its
relations with Algeria continue to improve - even under Reagan -
and are likely to improve still more should an accommodation be
reached between Algeria and Morocco in the Western Sahara.
Algerian relations with Eastern Europe have generally been
positive although, again, trade is much smaller than with the
Western countries.
	 Algeria continues to receive military and
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technical assistance from countries like Hungary, which in the
late seventies provided large numbers of teachers, including
academics, as well as doctors and other medical personnel. There
was much support in Algeria for an East German programme offering
systematic vocational training for Algerian workers who were
later repatriated home where they could assist in national
development. Problems arose, however, in 1976 when several
thousand Algerian workers struck over low pay - many were then
deported. The most cordial relations were those between Algeria
and Yugoslavia, also a prominent member of the Non-Aligned
Movement whose relations with the Soviet Union have shown a will
to independence much appreciated by Algiers if not by Moscow.
Yugoslavia gave unconditional support to Algeria during the war
with France and many of the leaders and officials of the GPRA
were guests of Marshal Tito in Belgrade. 	 After independence
Algerian leaders and intellectuals also drew on Yugoslav
experience with "self-management" and industrial relations in the
establishment of the new state enterprises created after
independence in 1962.
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CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE : MOROCCO AND THE SUPER-POWERS 
THE ART OF PLAYING THE GAME 
Morocco : a reliable friend of America 
Since the 1960s Morocco has been classified as a pro-Western
state enjoying a very close and sympathetic relationship with the
United States.	 Under Hassan II Morocco was for a time the
largest African recipient of American aid.
	
For the Moroccan
state, however, there were risks as well as advantages in this
policy. American support for Israel remains a highly contentious
issue among Arab leaders and has been an even more sensitive
question with Arab opinion generally in the Middle East.
American support for the Moroccan regime did, however, bring
important diplomatic and,
	 on occasion,	 military support
particularly when, as in the Western Sahara in the late 1970s,
the government in Rabat was under considerable pressure.	 In
return Hassan agreed to despatch troops to the troubled province
of Shaba in Zaire, in 1977 and again in 1978, to bolster the
regime of Mobutu Sese Seko. And it was in Morocco that
preparations were made for the subsequent meeting between Anwar
Sadat and Menachem Begin. On a visit to Washington, in November
1978, Hassan had offered to help recruit and staff a pan-African
force, some 20,000 strong, to replace Cuban troops stationed in
Africa.'
As we have seen the Americans were nevertheless reluctant to
be drawn into the contest in the Western Sahara, and were under
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some economic pressure to adopt an even-handed approach : in the
second half of the seventies the value of American trade with
Algeria was ten times the figure for trade with Morocco. While
the United States has remained ideologically attached to Morocco,
it also has a clear interest in maintaining and expanding its
commercial relations with 'socialist' Algeria. 	 By way of
contrast the Soviet Union is ideologically closer to Algeria, but
values its commercial exchanges with Morocco.	 Neither power
therefore wants to see the Western Sahara erupt into a major
East-West conflict. On a visit to Moscow, in January 1976, Henry
Kissinger had warned Brezhnev that Washington would not tolerate
an Angolan-type intervention in the Western Sahara. 2
 Nor did the
Americans view Algeria as a Soviet satellite.
It remains the case that the United States wants to secure
the Moroccan regime and that the occupation of the Western Sahara
is the essential condition for that security. 	 There is no
enthusiasm in Washington for an Algerian or Libyan-influenced
Polisario government in the SADR.	 Hence Morocco in 1976 was
still one of the largest recipients - although no longer the
largest - of American aid and military assistance in Africa. In
1979, however, Polisario guerrillas took the initiative and
embarked on a series of offensive operations that found the
Moroccans unprepared and forced to withdraw to prepared defensive
positions. Rabat increased its pressure on the United States to
furnish more effective "defensive" weaponry. 	 Washington
responded favourably and American policy tilted noticeably in the
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direction of its old ally. Egypt and Saudi Arabia also seem to
have intervened with Washington on behalf of the Moroccan
government. The African states were themselves more divided on
the Western Sahara, at this time, than they had previously been
over earlier Moroccan claims to Mauritania.
	 And in Washington
the availability of Mexican natural gas after 1979 - with lower
transportation costs and less hassle about the price - weakened
the position of the Algerian government.
With Mauritania's withdrawal from the conflict in the Western
sahara, Polisario inflicted further humiliations on the besieged
and increasingly demoralised Moroccan forces. The rising cost of
imported oil coupled with the economic haemorrhage of the war in
the Sahara, falling world prices for phosphates, and the ever-
present threat of open confrontation with Algeria 	 all
threatened to engulf the Moroccan regime, despite the undoubted
popularity of the war among all sectors of the Moroccan
population. The only solution seemed to lie in the construction
of an elaborate network of sand walls to exclude Polisario
guerrillas while maintaining maximum security within the occupied
territory at a minimum cost in political as well as military
terms. Once the territory was pacified Morocco could then afford
the luxury of a plebiscite to confirm (if not legitimise) its
presence. But defences on that scale would require substantial
investment that, in the circumstances could only come from
abroad.	 In 1980 the American government asked Congress to
authorise a 100% increase in the arms vote for Morocco - despite
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evidence that such arms, whatever the conditions governing their
future use, would be deployed against Polisario.3
Where Morocco's relations with France suffered strain after
the socialist victory in 1981, relations with the new American
president were closer and more cordial than before. In contrast
to President Carter, Ronald Reagan was determined from the outset
to confirm his administration's unwavering support for its loyal
allies and partners in other parts of the world. 	 Washington
would tolerate no more Irans in the Middle East and no more Cubas
in Central America. Hassan had condemned the Soviet intervention
in Afghanistan in 1979; was prepared to allow American warships
to use its ports and to negotiate the use of its airfields;
Moroccan policies in the Middle East were highly flexible and
pragmatic and inspired by an acute awareness of the 'realities'
of the situation, while Morocco also shared Washington's concern
at the Soviet and Cuban presence in various parts of Africa, and
at Libyan involvement in the affairs of many African states. In
March 1981, therefore, the Pentagon announced the sale of 108 1(60
tanks to Morocco with a value of $182 million. Washington also
undertook to deliver fighter aircraft already promised Morocco by
the previous Carter administration.4
An official visit to Washington by King Hassan, in May 1982,
resulted in in agreement whereby the United States would acquire
military transit facilities from Morocco for a period of six
years.	 In return Morocco would receive military credits to
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expand its purchases of American arms and military equipment.
Moreover, these would now include
	 sophisticated electronic
devices for monitoring Polisario movements in the Western Sahara.
The two countries held joint military manouevres in the autumn of
1982 confirming their new more intimate partnership. Algeria and
Libya were critical but could do little to influence American
policy.	 There was some indication, however, of dissent inside
Morocco, directed against the American connection rather than
against the war itself. The incidents were minor but pointed to
growing anti-American sentiment elsewhere in the society - in the
aftermath of Israel's invasion of Lebanon and the failure of the
Americans to condemn the Israeli action. A meeting sponsored by
the official Moroccan Association of Support for the Palestinian
Struggle ended in confusion when a junior minister was prevented
from speaking by cries of "long live popular regimes and down
with reactionary Arab regimes". And in July 1982 a member of the
American consular staff in Casablanca was killed, apparently in a
car accident although a fundamentalist group claimed to have been
responsible for his death. 6 Even greater mystery surrounded the
death, in January 1983, of General Ahmed Dlimi, the most senior
officer in the Moroccan Army. This, too, was said to have been
the result of a car accident, while he was on an inspection tour
of the defences in the Sahara. 	 There were rumours, however,
linking Dlimi with a plot to overthrow Hassan apparently in
opposition to the latter's pro-American views.
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The administration in Washington was clearly upset and
disappointed by the Libyan-Moroccan rapprochement of August 1984.
While relations continued they did not exhibit the same warmth or
sense of mutual trust. The 'Moroccan lobby' was busy trying to
play down the significance of Hassan's new alliance with
America's leading opponent in North Africa. 6 And the lobby had
some support from the Jewish community and the zionist
organisations. Nevertheless there were increasing 'difficulties'
with the agreed supply of arms to Morocco. Trade with Algeria
was thriving and Hassan was soon looking for excuses to withdraw
from the 'union'. The American attack on Tripoli and Benghazi in
April 1986 was particularly embarrassing from the Moroccan point
of view since their treaty with Libya did involve a mutual
defence undertaking.	 The Moroccan decision later that year to
receive the	 Israeli Prime Minister,	 Shimon Peres,	 for
confidential talks had the required effect on the Libyans, who
tore up their treaty with Morocco. Relations between Rabat and
Washington improved at once.
In October 1986 there was a meeting between the Moroccan
Minister for commerce and the American Deputy-Secretary which
ended with an agreeent that Morocco would, in future, undertake
to supply fresh fruits and other produce to American troops
stationed in Western Europe. Morocco would also accommodate the
most powerful Voice of America transmitting station outside the
American mainland. And in December 1986 it was the turn of the
American Secretary of State for Defence, Casper Weinberger, to
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pay an official call on Morocco. Washington apparently was ready
to resume military aid and even to sell advanced F16 fighter
aircraft to Rabat.
We particularly appreciate the moderate, pro-Western
policy being pursued by Morocco. We will do everything
in our power to help provide whatever might be useful to
the Kingdom...We will give Morocco any assistance that
may be necessary to maintain security in Western Sahara.7
There would also be measures to reduce the debt burden and
reflate the economy. Prior to the visit some 10,000 American and
Moroccan troops had been involved in Joint manoeuvres conducted
in southern Morocco as part of an exercise labelled "African
Eagle".
Norocco and the Soviet Union : economic opportunism
In the case of Algeria's long struggle against the French the
Soviet Union had already shown that, in its view, the right to
"self-determination",	 however	 praiseworthy,	 does	 not
automatically involve a right to "independence". Much depends on
the state of Moscow's relations with the colonial or occupying
power, to say nothing of the risks of confrontation with the
United States. While Polisario and Algeria might view the issue
in the Western Sahara as one of self-determination, Moscow was
more concerned with balancing arms sales to Algeria off against
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purchases of Moroccan (and Saharan) phosphates, to say nothing of
securing access for commercial Soviet trawling fleets to the rich
Atlantic waters adjoining Western Sahara. In 1976 Moscow went so
far as to warn Algeria about allowing Polisario to use Soviet-
supplied arms in its attacks on Moroccan outposts and other
military targetsli
 The Soviet Union did not support the Moroccan
position on the Saharan issue, but neither did it support
Polisario or Algeria. The Soviet Union has yet to recognise the
SADR or to establish close relations with Polisario.	 Nor does
the Soviet Union supply arms directly to the Polisario
guerrillas. Where the United States has rationed its support for
UNITA in Angola it has been argued that the Soviet Union has
shown a similar restraint in its support for Polisario.
Although sympathetic with Algeria on the political plane, the
Soviet Union has developed a very profitable economic
relationship with Morocco which it has no wish to sacrifice. In
the seventies Morocco was the Soviet's major trading partner in
Africa. There was a $2 billion agreement for the construction
of phosphates mines, which Hassan, using a somewhat familiar
phrase, described as the 'Deal of the Century' (narcIA du
siècle), signed in March 1978. Which was followed by a fisheries
45reement, signed the following April in Moscow, which provided
access to the Atlantic coast for Soviet fleets, as well as
credits for the establishment of a canning industry in Morocco
and investment in the expansion of the Moroccan fishing fleet.
The 'deal' encountered certain 'teething' troubles at the outset
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since the Moroccans were evidently trying to manouevre the Soviet
Union into recognising, at least implicitly, Moroccan sovereignty
over the Saharan waters. The Soviet ambassador in Algiers had to
confirm to the Algerian authorities that the agreement did not
cover the territorial waters in dispute off the coast of Western
Sahara.'3
Problems between Morocco and Cuba in 1980 also had
implications for Moroccan relations with the Soviet Union.
Morocco broke off diplomatic relations with Cuba in April 1980,
following Cuban recognition of the Saharawi Arab Democratic
Republic (SADR) the previous January. In July 1980 the official
Moroccan Press Agency insisted that Cuba was conniving with
Algeria and the Polisario 'pirates' in kidnapping fishermen
operating inside Moroccan territorial waters. 1 ° The Soviet Union
continued to maintain a low profile on the Saharan question. It
has also sought to develop the mutually beneficial commercial
exchanges between the two countries. In October 1984 there were
two further agreements, covering phosphates and agricultural
produce, while the two states envisaged exchanges worth $2.2
billion by the year 1990."
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CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO : TUNISIA AND THE SUPER-POWERS 
A TILT TOWARDS THE UNITED STATES 
Tunisian foreign policy, as we have seen, has been largely
shaped by Habib Bourguiba, himself a product of Western liberal
thinking.	 He has consistently taken moderate, pro-Western
positions on international issues, being one of the very few
leaders in the Third World to have openly supported American
policy in Vietnam.' 	 The same factors explain Bourguiba's
distaste for radical policies, his distrust of the communist
bloc, particularly Maoist China, and his suspicion of Third World
leaders who seek communist support. Tunisia has never accepted
the radical Third World view of the United states as an
imperialist or neo-colonial state. When the French stopped aid
to Tunisia, in 1964, after Tunisia had nationalised the european
estates, the American government intervened to provide assistance
for Tunisia.	 Since then the United States has remained an
important source of foreign aid.	 During 1957-76 American
bilateral assistance to Tunisia amounted to $850 million. 2 And
while there are no security treaties between the two countries
America has undertaken to supply Tunisia with considerable
military aid and to assist with military training.
Henry Kissinger took the opportunity to confer with Bourguiba
and other Tunisian officials, in November 1974, in the course of
his 'shuttle' diplomacy, to sound out their views, and those of
other Middle Eastern leaders, on a Middle Eastern settlement. It
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was the view of the Tunisian officials that, without American
pressure, the Israelis were unlikely to enter into substantive
negotiations.
	 Tunisia has therefore been disappointed by
continuing American support for Israel and the refusal of
Washington to enter into direct talks with the leaders of the
Palestinian resistance.
	 A joint communique, issued in 1976 by
the Tunisian-American Joint commission, pointed to the 'healthy
state of bilateral relations. Kissinger once again stressed the
importance Washington attached to Tunisia's independence, 	 and
the role it was playing, as a moderate 	 w.ad as a force for
stability in the Mediterranean region.'
As in the case of Morocco, however, there is considerable
suspicion inside Tunisia about American policy in the Middle East
generally and more specifically about the close ties that exist
between the two states.	 In Tunisia, as in Morocco, there were
anti-American demonstrations in 1982 - the first directed against
America since Tunisia became independent in 1956. Following the
Israeli invasion of Lebanon in the summer of 1982 a thousand
demonstrators gathered at a rally sponsored by the official
Tunisian Trade Union Confederation (UGTT) at which the American
flag was burnt. In July the Tunisian Foreign Minister, Beji Caid
Essebsi, appeared on television and was sharply critical of
American Middle Eastern policy, calling on the United States to
abandon its unwavering support for ISrael. Meanwhile hundreds of
Tunisians volunteered to fight for the PLO in Lebanon. A Although
Tunisian ties with the United States remained close, her
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continuing close association with Israel was highly embarrassing
for the Tunisian leaders in the aftermath of the Israeli invasion
of Lebanon.
	
When the American Secretary of State, George
Schultz, visited Tunisia, in December 1983, there was strong
criticism of the American position from President Bourguiba and
from Prime Minister M'Zali.
Apart from such momentary fluctuations, American-Tunisian
relations have remained relatively straight-forward. The United
States sees Tunisia as a bulwark against Libya and was therefore
ready to exert itself to ensure an orderly succession in Tunis.
Bourguiba's eventual successor, General Zine Al Abidine Ben Ali,
was himself trained in the United States and was formerly
responsible for national security in Tunisia. His appointment as
Interior Minister in 1984, after the bread riots in the capital,
was a clear indication of American as well as Tunisian concern to
maintain order and political stability at all costs. The first
joint Tunisian-U.S. military exercises to take place on Tunisian
soil were held in early May 1985.	 A month later, President
Bourguiba visited the United States where, among other issues, he
discussed the possibility of Tunisia receiving American military
aid in the form of grants rather than loans. 	 The President
claimed that the loan system was placing an "intolerable burden
on the economy" .5
In November 1987 Ben Ali would finally take power in a palace
coup, replacing Bourguiba as president. Since Libya's military
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escapade at the town of Gafsa, in January 1980, and the bread
riots of January 1984, Tunisia has acquired F5 fighter aircraft
and M60 tanks from the United States, as well as anti-aircraft
and anti-tank missiles.	 By the end of 1984, Tunisia's military
debt to the United States was estimated at $400 million.
	 The
commercial balance between Tunisia and the United States amounted
to $403 million - in favour of America. 8 After Bourguiba's visit
to the United States in 1985 there were tentative plans for
America to supply sophisticated air defence systems to Tunisia in
exchange for the right to use certain military facilities in that
country.' Washington and Tunis were agreed that any threat was
likely to emanate from Tripoli and Kadhafi.
Tunisia's western orientation has not precluded positive
relations with the East Communist states, although these for the
most part have been more recent and are usually on a more
temporary, ad hoc basis.
	 In 1973 two Soviet diplomats and a
Soviet news agency correspondent were accused of espionage : the
Soviet citizens were expelled - after the Soviet Union had
apologised for the incident - while four Tunisians also involved
in the affair were convicted of treason in May 1974. 8 Receiving
the Soviet Prime Minister, Anatoly Kosygin, on an official visit
to Tunisia in April 1975, Bourguiba remarked that "in this time
of détente we cannot be more American than the Americans". 8 And
just as Tunisia has from time to time expressed disappointment at
Washington's unconditional support for Israel, so too there have
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been differences between Tunis and Moscow over possible future
boundaries for the state of Israel.
Bourguiba favours frontiers based on the 1947 UN Partition
Plan while the Soviet Union prefers - perhaps more realistically
- a return to the frontiers that existed before the June 1967
war. On other issues, Tunisia has become increasingly alarmed at
the Soviet military presence in the Horn of Africa and elsewhere
in Africa as well as its involvement in Afghanistan. Bourguiba
did not share Boumedienne's interest in Chairman Mao's China or
its dispute with the Soviet Union and its distinctive Third World
policies. Relations were fairly minimal and were confined to a
number of official visits and an Y80 million loan, negotiated by
the Tunisian Prime Minister, Hedi Nouira, in April 1975.10
-
I- -
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CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE : LIBYA AND THE SUPER-POWERS 
NUTUAI.L_E15.212,1953.
Kadhafi's attitude to the super-powers has changed over the
period under consideration. At first he was hostile to both the
Soviet Union and the United States - but his hostility to the
Soviet Union was more pronounced. Prior to 1973 he was even seen
by Arab leftists and communists as an American agent because of
his anti-communsist utterances. In 1971 he denounced the Soviet
role in the Indo-Pakistan war, as "confirming Soviet imperialist
designs in the area".'
	 Briefly, Kadhafi supported Sultan Qaboos
of Oman, a close ally of Britain and the United states, against
the Dhofar guerrilla movement being supported by the pro-Soviet
marxists of Southern Yemen. The leaders of the abortive, pro-
communist coup in Sudan, in 1971, were intercepted by Kadhafi and
returned to Sudan where they were executed by the government of
Jaafar Numeiry. 2	Some have even claimed that Kadhafi was
protected by the Americans, and even by the CIA, in his initial
bid for power - in the conviction that he was a religious fanatic
and an anti-communist nationalist who would resist communist
penetration of the region.2
At the summit of the Non-Aligned Movement in Algiers, in
September 1973, Kadhafi even challenged the right of Cuba to be
represented because of its close alignment with Moscow. As we
have seen the two leaders embraced on the final day - after Cuba
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had agreed to sever diplomatic relations with Israel. But at the
very time that Egypt was turning to the United States, Libya was
starting to lean towards the Soviet Union. This had little to do
with communism but a great deal to do with the rebuff that
Kadhafi had suffered at the hands of Sadat in his attempts to
cement a union between their two states. In 1973 Kadhafi first
visited the Soviet Union and relations between the two have since
demonstrated the contradictions inherent in Libya's attitudes
towards the wider world.	 The Soviet Union, together with the
United States, had voted for Israel's entry to the United
Nations.	 The Soviet Union has pursued a vigorous policy of
secularisation among the Moslem populations that inhabit the
republics of Central Asia.	 In 1979 the Soviet Union took
advantage of internal divisions to invade Afghanistan. 	 For
Kadhafi, however, it is the United States and its Western allies
who must bear most of the responsibility for the creation of
Israel and its subsequent expansion - to the exclusion of the
native Palestinians.
A large arms deal was concluded in 1975 between the Soviet
Union and Libya, along with reports that the Soviets had offered
some assistance in the development of nuclear power - albeit for
peaceful purposes. 4 Moscow was reacting to its expulsion from
Egypt by the Americans in 1972, as well as to the chronic
shortage of foreign exchange that could be alleviated by the sale
of arms to the oil-rich Libyans (and Algerians). It appears that
the Soviets had little faith in Kadhafi and saw the alliance
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rather in terms of a short-term 'marriage of convenience'.
Political circumstances since 1973 had thrown them together
Libya, however, was no substitute for Egypt. The Green Book of
1973 demonstrated not only Kadhafi's nationalist fervour, but
also his determined rejection of communist as well as of
capitalist ideas.	 From the outset Moscow seems to have been
aware of the risks posed by Kadhafi with his well deserved
reputation for volatility. The communist leaders were wary lest
"the tail wag the dog".
Although Kadhafi threatened in 1978 to join the Warsaw Pact,
no invitation was issued and no acceptance of Libyan membership
was recorded.	 Kadhafi was to make similar requests, notably
after the American attack on Tripoli in 1986, but the door
remained shut fast and bolted. s In 1979 Kadhafi hinted that he
might reverse his previous non-aligned policy and permit Soviet
bases in Libya so as to counteract the flourishing alliance
between America and Egypt.	 Following the investiture of
President Ronald Reagan, in 1981, Kadafi threatened first to sign
a friendship pact with the Soviets and then to join the Warsaw
Pact on the grounds that Washington was pushing Tripoli into the
arms of Moscow. Under this mounting American pressure Kadhafi,
together with the Presidents of Ethiopia and South Yemen, signed
a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation on August 19, 1981. This
provided for closer political and economic cooperation.
-564-
In protest at the build-up of American military facilities
in the Indian Ocean - which in 1979 was declared a zone of peace
by the UN General Assembly - the three leaders referred in
particular to U.S. bases in Somalia, Oman, Egypt, and on the
island of Diego Garcia.	 The treaty was condemned by Oman and
Egypt, who both considered the Soviet Union to have instigated
the alliance with a view to spreading Soviet influence throughout
the Arab region. On the same day there was a clash between Libya
and the United States, resulting in the shooting down of two
Libyan aircraft by American F14 jets over the Gulf of Sirte. In
March 1983 the Soviet Union and Libya did agree, in principle, to
conclude a treaty of peace and friendship - reflecting their
joint concern of mounting American influence in the Middle East.
particularly after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon the previous
year.	 At the same time Soviet-Libyan trade rose from t504
million in 1981 to t1.2 bllion in 1982 - following large
purchases of Soviet arms paid for mainly by shipments of Libyan
oil,6
The Soviet Union remains to the present Libya's most
important military ally.	 Diplomatic relations with China were
not established until August 1978 and relations were temporarily
frozen in 1982 on account of the continuing supply of Chinese
arms to Egypt. Despite the friendship treaty, however, neither
side has quite matched the more optimistic expectations of the
other.	 Until recently Libya, together with Syria, has been
supportive of Iran against Iraq in the protracted Gulf war. And
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this despite growing Soviet support for Iraq since 1982 and
attempts by the Soviets to effect a cease-fire between the rival
governments.	 Libya, moreover, still looks to the west as its
major export market and as the source of most of its non-military
imports. Kadhafi has been largely unpredictable in his behaviour
towards the Soviet-backed PLO, frequently acting in defiance of
Soviet wishes, most notably in his long opposition to Yasser
Arafat, chairman of the PLO.	 Kadhafi had often had cause to
condemn Arafat : on account of his support for the peace process
in the mid seventies, his long reluctance to support the
revolution in Lebanon until the Christian militias had forced his
hand, and his unexpected decision to visit President Mubarak of
Egypt and King Hussein of Jordan, shortly after his expulsion
from Tripoli (Lebanon) in 1983 - by the Syrians who had mobilised
PLO and Fatah dissidents against him.
Because of the erratic behaviour of the Libyan leader the
Soviets have always preferred to keep their distance. Libya is
seen as yet another unreliable Arab state - with independent
means and therefore more likely to promote its own rather than
Soviet interests in the region. Kadhafi's close supervision of
the army and his control over the 'people's committees' leaves
little room in which the Soviets can manoeuvre. From Kadhafi's
point of view it is a matter of regret, too, that the Soviet
Union cannot or will not provide the kind of military and
diplomatic support for the Arab states that America so readily
dispenses to Israel. That is a cause of some resentment vis-a-
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vis the Soviet Union, but is also at the origin of the Libyan-
American conflict. In the words of the Libyan Minister of State
for Information, Mohammed Eelkacem Zwai
Israel was a foreign body wiThin the Arab nation; every
one who went there after 1945 should go back where they
came from...The Americans not only arm Israel but have
built it into a strong power that can threaten any other
country.'
Libya and the United States : continual confrontation 
In October 1980, following the delivery of American AWACS
aircraft to Saudi Arabia, Kadhafi urged the Arab states to strike
back at Israel and American imperialism.
We urge the Arab people, from the Ocean to the Gulf,
to strike back at United States bases, the United States
presence and its main base in Israel. Should the Arab
regimes obstruct the vengeance of the Arab people they
must pay the price for their obstruction; they will be
treated like the United States and the Israelis.'
Ironically, Kadhafi had welcomed the election of Ronald Reagan as
American president in November 1980, arguing that Republicans
were cloer to the Arab cause than Democrats.
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We firmly welcome the election of President Reagan,
firstly because it was Carter who signed the accords
which were a plot against the Arab and Palestinian
peoples...But also we feel the Republicans have always
been closer to the Arab cause than the Democrats. Proof
of this is seen by the reaction of Sadat before this
election. He detested Reagan.';
Since Reagan's election, however, relations between the two
states have sunk to their lowest level. In July 1981 there were
rumours that the CIA was planning Kadhafi's assassination. 	 A
month later F14 aircraft from the American Sixth Fleet shot down
two Libyan SU22 aircraft over the Gulf of Sirte, as part of a
long-standing dispute over the extent of Libya's territorial
waters.	 It also followed a long war of words over American
allegations that a Libyan assassination squad had been sent to
Washington with orders to kill President Reagan and other senior
American officials. Ever since Camp David Libya has seen itself
as a likely target for hostile action by Egypt, Israel and the
United States. In 1982 America and conservative Arab states had
pressured members of the OAU to boycott the summit due to be held
in Tripoli - thereby preventing Kadhafi becoming chairman of the
organisation during 1982-3.
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Reagan wished to remove Kadhafi to eliminate what he
considers to be a potential Soviet foothold in the Mediterranean
region.	 In March 1982 the United states banned imports of oil
from Libya and that same month token measures were announced to
stop the 'illegal' export of $1.7 billion of 'high technology'
goods to Libya. The intention was clearly to squeeze Kadhafi in
every way possible. Kadhafi has gauged his responses with a view
to eliciting the greatest reaction in the United States. Aware
of Reagan's crusade against communism, Kadhafi declared in
January 1986 that American policy was forcing Libya into the
hands of the Soviet Union and that his country might become the
"Cuba of the Mediterranean".'° One might argue equally that the
Libyan leader should be grateful to the United States for
distracting the attention of Libyans away from the urgent
domestic problems now facing them.
Oil revenues have fallen steeply while the national debt has
soared.	 Much of the budget has ben spent on an army that,
following its crushing defeat in Chad, in March 1987, may now
pose a serious threat to Kadhafi himself. The attempted coup of
1984 was primarily the result of mounting dissatisfaction with
Kadhafi among Libyan officers.	 Kadhafi's reaction has been to
re-shuffle the army command and to reinforce the surveillance of
the revolutionary people's guards. Arguably, the American attack
on Libya in April 1986, far from weakening the regime, served
largely to discredit the military - which was always the most
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likely focus of opposition to Kadhafi - while strengthening
public (civilian) support for the Libyan leader.
Meanwhile there was mounting frustration in the United states
following Libyan involvement in terrorist actions, particularly
those directed against American targets. 	 President Reagan has
been urging European support for economic sanctions and possible
military action against Libya. Since 1981, however, America's
European allies have been anxious to keep some distance between
themselves and the increasingly bitter dispute involving Reagan
and Kadhafi. Given the reasonably good relations between Libya
and the West European states, it is not surprising that the
latter have responded with a marked lack of enthusiasm to
discreet soundings from Washington about comprehensive and
collective economic sanctions against Libya.
The United States did not take kindly to the failure of her
European partners to follow her lead in imposing economic
sanctions against Libya, following attacks on the Rome and Vienna
airports in which Libya was said to be implicated.
	 If the
European states have hesitated it has been because they believe
the Reagan administration has been over-reacting while the effect
of American retaliation has not been that intended : one does not
isolate Kadhafi by making a martyr of him. In any case European
interests in Libya and the Arab world are far from negligeable -
nor is Europe, particularly southern Europe, immune from possible
Libyan retaliation.
	 So long as the United States continues to
-570-
support Israeli policy in the Middle East and refuses recognition
to the PLO, there will be support for Kadhafi in Libya and other
Arab states. Where American (and Western) policy towards South
Africa has cost Washington the support of much African opinion,
her unflinching support for Israel has helped alienate Arab
opinion in most of the Middle East.
Conclusions 
Algeria is the obvious point of reference for any examination
of the Maghreb on account of its greater size, manpower and
availability of natural resources.	 Compared with its immediate
neighbours, Morocco and Tunisia, its foreign policy has been more
'radical'	 and more	 consistently	 'radical'	 than the
unpredictable Libya. The principal object of Algerian policy,
particularly under Houari Boumedienne, has been to free itself
from the economic constraints and the consequent sense of
dependency imposed by colonial conquest and the reorganisation
and later evolution of its productive structures. Undertaken by
the French throughout North Africa this has led to the creation
of economies that relate to France rather than to one another or
to the other states around them. Today, long after independence,
such economies are still engaged in harmful competition with one
another for access to French and, more recently, European
markets.
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Greater economic independence and a measure of self-
sustaining growth have been the guiding principles of the
Algerian development programme in its formative years and
throughout the Boumedienne period.
	
This was a period when
priority went to industry and large-scale, state-owned and state-
directed organisations were the norm in business as well as in
agriculture.	 Self-reliance and socialist planning were the
ideals in economics just as self-determination and independence
were the goals of state-craft and foreign policy. After 1973 the
Algerian leadership launched itself into the struggle for a New
International Economic Order and the campaign for North-South
Dialogue.	 During 1973-76 President Boumedienne was in the
forefront of the Third World political offensive to win a radical
improvement in terms of trade with the industrial nations. He
was also chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement, favouring an
interpretation of non-alignment which matched the economic
concerns of the Third World rather than the strategic priorities
of the super-powers and their European allies.
Algeria's concern with international trading patterns
reflects her own experience as a Third World producer and the
struggle in the 1960s and early 1970s to secure a larger share of
oil royalties for re-investment in the country's development.
Together with Iraq, Algeria had experimented with a variety of
methods for ensuring more effective control not only over oil
extraction but also over refining and marketing.	 By the mid-
seventies Algeria was again active in pressing forward with
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similar policies for her other major export, natural gas, looking
for investment in the necessary infrastructure and technology,
and then adopting an aggressive marketing policy towards the
industrial states.
	 It was this radical policy and aggressive
approach to marketing and pricing that characterised Algeria's
relations with the European Community in particular, and the
industrialised world in general.
Other Maghrebin states, notably Tunisia and Morocco, have not
sought to follow the Algerian lead.	 Morocco has sought to
protect its largely agricultural economy by integrating itself
more closely with the European Community and seeking to adjust to
the economic needs and priorities of the West rather than
collaborating with other Third World states to try to influence
or change those priorities. Tunisia, although it enjoys higher
levels of social formation, has followed policies similar to
those of Morocco, although its own economy is more closely
integrated with that of Eastern Algeria. 	 The main concern of
Algeria's neighbours has been to secure and maintain preferential
access to the European Community and, especially, to the French
market.	 The alternative, closer integration with the Algerian
economy and a coordinated pattern of development in the
industrial and agricultural spheres has not proved sufficiently
attractive, although it would appear to offer substantial
advantages over the existing system. The principal objection
appears to be political although, in economic terms, it could be
argued that to pursue Maghrebin cooperation would be to replace
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one form of dependency - on the European Community - with
another, even less acceptable form 	 namely dependency on
Algeria. It remains to be seen, however, whether the entry into
the EC of Greece, Spain and Portugal will stimulate a new
interest in regional cooperation inside North Africa.
On the broad level of principle there is little to choose
between the foreign policies of the Maghrebin states. All, though
in	 differing	 degrees,	 emphasise	 national	 independence,
development, solidarity with the Third World, close association
with Africa, the Middle East and the Mediterranean, the need for
linkage with Europe, identification with the Arab 'nation' and
the Moslem world and the cause of the Palestinians. It is at the
level of action, on a day-to-day basis, that the policies begin
to diverge. Morocco, Algeria and Libya denounce imperialism but,
for Morocco, the threat comes from Eastern Europe and the
Soviets, as well as from Algeria; for Libya it emanates from
Ierf;al t tha Urated Etatee and the West, notably France; and for
Algeria it comes mainly from the North - at least until the
arrival in power of President Chadli - and, of course, from
Moroccan 'expansionism'.
Where the Maghrebin states are agreed that American support
for Israel has been a critical factor in maintaining Israel's
dominant position within the Middle East, this has produced very
different reactions.
	
Where Bourguiba has tried to bring
Washington and the Arab states within hailing, if not speaking
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distance, Morocco has been active on Washington's behalf in
precisely those areas and on those questions, like Camp David,
that continue to separate the United States from even the most
moderate Arab leaders.	 The Americans can, on the other hand,
point to the Libyan position on Middle Eastern questions to
justify their continuing support for Israel, notwithstanding the
invasion of Lebanon and subsequent events on the West Bank and in
the Gaza Strip. And if Algerian policy under President Benjedid
Chadli has drawn closer to Washington it rPflects an ability on
the part of each to differentiate between mutual economic
interest and conflicting political goals. But that is one of the
purposes of a foreign policy and is a requirement that every
state must submit to.
There is a suspicion that the Maghrebin states have marketed
their foreign policies with the same energy and conviction that
they try to market their industrial and agricultural produce and,
of course, their oil and gas when they have it. Barter has never
been confined to commodities but extends to investment,
contracts, military bases, and innumerable 'deals' of one kind or
another, involving political 'favours' and 'services' as much as
economic transactions. Foreign policies compete in a political
market just as commodities are subject to competition in the
economic market.
	 Foreign policies also have to be 'sold',
markets created and political rivals 'bought off'. And it is here
that the Maghrebin states, whatever their political complexion,
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have shown considerable ingenuity, not to be outdone, despite
their diminutive resources, by even the Saudis and the Kuwaitis.
It is as political as well as economic entrepreneurs that one
should perhaps view the Maghrebin leaders. 	 Here President
Kadhafi is at a clear disadvantage since he is largely debarred
from the one market where he wants to play an effective role -
the Middle East - and is forced to compete in other markets where
the Libyan role is even more peripheral. The problem of centre-
periphery relations has been a problem of alliance-building since
time-immemorial, and long before it was appropriated by
dependency	 writers and those	 concerned with	 'internal
colonialism'. And there are some goods that just cannot be sold
at any price, e.g., Kadhafi's efforts to integrate Libya with the
Warsaw Pact.	 In marketing the North-South debate, President
Boumedienne also contrived - without detracting from the
principles involved - to sell Algerian oil and gas. For the Arab
states even the oil embargo of 1973 was a political instrument
heavily circumscribed by calculations of economic profit and
loss. For some Arab leaders the Palestinians, too, have been a
'commodity' although here again the leadership has found itself
constrained by the favourable image that 'commodity' enjoys in
the political marketplace.
The fact remains that, with Egypt's switch after 1972, from
the Soviet to the Western camp, the pressures on the Maghrebin
states for closer integration with the West in the political as
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well as the economic sense became overwhelming.	 President
Reagan's bombing of Libya in April 1986 and the evident
reluctance of the Soviet Union to become involved merely
underline what had long been obvious in any case. Egypt stands
between Kadhafi and the Middle East. 	 France, America, Nigeria
and Algeria bar the path to Libyan expansion southwards as well
as westwards.	 In Western Sahara Algeria and Morocco are
competing for American attention : here as elsewhere the Soviet
response has been disappointing. The economic shake-up in Algeria
under Chadli and the experiment in liberalisation anticipated -
rather than followed - the more timid 'reforms' of the Soviet
Union under Gorbachev. This is the real context in which one has
to re-consider more traditional policies like non-alignment,
francophonie, and Third World solidarity.
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CONCLUSIONS 
The period 1973-87 was a particularly significant one for the
Maghrebin states and for their foreign policies. The year 1973
was a watershed in terms of inter-state relations in the global
context as well as in the Middle East, Africa and within the
Maghreb.	 In the international sphere attention became focussed
on the October 1973 war between Egypt and Syria on the one hand
and Israel on the other. The war saw a pronounced shift in the
Soviet-American 'balance' within the Middle East.	 Soviet
influence began to wane as American involvement in the area
increased.	 Already in 1968 the Rogers' Plan for a cease-fire
between Israel and her Arab neighbours was an indication of
growing American influence with the Arab leaders. The accession
of Sadat after the death of Nasser in 1970 saw the recognition by
Egypt and its conservative allies of the Gulf that no
satisfactory or lasting solution could be found in the Middle
East without the active participation and support of the United
States which was the only power with some leverage over Israel.
The Soviets were deliberately excluded over a year before the
October war when Sadat expelled the Soviet advisers from Egypt in
1972.	 American support for a cease-fire and for the "peace
process" that followed the war was to have a considerable impact
on the Arab states in their relations with Egypt and with one
another.	 The new and enlarged American role and the more
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conservative bias within the Arab League could not fail to
influence the Maghrebin states who had identified closely with
the Arab cause in 1973, to the extent of despatching arms and men
- although they arrived too late to have any very direct role in
the conflict.
The quadrupling of oil prices in the course of 1973 was the
outcome of a growing imbalance between the demand of the
industrial countries for oil and the capacity of the Middle
Eastern producers to meet that demand. It was also triggered by
closer collaboration than in the past among the producing states
represented in OPEC and a determination to exploit market forces
to secure the best possible return for existing reserves in the
knowledge that these were large but not inexhaustible.	 The
dramatic, if short-lived oil embargo imposed by the Arab Oil-
Producing and Exporting Countries (OAPEC) as their contribution
to the 1973 war effort also emphasised the dependency of many
West European states on oil from the Middle East and the
political as well as the economic significance of the oil weapon.
The impact on oil-importing Third World states proved even more
far-reaching as they confronted higher charges for fuel and
energy as well as higher prices for european imports. Struggling
to maintain commodity prices at a level that would finance
existing commitments, many Third World producers were unable to
apply the same collective pressure as OPEC for a time maintained.
or were they able to absorb or pass on to others the more
damaging inflationary effects of higher costs.
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Many European states began to differentiate between their own
oil dependency and the more secure position of the United States
with its large oil reserves and its substantial, if declining,
domestic production.	 Accordingly, the beginnings of the Euro-
Arab Dialogue date back therefore to 1973 and the last months of
the Presidency of Georges Pompidou.
	 Arab-African Dialogue was
also launched in 1973 as Algeria, Libya and other Arab states
called on their OAU colleagues to sever ties with Israel in a
display of African solidarity. Meanwhile the North-South debate
was effectively joined in 1973, following the meeting of the
UYCTAD group earlier in the year, in Santiago, Chile, Where the
Group of 77 had previously failed to interest the major West
European powers in any negotiation of their collective demands,
the French in particular, as well as the Italians and some of
the smaller European states were now prepared to break ranks and
organise joint discussions with Third World states, in the
initial stages of which the OPEC members and Algeria played a
very prominent role.
And in North Africa itself 1973 witnessed two events that
would play an increasing role in the evolution of inter-state
relations over the net decade and a half.
	 There was the
formation of the Polisario Front in the Spanish Sahara with its
demand for the independence of the Saquiet Al Hamra and Rio de
Oro, which was at the origin of the continuing dispute between
Algeria and Morocco over the future of the small but wealthy
territory.
	 And it was in 1973 that Libya occupied the Aouzou
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Strip in Northern Chad, announcing Kadhafi's shift of interest
from the Mackrek to the Maghreb, with Libya's new ambitions in
the Sahel, coinciding with large uranium discoveries in Niger and
a temporary weakening in French influence within the region, in a
context of prolonged drought and mounting economic tensions.
In relative contrast with the position in much of sub-Saharan
Africa, 1973 and the years immediately following saw some
improvement in the economic position of the Maghrebin states,
particularly for the surplus oil and gas producers, like Libya
and Algeria, but also for states like Morocco where phosphate
prices improved. There was also a transformation in the domestic
situation in the direction of what Zartman has called the
"national consolidation process".
	
Where the 1960s had been
rather optimistically described as the decade of nation-building,
emphasis of the 1970s was rather on state-consolidation. The
same process was evident elsewhere in the Middle East as Syria
and Iraq acquired more stable regimes in the 1970s following the
turmoil of the previous three decades. 	 The Maghrebin states
continued through the 1970s and 1980s with the regimes already in
place at the end of the 1960s.	 The civilian regimes remained
civilian, the military governments continued to be military.
The last attempted coup in Algeria was in 1967, following the
overthrow of Bet Bella by the military two years earlier. Its
failure marked the eclipse of 'wilayism' inside Algeria and the
strengthening of the new state with the fusion of the earlier
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'military' and 'guerrilla' traditions and the incorporation of
more technocratic, administrative elements.	 The revolution of
1969 in Libya inaugurated a political and administrative
transformation in that otherwise traditional monarchy. An
attempted coup in 1975 was unsuccessful, as was a later barracks
revolt in 1984.	 In Morocco, King Hassan survived the coup
attempts of 1971 and 1972 and promptly set about consolidating
his position, purging the senior ranks and despatching less
reliable officers and contingents to the Golan Heights well in
advance of the October war.	 The military in Tunisia had been
politicised from an early stage and posed no serious threat to
President Bourguiba until General Ben Ali intervened in 1987
putting an end to the constitutional 'crisis' that began with
Bourguiba's sudden 'illness' (and subsequent recovery) in 1974.
By 1973 the earlier legitimising formulas were no longer
adequate or even effective. Nationalism, differentiation and the
sabre-rattling of the 1960s were beginning to wear thin by the
1970s.	 The Naghrebin elites had now to seek legitimacy and
consolidation through institutionalisation and through new
policies, domestic and foreign, that sought to associate key
constituencies, military, administrative, economic and 'popular'
with the conduct of government. Anti-colonialism was no longer
sufficient rationale or justification for the 'new' state. 	 In
Tunisia, where the institutions were already firmly based and
well entrenched, it was sufficient for Bourguiba to be elected
President for Life in 1974 to dissipate the uncertainties arising
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from his 'illness' of that year and the political challenges
mounted from inside the government, first by the Planning
Minister, Ahmed Ben Sahal in 1969, and, more threatening, by the
Foreign Minister, Mohamed Masmoudi in 1974.
In Morocco where the military threat had been serious Hassan
announced a number of domestic as well as constitutional reforms
designed to enlarge the base of the regime while adopting a more
'militant' policy of Arab solidarity in the Middle East that
helped meet some of the demands from within the army while
providing a motive for removing other disgruntled elements to the
distant Syrian 'front'. 	 A new constitution had been presented
in 1972 while in July 1975 general elections were announced
(within eighteen months) for a re-convened session of parliament.
Meanwhile sweeping agrarian reforms in 1973 saw the expropriation
of all foreign-owned estates and measures of liberalisation and
land reform designed to renew and strengthen the bond between the
throne and the producers in the countryside. 	 Morocco's much
publicised participation in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war also helped
to strengthen the throne. but it was the Green March into the
Western Sahara at the end of 1975 that confirmed the popularity
of the regime with the people and with all the major parties,
from Istiglal on the Right, to the Socialists and Communists on
the left.
In Libya the failed coup of 1975 also suggested the need for
state consolidation to confirm Kadhafi's grip on a revolution
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whose military base had always been decentralised.
	 Hence the
General People's Congress summoned in March 1977 to proclaim
officially the installation of "people's power" under a new
constitution whereby the country was to be designated the
"Popular Socialist Libyan Arab Jamahiriya" or "state of the
masses". Kadhafi would be assisted in the administration of the
country by networks of control described as 'popular committees'
who appropriated much of the machinery of government including
the country's embassies abroad, The 'programme' of the revamped
state was the well-known Green Book, published as early as 1973.
Meanwhile the occupation of the Auouzou Strip in 1973 marked the
beginnings of a shift in policy away from pan-Arabist designs in
the East and towards a rather more pragmatic, state-based policy
directed at securing control of strategic territories and
resources in the Sahel and, if possible, the Maghreb.
Consolidation in Algeria was a more leisurely process given
the military's monopoly of power and President Boumedienne's
tight and effective control of the military. Nevertheless, there
too there was a new emphasis on state-building and on securing
state-control of resources and a foreign policy addressed more
directly to the country's economic interests, at home, in Western
Europe, and in the Middle East. Measures of nationalisation of
petroleum resources in the early 1970s were followed by the
National Debate of 1975, giving birth to the National Charter in
1976 and concluding with Presidential elections in 1977 and the
appointment of a new team of ministers, mostly technocrats
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Inspired more by economic liberalism and the American model than
by the East European experience of state ownership and socialism.
Beginning the decade with a new emphasis on socialism and
nationalisation, Boumedienne had given ground to the 'liberals'
shortly before his death in 1978 - foreshadowing the liberal
policies and technocratic inspiration of President Chadli
BenJedid after 1979.
The new emphasis on the state in the 1970s has been
accompanied by profound social transformation over the last two
decades, with greater access to education at all levels, higher
levels of literacy and greater awareness of developments both at
home and abroad.	 Policy-making can no longer be the-self-
contained, self-perpetuating process that it was in the first
decade after independence. It is no longer the preserve of the
King or the President as it so often was when Zartman first
described the process in the mid-1960s. 	 Signs that foreign
policy-making has been becoming more widely diffused have been
apparent since the early 1970s when foreign ministers began to
pursue initiatives of their own - albeit with the support of
their leaders.	 Abdelaziz Bouteflika as Foreign Minister seemed
to have had a very wide discretion indeed in his handling of
Algeria's relations with France from the beginning of the decade
until Boumedienne's death in 1978. His successor, Mohamed Sedik
Benyahia, played a pivotal role in the negotiations that
culminated in the release of the American hostages in Teheran in
1981, a year before his death while on a mission of mediation in
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the Iran-Iraq war. In Tunisia the radical initiatives of the
Foreign Minister, Mohamed Masmoudi (1970-1974) including the
attempted fusion of Tunisia with Libya,	 were policies
fundamentally opposed to the convictions and the inclinations of
the President, Habib Bourguiba. And there were conflicting views
about Sadat's unilateral peace initiative contained in statements
issued by King Hassan on the one hand, and his Foreign Minister,
Mohamed Boucetta, on the other.
The contest for leadership in North Africa has been the
crucial factor dictating Maghrebin policies in the Middle East
and Africa, as well as in Europe, East and West. 	 The earlier
checkerboard conflicts of the 1960s had given way to the power
struggles of the 1970s which focussed on the independence of the
Western Sahara after Spanish withdrawal and future control over
the territory.
	
Ideology was much less important here than in
previous quarrels of the 1960s.	 Personalities were still
important but there was also a new emphasis on the state and the
perception and defence of national interest accompanied by a more
pragmatic less ideological style. 	 Again one could point to
parallels in other Arab states where pan-Arab rhetoric gave way
after 1967 (and especially after 1973) to a new emphasis on the
state and state/national interests. 	 A change of leadership in
Algeria in 1979 brought a change of style and, in the handling of
the domestic economy, a change of policy.	 There was greater
flexibility over the Western Sahara and a search for
reconciliation in the Maghreb as a whole.	 But the conflict
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nevertheless continues, albeit in a more contained and muted form
(perhaps because of the sand walls).
What has changed, of course, since 1973 has been the pattern
of alliances within the Maghreb. The checkerboard that was the
dominant mode in the 1960s has been frequently challenged in the
1970s and 1980s.	 In the early 1970s inter-state relations were
still based on the "bad-neighbour" principle identified by
Zartnan.	 Algerian-Tunisian ties were close and intimate while
Morocco and Tunisia shared the same 'moderate' outlook as well as
a common suspicion of Algeria. In 1975, however, Morocco and
Mauritania broke away from the pattern, setting aside their
previous hostility in the pursuit of common 'national' interest,
namely the partition of the Western Sahara under the tripartite
agreement with Madrid. Tunisia acted the role of 'honest broker'
in setting up this cosy arrangement which effectively isolated
Algeria.	 The checkerboard pattern then re-asserted itself, but
in a different guise, when Algeria signed the agreement of Hassi
Xessaoud with Libya, effectively coopting a new actor into the
Maghrebin sub-system, providing additional military as well as
diplomatic backing for Polisario which was active against
Mauritania, while effectively encircling Tunisia.
Mauritania abandoned its claim to the southern part of
Western Sahara after the July 1978 coup that removed President
Mokhtar Ould Daddah and signed an agreement with Polisario the
following year. Tunisia also hastened to distance itself from its
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earlier allies, taking advantage of Chadli's accession in Algeria
in 1979.	 Chadli clearly wanted to have done with the
checkerboard pattern once and for all within the Maghreb
substituting a policy of "good neighbourliness" which implied
cooperation rather than confrontation. And for a time relations
between Algeria and Morocco were more relaxed and the Maghreb
seemed to be heading towards a 'concert' rather than a 'balance
of power' system.	 After 1979 Kadhafi distanced himself from
President Chadli whom he regarded as too 'moderate' and whom he
accused of failing to support Tripoli as the venue for the OAU
summit in 1982.	 Tunisia, however, responded positively to the
new Algerian approach and a Treaty of Friendship was signed in
1983, soon to be joined by Mauritania.
	 The object of Algerian
policy was to constitute the nucleus of a Maghrebin community
based on economic cooperation, respect for existing frontiers,
and non-interference by one state in the affairs of its
neighbours.	 It was argued that Morocco and Libya would remain
outside the terms of the treaty for as long Western Sahara and
the people of Chad were denied independence and self-
determination and for as long as Morocco and Libya failed to
respect the Charter of the OAU.
The outcome was an attempt by Morocco and Libya to outflank
the more central states by a new checkerboard alliance - at one
remove - signed and sealed in 1984.
	 This new and surprising
'union',	 which	 resembled
	 'leap-frog'	 rather	 than	 the
checkerboard, was nevertheless directed essentially against
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Algeria and in an attempt by the two states to overcome their
mutual isolation and to win time to consolidate their position in
Western Sahara and Chad. It was an example of the politique du
pire.
	 Like other alliances of the 1960s, including the
Casablanca bloc, and like the earlier alliance of Morocco and
Mauritania in 1975, it was based on opportunism and on a short-
term appreciation of national interest. 	 It collapsed in 1986
after Morocco had consolidated its position in the Western Sahara
while Libya had suffered a humiliating defeat in Chad. American
intervention against Libya and the timely diplomatic decision by
Hassan to receive the Israeli Prime Minister effectively put paid
to the unholy alliance. Indications now are that the checkerboard
may give way before long to a new 'concert' pattern within the
Maghreb based on cooperation rather than confrontation - but the
probability is that periods of cooperation will alternate 	 with
periods of confrontation unless and until Algeria or Morocco
secures a distinct military and/or economic advantage over the
other. Zartman's original model was based on an evolutionary or
developmental perspective that may be more appropriate in the
European than in the African context - or may not be appropriate
in either.
While Maghrebin foreign policies are closely related to
events in the Maghreb itself and, above all, to the continuing
rivalry between Algeria and Morocco, this is not in any way meant
to imply that those policies have been static.	 The style and
content of the policies has changed considerable since 1973. The
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change has been most marked in Libya where the whole focus of
policy has shifted from the East and Egypt/Sudan, to the West
the Maghreb and the Sahel. 	 Arab union and anti-imperialism
continue to provide the rationale but territorial aggrandisement
and acquisition of resources (uranium) seem to play a more
prominent role while Kadhafi's strategy seems to be aligned more
closely with that of the Senoussiya and their twin goals of
resisting western (French) penetration and upholding Islamic
orthodoxy.
	
Moroccan policy has shown greater consistency over
time although the claims to the Western Sahara - and the way they
were prosecuted - displayed greater realism than the earlier
campaign to annexe Mauritania. 	 This time Mauritania was to be
associated, in a small way, with the conquest. 	 The Moroccans
could also count on the support of the conservative Arab states
and on backing from the United States.
Tunisian policy continues to focus on survival in a North
African environment that has been none too hospitable for a state
with a small territory and comparatively few natural resources.
As before Tunisia looks to America, France and conservative
African states like Senegal and Ivory Coast. 	 But Egypt's
suspension from the Arab League in 1979 brought new opportunities
and also new responsibilities, namely the acquisition of the Arab
League Secretariat as well as the PLO headquarters. Another new
factor is the continuing improvement in relations between Tunisia
and Algeria and Tunisia's association with the 1983 Friendship
Treaty as a privileged partner in the latest attempt at Maghrebin
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cooperation. The recent change of leadership in Tunisia is
to strengthen those links.
The trend in Algerian foreign policy has been the move away
from Arab and African solidarity and the linkage between the two
and towards a policy based more closely on national interest
particularly as it affects Algeria's present and future economic
prospects.	 Where domestic policy in the last year of
Boumedienne's rule and under Chadli has begun to stress economic
liberalisation at the expense of socialism and state control,
foreign policy has been increasingly involved since 1973 in the
pursuit of economic advantage, particularly as it affects the
sale of oil and natural gas. This involves bargaining not only
within OPEC but also with western industrial nations who provide
the main market for Algeria's surplus energy production, but who
also provide the most obvious source of new technology and
capital investment.
The rivalry between Algeria and Morocco continues, however,
to provide the dynamic foi their relations not only with one
another but also with other states in the Maghreb and elsewhere.
But it is a real dynamic rather than the kind of static situation
that Zartman seems to be describing in his more recent works.
Foreign policies may not be 'developing' but they are certainly
changing. And one can identify patterns here that are themselves
evolving. In the 1960s, for example, the quarrel between Algeria
and Morocco almost invariably suggested a conscious and
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deliberate choice of different partners.
	 In the Middle East
Algeria chose the more 'radical', secular Arab states while
Morocco was closer to the moderate Arab states and, above all, to
the monarchies.	 After 1965, however, Algeria under Boumedienne
was already distancing itself from President Nasser and, by 1973,
Boumedienne had drawn close to President Sadat. While Algeria,
like most other Arab states, severed formal diplomatic ties with
Egypt in 1979, President Chadli nevertheless contrived to remain
on good terms with Sadat and his successor, Mubarak, while moving
even closer to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states.	 Competition
between Algeria and Morocco in the 1960s had dictated a choice
of rival Arab partners and rival 'ideological' alliances within
the Arab League.	 The competition in the 1970s between the
Maghreb rivals, this time over the Western Sahara, was just as
intense as before, but this time both states were competing for
the attention and support of the leading conservative states who
comprised the core group within the Arab community, notably Saudi
Arabia and the Gulf states.
In Africa, too, after the dissolution of the Casablanca bloc,
Algeria aligned consistently with the 'progressive' states while
Morocco deserted its former radical allies to join the other
'moderate' groupings. Those rival alignments intensified in the
mid-1970s with the appearance of marxist regimes in the former
Portuguese territories and, in particular, with the civil war in
Angola in 1975-6 and the later conflicts in Shaba province of
Zaire in 1977 and 1978. The occupation of the Western Sahara by
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Morocco and Mauritania, in 1975, and the readiness of the French
to intervene in their defence against Polisario and against
Algerian interests, even pushed Algeria into an alliance with
Libya, threatening a major confrontation in the North-West of
Africa. However, Algeria's diplomatic success in persuading a
majority of OAU members to recognise and admit the SADR,
including leading moderate states like Nigeria, and Algeria's
defence of an 'African' solution to the problems of Chad,
effectively isolated both Morocco and Libya inside the OAU, with
the consensus here, as in much of the Third World, favouring the
Algerian theses.
In their relations with Western Europe and the super-powers
the Algerian and Moroccan policies have likewise evolved
considerably - and in a paradoxical sense have even converged. In
the 1960s the rivalry between the main Maghrebin states pushed
each into opposing international camps. 	 Morocco (like Tunisia)
was pro-American and looked to Western Europe and especially to
France. Algeria favoured the socialist countries and the Soviet
Union while playing a prominent role in the Non-Aligned Movement.
Her relations with France were strained, particuarly after 1965.
In the 1970s, as the Soviet Union lost ground in the Middle East,
Boumedienne shifted Algerian policy closer to the American
position.	 He cooperated with Kissinger in the early stages of
the "peace process", while later in the 1970s Algeria pursued a
more aggressive marketing policy in the direction of the United
States and Western Europe with a view to disposing profitably of
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its large oil and gas surplus.
	 By the 1980s the process had
assumed a political as well as an economic dimension as Algeria
tried to obtain some leverage over Washington through offering
its services to secure the release of the American hostages held
in Teheran during 1979-1981.
In order to compete more effectively with Morocco over the
Western Sahara Algeria was drawing closer to the Western camp and
the United States in particular.	 Most of Algeria's armaments
continued to come from the Soviet Union but there, too, Algeria
is now increasingly looking to the United States .
	 In Western
Europe there is a similar pattern. Before 1973 and, indeed, as
late as 1978, Morocco was closely involved, politically and
militarily with France.	 Increasingly, however, 	 Algerian
governments have held out the prospect of a political
rapprochement with France in order to strike favourable
commercial deals over the supply of natural gas. More recently
they have mediated effectively in Lebanon to secure the release
of French hostages.
	 Their reward was a highly favourable gas
contract negotiated over the opposition of the French gas
industry and at the insistence of the Prime Minister.
	 While
Algeria has moved closer to the West in the 1970s and, more
particularly, the 1980s, and has enjoyed a certain economic
success as a result, it has yet to displace Morocco as the
privileged strategic ally of the United States (and France) in
North Africa.
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Meanwhile there is the paradoxical situation that the United
States which is strategically close to Morocco and which was, at
least until recently, ideologically opposed to Algeria, has since
the late 1970s conducted far more trade with Algeria than with
Morocco.	 And as a privileged trading partner Washington was
compelled to revise its earlier unfavourable image of Algeria.
The Western Sahara conflict had therefore to be viewed in local
terms rather than as part of the East-Vest conflict - which was
no small concession to President Chadli at the time of the
"Reagan watch". Washington nevertheless maintained the supply of
arms and equipment to the Moroccans as they constructed their
defensive perimeter in the Western Sahara.	 Meanwhile the
Soviets, although ideologically close, until recently, to Algeria
does most of its North African trade with Morocco, with the
purchase of phosphates and investments in light industry,
infrastructure and off-shore fisheries. Which is one important
reason why the Soviet Union (like the United States) does not
wish to view the Saharan conflict in global terms and prefers not
to become directly involved. And why Moscow, unlike Cuba, has
yet to recognise the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic. Policy-
aking in the North African context is less obviously
ideological while 'national interest' and statecraft would seem
to have largely replaced the earlier emphasis on differentiation,
national identity and inter-personal relations.
The year 1987 seemed an appropriate as well as a convenient
place to end our analysis of the Maghrebin foreign policies.
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Under pressure of the Iran-Iraq war and under the leadership of
Saudi Arabia the Arab states seem to be preparing for the return
of Egypt to the Arab League, particularly with the decision of
1987 that Arab states were now free to resume normal diplomatic
relations with Cairo.	 The aim seems to be a resumption of the
"peace process" in the near future and the pursuit this time of
the "comprehensive" settlement that failed to emerge from the
negotiations of the 1970s. Oil prices have been falling sharply
through the 1980s as the divisions within OPEC become more
pronounced, There is no question now of an OAPEC embargo, while
the Arab-African Dialogue is now more or less defunct. 	 The
threat by Zaire to re-constitute the OAU without the Xorth
African states was empty bombast but does reflect the extent of
black African disillusionment with the interminable quarrels of
the Arab states, their attempts to enlist black African support,
their failure often to match their earlier promises of financial
and other support, and the fact that Arab aid, too, comes with
strings attached.	 In any case the African predicament of the
1980s, which centres largely on the question of debt and the need
for 'structural adjustment', would seem to have driven most
African states into the arms of the IMF and the World Bank which
alone can provide debt relief, credits and new investment on the
massive scale that is now required.
In North Africa, too, Tunisia and Morocco have had to seek
assistance from the IMF during the 1980s while Algeria has
maintained its economic 'independence' but only by cultivating
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American and European markets and by playing the 'capitalist'
game with much the same determination (one hesitates to say
enthusiasm) as its erstwhile ideological opponents in Washington,
Paris and the other european capitals. 	 Soviet influence has
receded to such an extent that Libyan appeals to be more closely
associated with the Warsaw Pact are no longer even acknowledged.
In the Maghreb the rivalry and competition remain but the nature
and direction of the alliances have changed. 	 Meanwhile the
foreign policies of the North African states are better defined,
show a greater degree of realism and consistency, are less
involved with ideological concerns, and are more independent of
'personal' considerations. 	 They also relate more closely to
perceptions of national interest as distinct from a pre-
occupation with differentiation. The 1980s have, however, seen a
determined attempt by the Algerian government, in conjunction
with neighbouring Tunisia, to break out of the checkerboard
pattern once and for all by substituting a more cooperative,
'concert of states' pattern for the previous confrontational
model.
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Table II
Population and GNP (bn US $) 
1978 1981 1985
GNP Population GNP Population GNP Population
Algeria 15.9 18.420.000 36.8 20.580.000 46.2 22.000.000
Morocco 9.5 18.590.000 14.9 20.700.000 11.9 22.000.000
Tunisia 5.3 6.250.000 8.0 6.670.000 8.0 7.150.000
Libya 19.0 2.760.000 33 3.125.000 22.6 3.550.000
Source: On Military Balance. International Institute for Strategic
Studies (IISS) London, from 1976-86.
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Table VI
The Maghreb Position in the World Phosphate Market (1978) 
Country	 Production (million tons) 	 Export (million tons)
United States
	 50.037	 13.684
Soviet Union
	 24.000
	 4.992
Morocco	 19.278	 17.307
P. R. of China	 4.300
	
-
Tunisia
	 3.712
	 1.667
Togo	 2.849
	 2.827
South Africa	 2.699
	 -.-
Senegal	 1.843	 1.686
Israel	 1.759	 1.367
Algeria
	 1.136	 0.619
Brazil	 1.049	 -
Source: Al Ahram Al Icitisadi (Al Ahram Economist-Cairo)N. 589
March 1, 1980, p. 31.
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Table VII
Intra-Maghrebin	 Commercial Exchanges %
Exports Imports
1964 1970 1977 1964 1970 1977
Algeria 1.16 1.5 0.01 2.40 2.0 0.3
Morocco 2.46 4.0 0.0 2.07 1.7 0.0
Tunisia 7.89 14.2 1.2 2.06 0.9 0.01
Source: Mohsen Toumi, Le Maghreb, Presses Universitaires de France,
Paris, 1982, p. 75.
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Table VIII
France-MaghrebiExchanges in 1977 % 
Exports Inports
Algeria 12.7 24.1
Morocco 24.7 27.3
Tunisia 16.6 33.1 (1978)
Source: Mohsen Toumi, Le Maghreb, Presses Universitaires de France,
Paris, 1982, p. 76.
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Table IX
French Trade with Algeria 1982-85 (F F million) 
1982 1983 1984 1985
Imports 14.022 18.591 23.633 21.832
Exports 25.000 23.447 24.809 20.737
Balance -11.892 -4.856 -1.176 +1.095
Source: Middle East Economic Digest, (NEED), Vol. 30, N. 18, May 3-9
1986, p. 6.
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Table X
Algeria's Trading Partners (Figures in Percentage) 
Imports	 Exports
1983
Imports	 Exports
1984
Imports	 Exports
1985
EEC 84.5 59.8 86.1 65.2 87.9 64.4
N. America 9.7 23.7 9.5 22.4 10.6 17.6
Japan 6.0 3.5 8.1 0.7 5.8 1.0
Eastern Bloc 6.3 0.9 5.2 2.6 4.5 5.0
Source: The Financial Times, December 10 1986, Survey on Algeria,
pp. 1-8.
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Table XI
Morocco's Major Trading Partners (1985) 
% of Total Imports % of Total Exports
France 25 24
Spain 14 7
West Germany 8 7
Italy 6 6
U.K. 3 3
Others 44 53
Source: The Financial Times, July 13, 1987, p. 4.
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Table XII
African Students in Algerian Universities Supported by Algerian Grants
Country Academic Year
1975-76 1976-77 197 7-7 8
Benin 7 16
Burundi 8 17
Cameroon 16 21 17
Cape Verde 12 9
Chad 5
Congo (P.R.) 59 97 99
Eritrea 2 2 1
Gabon 6 6 5
Gambia 1
Guinea Bissau 8 8 6
Guinea 17 19 30
Upper Volta 25 27 20
Comoro Islands 16
Mauritius 7 13 18
Madagascar 21 28 48
Mali 27 38 51
Mauritania 57
Niger 18 40 33
Senegal 17 16 21
Sudan 3 8
Togo 6 29 38
Source: Slimane Chikh "La Politique Africaine de L'Algerie",in
Slimane Chikh et al, Le Maghreb et L'Afrique Subsaharienne,
Editions du CNRS, Paris, 1980, p. 28.
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APPENDIX II 
The Founding Countries of the CAU
1. Algeria 17. Mali
2. Burundi 18. Mauritania
3. Cameroun 19. Morocco
4. Central African Republic 20. Niger
5. Chad 21. Nigeria
6. Congo (Brazaville) 22. Rwanda
7. Congo (Leopoldville) 23. Senegal
8. Dahomey 24. Sierra Leone
9. Ethiopia 25. Somalia
10. Gabon 26. Sudan
11. Ghana 27. Tanganyika
12. Guinea 28. Togo
13. Ivory Coast 29. Tunisia
14. Liberia 30. Uganda
15. Libya 31. United Arab Republic
16. Madagascar 32. Upper Volta
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APPENDIX III 
Arab Oil Embargo in 1973 
Operation BADR, October 1973
Algeria
Bahrein
Bahrein
Bahrein
Kuwait
Kuwait
Libya
Libya
Oman
Qatar
Qatar
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
UAE/Abu Dhabi
UAE/Abu Dhabi
Dubay
October 20
October 20
October 21
.October 30
October 19
October 23
October 19
October 30
October 25
October 19
October 21
October 24
October 18
October 20
October 18
October 21
October 21
10% cut, US ban
10% cut
US ban
Netherlands ban
10% cut, US ban
Netherlands ban
5% cut, US ban
Netherlands ban •
US and Netherlands ban
10% cut
US ban
Netherlands ban
10% cut
US ban
US ban
Netherlands ban
US ban
Source: John W Amos II, Arab-Israeli Military Political Relations,
Pergamen Press, New York, Oxford, 1979, p.201.
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APPENDIX IV
Membership of the Arab League
Member Date of Admission
1. Egypt March 22, 1945
2. Saudi Arabia March 22, 1945
3. Iraq March 22, 1945
4. Transjordan March 22, 1945
5. Syria March 22, 1945
6. Lebanonl/ March 22, 1945
7. North Yemen May 5, 1945
8. Sudan January 19, 1945
9. Libya March 28, 1956
10. Morocco October 1, 1958
11. Tunisia October 1, 1958
12. Kuwait July 20, 1961
13. Algeria August 16, 1962
14. South Yemen December 12, 1967
15. Bahrain Septeber 11, 1971
16. Qatar September 11, 1971
17. Oman September 29, 1971
18. United Arab Emirates December 6, 1971
19. Mauritania November 26, 1973
20. Somalia February 14,.1974
21. PLO September 9, 1976
22. Djibouti September 4, 1977
1/ The first six were the founding members of the League.
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APPENDIX V
CAU Summit Metings1/
Date	 Place 
-May 1963
1st	 1964
2nd	 1965
3rd
	 1966
4th	 1967
5th	 1968
6th	 1969
7th	 1970
8th	 1971
9th 1972
10th 1973
11th 1974
12th 1975
13th 1976
14th 1977
15th 1978
16th 1979
17th 1980
18th 1981
19th 19832/
20th 1984
21st 1985
22nd 1986
23rd 1987
The Founding Summit in Addis Ababa
Cairo (Egypt)
Accra (Ghana)
Addis Ababa (Ethiopia)
Kinshassa (Congo Kinshassa)
Algiers (Algeria)
Addis Ababa (Ethiopia)
Addis Ababa (Ethiopia)
Addis Ababa (Ethiopia)
Rabat (Morocco)
Addis Ababa (Ethiopia)
Mogadishu (Somalia)
Kampala (Uganda)
Port Louis (Mauritius)
Libreville (Gabon)
Khartoum (Sudan)
Monrovia (Liberia)
Freetown (Sierra Leone)
Nairobi (Kenya)
Addis Ababa (Ethiopia)
Addis Ababa (Ethiopia)
Addis Ababa (Ethiopia)
Addis Ababa (Ethiopia)
Addis Ababa (Ethiopia)
1/ CAU Headquarters in Addis Ababa
2/ The 19th OAU Summit failed to take place in Tripoli (Libya) in
1982 because of disagreement over the seating of the SADR as well
as the representation of Chad.
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APPENDIX VT 
Diplomatic Break of African States with Israel*
Country
1. Guinea
2. Uganda
3. CHAD
4. Congo (B)
5. Niger
6. Mali
7. Burundi
8. Togo
9. Zaire
10. Dahomey
11. Rwanda
12. Cameroun
13. Equatorial Guinea
14. Upper Volta
15. Tanzania
16. Malagash Republic
17. Central African Republic
18. Sierra Leone
19. Ethiopia
20. Nigeria
21. Zambia
22. Gambia
23. Ghana
24. Senegal
25. Gabon
26. Kenya
27. Liba
28. Ivory Coast
29. Botswana
Date
June 12, 1967
March 30, 1972
November 28, 1972
December 31, 1972
January 4, 1973
January 5, 1973
May 16, 1973
September 11, 1973
October 4, 1973
October 6, 1973 -
October 9, 1973
October 15, 1973
October 15, 1973
October 18, 1973
October 18, 1973
October 20, 1973
October 21, 1973
October 22, 1973
October 23, 1973
October 25, 1973
October 25, 1973
October 25, 1973
October 27, 1973
October 27, 1973
October 29, 1973
November 1, 1973
November 2, 1973
November 8, 1973
November 13, 1973
Source: G Aforke NWeke, Harmonization of African foreign policies 
1955-1975, The Political Economy of African Diplomacy,
African Studies Centre, Boston University, 1980, p.230.
Three African States - Leshotho, Malawi and Swaziland. Did not
break diplomatic relations with Israel. By June 1987, five other
African states resumed diplomatic relations with the state
	 oF
Israel. These are: Zaire, on May 14, 1982; Liberia, on August 13,
1983; Ivory Coast, February 12, 1986; Camberoun, August 26, 1986;
and Togo, June 1987.
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APPENDIX VII 
Chronoloqv of the States Recognising the Saharawi Arab
Democratic Reputlic (SADR) 
1. Madagascar	 February 28, 1976
2. Burundi February 29, 1976
3. Algeria March 6, 1976
4. Benin March 9, 1976
5. Angola March 9, 1976
6. Mozambique March 11, 1976
7. Guinea Bissau March 13, 1976
8. North Korea March 15, 1976
9. Togo March 15, 1976
10. Rwanda March 30, 1976
11. Seychelles October 25, 1977
12. South Yemen February 12, 1978
13. Congo June 3, 1978
14. Sao-Tome and Principe June 20, 1978
15. Panama June 22, 1978
16. Tanzania November 9, 1978
17. Ethiopia February 24, 1979
18. Vietnam March 12, 1979
19. Kampuchea April 10, 1979
20. Laos May 9, 1979
21. Afghanistan May 23, 1979
22. Cap Verdo July 4, 1979
23. Granada August 24, 1979
24. Ghana August 24, 1979
25. Guyana September 1, 1979
26. Martinique September 1, 1979
27. Saint Lucia September 1, 1979
28. Jamaica September 4, 1979
29. Uganda September 6, 1979
30. Nicaragua September 6, 1979
31. Mexico September 8, 1979
32. Lesotho October 9, 1979
33. Zambia October 12, 1979
34. Cuba January 20, 1980
35. Iran February 27, 1980
36. Sierra Leone March 27, 1980
37. Syria April 15, 1980
38. Libya April 15, 1980
39. Swaziland April 28, 1980
40. Botswana May 14, 1980
41. Zimbabwe July 3, 1980
42. Chad July 4, 1980
43. Mali July 4, 1980
44. Costa Rica October 30, 1980
45. Vanuatu November 26, 1980
46. Kiribati August 12, 1981
47. Nauru August 12, 1981
48. Papua New Guinea August 12, 1981
49. Solomon Islands August 12, 1981
50. Tuvalu August 12, 1981
51. Venezuela August 5, 1982
52. Surinam August 5, 1982
53. Bolivia August 5, 1982
54. Mauritius August 5, 1982
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55.
56.
57.
58.
Equador
Mauritania
Upper Volta
Chad
November 15, 1983
February 27, 1984
March 4, 1984
August 21, 1984
59. Nigeria November 11, 1984
60. Yugoslavia November 24, 1984
61. Colombia February 27, 1985
62. Liberia July 31, 1985
63. India October 1, 1985
64. Guatemala April, 1986
65. The Dominique Republic July, 1986
66. Belize September, 1986
67. St Kitts and Nevis February, 1987
68. Antigua and Barbuda February, 1987
651
APPENDIX VIII
GNU: Resolution No. 3458 A du 10 Decembre 1975 sur le Sahara 
Occidental, adoptee par 88 voix contre 57 et 41 abstentions 
L'Assemblee generale,
1. Reaffirme le droit inalienable du peuple sahraoui é a
L'autodetermination, conformement a la resolution 1514 (XV) de
l'Assemblee generale.
2. Reaffirme son attachement au principe de l'autodetermination
des peuples et son souci de voir appliquer ce principe aux habitants
du territoire du Sahara Occidental dans un cadre qui leur garantisse
et permette l'expression libre et authentique de leur, volonte,
conformement aux resolutions pertinentes de l'Organisation des Nations
unies.
3. Reaffirme la responsabilite de la puissance administrante et
celle de l'Organisation des Nations unies en ce qui concerne la
decolonisation du territoire et la guarantie de la libre expression
des voeux du peuple du Sahara Occidental.
4. Prend note avec satisfaction de l'avis consultatif de la
cour internationale de justice au sujet du Sahara Occidental. .
5. Prend note avec satisfaction du rapport de la mission de
visite des Nations unies au Sahara occidental en 1975, et fait sienne
sa conclusion*selon laquelle des mesures devraient etre prises pour
permettre a tous les sahraouis originaires du territoire de decider de
leur avenir en toute liberte et dans une atmosphere de paix et de
securite conformement a la resolution 1514.
6. .EXprime ses remerciements au gouvernement espagnol et aux
governments marocain, algerien et mauritanein pour la cooperation et
l'assistance qu'ils ont apportees a la mission de visite.
7. Demande au governement espagnol, en tant que puissance
administrante, conformement aux observations et conclusions de la Cour
internationale de justice, de prendre immediatement toutes les mesures
necessaires, en consultation avec toutes les parties concernees et
interessecs, pour faire en sorte que tous les sahraouis originaires du
territoire exercent pleinement et librement sous la supervision de
l'Organisation des Nations unies. leur droit inalienable a
l'autodetermination.
8. Prie le secretaire general, en consultation avec le
gouvernement espagnol, en tant que puissance administrante, et le
comite special charge d'etudier la situation en ce qui concerne
l'application de la declaration sur l'octroi de l'independance aux
pays et aux peuples coloniaux de prendre les dispositions necessaires
a la supervision de l'acte d'autodetermination vise au paragraphe 7
ci-dessus.
9. Prie instamment toutes les parties concernees et interessees
de faire preuve de moderation et de mettre fin a toute action
unilaterale ou autre qui outreppasserait les decisions de l'Assemblee
generale relatives au territoire.
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10.	 Prie le comite special de suivre l'application de la
presente resolution et de faire rapport sur la question a l'Allemblee
generale a sa trente et unieme session.
Source: Annuaire de L'Afrique du Nord, VO1.14, CNRS, Paris, 1975,
p.974.
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APPENDIX IX 
OW: Resolution 3458 B du 10 Decembre 1975 adoptee par 56 voix
contre 42 et 88 abstentions 
L'Assemblee generale,
Reaffirmant sa resolution 1514 (XV) du 14 Decembre 1960,
Reaffirmant ses resolutions 1541 (XV) du 15 Decembre 1960, 2072 (XX)
du 16 Decembre 1965, et toutes les autres resolutions pertinentes des
Nations-Unies, notamment sa resolution 3292 (XXIX) du 13 Decembre
1974.
Prenant acte du rapport de la Mission de visite des Nations Unies
envoy& dans le territoire en 1975.
Prenant acte de l'avis consultatif de la Cour internationale de
Justice du 16 Octobre 1975, au sujet du Sahara occidental.
Considerant les resolutions du conseil de securite 377 (1975) du 22
Octobre 1975, 379 (1975) du 2 Novembre 1975 et 380 (1975) du 6
Novembre 1975.
1. Prend acte de l'accord tripartite intervenu a Madrid, le 14
Novembre 1975, entre les Couvernements espagnol, marocain et .
mauritanien, dont le texte a ete transmis au Secretaire general de
l'Organisation des Nations Utiles le 18 Novembre 1975.
2. Reaffirme le droit inalienable a l'autodetermination de
toutes les populations sahraouies originaires du territoire,
conformement a la resolution 1514 (XV) de l'Assemblee generale;
3. Demande aux parties a l'accord de Madrid du 14 Novembre 1975
de veiller au respect des aspirations librement exprimees des
populations sahraouies;
4. Demande a l'administration interimaire de prendre toutes les
mesures necessaires pour faire en sorte que toutes les populations
sahraouies orginaires du territoire puissent exercer leur droit
inalienable a l'autodetermination au moyen d'une consultation libre
organisee avec le concours d'un representant des Nations Unies designe
par le secretaire general.
Source: Annuaire De l'Afrique du Nord (MN), Vb1.14, CNRS, Paris,
1975, pp.974-75.
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APPENDIX X
Announcement of The Birth of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic
(SADR) February 27, 1976 
Text of the Official Communiqué 
"Le peuple Arabe Saharaoui, en rappellant aux peuples du
• monde qui'ils ont annonce dans la Charte des Nations Unis et dans la
proclamation Universelle des droits de L'homme, ainsi que par le biais
de la decision de l'Assemblee Generale No.1514 prise lors de sa
quinzieme session, ce qui suit:
"Les peuples du monde se declarent resolus a proclamer a
nouveau leur foi dans le droits fondamentaux de l'homme, dans la
dignite et la valeur de la personne humaine, dans l'egalite des droits
des homme et des femmes, ainsi que des nations grandes et petites, et
a favoriser le progres social et instaurer de meilleures conditions de
vie dans une liberte plus grande"... "Conscient des repercussions des
conflits accrus decoulant du refuns de la liberte a ces peuples des
entraves mises dans leur voie constituant ainsi une menaie dangereuse
pour la paix mcndiale.
"Convaincu que tous les peuples jouissent du droit
inalienable de disposer d'une liberte totale, d'exercer leur
souverainte et du droit a l'integrite de leur territoires. .
"Conformement au principe dictant de mettre fin rapidement
sans prealable ou condition, an colonialisme sous tout ses formes afin
de realiser le developpement economique, socio-culturel de tous
les peuples en lutte;
"Announce au monde entier, sur la base de la libre volonte
populaire fondee sur les principes de l'option democratique, la
naissance d'un etat libre, independent, souverain, regi par un systeme
national democratique Arab d'orientation, Unioniste, progressiste et
de religion Islamique.
"En harmonie avec sa doctrine son orientation et la voie
qu'il s'est trace, cet 6-tat Arabe Africain non aligne proclame son
respect pour les chartes et les traites internationaux ainsi que son
attachement a la charte des Nations Unis, a celle de la Ligue Arabe, a
celle de l'organisation de l'unite Africaine, tout en reaffirmant son
engagement a la proclamation Universelle de droits de l'homme.
"Le peuple Arabe en Republique Arabe Saharaouie
Democratique, tout en etant resolu a defendre son independence, son
integrite territoriale, et a prendre en main ses resources et les
richesses naturelles, lutte aux cotes de tous le peuples epris de paix
pour le renforcement de la paix et la consolidation de la securite
dans le monde entier. Ii soutient tous les mouvements de liberation
en lutte pour se•soustraire a la domination colonialiste.
"En ces .moments historiques, al se proclame la naissance de
le nouvel etat, la Republique Arabe saharaouie Democratique lance un
appel a tous le pays freres et aux etats du monde entier pour la
reconnaitre, et exprime, en meme temps, son desir sincere d'etablir
des relations avec eux sur la base de l'amitie de la cooperation et de
la non-ingerence dans les affaires interieures.
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"La Republique Arabe Saharaouie Democratique lance egalement
un appel a la communantO internationale qui a pour objectif
l'instauration du droit et de la justice et qui oeuvre pour le
reinforcement des fondements de la paix et de la securite, afin
qu'elle participe a l'edification et au developpement du nouvel etat."
Source: Le Monde, February 29, March 1, 1976, p.3.
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APPENDIX XI
Proclamation du gouvernement de la Republique Arabe Sahraouie 
Democratique du 4 Mars 1976 
Au nom du peuple sahraoui et en execution de sa volonte, le
drapeau de la RASD s'est eleve sur la terre de Saguia El Hamra et Rio
de Oro. Ii annoncait ainsi la naissance d'un Etat africain dont
l'authenticite plonge des racines profondes dans l'histoire de notre
peuple, et de sa civilisation qui a rayonne sur tout le Maghreb. Un
Etat dont la force vient de la-foi des fils de ce peuple dans leur
droit a une vie digne, a la liberte vraie, et dont la principale arme
est la determination et l'opiniatrete dans la lutte.
Aussi une nouvelle page est ouverte ou s'inscrit la lutte de
notre peuple qui defie aujourd'hui le colonialism des "freres" voisins
apres avoir ferme par sa lutte heroique la page du colonialisme de
l'ennemi etranger.
Aujourd'hui, notre peuple a decide de rendre publique une
etape importante de la mise en place de nos institutions
fondamentales, base indispensable pour franchir cette 6-tape de notre
lutte permanente pour la liberte, et pout permettre a notre peuple
d'exercer un pouvoir reellement democratique ayant sa source dans la
legalitó revolutionnaire.
En execution de la volonte de notre peuple, la direction du
F. Polisario, en accord avec le Conseil national Sahraoui provisoire
unanime, a decide la constitution d'un gouvernement qui assume ses
responsabilites dans la continuite de la lutte en levant toujours plus
haut le drapeau du combat liberateur jusqu'a la victoire et la
garantie pour notre peuple de vivre en paix et en securite, et pour
ouvrir devant lui et les autres peuples freres arabes et africains la
voie de l'unite et de la liberation.
Nous renouvelons a cette occasion notre attachement a tous
les principes des chartes des Nations Uhies et de l'OUA. Nous
mentionnons tous specialement les principes relatifs a la protection
des droits de l'homme, a l'integrite territoriale, et a
l'intangibilité des frontieres etablies, come garantie de la paix et
de la securite africaine et internationale.
Nous attirons l'attention de l'ONU, de l'OUA et de la Ligue
Arabe sur la responsabilite historique qui leur incombe vis-a-vis d'un
peuple pacifique victime d'une tentative d'extermination et d'une
veritable action de genocide.
Nous mettons egalement tous les peuples du monde devant
leurs responsabilites, leur devoir etant d'aider ce peuple agresse a
faire echouer le complot imperialiste dont il est victime.
En cet instant historique ou le gouvernement de la RASD est
proclame en mettle temps a Alger, Tripoli, Tananarive, Conakry et
Bujunbura apres avoir ete constitute sur le sol national, nous tendons
une main fraternelle aux peuples freres du Maroc et de la Muritanie,
pour leur demander de soutenir notre lutte de liberation et de
comprendre que l'avenir est aux peuples. Nous lea adjurons d'epargner
le sang innocent en exigeant l'arret de la guerre qui nous est imposee
par lairs regimes pour servir des interets etrangers et des ambitions
personnelles.
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Nous tendons la main de l'amitie a tous les peuples et Etats
du monde en leur demandant de soutenir notre juste lutte et de
recommaitre la RASD. Nous affirmons a cette occasion notre desir
sincere d'etablir des relations d'amitie et de dooperation avec tous
le Etats sur la base du respect mutuel de la souverainete nationale.
Nouse sommes decides a poursuivre la lutte jusqu'a la
victoire, quels que soient les sacrifices. Cette region ne connaitra
ni paix ni stabilite tant que durera l'agression et tant que notre
peuple d'aura pas paracheve la liberation de son territoire national.
Amgala, le 4, Mars 1976
Conseil National Provisoir Sahraoui
Source: Annaire de L'Afrique du Nord (AN), NRS, Paris, 1976,
917-918.
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APPENDIX XII 
Western Sahara 
Recommendation of the Ad-Hoc Committee of CAU Heads of State
fifth session, Freetown, Sierra Leone (9-11 September 1980) 
AHG/103	 B 
The Ad-Hoc Committee of CAU Heads of States having heard all the
concerned and interested parties to the conflict of Western Sahara;
noting with regret that the positions of the concerned and interested
parties on the question of Western Sahara are widely divergent;
satisfied, however, at the fact that all the concerned and interested
parties are willing to establish peace in the region; convinced that
there is need for a fair and general referendum in the Western
Sahara; decides:
1. That there is a clear need for a fair referendum in Western
Sahara in accordance with Decision AHG/Dec. 114 (XVI) Revd;
2. To call upon all parties concerned to observe a cease-fire
which should come into force by December 1980;
3. To request the concerned parties, during the cease-fire, to
confine their forces to their respective bases and barracks;
4. That a UN peacekeeping force should be entrusted with the
responsibility of ensuring an effective cease-fire;
5. That the OAU, with the assistance of the UN, should proceed
with the organisation and conduct of the referendum in Western Sahara;
6. To charge the Secretary-General of the CAU with the
responsibility of bringing this decision to the attention of the
concerned parties.
Source: Africa Contemporary Record, Holmes and Meier publishers,
New York and London, Vol.14, 1981-82, pp.C36-C37.
659
APPENDIX XIII 
Text of the Decision of the OAU Implementation Committee on
Western Sahara at its First Meeting, Nairobi, Kenya 
(24-26 August 1981) 
The OAU implementation committee on Western Sahara... conscious of the
need for all the parties concerned to cooperate for the successful
implementation of Resolution AHG/Res. 103 (XVIII), of the eighteenth
ordinary session of the Assembly of CAU Heads of State and Government,
held in Nairobi, so as to attain the objectives laid down in the
resolution and make the parties concerned agree on the steps to be
taken in the context of that resolution; taking into consideration the
need for the UN to participate in the referendum and ceasefire, by
virtue of resolution ABC/Res. 103 (XVIII), adopted by the eighteenth
ordinary session of the Assembly of OAU Heads of State and Government,
held in Nairobi, in June 1981:
Decides to organise and conduct a general and free
referendum in the Western Sahara, establish and maintain the
ceasefire, as follows:
(a)	 Referendum
1. The referendum shall be one of self-determination which
will enable the people of the Western Sahara to express themselves
freely and democratically on the future of their territory.
2. The referendum shall be held in the Western Sahara
(ex-Spanish Sahara) the maps of which were deposited with the UN.
3. All Saharawis listed in the census conducted in 1974 by the
Spanish authorities who have attained the age of 18 or above, shall be
eligible to vote in the referendum. In determining the Saharawi
refugee population in the neighbouring countries, reference should be
made to the records of the UNHCR. In establishing the population of
the Western Sahara, account shall be taken of the
internationally-recognised rate of population growth.
4. The voting shall be by secret ballot on the basis of one
person, one vote.
5. The people of Western Sahara shall be given the following
choice:
(a) Independence, or
(b) Integration with Morocco.
(b)	 Structural Requirements 
1. The referendum shall be organised and conducted by the
implementation committee in collaboration with the UN.
2. For a fair and impartial organisation of the referendum, an
impartial interim administration, supported by civilian, military and
police components, shall be set up.
3. The interim administration shall also be assisted by an
adequate number of UN peacekeeping force.
660
(c)	 Ceasefire
1. The committee urges the parties concerned to agree on a
ceasefire through negotiations under the auspices of the
implementation committee.
2. All the parties concerned shall undertake to respect the
ceasefire and maintain it after the proclamation of the date fixed by
the implementation committee.
3. For the fair conduct of the referendum and the strict
observance of the ceasefire, troops of the parties to the conflict
should be effectively confined to their bases in conformity with the
recommendations of the fifth session of the Ad hoc Committee of Heads
of State on Western Sahara held in Freetown, Sierra Leone, from 9 to
11 September 1980.
4. The peacekeeping forces shall be stationed in the area so as
to guarantee the ceasefire.
(d)	 Financing of the Implementation of the Decision
The OAU current chairman shall consult the UN in order to
determine involvement in the implementation of this decision including
its financing.
(e)	 General Principles 
1. All the parties undertake to respect the results of the
referendum.
2. Neighbouring countries undertake to respect the results of
the referendum and to abstain from interfering in the internal affairs
of other countries.
3. The implementation committee shall announce the results of
the referendum.
Implementation Committee members: Kenya, Tanzania, Mali, Sudan,
Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Guinea.
Source: Africa Contemporary Record, Holmes and Meier publishers,
New York and London, Vb1.14, 1981-82, pp.C37-C38.
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APPENDIX XIV
Resolution on Western Sahara adopted by the UN General Assembly
76 in favour, nine against and 57 abstaining (24 November 1981) 
The General Assembly, having considered in depth the
question of Western Sahara: recalling the inalienable right of all
peoples to self-determination and independence in accordance with the
principles set forth in the Charter of the UN and in General Assembly
resoltuion 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, containing the Declaration
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial countries and Peoples;
recalling its resolution 35/19 of 11 November 1980 on the question of
Western Sahara; having considered the relevant chapter of the report
of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the
Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples; having heard the statements made on
the question of Western Sahara, in particular the statements of the
representative of Polisario; recalling its resolution 35/117 of 10
December 1980 on cooperation between the UN and the OAU; taking note
of the decision of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of
the CAU at its eighteenth ordinary session held at Nairobi from 24 to -
27 June 1981, to organise throughout the Territory of Western Sahara a
general and free referendum of the people of Western Sahara on
self-determination: Taking note of the decision adopted by the
Implementation Committee on Western Sahara of the °AU at its first
ordinary session, held at Nairobi from 24 to 26 August 1981,
concerning the establishment of appropriate machinery to enable the
people of Western Sahara to express themselves freely and
democratically on their future:
1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of Western
Sahara to self-determination and independence in accordance with the
Charter of the UN, the Charter of the CAU and the objectives of
General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), as well as the relevant
resolutions of the General Assembly and the CAU;
2. Welcomes the efforts made by the CAU and its Implementation
Committee on Western Sahara, with a view to promoting a just and
definitive solution to the question of Western Sahara...
4. Welcomes the steps taken by the Implementation Committee
with a view to organising and conducting the referendum;
5. Appeals to the two parties to the conflict, Morocco and
Polisario Liberacián de Sanguia el-Hamra y de Rio de Oro, to observe a
cease-fire in accordance with the decisions of the Organization of
African Unity and its Implementation Committee;
6. Urges to that end, Morocco and Polisario to enter into
negotiations with a view to establishing an immediate ceasefire and
concluding a peace agreement permitting the fair conduct of a general,
free and regular referendum on self-determin, ation in Western Sahara;
7. Reaffirms the determin ation of the UN to cooperate fully
with the CAU in the fair and impartial organisation of the referendum;
8. Requests, to that end, the Secretary-General to take the
necessary steps to ensure that the UN participates in the organisation
and conduct of the referendum, and to report to the General Assembly
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and the Security Council on this subject, and on the measures
requiring a decision by the Council;
9. Urgently requests the Secretary-General to cooperate closely
with the Secretary-Gneral of the OAU with a view to the implementation
of the decisions of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of
the OAU and of its Implementation Committee, and of the present
resolution;
10. Requests the Special Committee on the Situation, with regard
to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, to continue to
consider the situation in Western Sahara as a matter of priority and
to report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh
session.
Source: Africa Contemporary Record, Holmes and Meier publishers,
New York and London, VO1.14, 1981-82, pp. C38-C39.
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APPENDIX XV
Tripoli Declaration of the African Heads of State and Government
present in Tripoli, Libya for the first attempted OAU Assembly 
(5 August 1982) 
(a) Western Sahara 
The spirit of understanding and cooperation shown by the
Sahraoui Arab Democratic Republic and its efforts to ensure the
success of the schedules 39th session of the Ministerial Council of
the Organisation and the 19th ordinary session of the Assembly of
Heads State and Government is an indication of its political maturity
and devotion to the African cause;
The Heads of State and Government participating in this
meeting reaffirm their support to and solidarity with the Sahraoui
Arab Democractic Republic in its struggle and acclaim the heroic
struggle led by the Sahraoui people to safeguard its sovereignty and
territorial integrity;
We are still convinced that the admission of the Sahraoui
Arab Democratic Republic to ONO constitutes an important step towards
the reestablishment of peace in the Western Sahara, in the region and
in Africa at large;
The Heads of State and Government appeal to both the
Sahraoui Arab Democratic Republic and the Kingdom of Morocco to
explore ways and means to put an end to the conflict between them;
(b) Chad 
We express our deep concern for the deteriorating situation
in Chad and the renewal of civil strife since the voluntary departure
of the troops of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, whose
efforts and sacrifices had significantly contributed to restore peace,
security and to safeguard the unity of that troubled sister-country
and to safeguard the unity of the people and territorial integrity of
Chad;
Faced with the danger of destruction of the territorial
integrity of that country, we solemnly invite all African states to
exert all possible efforts to put an end to the blood-shed and strife
in Chad, and to find a lasting solution to the problem of Chad in
order to achive the unity and stability of the people of Chad;
We affirm our support to the Lagos Accord on national
reconciliation in Chad and condemn any faction signatory to this
agreement which may seize power in a way that would disturb the peace
and security of the country.
Source: Africa Contemporary Record, Holmes and Neier publishers,
New York and London, Vb1.15, 1982-83, pp.C3-C6.
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APPENDIX XVI 
OAU Tripoli Meetings: Record of Member-States 
Algeria	 Supported seating SADR.
Angola	 Supported seating SADR; appointed to liaison
committee to arrange third attempt.
Benin	 Supported seating SADR
Botswana
	 Supported seating SADR
Burundi	 Supported seating SADR.
Cameroon	 Opposed seating SADR, attended Tripoli II,
walked out after compromise.
Cape Verde
	 Supported seating SADR.
Central African Rep.
	 Supported seating SADR, did not attend final
session of Tripoli 1, attended Tripoli 2;
walked out after compromise.
Chad	 Both supported seating SADR; both delegations
arrived for summit; HabrO did not accept the
compromise, was not seated.
Comoros	 Opposed seating SADR; declined to join
Tripoli 2 after compromise.
Congo	 Supported seating SADR; member of liaison
committee for Tripoli 2; appointed to liaison
committee to arrange third attempt.
Djibouti	 Opposed seating SADR, attended Tripoli 1 until
5 August; attended Tripoli 2; walked out after
compromise.
Egypt	 Refused to attend summit in Tripoli.
Eq Guinea	 Opposed seating SADR; attended Tripoli 2,
walked out after compromise.
Ethiopia	 Supported seating SADR; appointed to liaison
committee to arrange third attempt.
Gabon
	 Opposed seating SADR; attended Tripoli 2,
walked out after compromise.
Gambia	 Opposed seating SADR; attended Tripoli 2,
walked out after compromise.
Ghana	 Supported seating SADR.
Guinea
	 Opposed seating SADR; attended Tripoli 2,
walked out after comprise.
Guinea-Bissau	 Supported seating SADR.
Ivory Coast	 Opposed seating SADR; attended Tripoli 2,
walked out after compromise.
Kenya
	 Opposed seating SADR, did not attend final
session of Tripoli 1; Daniel arap Mbi, the
outgoing chairman, opposed the Chad
compromise, but called upon all African states
to attend the summit; member of liaison
committee for Tripoli 2; appointed to liaison
committee to arrange third attempt. .
Lesotho
	 Supported seating SADR, did not attend final
session of Tripoli 1; appointed to liaison
committee to arrange third attempt.
Liberia
	 Opposed seating SADR
Libya
	 President Quadhafi, slated to become the new
OAU chairman, insisted upon Chad compromise,
supported Goukouni Weddeye's GUNT regime;
member of liaison committee for Tripli 2,
appointed to liaison committee to arrange
third attempt.
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Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Mauritius
Morocco
Mozambique
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
Sao Tome et Principe
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierre Leone
Somalia
Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Tunisia
Uganda
Upper Volta
Western Sahara
Zaire
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Supported seating SADR.
Supported seating SADR.
Supported seating SADR; member of liaison
committee for . Tripoli 2, appointed to liaison
committee to arrange third attempt.
Supported seating SADR.
Supported seating SADR.
Opposed seating SADR; attended Tripoli 2,
walked out after compromise.
Supported seating SADR; member of liaison
committee for Tripoli 2, appointed to liaison
committee to arrange third attempt.
Attended Tripoli 1 through July, opposed
seating SADR; attended Tripoli 2, walked out
after compromise.
Opposed seating SADR, did not attend final
session of Tripoli 1; appointed to liaison
committee to arrange third attempt.
Supported seating SADR.
Supported seating SADR.
Opposed seating SADR; attended Tripoli 2,
walked out after compromise.
• Supported seating SADR.
Opposed seating SADR.
Refused to attendsummit in Tripoli.
Opposed seating SADR; on October 24,. President
Numeiry stated that Sudan and Egypt would
welcome an African summit provided it was not
held in Tripoli.
Supported seating SADR, did not attend final
session of Tripoli 1
Supported seating SADR; appointed to liaison
committee to arrange third attempt.
Supported seating SADR, did not attend final
session of Tripoli 1; attended Tripoli 2,
walked out after compromise.
Opposed seating SADAR
Arrived in Tripoli in August, attended final
session of Tripoli 1; appointed to liaison
committee to arrange third attempt.
Opposed seating SADR; unable to send
delegation to Tripoli 2 because of coup in
October.
Seated as member of OAU at Tripoli 1; agreed
to pull out of OAU temporarily 30 October.
Opposed seating SADR; attended Tripoli 2,
walked out after compromise.
Supported seating SADR; appointed to liaison
committee to arrange third attempt.
Supported seating SADR.
Source: Africa Contemporary Record, Holmes and Meier publishers,
New York and London, VO1.15, 1982/83, pp.C10-C11.
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APPENDIX XVII (A) 
The Organisation of African Unity 
Selected resolutions adopted by the Nineteenth Assembly of 
Heads of State and Government, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 
(6-12 June 1983) 
(a)	 Western Sahara 
The OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government... Having
examined the Report of the Implementation Committee of Heads of State
on Western Sahara; recalling the solemn commitment made by His Majesty
King Hassan II during the 18th Summit t6 accept the holding of a
referendum in the Western Sahara to enable the people of that
territory to exercise their right to self-determination; recalling
with appreciation, His Majesty King Hassan's acceptance of the
Recommendation of the Sixth Session of the Ad Hoc Committee of Heads
of State on Western Sahara contained in Document AHQ/103 (XVTII1 B
Annex 1, as well as his pledge to cooperate with the Ad Hoc Committee
in the search for a just, peaceful and lasting solution; reaffirming
its previous Resolutions and Decisions on the Question of Western
Sahara, and in particular AHGAZes. 103 (XVIII) of 27 June 1981:
1. Takes note of the Reports of the Implementation Committee of
Heads of State on Western Sahara;
2. Urges the parties to the conflict, the Kingdom of Morocco
and the Polisario Front, to undertake direct negotiations with a view
to bringing about a ceasefire to create the necessary condition for a
peaceful and fair referendum for self-determination of the people of
Western Sahara, a referendum without any administrative or military
constraints, under the auspices of the OAU and the UN and calls on the
Implementation Committee to ensure the observance of the ceasefire;
3. Directs the Implementation Committee to meet as soon as
possible, and in collaboration with the parties to the conflict should
continue to work out the modalities and all other details relevant to
the implementation of the ceasefire and the conduct of the referendum
in December 1983;
4. Requests the UN, in conjunction with the OAU, to provide a
Peacekeeping Force to be stationed in Western Sahara to ensure peace
and security during the organisation and conduct of the referendum;
5. Mandates the Implementation Committee, with the
participation of the UN, to take all necessary measures to ensure the •
proper implementation of this resolution;
6. Requests the Implementation Committee to report to the 20th
Assembly of Heads of State and Government on the result of the
Referendum With a view to enabling the 20th Summit to reach a final
decision on all aspects of the question of the Western Sahara;
9.	 Welcomes the constructive attitude of the Sahrawi leaders in
making it possible for the 19th Summit to meet by withdrawing from it
voluntarily and temporarily.
Source: Africa Contemporary Record, Holmes and Meier publishers,
New York and London, VO1.16, 1983-84, PC3.
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APPENDIX XVII (B) 
The Organisation of African Unity 
Selected resolutions adopted by the Nineteenth Assembly
of Heads of State and Government, Addid Ababa, Ethiopia 
(6-12 June 1983) 
(b)	 On Chad/Libya Dispute AHG/Res.106 (XIX) 
The OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government... having
heard the statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation
of Chad on the worsening situation between his country and the
Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya regarding the Tibesti
Region; recalling decision AHVDec.109 (XIX) relating to the
settlement of intra-African disputes; reaffirming decision AHG/Dec.108
(XIV) on the setting up of an Ad Hoc Mediation Committee on Chad/Libya
dispute; noting that the Security Council, which had been seized with
Chad's complaint regarding this dispute, has referred the matter to
the CAU, requesting it to find ways and means of resolving it through
its appropriate machineries; gravely concerned by the serious tension
characterising the relations between the two sister-states of Chad and
the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya:
1. Takes note of the statement made by the Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Cooperation of Chad;
2. Urgently requests the two parties to refrain from any action
likely to further worsen the present situation;
3. Calls upon the Ad Hoc Mediation Committee to pursue its
activities with a view to finding, as early as possible, ways and
means of settling this dispute;
4. Appeals to the two parties to cooperate sincerely and
faithfully with the Ad Hoc Committee in a manner as to enable it to
accomplish its mission;
5. Requests the Ad Hoc Committee to report to the next session
of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the CAU.
Souce: Africa Contemporary Record, Holmes and Meier publishers,
New York and London, Vol.16, 1983-84, p.C4.
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APPENDIX XVIII 
The December 1975 Hassi Massaoud Joint Communique Between Presidents, 
Houari Boumedienne of Algeria and Muammar Kadhafi of Libya 
"L'escalade des defis auxquels se trouve confrontee la
nation Arabe au Machrek et au Maghreb impose plus que jamais aux deux
directions revolutionaires la necessite d'assumer pleinement et en
commun leurs responsabilites a l'echelle de la nation Arabe dans sa
vocation unitaire et pour le . progres... Les deux directions sont
convenues, par ailleurs, de faire front tous les dens, quelle qu'en
soit la nature et ou qu'ils se situent... "Toute atteinte port& a
l'une des deux revolutions sera consider& par l'autre comme une
atteinte contre elle"... "La communaute ineluctable de destin des
peuples freres d'Algerie et de Libye, l'identite de leurs options
revolutionaires ainsi que les facteurs evidents de complementarite
entre les deux pays ont determine les directions revolutionaires
respectives a intensifier leurs efforts dans une action perserverante
en vue d'etablir, d'une maniere rigoureuse, des liens organiques
adequats entre les dux pays. Ces liens seront renforces de telle
sorte qu'ils se situent au niveau des aspirations legitimes des deux
pays freres et de toute la nation Arabe dans la voie de l'unite et de
la liberation."
Source: Le Monde, Paris, December 31, 1975, p.2.
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APPENDIX XIX 
Fusion tuniso-libyenne 
The Djerba Declaration of January 12, 1974, Read by M Mohammed 
Masmoudi (Tunisia's Foreign Minister) 
Au nom de Dieu Clement et Misericordieux,
A une heure decisive, a un moment ou les defis se
multiplient, en un jour dont le souvenir sera imperissable, conscient
du poids des responsabilites historiques qui lui incombent,
Le Combattant Supreme, repondant a l'appel en faveur de
l'unite arabe, appel aussi pressasnt que celui en faveur de la lutte
pour la liberation des territoires arabes et musulmans, a signe avec
le Colonel Muammar Quaddhafi la proclamation de l'Union de la TUnisie
et de la Libye Arabes sur la base des principes constitutionnels en
vigueur dans chacun des deux pays.
Les deux pays constitueront une seule Republique qui prendra
le nom de "Republique Arabe Islamique". Elle aura une seule
constitution, un seul drappaeu, un seul president, une seule armee,
les memes pouvoirs legislatif, executif et judiciare.
Un referendum sur l'union aura lieu le 18 Janvier 1974.
Signe: Habib Bourguiba - Muammar Quaddhafi
Source: Annuaire de L'Affrique du Nord (AAN), Vb1.13, CNRS, Paris,
1974, p.742.
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APPENDIX XX 
Traite de Fraternite et de Concorde 
La Republique algerienne democratique et populaire et
La Republique tunisienne,
Ayant foi en leur communaute de destin dans la cadre du
Grand Maghreb Arabe conscientes de leur appartenance au Monde Arabe et
Islamique, au continent africain et de la necessite de renforcer les
liens de reapprochement et de solidarite entre les deux Peuples
Freres,
Desireuses de renforcer la stabilite et la securite dans la
region du Grand Maghreb Arabe et dans le monde.
Convaincues de contribuer ainsi a la consolidation des
relations de voisinage positives et de cooperation fraternelle
existantes entre les pays du Grand Maghreb Arabe,
Resolues a oeuvrer, en commun, pour un developpement
domplementaire et global de leurs deux societes repondant ainsi aux
aspirations de leurs deuX peuples vers la progres et la prosperite,
Se fondant sur le traite de fraternite, de bon voisinage et
de cooperation, signe a Tunis le 6 Janvier 1970,
Determinees a conjuguer leurs efforts pour le renforcement
de la justice, de la paix de la securite et de la coexistence
pacifique dans le monde et a poursuivre leur action pour le respect de
l'application des principes des Nations Utiles, de l'OUA et de la Ligue
Arabe,
Convaincues qu'un traite de fraternite et de concorde
implique necessairement le reglement de tout differend pouvant surgir
entre elles par des moyens pacifiques, conformement aux principes de
la Charte des Nations unies,
Sont convenues des dispositions suivantes:
Article ler
En vue de renforcer entre le deux pays les relations
pacifiques, fraternelles et de bon voisinage, fondees sur leur
appartenance au Grand Maghreb Arabe et cur leur communaute de destin
ainsi que cur le respect des principes de la souverainete nationale,
de l'egalite des droits des peuples et de leur droit a disposer
d'eux-memes, les hautes parties contractantes s'engagent a oeuvrer
continuellement pour le maintien de la paix et de la securite entre
elles et, d'une facon generale, entre tous les pays du Grand Maghreb
Arabe.
Article 2 
Les hautes parties contractantes s'engagent a s'abstenir de
recourir a la menace ou a l'emploi de la force pour regler les
differends qui pourraient surgir entre elles, compte tenu de
l'authenticite des liens historiques qui unissent les deux peuples, en
vue du preserver une cooperation fraternelle et fructueuses et de
maintenir entre elles une paix permanente basee'sur le respect mutuel
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de l'integrite territoriale, de l'intangibilite de leurs frontieres
nationales, de la souverainete et de l'independance politique de
chacune d'elles.
Elles s'engagent egalement a resoudre les differends qui
pourraient surgir entre elles par la voie de la concertation, de la
negociation ou par tout autre voie pacifique.
Article 3 
Chacune des hautes parties contractantes s'engage a
n'adherer a aucune alliance ou coalition de caractere militaire ou
politique avec un ou plusieurs etats tiers dirigee contre
l'independance politique, l'integrite territoriale ou la securite de
l'autre partie contractante.
Chacune des hautes parties s'engage a ne tolerer, sur son
territoire, aucune initiative ou acte decoulant d'une attitude histile
adoptee par un ou plusieurs autres Etats tiers contre l'une d'entre
elles.
Article 4 
Les hautes parties contractantes s'engagent a ne pas
tolerer, sur leur territoire, l'organisation et l'activite de
groupements qui attenteraient a la securite et a l'integrite
territoriale de l'autre partie ou tenteraient par la violence de
changer son regime.
Article 5 
Chacune des hautes parties contractantes conserve sa pleine
liberte d'action pour conclure avec des Etats tiers tout accord qui ne
serait pas contraire aux dispositions du present traite.
Article 6 
Le present traite demeurera ouvert a l'adhesion, avec
l'accord des hautes parties contractantes, aux autres Etats du Grand
Maghreb Arabe qui en accepteraient les dispositions.
Article 7 
Le present traite sera valable pour une duree de vingt ans.
Ii sera ratifie conformement aux procedures constitutionnelles en
vigueur dans chacune des hautes parties contractantes. Ii entrera en
vigueur a la data de l'echange des instruments de ratification.
A l'expiration de la periode de vingt ans, le present traite
sera renouvele, par tacite reconduction et pour une meme duree, a
moms que l'une des hautes parties contractantes ne le denonce, par
ecrit, un an au moms, avant la date d'expiration de la periode en
cours.
Le present traite est etabli en deux exemplaires originaux,
en langue arabe, le deux textes faisant egalement foi.
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Fait a Tunis, le 4 joumada II 1403 correspondant au 19 Mars
1983.
P la Republique	 P la Republique
Algerienne democratique
	 tusienne
et populaire
Chadli BENDJEDID	 Habib BCURGUIBA
Source: ANNUAIRE DE L'Afrique Du Nord (MN), CNRS, Vol. 22, Paris,
1983, pp.694-95.
673
APPENDIX XXI 
Libya-Morocco 
Text of the Libyan-Moroccan federation agreement signed at 
a meeting between King Hassan of Morocco and Col. 9adhafi of 
Libya at Oujda, Morocco (13 August 1984) 
In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate. The
Kingdom of Morocco and the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah,
out of their realisation of the dangers threatening the Arab nation
and the Islamic world in general and usurped Palestine and Jerusalem
in particular as a result of the policy of violence and agl-ession
which the Zionists have been practising, flouting the sanctions of
Islam and violating the rights of Muslims and Arabs, after coming to
cherish wrongdoing and have been blinded by arrogance, so that they no
longer paid any attention to the principles and high ideas on which
the international order is founded, nor to the resolutions adopted by
international organisations and conferences at every level;
And out of their feeling that the checking of these
threatening dangers against the Arab nation and the Islamic world
headed by Palestine and Jerusalem requires a unification of outlook
and determination and the pooling of efforts to check agression,
establish the rights and safeguard the interests of Arabs and Muslims
and defend their right to existence and dignity;
And out of their belief that the adoption of this course
will act as a decisive factor in giving the Arab nation and the
Islamic world the opportunity to regain their past glory and secure
the appropriate position compatible with their glorious religion;
And devoting their efforts to lifting their peoples and
prepare them to enter the 21st century equipped with all the things
that would enable them to occupy a prominent position among those who
are advanced in the fields of science, technology and all other fields
of human culture and civilisation;
And in consideration of the obstacles standing in the way of
Arab unity, as has been revealed by past experience, and in
consideration also of what wisdom dictates on the need to learn
lessons from setbacks which were actually the result of disregarding
obstacles, and what widsom demands in the way of persistent and
continued work to achieve the desired goal gradually and without
haste, improvisation in implementation;
And out of their feeling in particular of the strong bonds
that bind the peoples of the Arab Maghrib together - bonds based on
their common geography, history, religion, language knowledge and
cultural aspects;
And in consideration of the aspiration of these peoples and
their leaders, since long ago, to establish unity that would bolster
the bonds among them, based on the unity of destiny and dialogue, and
which would lead them towards a complementary unit of considerable
weight politically and economically among the advanced peoples of the
world, particularly in the community of the Mediterranean basin
countries, who - irrespective of their individual characteristics -
share a cultural heritage which has its roots in common spiritual and
intellectual values;
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And out of their wish to respond to these aspirations and to
contribute towards the realisation of these aspirations in a manner
characterised with realism, moving them from the sphere of theorising
to the sphere of precise implementation, and out of their realisation
that the best way to achieve this lies in the creation of a federation
between them which would act as a springboard for the establishment of
wider institutions aimed at serving the unity of the Arab and Islamic
peoples and realising the dignity and strength they aspire to, since .
this federation would constitute a cornerstone of Arab Maghrib unity
and, consequently, an historic step towards achieving the unity of the
Arab nation, have agreed on the following:
Article 1: In accordance with this pact a federation that will
consist of the Kingdom of Morocco and the SPLAJ will be founded and
will be known as the Arab-African Federation.
Article 2: The Presidence will be the supreme body of the federation.
HM the King of Morocco and HE the Leader of the 1st September
revolution [Qadhafi] will exercise the presidency jointly, and in it
will be vested the authority to issue decisions.
Article 3: A general secretariat will be created under the authority
of the Presidency, the headquarters of which will alternate between
the two countries, the secretariat will have a permanent
representative in each of them. The federation's Secretary General
must be a citizen of the country where the headquarters of the general
secretariat is not situated, and the Assistant Secretary General must
belong to the other country. The term of office will be two years.
Article 4: The federation will have the following councils: (a)
political council; (b) defence council; (c) economic council; (d)
educational and technological activities council. These councils will
be composed, in accordance with the decision of the presidency, of
delegates from each of the two countries, and the number of
representatives from each country will be equal. The councils will
have a consultative role, and their tasks within their specialist
fields will be to study issues referred to them by the presidency,
propose solutions and prepare plans at the request of the presidency.
Article 5: The federation will have a federal body which will be
composed of members of the House of Representatives of the Kingdom of
Morocco and members of the General People's Congress of the SPLAJ.
The task of this body will be to put forward proposals to the
presidency regarding the strengthening of the federation and the
achievement of its objectives.
Article 6: The federation will have an executive committee composed
of the Council of Ministers of the Kingdom of Morocco and the General
People's Committee of the SPLAJ, whose task will be to execute and
follow up the presidency's decisions. The executive committee will
hold regular meetings in each country alternately.
Article 7: The federation will have a federal court to be formed by a
decision of the presidency. In the event of a dispute between the two
sides regarding the implementation or realisation of this pact, they
will have the right to submit their complaint to the court for
settlement. The rulings and opinions of the court will be final and
binding.
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Article 8: The federation will seek to strengthen ties of fraternity
between the two countries and their peoples, to work for the
advancement of the Arab nation and the defence of its rights, to
contribute to the maintenance of peace on the basis of the principles
of justice and harmony and characterised by continuity and stability,
pursuing a joint political policy in all spheres, to contribute to
uniting the Arab Maghrib and subsequently to achieving the unity of
the Arab nation.
Article 9: The joint policy referred to in the previous article is
aimed at achieving the following objectives: (a) In the international
field: to strengthen ties of fraternal amity between the two countries
and establish firm diplomatic cooperation between them; (b) In the
defence field: to maintain the independence of both countries; (c) in
the economic field; to work for the achievement of technical,
industrial, agricultural, commercial and social development in both
countries, and take all necessary steps to achieve that objective,
especially by creating joint institutions and preparing general or
specific economic programmes; (d) In the educational field: to
establish cooperation aimed at developing education at its various
levels, maintaining spiritual and moral values which adhere to Islamic
teachings, and preserving Arab national identity, and to adopt the
necessary measures to reach all those objectives, particularly by
exchanging lecturers and students and creating joint university,
educational and research institutions.
Article 10: The federation will have an administrative and a
development budget.
Article 11: Each country will accord absolute respect to the
sovereignty of the other country and will undertake not to interfere
in the other's internal affairs.
Article 12: Any agression directed against one of the countries will
be regarded as aggression against the other country.
Article 13: The federation will not prevent either of the
participating countries from signing agreements which are alike or
similar to the pact which it is based on; on the contrary, each of
them is permitted to sign such (? an agreement) with other countries.
Other countries belonging to the Arab nation or the African community
are permitted to join this pact and become members of the federation,
provided that the two sides consent to this.
Article 14: A special committee, whose members will be appointed by
the presidency [of the federation], will be responsible for presenting •
the regional draft agreements aimed at explaining the aforementioned
clauses. The aforementioned proposals will be submitted to the
presidency for consideration.
Article 15: A resident minister or secretary will represent the
interests of his country in the other country.
Article 16: The pact will come into force as soon as it is approved
by the people of the Kingdom of Morocco and the people of the SPLAJ,
through a referendum that will be held in accordance with the measures
in operation in each country.
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Issued at Oujda on August 13, 1984, signed by Hassan II, the
King of Morocco, Colonel Muammer Al Kadhah, Leader of the September
1st Revolution.
Source: Africa Contemporary Record, Holmes and Meier publishers,
New York and London, VO1.17, 1984/85, pp.C20-22.
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APPENDIX XXII 
Sommet des Chefs d'Etats arabes revolutionnaires
et progressistes (Tripoli, 2 au 5 decembre 1977)
(a)	 Communique Final 
Au nom de Dieu, clement et misericordieux,
A l'initiative du Colonel Mbammar Quaddhafi, un sommet arabe
s'est tenu a Tripoli, capitale de la Jamahiriya arabe libyenne
populaire et socialiste, entre les 22 et 25 Dhou El Hejja 1398 de
l'hegire, correspondant aux 2 et 5 decembre 1977 de l'ere chretienne.
Ce sommet a regroupe:
1. FL Houari Boumediene, President de la Republiqm Algerienne
Democratique et populaire;
2. FL Hafedh Al Assad, President de la Republique Arabe
Syr ienne.
3. M. le Colonel Mbammar Quaddhafi, Secretaire General du
Congres du Peuple de la Jamahiriya Arabe Libyenne Populaire et
Socialiste;
4. M. Abdelfattah Ismael, Secretaire General du Front National
de la Republique Democratique du Yemen;
5. M Taha Yassine Ramadan, representant du President de la
Republique Irakienne;
6. M Yasser Arafat, Chef du Comite executif de l'OLP et
commandant en chef des forces armees de la revolution palestinienne.
Avec tin set-is developpe des responsabilites nationales, et tin
haut degre de conscience, lea participants au sommet ont examine les
divers aspects de la situation qui prevaut actuallement dans la region
arabe, et les circonstances que traverse la cause prevaut actuellement
dans la region arabe, et les circonstances que traverse la cause
palestinienne en particulier.
Les responsables arabes ont egalement analyse les
conspirations tramees par lea imperialistes et les sionistes contre la
Nation Arabe.
Ces conspirations ont pour but d'imposer aux masses
palestiniennes et arabes des solutions defaitistes qui font - fi des
droits nationaux du peuple palestinien, qui liquident lea acquis
revolutionnaires dans la patrie arabe et devoient lea mouvements
arabes de liberation nationale. Ces solutions ne seraient evidemment
qu'un prelude permettant aux ennemis de la Nation arabe de soumettre
toute la region et de la laisser a la traine de l'imperialism.
Le sommet de Tripoli a egalement etudie la signification et
la port& de la visite effectuee par le President Sadate en Palestine
occupee. Cette visite, pour les chefs des Etats arabes progressistes,
n'etait que l'un des volets du vaste complot frame par lea ennemis de
la Nation arabe. Les consequences de ce pas accompli par Sadate sot-it
certes graves. Cette visite eat en effet, tine atteinte grave aux
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aspirations des massases arabe, et une trahison envers le Mouvement de
Liberation Nationale qui mene un lutte ardue contre le sionism. C'est
egalement une braderie des droits nationaux du peuple palestinien, et
une exclusion de l'Egypte du front de la lutte arabe anti-imperialiste
et anti-sioniste. En consequence, les participants au sommet de
Tripoli accusent le President Egyptien de haute trahison. Son
initiative a ete un service inappreciable rendu a ses maitres
imperialistes et a ses nouveaux maitres sionistes. Sadate a torpille
dangereusement la solidarite arabe, en voulant cyniquement la charte
de la ligue arabe, ainsi que le decisions des precedents sommets
arabes, pardessus tout. La visite effectuee par Sadate en Palestine
occupee a ete une reconnaissance de fait de l'entite sioniste, et une
consolidation de l'existence de cette citadelle de l'imperialisme dens
la region.
Tirant les conclusions de l'analyse a laquelle ils ont
procede, les participants au sommet ont ainsi classe les buts de la
conspiration tramee actuellement contre la Nation arabe.
1. Rendre impossible toute paix qui pourrait etre juste et
honorable, en sauvegardant les droits legitimes de la Nation arabe et
du peuple palestinien, et permettre la liberation des territoires
arabes occupes par les sionistes, en premier lieu Al Quds.
2. Couper la Nation arabe des Pays africains qui ont adopte une
attitude juste et courageuse en faveur de la cause arabe, et devoile
parallelement, les liens organiques qui lient l'entite sioniste aux
regimes racistes implantes au sud du continent africain.
3. Couper la Nation arabe des pays non-alignes et des pays
musulmans qui ont toujours appuye la cause arabe et soutenu la juste
lutte du peuple palestinien.
4. Causer du tort aux liens de cooperation et d'amitie qui
unissent les pays arabes a l'Union Sovietique et a l'ensemble des pays
du bloc socialiste, parce que l'URSS et les pays du Pacte de Varsovie
ont accorde un soutien inestimable a la Nation arabe dens sa lutte
contre l'ennemi imperialo-sioniste.
5. Permettre aux ennemis de la Nation arabe, et a leur tete,
les Etats-Unis, de s'assurer des acquis considerables qui les
rendraient a meme de renverser l'equilibre des forces en faveur des
imperialo-sionistes et de mettre en danger l'independance nationale
des pays d'Afrique, d'Asie et d'Amerique latine.
6. Instaurer un systeme d'alliance entre les sionistes et le
regime egyptien en place actuallement. Le but de cette alliance este
la liquidation de la cause palestinnienne et de la cause arabe en
general. L'atomisation des efforts deployes par la Nation arabe, et
la braderie des interets nationaux.
Conscients du grave danger que representent les
conspirations imperialo-sionistes qui visent a affaiblir le mouvement
de liberation arabe, et a sealer le decouragement et le defaitisme.
Sachant parfaitement que ces conspirations n'ont pour autre
but que de liquider les droits nationaux du peuple palestinien, et
surtout son droit a retourner dens sa patrie et a y elever un Etat
Independent comprenant tout le territoire national, sous direction de
l'OLP, seul reprêsentant legitime de ce peuple.
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Sachant que les droits du peuple palestinien ont ete
reconnus comme legitimes et inalienables par l'ensemble de la
communaute internationale.
Les participants au sommet, mus par la grande responsibilite
historique qui leur incombe dans ces circonstances criqiques, decident
ce qui suit:
1. La condamnation de la visite effectuee par le President
Egyptien en Palestine occupee; les participants au sommet, tout en
estimant a sa juste valeur le role important joue par le peuple
egyptien frere dans la lutte arabe pour la liberation nationale,
savent que l'Egypte n'est tout de meme pas la clef de toute solution
dans la region, et que, Si la Nation arabe est renforcee par le poids
de l'Egypte, le pays ne peut etre fort que s'il reste dans le cadre de
la Nation arabe, sinon son role et son poids ne peuvent qu'etre
affaiblis.
2. Le deploiement des efforts necessaires pour eliminer les
consequences dangereuses engendrees par la visite du traitre Sadate en
Palestine occupee et des pourparlers que le President Egyptien a eus
avec le dirigeants sionistes, ainsi ape toutes les initiatives
decidees au lendemain de cette visite et de ces pourparlers. Les
participants au sommet mettent en garde tous ceux qui seraient tenths
d'emprunter la meme voie que le President Egyptien et de se laisser
entrainer par ses demarches, car leur responsibilite devant l'histoire
et devant la Nation arabe sera grande.
3. Le gel des relations politiques et diplomatiques avec le
gouvernement egyptien et l'arret de toute forme d'èdhange avec ce
gouvernement, sur le plan arabe et international, ainsi que
l'application des mesures de boycott arabe contre toute personne,
toute societe ou toute institution egyptienne qui traiterait avec
l'ennemi sioniste.
4. Le boycott de tout reunion de la Ligue arabe qui se
tiendrait en Egypte. Les participants au sommet decident egalement de
prendre les contacts necessaires avec les pays de la Ligue arabe pour
etudier avec eux le probleme du siege de la Ligue, des organisations
qui dependent de la Ligue et le probleme pose par l'appartenance de
l'Egypte Sadatienne a cette organisation.
5. Les participants au sommet saluent fraternellement le peuple
arabe palestinien qui lutte avec courage et determination dans le
territoires =napes, guide par ses organisations patriotiques et
populaires qui ont unanimement condamne la visite du traitre Sadate en
Palestine occupee.
Les participants au sommet resteront touj ours vigilants pour
denoncer energiquement toute tentative visant a remettre en cause la
legitimite de l'OLP en tant ape seul representant du peuple
palestinien.
6. Les participants au sommet enregistrent avec satisfaction
les premieres reactions de certains pays arabes qui se sont eleves
contre la visite-trahison. us demandent a ces pays de prendre les
mesures pratiques necessaires pout faire face aux dangers de la
politique defaitiste et capitularde menee dans la region. Line des
premieres measures a prendre est la suspension de toute aid financiere
et de toute assistance politique a l'Egypte sadatienne. Les
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participants au sommet denoncent, par contre, les attitudes de ceux
qui ont ose magnifier la visite du President Sadate, ou la soutenir.
us les mettent en garde contre les consequences desastreuses qu'une
telle politique pourrait leur valoir.
7. Les participants au sonnet demandent aux organisations
officielles et populaires arabes d'accorder leur soutien economique,
politique, militaire et financier a la Republique Arabe Syrienne,
etant donne que la Syrie est devenue le principal pays du front et la
principale citadelle d'ou la Nation arabe pourra continuer a resister
face a l'ennemi. La meme aid doit etre fournie au peuple palestinien
represente par l'OLP.
8. Les participants au sommet saluent le peuple arabe egyptien
frere, et surtout ses forces patriotiques et progressistes qui
ref usent la politique defaitiste et capitularde de Sadate. Cette
politique qui est une veritable injure a la memoire des martyrs du
peuple egyptien est une atteinte grave aux vaillantes forces armees
egyptiennes.
9. Conscients de l'importance des liens militants entre les
forces syriennes et les forces palest iniennes, la Republique Arabe
Syrienne et POLP ont decide d'instaurer un front de lutte unissant
les deux parties pour rendre plus efficace la lutte contre l'ennemi
sioniste et pour dejouer les complots transe  par l'imperialisme. La
Republique Algerienne Democratique et Populaire, le Jamahiriya et le
Yemen démocratique ont decide de se joindre a ce front qui petit etre
considere come le noyau d'un large front arabe pour la resistence et
la lutte. Ce front reste ouvert a tous le autres pays arabes qui
peuvent decider de s'y joindre a tout moment.
10. Les membres de ce front national considereront toute
agress ion dont serait victime l'un d'eux come une agression contre
l'ensemble du front.
Les participants au Contres, tout en s'engageant
sollennellement aupres de la Nation arabe a continuer la lutte et a
rester toujours fideles aux aspirations des masses arabes, affirment
que la Nation arabe - cette Nation qui declenche maintes revolutions
victorieuses, qui a su vaincre les obstacles les plus difficiles, tout
au long d'une longue histoire jalonnee par des actes militants en
heroiques qui suscitent 1' admiration - est aujourd'hui capable de
repondre energiquement a tous see ennemis et de liberer definitivement
des imperialistes et des renegats qui ont trahi see valeurs et sa
cause sacree. Les chefs des Etats arabes progressistes sont
absolument convaincus que, grace a Dieu, cette Nation est capable
d'aller de 1' avant dans le chemin du progres, justqu'a la victoire
finale.
Ehfin, lee participants au Cbngres apprennent avec
satisfaction que lee combattants palestiniens ont decide de s' unifier
dans le cadre et sous l i egide de l'OLP.
Source: Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord, CNRS, Paris, VO1.16, 1977,
pp.913-16.
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